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Williams-Ford Texas A&M University Military History Series #121
By Joel Ira Holwitt Execute against Japan: The U.S. Decision to Conduct Unrestricted Submarine Warfare (Williams-Ford Te (Reprint) [Paperback]
Less than five hours after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, U.S. naval leaders reluctantly chose to pursue a form of warfare they despised—targeting not only Japanese military assets but also civilian-operated fishing trawlers, freighters, and tankers. The move to unrestricted submarine warfare represented a major change in the longstanding American adherence to the classic doctrine of "freedom of the seas," under which commercial vessels were held to have the right to navigate the oceans without threat of attack. This dramatic about-face in naval policy, potentially as controversial as the decision to use the atomic bomb, has never been seriously challenged and, until now, closely examined. Holwitt combed archival sources from the National Archives, the Naval Historical Center, the Naval War College, Yale University, and the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library in order to reconstruct the development of both the U.S. submarine fleet and the policies for its use during World War II. As he shows in this meticulously researched book, the U.S. move to launch unrestricted air and submarine warfare against Japan was illegal. "Execute Against Japan" offers a new understanding of U.S. military policy during World War II. This thoughtful analysis will be a vital resource for military and maritime historians and professionals, as well as students of World War II.
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First published March 31, 2009
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Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews
March 21, 2020
A short read, but the research for this book was very well done.
May 5, 2017
The US entered World War One in large part because of outrage against German unrestricted submarine warfare -- particularly, the sinking of neutral ships. All during the 1920s and 1930s, US diplomacy and naval strategy emphasized that neutral ships ought to be inviolate during wartime and that even civilian ships belonging to an enemy government should not simply be sunk without warning. As late as 1941, the official Instructions for the US Navy required submarines to search merchant allow the crew to evacuate before sinking a merchant ship. This was not a point of antiquarian fussiness -- this was the public view of the President and the State Department who were repeatedly and publicly complaining about German submarine warfare.
These elaborate rules lasted approximately 90 minutes into the Second World War. At 3:45 manilla time (9:15 Hawaii), Admiral Hart ordered the Asiatic Fleet "SUBMARINES AND AIRCRAFT WILL WAGE UNRESTRICTED WARFARE." A few hours later, Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, signaled the rest of the US Navy: "EXECUTE AGAINST JAPAN UNRESTRICTED AIR AND SUBMARINE WARFARE. CINCAF INFORM BRITISH AND DUTCH. INFORM ARMY."
As the author notes, this is a striking reversal of past US practice, and doubly so because it appears that the Navy adopted unrestricted submarine warfare with no deliberation with the civilian government. Certainly Hart issued his orders without any direction from Washington, and it is not at all clear that Stark had any, either. Possibly it was discussed verbally between Stark and the President, but there was no written record of such a discussion.
The book explains the background of this decision-making, both for the Asiatic Fleet in the Philippines and for the Navy as a whole. As the author documents, the key people in the Navy understood by the mid 1930s that submarines could not, in practice, follow traditional cruiser-warfare rules and pushed for more relaxed laws of war. Memoranda advocating unrestricted warfare reached the General Board in 1941, and that body essentially declared "this is against US policy and if we were going to change that policy we wouldn't say so in advance."
As the author shows, there was a great deal of nodding and winking between Admiral Hart and the CNO, immediately before the war. It was made clear to Hart that he _would_ be ordered to conduct unrestricted submarine warfare as soon as hostilities broke out (as, in fact, he was.) Moreover, he had been coached by Stark on how to justify such conduct based on his existing orders. In February of 1941, Stark wrote a private letter to Hart, saying "It is believed that further careful study of these tasks will reveal all their implications. The term ‘sea communications’ includes all naval as well as merchant shipping. .... The question of inability to sink merchant shipping by submarines, without warning, is unlikely to arise, since it is probable that all shipping within your reach will be under Japanese naval operation or control." That is, "you should just assert that the Japanese merchant ships are really part of the navy, and shoot them based on that."
Overall, I thought this was a well-written and carefully-researched exploration of a topic that has previously been overlooked. It's a useful case study on how the inter-war navy formulated its doctrine, and in particular how these deliberations often happen out of sight of the civilian leadership. The author manages to be thorough without being pedantic, and the writing is solid for an academic historian, without any pedantic methodological asides.
The book was based on the author's dissertation. If you don't want to read the book, the dissertation is available online.
https://etd.ohiolink.edu/rws_etd/docu...
These elaborate rules lasted approximately 90 minutes into the Second World War. At 3:45 manilla time (9:15 Hawaii), Admiral Hart ordered the Asiatic Fleet "SUBMARINES AND AIRCRAFT WILL WAGE UNRESTRICTED WARFARE." A few hours later, Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, signaled the rest of the US Navy: "EXECUTE AGAINST JAPAN UNRESTRICTED AIR AND SUBMARINE WARFARE. CINCAF INFORM BRITISH AND DUTCH. INFORM ARMY."
As the author notes, this is a striking reversal of past US practice, and doubly so because it appears that the Navy adopted unrestricted submarine warfare with no deliberation with the civilian government. Certainly Hart issued his orders without any direction from Washington, and it is not at all clear that Stark had any, either. Possibly it was discussed verbally between Stark and the President, but there was no written record of such a discussion.
The book explains the background of this decision-making, both for the Asiatic Fleet in the Philippines and for the Navy as a whole. As the author documents, the key people in the Navy understood by the mid 1930s that submarines could not, in practice, follow traditional cruiser-warfare rules and pushed for more relaxed laws of war. Memoranda advocating unrestricted warfare reached the General Board in 1941, and that body essentially declared "this is against US policy and if we were going to change that policy we wouldn't say so in advance."
As the author shows, there was a great deal of nodding and winking between Admiral Hart and the CNO, immediately before the war. It was made clear to Hart that he _would_ be ordered to conduct unrestricted submarine warfare as soon as hostilities broke out (as, in fact, he was.) Moreover, he had been coached by Stark on how to justify such conduct based on his existing orders. In February of 1941, Stark wrote a private letter to Hart, saying "It is believed that further careful study of these tasks will reveal all their implications. The term ‘sea communications’ includes all naval as well as merchant shipping. .... The question of inability to sink merchant shipping by submarines, without warning, is unlikely to arise, since it is probable that all shipping within your reach will be under Japanese naval operation or control." That is, "you should just assert that the Japanese merchant ships are really part of the navy, and shoot them based on that."
Overall, I thought this was a well-written and carefully-researched exploration of a topic that has previously been overlooked. It's a useful case study on how the inter-war navy formulated its doctrine, and in particular how these deliberations often happen out of sight of the civilian leadership. The author manages to be thorough without being pedantic, and the writing is solid for an academic historian, without any pedantic methodological asides.
The book was based on the author's dissertation. If you don't want to read the book, the dissertation is available online.
https://etd.ohiolink.edu/rws_etd/docu...
June 25, 2017
Execute Against Japan began as a Ph. D. dissertation by Joel Holwitt. Then a Lieutenant, USN and serving in nuclear submarines. As such it is carefully researched and logically constructed. For a research paper the writing style is accessible to a general reader. At 184 pages and another 45 of notes it is not a long read. Because the research is in depth, it can be a demanding read on the casual reader who may tire of some of the extra steps required of a doctoral thesis.
In the hours after knowledge of the Japanese attack on Perl Harbor, the US submarine fleet was directed to “Execute against japan, unrestricted submarine and air warfare.” The term “unrestricted warfare” had not been fully defined such that all commanders knew what this direction meant. Most air units were not in a position to execute any version of this command and it would be up to individual submarine commanders to convert it into what was one of the most complete victories by one naval power over another.
Many of us will remember in our history classes that the United States had a long tradition of insisting on freedom of the seas, the right of neutrals to conduct sea born commerce with belligerent nations. Twenty years before the German decision to fight unrestricted submarine warfare against the US contributed to the American casus belli that brought us into WW I.
Joel Howlet’s book carefully documents the fact that the US had not abandon this principle as a nation. The United States Navy had spent years working its way to its own policy for fighting with submarines and the above order was not an accident or a blind response to the surprise attack. The record suggest that the USN made this decision without consultation with the State Department, the president or even the Sec of the Navy. The record does not specify any instance of proper channels agreeing to or being expressly asks to agree to this decision.
Several things make it worth the reader time to follow Lt Holwitt through the entire history of this decision. The details and the depth of the discussion by the many participants is worth following. While the author has a strong opinion that the right thing was to give the order, he leaves it to the reader to form an independent opinion.
Perhaps the next book should ask: Why has no one noticed? If this is a precedence, what is the significance? Is this a precedence?
In the hours after knowledge of the Japanese attack on Perl Harbor, the US submarine fleet was directed to “Execute against japan, unrestricted submarine and air warfare.” The term “unrestricted warfare” had not been fully defined such that all commanders knew what this direction meant. Most air units were not in a position to execute any version of this command and it would be up to individual submarine commanders to convert it into what was one of the most complete victories by one naval power over another.
Many of us will remember in our history classes that the United States had a long tradition of insisting on freedom of the seas, the right of neutrals to conduct sea born commerce with belligerent nations. Twenty years before the German decision to fight unrestricted submarine warfare against the US contributed to the American casus belli that brought us into WW I.
Joel Howlet’s book carefully documents the fact that the US had not abandon this principle as a nation. The United States Navy had spent years working its way to its own policy for fighting with submarines and the above order was not an accident or a blind response to the surprise attack. The record suggest that the USN made this decision without consultation with the State Department, the president or even the Sec of the Navy. The record does not specify any instance of proper channels agreeing to or being expressly asks to agree to this decision.
Several things make it worth the reader time to follow Lt Holwitt through the entire history of this decision. The details and the depth of the discussion by the many participants is worth following. While the author has a strong opinion that the right thing was to give the order, he leaves it to the reader to form an independent opinion.
Perhaps the next book should ask: Why has no one noticed? If this is a precedence, what is the significance? Is this a precedence?
March 3, 2017
America entered World War I, in part to protest Germany's unrestricted use of submarines against merchant sailors. When she fought against Japan, the US Navy immediately started the same strategy. Holwitt traces, in excruciating detail, how that change in outlook came about.
Why I started this book: I'm working my way thru the Navy's Recommended Reading list.
Why I finished it: This book took a long time for me to read. It's dense with fact and details. I would recommend that anyone interested read the conclusion first and then go back and read the whole book. Reading it in this order allows any reader, not familiar with naval history, to realize the significance of what Holwitt is saying from chapter 1 on.
Why I started this book: I'm working my way thru the Navy's Recommended Reading list.
Why I finished it: This book took a long time for me to read. It's dense with fact and details. I would recommend that anyone interested read the conclusion first and then go back and read the whole book. Reading it in this order allows any reader, not familiar with naval history, to realize the significance of what Holwitt is saying from chapter 1 on.
July 7, 2020
First off, this book is very, very dry. Since it's a review of naval policy, I'm not sure how it could be anything but. However, it is a very important addition to the historiography of the Pacific War. I had often wondered how the US had gone from entering WW1 over Imperial Germany's policy of unrestricted submarine warfare to conducting it immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor just 24 years later.
I was curious whether the change in policy was a desire for vengeance after Pearl Harbor, a recognition that WW2 was going to be a nearly "total war," a realization that there really were no neutrals of note in the Pacific (the Soviet Union comes to mind as one nation that was not either under Japanese control or at war with Japan; I'm not sure how much trade there was between the USSR and Japan in 1941) or even if racism came to play to some extent.
In this book, which I read somewhere came out of his doctoral dissertation, Joel Holwitt examines how the conduct of submarine warfare was negotiated throughout the post-WW1 period. While the US and Britain seemed to favor restricting submarine warfare, smaller naval powers like France and Italy did not favor restrictions seeing submarines as an opportunity to level the playing field with the major naval powers. Additionally, it came to be recognized that submarines could not be expected to abide by the rules of cruiser warfare in which ships are stopped and searched before they could be attacked without addressing the issue of armed merchant ships. Conducting cruiser warfare against armed merchant ships was kind of like requiring soldiers in foxholes to stand up before firing their weapons - ridiculous.
Holwitt has extensively reviewed all of the naval treaties, official correspondence and personal papers of the US policymakers of the interwar period. His research is thorough and comprehensive. He reveals that in the year leading up to Pearl Harbor, Naval leaders essentially came to the conclusion that the US Navy would conduct unrestricted warfare against Japan once war came. Although the official position of the Navy and the US Government remained in support of the concept of freedom of the seas, Naval leaders realized that the traditional forms of interdicting commerce were simply not possible in against modern weapons. In fact, all of the evidence indicates that Naval leaders did this independently without consulting civilian leadership. Additionally, the evidence indicates that Admiral Thomas Hart, CinC Asian Fleet, issued orders to conduct unrestricted warfare before his superior, Admiral Stark, CNO, issued orders to that effect. Neither officer appears to have consulted with the President or SECNAV prior to these orders being issued.
This issue is not typically examined by most historians since civilian leadership quickly approved the actions of the Navy's leadership and no one ever really complained about the US Navy's campaign. The results cannot be argued with either.
Holwitt's book answered all of my questions about US unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan. I frankly can't see how this book can be surpassed as the definitive book on this topic. This book isn't for the casual reader - you will not find stories about stalking Japanese merchant ships or sweating out a string of depth charges from an IJN destroyer. For students of the Pacific War who are interested in the decision-making leading up to this dramatic change in US policy, Holwitt's book is the place to go.
I was curious whether the change in policy was a desire for vengeance after Pearl Harbor, a recognition that WW2 was going to be a nearly "total war," a realization that there really were no neutrals of note in the Pacific (the Soviet Union comes to mind as one nation that was not either under Japanese control or at war with Japan; I'm not sure how much trade there was between the USSR and Japan in 1941) or even if racism came to play to some extent.
In this book, which I read somewhere came out of his doctoral dissertation, Joel Holwitt examines how the conduct of submarine warfare was negotiated throughout the post-WW1 period. While the US and Britain seemed to favor restricting submarine warfare, smaller naval powers like France and Italy did not favor restrictions seeing submarines as an opportunity to level the playing field with the major naval powers. Additionally, it came to be recognized that submarines could not be expected to abide by the rules of cruiser warfare in which ships are stopped and searched before they could be attacked without addressing the issue of armed merchant ships. Conducting cruiser warfare against armed merchant ships was kind of like requiring soldiers in foxholes to stand up before firing their weapons - ridiculous.
Holwitt has extensively reviewed all of the naval treaties, official correspondence and personal papers of the US policymakers of the interwar period. His research is thorough and comprehensive. He reveals that in the year leading up to Pearl Harbor, Naval leaders essentially came to the conclusion that the US Navy would conduct unrestricted warfare against Japan once war came. Although the official position of the Navy and the US Government remained in support of the concept of freedom of the seas, Naval leaders realized that the traditional forms of interdicting commerce were simply not possible in against modern weapons. In fact, all of the evidence indicates that Naval leaders did this independently without consulting civilian leadership. Additionally, the evidence indicates that Admiral Thomas Hart, CinC Asian Fleet, issued orders to conduct unrestricted warfare before his superior, Admiral Stark, CNO, issued orders to that effect. Neither officer appears to have consulted with the President or SECNAV prior to these orders being issued.
This issue is not typically examined by most historians since civilian leadership quickly approved the actions of the Navy's leadership and no one ever really complained about the US Navy's campaign. The results cannot be argued with either.
Holwitt's book answered all of my questions about US unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan. I frankly can't see how this book can be surpassed as the definitive book on this topic. This book isn't for the casual reader - you will not find stories about stalking Japanese merchant ships or sweating out a string of depth charges from an IJN destroyer. For students of the Pacific War who are interested in the decision-making leading up to this dramatic change in US policy, Holwitt's book is the place to go.
May 22, 2023
"Execute Against Japan" is an honest and well-researched account of the US decision to conduct unrestricted submarine warfare during World War II.
Holwitt has masterfully presented a legal analysis of this crucial period in history, while maintaining an engaging and easy-to-read writing style.
One of the standout qualities of this book is its meticulous research. Holwitt has clearly done his due diligence in both Naval and executive branch archives and correspondence and the research of other historians and has gone the extra mile of cross-referencing them with one another to paint accurate timelines. Holwitt's dedication to thoroughness shines through, elevating the book's credibility and adding weight to his legal analysis.
I especially enjoyed the legal analysis in "Execute Against Japan." Though not a legal book or legal history, the decision to wage unrestricted submarine warfare cannot be separated from understanding the international legal and political landscape at the time and in the interwar period. Sub warfare was a hot-button topic after the first world war and the legal analysis into how international law and USN Instructions treated it as well as possible future treatment by the War College is comprehensive, yet digestible and easy to follow-along. Holwitt presents a balanced perspective, examining the ethical and legal implications of unrestricted submarine warfare. Ultimately, the legal justifications provide readers with a a comprehensive understanding of the Navy’s ultimate decision in favor of such a controversial strategy.
This book definitely brings something new to the table in a genre oversaturated with books on the US Navy in WWII. One doesn’t have to be a laywer to enjoy this book, though I think it’d be hard to unless you were really into this period of time and the conflict. I’d recommend this to anyone interested in US Navy history and WWII in general.
Holwitt has masterfully presented a legal analysis of this crucial period in history, while maintaining an engaging and easy-to-read writing style.
One of the standout qualities of this book is its meticulous research. Holwitt has clearly done his due diligence in both Naval and executive branch archives and correspondence and the research of other historians and has gone the extra mile of cross-referencing them with one another to paint accurate timelines. Holwitt's dedication to thoroughness shines through, elevating the book's credibility and adding weight to his legal analysis.
I especially enjoyed the legal analysis in "Execute Against Japan." Though not a legal book or legal history, the decision to wage unrestricted submarine warfare cannot be separated from understanding the international legal and political landscape at the time and in the interwar period. Sub warfare was a hot-button topic after the first world war and the legal analysis into how international law and USN Instructions treated it as well as possible future treatment by the War College is comprehensive, yet digestible and easy to follow-along. Holwitt presents a balanced perspective, examining the ethical and legal implications of unrestricted submarine warfare. Ultimately, the legal justifications provide readers with a a comprehensive understanding of the Navy’s ultimate decision in favor of such a controversial strategy.
This book definitely brings something new to the table in a genre oversaturated with books on the US Navy in WWII. One doesn’t have to be a laywer to enjoy this book, though I think it’d be hard to unless you were really into this period of time and the conflict. I’d recommend this to anyone interested in US Navy history and WWII in general.
July 29, 2021
The author did a superb job researching, organizing, and presenting this topic.
May 6, 2015
Read after Aircraft Carriers At War, the third in a series of non-fiction books that've marked May so far.
This is niche, dense stuff about an area that I knew absolutely nothing about. I'd recommend you read this for two reasons:
First, to learn about the "freedom of the seas", a significant part of what drew the US into the First World War, and a key piece of Woodrow WIlson's Fourteen Points. And to see how this idea changed and evolved over time, as nations attempted to reconcile the submarine with naval law that had remained fixed since the time of prize ships and cruiser warfare.
Second, and perhaps as interesting, to see how an organization and bureaucracy as large as the Navy changes its mind. The mechanisms through which arguments are made, the tactics used in ensuring that a 'new' idea can gain sway, and how analysis is used as a compliment to personality in decision making.
Fascinating stuff.
This is niche, dense stuff about an area that I knew absolutely nothing about. I'd recommend you read this for two reasons:
First, to learn about the "freedom of the seas", a significant part of what drew the US into the First World War, and a key piece of Woodrow WIlson's Fourteen Points. And to see how this idea changed and evolved over time, as nations attempted to reconcile the submarine with naval law that had remained fixed since the time of prize ships and cruiser warfare.
Second, and perhaps as interesting, to see how an organization and bureaucracy as large as the Navy changes its mind. The mechanisms through which arguments are made, the tactics used in ensuring that a 'new' idea can gain sway, and how analysis is used as a compliment to personality in decision making.
Fascinating stuff.
September 5, 2010
Dr. Guilmartin recommended this one to me a year ago, and I finally got my hands on a copy today via the Inter-library loan @ the Columbus Public Library (via the Ohio State Library). So far, I'm really intrigued and enjoying it. It's a scholarly work, so not for everyone.
March 17, 2014
An interesting account of the US decision to conduct unrestricted sustains warfare against Japan. I enjoyed reading about the moral and political thought behind the decision. Fun for an international/operational law nerd.
August 17, 2012
Very good history. Nothing much to add over what you can get from the synopsis. Well researched, solid, and important. Recommended.
December 3, 2015
I found this book very interesting as well as helpful in explaining why the decision was made.
Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews