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The Proto-Totalitarian State: Punishment and Control in Absolutist Regimes
Totalitarian rule is commonly thought to derive from spe- cific ideologies that justify the complete control by the state of social, cultural, and political institutions. The major goal of this volume is to demonstrate that in some cases brutal forms of state control have been the only way to maintain basic social order.Dmitry Shlapentokh seeks to show that totalitarian or semi-totalitarian regimes have their roots in a fear of disorder that may overtake both rulers and the society at large. Although ideology has played an important role in many totalitarian regimes, it has not always been the chief reason for repression. In many cases, the desire to establish order led to internal terror and intrusiveness in all aspects of human life.Shlapentokh seeks the roots of this phenomenon in France in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries, when asocial processes in the wake of the Hundred Years War led to the emergence of a brutal absolutist state whose features and policies bore a striking resemblance to totalitarian regimes in the Soviet Union and China. State punishment and control allowed for relentless drive to "normalize" society with the state actively engaged in the regulation of social life. There were attempts to regulate the economy and instances of social engineering, attempts to populate emerging colonial empires with exiles and produce "new men and women" through reeducation. This increased harshness in dealing with the populace, in fact, the emergence of a new sort of bondage, was combined with a twisted form of humanitarianism and the creation of a rudimentary safety net. Some of these elements can be found in the democratic societies of the modern West, although in their aggregation these attributes are essential features of totalitarian regimes of the modem era.
174 pages, Kindle Edition
First published June 7, 2007
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August 11, 2022
"The major goal of our work is to prove that in some cases brutal totalitarian regimes, or at leas regimes with significant totalitarian attributes, have been the only way to maintain basic social order. Moreover, we intend to show that these totalitarian or semi-totalitarian regimes (those with attributes of a totalitarian society) were not the product of 'discourse', a wrong ideology that somehow took over the elite and the rest of society as well. Althought ideology plays an important role in many totalitarian regimes, it was hardly the chief reason for the existence of controlling or repressive systems. Maintaining basic order is one of the most important, if not the important tasts of the elite in all societies; the interaction between the elite and the rest of society and the elite's response to the needs of society are the most important variables. For example, in fourteenth- though sixteenth-century France, when the general meltdown of the entire society was based on asocial behavior that affected all groups and all aspects of their interactions - from social to sexual to the way people disposed of their waste. In this situation, the state, engaging in 'normalizing' society, confronted the entire society and acquired distinctly totaliarian features in the process."
"This work will argue that this essential aspect of the activities of totalitarian or semi-totalitarian states has been obscured in modern thouht, especially Anglo-American thought, which almost always takes for granted that the majority are part of this or that social group and that asocial behaviors are the actions of a few marginalized individuals. This is the reason why many social scientists reduce the rise of modern totalitarian regmes to the influence of 'wrong' ideologies. I will argue that not ideology but social conditions led to the rise of totalitarian governments and that the interaction between these states and society must be examined closely. The interaction must not be perceived in the traditional Marxist sense. For Marx, the state, while employing violence (in fact, he saw violence as an essential part of the state), did so mostly in the name of the ruling class; in effect, he saw the state as the tool of the ruling elite."
"This approach is challenged here. Totalitarian and semi-totalitarian states confronted not only the lower classes, but all socioeconomic levels of the societies they ruled. This was done not because of the 'discursive' drive for power, ideological obsessions, the internal logical of the development of the state apparatus, or even the need to mobilize state resources for foreign adventures, although all these variables must be taken into account, but because the society could not hold together on its own."
"A certain amount of control and repressiveness is essential for the functioning of all societies, but it is especially crucial during certain periods of history, in certain places. At times a strong government with an assortment of repressive measures is the only way a society can survive. But why is the importance of the need for the state to take repressive/controlling actions marginalized or ignored in social science? Why is ideology/culture, lust for power and material benefits of power, or drive for imperial aggrandizement often given as the explanatory model of authoritarian/totalitarian governments?"
"The major reason, of course, is that Western societies are not in danger of being overwhelmed by criminalized anarchy, cases of criminal behavior notwithstanding. Thus, the important of the asocial process in shaping the historical process was already lost sight of by the ninteenth century. Ninteenth-century sociology would downplay the role of asocial processes in the social process. Although sociologists would elaborate on conflicts, in almost all cases they detailed the conflicts as between various social, political, and ethnic groups or between the state and these groups. Nineteenth-century sociology would basically ignore conflict between the state, which in some cases stayed outside the social interplay, and its criminal elements - the society of anomies. Moreover the notion of society as an aggregation of anomies would be seen as a contradiction in terms."
"Indeed the notion of society implied the cohesiveness of various groups. In this arrangement, asocial elements and processes (elements that would be in opposition to the entire society) would be marginalized. This would especially be the case with Anglo-Saxon sociological traditions, which took as axiomatic the notion that each individual, with few exceptions, was attached to one group or another. These notions would come to dominate twentieth-century sociology, especially American sociology."
"Thus, the major reason for modern sociology to ignore or marginalize the role of asocial processes (necessitating a strong/repressive government) in shaping major historical events is the fact that these conditions (situations where criminality threatened the very existence of the society) have not been part of the historical picture in the West for centuries."
"Consequently, modern social scientists generally fail to understand the role of controlling/repressive elements and the importance of order, in the holistic meaning of the word, for society. Order and a strong repressive aspect of the society/state are mostly seen as caused by the desires of the elite to maintain power or as a product of ideological drivesl this last explanation is most important in our case."
"Indeedn, while there are many explanations of the emergence on the modern totalitarian society, the most popular is that its rise is due to the spread of certain ideologies. This notion developed in the course of post-World War II history and obscured many other roles for totalitarian regimes, including their repressive policies as being the only way to maintain basic order. Due to the importance of this notion and its spell over many explanatory models of totalitarian regimes, it is critical to see how it emerged and changed. At the same time, we shall look beyond the discursive model to see the real causes on the rise of repressive/controlling aspects of totalitarian regimes, for it is clear that no one theory can explain the rise of all totalitarian regimes."
"Thus, the goal of this book can be condensed to the following. It is most important to discard the notion of the totalitarian system as 'discourse', a concept that dominated intellectual thought. Most pundits have visualized the totalitarian regime as the product of an ideology that the ruling elite imposed upon the helpless society. These visions of the regimes ignore their essential roles in the development of society, for example, the totalitarian state's role in economic development or upgrading the military potential of the country. These essential roles are either discarded or marginalized. It also goes without saying the vision of the totalitarian state as the product of a artificial quasi-religious ideology provides no room for the role of these regimes in maintaining basic order. In fact, the assumption that at times a repressive government is essential for the maintenance of basic order was rejected not only by the conservatives who rallied against the Soviet and Chinese totalitarian regimes, but also by the liberals and the Left, who often discarded the term of 'totalitarian regime' itself."
"In their view, repressive external control is absolutely not needed, and the citizens, upon being liberated from the controlling and repressive power of totalitarian regimes, can easily control their asocial drives. It was assumed in this context that asocial drives are marginal, for the great majority of the people are part of this or that self-policed cohesive social group. Basic order and security are a given."
"Only recently has the situation started to change. Russian intellectuals have been in the vanguard. Many of them were horrified by the criminal anarchy that overwhelmed post-Soviet Russia, and some started to look favorable toward the time of the repressive Soviet regime, which is beginning to be appreciated for its stability and comparative security. In this vision, the asocial drives that grip post-Soviet Russia are seen as more dangerous than the repression during the Soviet era."
"Of course, the views of these Russian intellectuals were marginalized and dismissed as the manifestation of their reactionary ideology, not only in FRussia but also outside its borders. Their view was thought of as absolutely irrelevant to the West in general and the U.S. in particular. Yet the situation started to change since September 11, 2001 and the events that have unfolded afterward. For first time in history, Americans fear for their personal safety, a fear shared by all segments of society."
"The asocial elements of society (criminals), or thsoe who can be seen as structurally similar to them (terrorists), have ceased to be a 'discourse' - the product of the intellectual interplay and arbitrary labelling of the ruling elite. Asocial groups, and the processes directly or indirectly connected with then, have become a real threat that has spilled into the international arena, supplanting the fear of a nuclear Armageddon with the USSR. There are various manifestations of this fear. There is the fear of the spread of weapons of mass destruction amount terrors and 'rogue' states. The chaos that emerged after the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime in Baghdad and American inability to stop it have implied that similar events are possible globally. This has created the sense that a strong state is necessary to maintain stability both inside and outside international borders."
"Although the threat to personal safety and the fear of anarchy in the beard sense have not entirely changed the view of repressive regimes, at least there is a visible new trend. Fear has challenged the assumption that asocial behavior and processes related to it are merely 'discourse', for instance, the motion that calling terrorists 'terrorists' is merely the manifestation of 'hegemonic discourse'. Conservative intellectuals continue to see the roots of terrorism in 'wrong' ideologies, in this case the spread of fundamentalist Islam, but some of their other basic assumptions have changed. They do not assume that the problem with terrorists can be solved so easily, as supposedly was the case with the Soviet regime when it was stated that simply laying bare the follies of the Soviet ideology would make the Soviet people similar to people in the West. In the case of Islamic terrorism, decisive actions would also be necessary. And these actions were indeed implemented ias the wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq show. However, these actions are not limited to external conflicts but also have direct implications for internal American life."
"There has been a dramatic increase of the power of the federal government and the new Department of the Homeland Security. There are apparent limits on constitutional liberties and some measures (eg. creation of the military tribunal) could be easily compared with the actions of a totalitarian government. While it is true that this government control has evoked a stream of critical articles, what would be called the 'silent majority' have not been very critical of these actions. One can assume that they do not mind the increase in governmental intrusiveness."
"Of course, one must state that intellectuals have not directly reconsidered the role of totalitarian governments, for example the Soviet regime, as a force that can provide security and stability. Yet they are obviously moving in this direction. It is thought, for example, that an empire (American empire in this case) can sometimes be regarded as a positive phenomenon, even if it involved rule over people against their wills. It is implied here that imperial presence is essential for stability. It is recognized that democracy does not always work, and that power might be imposed from above, as in the case of Iraq where democratic institutions could lead to the rise of a fundamentalist regime. All these intellectual trends provide the incentive for a reevaluation of the role of totalitarian regimes in non-modern and non-Western societies and case doubt on the theory of all totalitarian regimes as the product of ideology. The new conditions also require reevaluation of the role of some previous reimes' relationships to society."
"There is no double that ideology has played an important role in the historical process and that various ideological paradigms have occupied a central position in certain totalitarian regimes. Some of the actions of these regimes (eg. the Holocaust) cannot be understood in the context of the geopolitical rationale. In fact, they were counterproductive to the regime's stated goals - maintaining power and expansion of empire. Yet ideology often obscured the real roles of the regimes, which in some modifications have played an important role in the stability of society. In many ways their desire to establish order cause their internal terror and intrusiveness in all aspects of human life."
"To emphasize the importance of the fear of disorder but not the ideology in the formation of the totalitarian regime, I will focus attention on the late medieval/early modern France in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries. This case demonstrates how fear of disorder, of asocial processes, led to the emergence of a brutal absolutist state with features and policies strikingly similar to the totalitarian regimes in the USSR and China."
"This work deals with the totalitarian, or to be precise, the proto-totalitarian system as the product of the reality of fourteenth- through sixteenth-century Eirope in general and France in particular. France, like many countries in Europe, was in a process of asocial/political transformation that in many cases was nothing but a societal meltdown aggravated by the Hundred Years War."
"Asocial behavior spread to all segments of the society, in all forms, and led to the brutish response by the state. The range of punishment - its totality and cruelty - could well be compared with the actions of a totalitarian government. In its relentless drive to 'normalize' society, the state actively regulated social life and even more intimate aspects of the people's lives, including their sexual lives. There were drives for regulation of the economy and even some aspects of social engineering, for example, attempts to populate the emerging colonial empires with exiles and produce 'new men' and 'new women' through a 'reeducation' process that included hard physical labor and ideological indoctrination."
"This increase in harshness in dealing with the populace, in fact, the emergence of a new sort of bondage, was combined with a twisted humanitarianism and a rudimentary safety net. Taken separately these elements can can all be found in democratic societies of the modern West, although in aggregate they should be regarded as features of totalitarian regimes of the modern era and of other types of regimes such as Oriental despotism."
"The proto-totalitarian features in the early French monachy cannot be attributed to the nefarious influence of ideology. France's kings were not aware of any socialist doctrine. Moreover, capitalism was in an embryonic state. Thus, the influence of capitalist ideology with its spirit of 'control and punishment', as Foucault claims, should not be exaggerated. The role of the imperial drive for centralized power in the hands of the monarchy should not be exaggerated either. Indeed, France at that time was more preoccupied with sheer survival than with imperial aggrandizement..."
---
Dmitry Shalpentokh has presented an arresting alternative to standard views of the modern state. Rejecting theories which view ideology as central in the expansion of government, and developing a line of thought that owes much to Hobbes, he argues that the growth of state power in early times and in contemporary contexts can be understood as a defense against asocial processes of anarchic violence. A forceful challenge to conventional wisdom, The Proto-Totalitarian State should be read closely by historians, political theorists and anyone interested in the nature of power.
John Gray, London School of Economics
---
blurb
Totalitarian rule is commonly thought to derive from specific ideologies that justify the complete control by the state of social, cultural, and political institutions. The major goal of this volume is to demonstrate that in some cases brutal forms of state control have been the only way to maintain basic social order.
Dmitry Shlapentokh seeks to show that totalitarian or semi-totalitarian regimes have their roots in a fear of disorder that may overtake both rulers and the society at large.
Although ideology has played an important role in many totalitarian regimes, it has not always been the chief reason for repression.
In many cases, the desire to establish order led to internal terror and intrusiveness in all aspects of human life.
Shlapentokh seeks the roots of this phenomenon in France in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries, when asocial processes in the wake of the Hundred Years War led to the emergence of a brutal absolutist state whose features and policies bore a striking resemblance to totalitarian regimes in the Soviet Union and China.
State punishment and control allowed for relentless drive to "normalize" society with the state actively engaged in the regulation of social life. There were attempts to regulate the economy and instances of social engineering, attempts to populate emerging colonial empires with exiles and produce "new men and women" through reeducation. This increased harshness in dealing with the populace, in fact, the emergence of a new sort of bondage, was combined with a twisted form of humanitarianism and the creation of a rudimentary safety net.
Some of these elements can be found in the democratic societies of the modern West, although in their aggregation these attributes are essential features of totalitarian regimes of the modem era.
---
Dmitry Shlapentokh challenges three regnant schools of thought, that states are the product of elite design or war, that totalitarianism is the product of ideology or discourse, and that totalitarian states can only be modern entities. An iconoclast's delight and a major contribution to the theory of state formation.
Alexander J. Motyl, Rutgers University-Newark
"This work will argue that this essential aspect of the activities of totalitarian or semi-totalitarian states has been obscured in modern thouht, especially Anglo-American thought, which almost always takes for granted that the majority are part of this or that social group and that asocial behaviors are the actions of a few marginalized individuals. This is the reason why many social scientists reduce the rise of modern totalitarian regmes to the influence of 'wrong' ideologies. I will argue that not ideology but social conditions led to the rise of totalitarian governments and that the interaction between these states and society must be examined closely. The interaction must not be perceived in the traditional Marxist sense. For Marx, the state, while employing violence (in fact, he saw violence as an essential part of the state), did so mostly in the name of the ruling class; in effect, he saw the state as the tool of the ruling elite."
"This approach is challenged here. Totalitarian and semi-totalitarian states confronted not only the lower classes, but all socioeconomic levels of the societies they ruled. This was done not because of the 'discursive' drive for power, ideological obsessions, the internal logical of the development of the state apparatus, or even the need to mobilize state resources for foreign adventures, although all these variables must be taken into account, but because the society could not hold together on its own."
"A certain amount of control and repressiveness is essential for the functioning of all societies, but it is especially crucial during certain periods of history, in certain places. At times a strong government with an assortment of repressive measures is the only way a society can survive. But why is the importance of the need for the state to take repressive/controlling actions marginalized or ignored in social science? Why is ideology/culture, lust for power and material benefits of power, or drive for imperial aggrandizement often given as the explanatory model of authoritarian/totalitarian governments?"
"The major reason, of course, is that Western societies are not in danger of being overwhelmed by criminalized anarchy, cases of criminal behavior notwithstanding. Thus, the important of the asocial process in shaping the historical process was already lost sight of by the ninteenth century. Ninteenth-century sociology would downplay the role of asocial processes in the social process. Although sociologists would elaborate on conflicts, in almost all cases they detailed the conflicts as between various social, political, and ethnic groups or between the state and these groups. Nineteenth-century sociology would basically ignore conflict between the state, which in some cases stayed outside the social interplay, and its criminal elements - the society of anomies. Moreover the notion of society as an aggregation of anomies would be seen as a contradiction in terms."
"Indeed the notion of society implied the cohesiveness of various groups. In this arrangement, asocial elements and processes (elements that would be in opposition to the entire society) would be marginalized. This would especially be the case with Anglo-Saxon sociological traditions, which took as axiomatic the notion that each individual, with few exceptions, was attached to one group or another. These notions would come to dominate twentieth-century sociology, especially American sociology."
"Thus, the major reason for modern sociology to ignore or marginalize the role of asocial processes (necessitating a strong/repressive government) in shaping major historical events is the fact that these conditions (situations where criminality threatened the very existence of the society) have not been part of the historical picture in the West for centuries."
"Consequently, modern social scientists generally fail to understand the role of controlling/repressive elements and the importance of order, in the holistic meaning of the word, for society. Order and a strong repressive aspect of the society/state are mostly seen as caused by the desires of the elite to maintain power or as a product of ideological drivesl this last explanation is most important in our case."
"Indeedn, while there are many explanations of the emergence on the modern totalitarian society, the most popular is that its rise is due to the spread of certain ideologies. This notion developed in the course of post-World War II history and obscured many other roles for totalitarian regimes, including their repressive policies as being the only way to maintain basic order. Due to the importance of this notion and its spell over many explanatory models of totalitarian regimes, it is critical to see how it emerged and changed. At the same time, we shall look beyond the discursive model to see the real causes on the rise of repressive/controlling aspects of totalitarian regimes, for it is clear that no one theory can explain the rise of all totalitarian regimes."
"Thus, the goal of this book can be condensed to the following. It is most important to discard the notion of the totalitarian system as 'discourse', a concept that dominated intellectual thought. Most pundits have visualized the totalitarian regime as the product of an ideology that the ruling elite imposed upon the helpless society. These visions of the regimes ignore their essential roles in the development of society, for example, the totalitarian state's role in economic development or upgrading the military potential of the country. These essential roles are either discarded or marginalized. It also goes without saying the vision of the totalitarian state as the product of a artificial quasi-religious ideology provides no room for the role of these regimes in maintaining basic order. In fact, the assumption that at times a repressive government is essential for the maintenance of basic order was rejected not only by the conservatives who rallied against the Soviet and Chinese totalitarian regimes, but also by the liberals and the Left, who often discarded the term of 'totalitarian regime' itself."
"In their view, repressive external control is absolutely not needed, and the citizens, upon being liberated from the controlling and repressive power of totalitarian regimes, can easily control their asocial drives. It was assumed in this context that asocial drives are marginal, for the great majority of the people are part of this or that self-policed cohesive social group. Basic order and security are a given."
"Only recently has the situation started to change. Russian intellectuals have been in the vanguard. Many of them were horrified by the criminal anarchy that overwhelmed post-Soviet Russia, and some started to look favorable toward the time of the repressive Soviet regime, which is beginning to be appreciated for its stability and comparative security. In this vision, the asocial drives that grip post-Soviet Russia are seen as more dangerous than the repression during the Soviet era."
"Of course, the views of these Russian intellectuals were marginalized and dismissed as the manifestation of their reactionary ideology, not only in FRussia but also outside its borders. Their view was thought of as absolutely irrelevant to the West in general and the U.S. in particular. Yet the situation started to change since September 11, 2001 and the events that have unfolded afterward. For first time in history, Americans fear for their personal safety, a fear shared by all segments of society."
"The asocial elements of society (criminals), or thsoe who can be seen as structurally similar to them (terrorists), have ceased to be a 'discourse' - the product of the intellectual interplay and arbitrary labelling of the ruling elite. Asocial groups, and the processes directly or indirectly connected with then, have become a real threat that has spilled into the international arena, supplanting the fear of a nuclear Armageddon with the USSR. There are various manifestations of this fear. There is the fear of the spread of weapons of mass destruction amount terrors and 'rogue' states. The chaos that emerged after the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime in Baghdad and American inability to stop it have implied that similar events are possible globally. This has created the sense that a strong state is necessary to maintain stability both inside and outside international borders."
"Although the threat to personal safety and the fear of anarchy in the beard sense have not entirely changed the view of repressive regimes, at least there is a visible new trend. Fear has challenged the assumption that asocial behavior and processes related to it are merely 'discourse', for instance, the motion that calling terrorists 'terrorists' is merely the manifestation of 'hegemonic discourse'. Conservative intellectuals continue to see the roots of terrorism in 'wrong' ideologies, in this case the spread of fundamentalist Islam, but some of their other basic assumptions have changed. They do not assume that the problem with terrorists can be solved so easily, as supposedly was the case with the Soviet regime when it was stated that simply laying bare the follies of the Soviet ideology would make the Soviet people similar to people in the West. In the case of Islamic terrorism, decisive actions would also be necessary. And these actions were indeed implemented ias the wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq show. However, these actions are not limited to external conflicts but also have direct implications for internal American life."
"There has been a dramatic increase of the power of the federal government and the new Department of the Homeland Security. There are apparent limits on constitutional liberties and some measures (eg. creation of the military tribunal) could be easily compared with the actions of a totalitarian government. While it is true that this government control has evoked a stream of critical articles, what would be called the 'silent majority' have not been very critical of these actions. One can assume that they do not mind the increase in governmental intrusiveness."
"Of course, one must state that intellectuals have not directly reconsidered the role of totalitarian governments, for example the Soviet regime, as a force that can provide security and stability. Yet they are obviously moving in this direction. It is thought, for example, that an empire (American empire in this case) can sometimes be regarded as a positive phenomenon, even if it involved rule over people against their wills. It is implied here that imperial presence is essential for stability. It is recognized that democracy does not always work, and that power might be imposed from above, as in the case of Iraq where democratic institutions could lead to the rise of a fundamentalist regime. All these intellectual trends provide the incentive for a reevaluation of the role of totalitarian regimes in non-modern and non-Western societies and case doubt on the theory of all totalitarian regimes as the product of ideology. The new conditions also require reevaluation of the role of some previous reimes' relationships to society."
"There is no double that ideology has played an important role in the historical process and that various ideological paradigms have occupied a central position in certain totalitarian regimes. Some of the actions of these regimes (eg. the Holocaust) cannot be understood in the context of the geopolitical rationale. In fact, they were counterproductive to the regime's stated goals - maintaining power and expansion of empire. Yet ideology often obscured the real roles of the regimes, which in some modifications have played an important role in the stability of society. In many ways their desire to establish order cause their internal terror and intrusiveness in all aspects of human life."
"To emphasize the importance of the fear of disorder but not the ideology in the formation of the totalitarian regime, I will focus attention on the late medieval/early modern France in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries. This case demonstrates how fear of disorder, of asocial processes, led to the emergence of a brutal absolutist state with features and policies strikingly similar to the totalitarian regimes in the USSR and China."
"This work deals with the totalitarian, or to be precise, the proto-totalitarian system as the product of the reality of fourteenth- through sixteenth-century Eirope in general and France in particular. France, like many countries in Europe, was in a process of asocial/political transformation that in many cases was nothing but a societal meltdown aggravated by the Hundred Years War."
"Asocial behavior spread to all segments of the society, in all forms, and led to the brutish response by the state. The range of punishment - its totality and cruelty - could well be compared with the actions of a totalitarian government. In its relentless drive to 'normalize' society, the state actively regulated social life and even more intimate aspects of the people's lives, including their sexual lives. There were drives for regulation of the economy and even some aspects of social engineering, for example, attempts to populate the emerging colonial empires with exiles and produce 'new men' and 'new women' through a 'reeducation' process that included hard physical labor and ideological indoctrination."
"This increase in harshness in dealing with the populace, in fact, the emergence of a new sort of bondage, was combined with a twisted humanitarianism and a rudimentary safety net. Taken separately these elements can can all be found in democratic societies of the modern West, although in aggregate they should be regarded as features of totalitarian regimes of the modern era and of other types of regimes such as Oriental despotism."
"The proto-totalitarian features in the early French monachy cannot be attributed to the nefarious influence of ideology. France's kings were not aware of any socialist doctrine. Moreover, capitalism was in an embryonic state. Thus, the influence of capitalist ideology with its spirit of 'control and punishment', as Foucault claims, should not be exaggerated. The role of the imperial drive for centralized power in the hands of the monarchy should not be exaggerated either. Indeed, France at that time was more preoccupied with sheer survival than with imperial aggrandizement..."
---
Dmitry Shalpentokh has presented an arresting alternative to standard views of the modern state. Rejecting theories which view ideology as central in the expansion of government, and developing a line of thought that owes much to Hobbes, he argues that the growth of state power in early times and in contemporary contexts can be understood as a defense against asocial processes of anarchic violence. A forceful challenge to conventional wisdom, The Proto-Totalitarian State should be read closely by historians, political theorists and anyone interested in the nature of power.
John Gray, London School of Economics
---
blurb
Totalitarian rule is commonly thought to derive from specific ideologies that justify the complete control by the state of social, cultural, and political institutions. The major goal of this volume is to demonstrate that in some cases brutal forms of state control have been the only way to maintain basic social order.
Dmitry Shlapentokh seeks to show that totalitarian or semi-totalitarian regimes have their roots in a fear of disorder that may overtake both rulers and the society at large.
Although ideology has played an important role in many totalitarian regimes, it has not always been the chief reason for repression.
In many cases, the desire to establish order led to internal terror and intrusiveness in all aspects of human life.
Shlapentokh seeks the roots of this phenomenon in France in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries, when asocial processes in the wake of the Hundred Years War led to the emergence of a brutal absolutist state whose features and policies bore a striking resemblance to totalitarian regimes in the Soviet Union and China.
State punishment and control allowed for relentless drive to "normalize" society with the state actively engaged in the regulation of social life. There were attempts to regulate the economy and instances of social engineering, attempts to populate emerging colonial empires with exiles and produce "new men and women" through reeducation. This increased harshness in dealing with the populace, in fact, the emergence of a new sort of bondage, was combined with a twisted form of humanitarianism and the creation of a rudimentary safety net.
Some of these elements can be found in the democratic societies of the modern West, although in their aggregation these attributes are essential features of totalitarian regimes of the modem era.
---
Dmitry Shlapentokh challenges three regnant schools of thought, that states are the product of elite design or war, that totalitarianism is the product of ideology or discourse, and that totalitarian states can only be modern entities. An iconoclast's delight and a major contribution to the theory of state formation.
Alexander J. Motyl, Rutgers University-Newark
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