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The Red Army
Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War
Germany's surprise attack on June 22, 1941, shocked a Soviet Union woefully unprepared to defend itself. The day before the attack, the Red Army still comprised the world's largest fighting force. But by the end of the year, four and a half million of its soldiers lay dead. This new study, based on formerly classified Soviet archival material and neglected German sources, reveals the truth behind this national catastrophe. Drawing on evidence never before seen in the West-including combat records of early engagements-David Glantz claims that in 1941 the Red Army was poorly trained, inadequately equipped, ineptly organized, and consequently incapable of engaging in large-scale military campaigns-and that both Hitler and Stalin knew it. He provides the most complete and convincing study of why the Soviets almost lost the war that summer, dispelling many of the myths about the Red Army that have persisted since the war and soundly refuting Viktor Suvorov's controversial thesis that Stalin was planning a preemptive strike against Germany. Stumbling Colossus describes the Red Army's command leadership, mobilization and war planning, intelligence activities, and active and reserve combat formations. It includes the first complete Order of Battle of Soviet forces on the eve of the German attack, documents the strength of Soviet armored forces during the war's initial period, and reproduces the first available texts of actual Soviet war plans. It also provides biographical sketches of Soviet officers and tells how Stalin's purges of the late 1930s left the Red Army leadership almost decimated. At a time when blame for the war in eastern Europe is being laid with a fallen regime, Glantz's book sets the record straight on the Soviet Union's readiness-and willingness-to fight. Boasting an extensive bibliography of Soviet and German sources, Stumbling Colossus is a convincing study that overshadows recent revisionist history and one that no student of World War II can ignore.
408 pages, Hardcover
First published May 1, 1998
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347 people want to read
About the author
David M. Glantz
102 books225 followersDavid M. Glantz is an American military historian and the editor of The Journal of Slavic Military Studies.
Glantz received degrees in history from the Virginia Military Institute and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Defense Language Institute, Institute for Russian and Eastern European Studies, and U.S. Army War College. He entered active service with the United States Army in 1963.
He began his military career in 1963 as a field artillery officer from 1965 to 1969, and served in various assignments in the United States, and in Vietnam during the Vietnam War with the II Field Force Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCE) at the Plantation in Long Binh.
After teaching history at the United States Military Academy from 1969 through 1973, he completed the army’s Soviet foreign area specialist program and became chief of Estimates in US Army Europe’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (USAREUR ODCSI) from 1977 to 1979. Upon his return to the United States in 1979, he became chief of research at the Army’s newly-formed Combat Studies Institute (CSI) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from 1979 to 1983 and then Director of Soviet Army Operations at the Center for Land Warfare, U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, from 1983 to 1986. While at the College, Col. Glantz was instrumental in conducting the annual "Art of War" symposia which produced the best analysis of the conduct of operations on the Eastern Front during the Second World War in English to date. The symposia included attendance of a number of former German participants in the operations, and resulted in publication of the seminal transcripts of proceedings. Returning to Fort Leavenworth in 1986, he helped found and later directed the U.S. Army’s Soviet (later Foreign) Military Studies Office (FMSO), where he remained until his retirement in 1993 with the rank of Colonel.
In 1993, while at FMSO, he established The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, a scholarly journal for which he still serves as chief editor, that covers military affairs in the states of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the former Soviet Union.
A member of the Russian Federation’s Academy of Natural Sciences, he has written or co-authored more than twenty commercially published books, over sixty self-published studies and atlases, and over one hundred articles dealing with the history of the Red (Soviet) Army, Soviet military strategy, operational art, and tactics, Soviet airborne operations, intelligence, and deception, and other topics related to World War II. In recognition of his work, he has received several awards, including the Society of Military History’s prestigious Samuel Eliot Morrison Prize for his contributions to the study of military history.
Glantz is regarded by many as one of the best western military historians of the Soviet role in World War II.[1] He is perhaps most associated with the thesis that World War II Soviet military history has been prejudiced in the West by its over-reliance on German oral and printed sources, without being balanced by a similar examination of Soviet source material. A more complete version of this thesis can be found in his paper “The Failures of Historiography: Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941-1945).” Despite his acknowledged expertise, Glantz has occasionally been criticized for his stylistic choices, such as inventing specific thoughts and feelings of historical figures without reference to documented sources.
Glantz is also known as an opponent of Viktor Suvorov's thesis, which he endeavored to rebut with the book Stumbling Colossus.
He lives with his wife Mary Ann Glantz in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The Glantzes' daughter Mary E. Glantz, also a historian, has written FDR And The Soviet Union: The President's Battles Over Forei
Glantz received degrees in history from the Virginia Military Institute and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Defense Language Institute, Institute for Russian and Eastern European Studies, and U.S. Army War College. He entered active service with the United States Army in 1963.
He began his military career in 1963 as a field artillery officer from 1965 to 1969, and served in various assignments in the United States, and in Vietnam during the Vietnam War with the II Field Force Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCE) at the Plantation in Long Binh.
After teaching history at the United States Military Academy from 1969 through 1973, he completed the army’s Soviet foreign area specialist program and became chief of Estimates in US Army Europe’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (USAREUR ODCSI) from 1977 to 1979. Upon his return to the United States in 1979, he became chief of research at the Army’s newly-formed Combat Studies Institute (CSI) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from 1979 to 1983 and then Director of Soviet Army Operations at the Center for Land Warfare, U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, from 1983 to 1986. While at the College, Col. Glantz was instrumental in conducting the annual "Art of War" symposia which produced the best analysis of the conduct of operations on the Eastern Front during the Second World War in English to date. The symposia included attendance of a number of former German participants in the operations, and resulted in publication of the seminal transcripts of proceedings. Returning to Fort Leavenworth in 1986, he helped found and later directed the U.S. Army’s Soviet (later Foreign) Military Studies Office (FMSO), where he remained until his retirement in 1993 with the rank of Colonel.
In 1993, while at FMSO, he established The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, a scholarly journal for which he still serves as chief editor, that covers military affairs in the states of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the former Soviet Union.
A member of the Russian Federation’s Academy of Natural Sciences, he has written or co-authored more than twenty commercially published books, over sixty self-published studies and atlases, and over one hundred articles dealing with the history of the Red (Soviet) Army, Soviet military strategy, operational art, and tactics, Soviet airborne operations, intelligence, and deception, and other topics related to World War II. In recognition of his work, he has received several awards, including the Society of Military History’s prestigious Samuel Eliot Morrison Prize for his contributions to the study of military history.
Glantz is regarded by many as one of the best western military historians of the Soviet role in World War II.[1] He is perhaps most associated with the thesis that World War II Soviet military history has been prejudiced in the West by its over-reliance on German oral and printed sources, without being balanced by a similar examination of Soviet source material. A more complete version of this thesis can be found in his paper “The Failures of Historiography: Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941-1945).” Despite his acknowledged expertise, Glantz has occasionally been criticized for his stylistic choices, such as inventing specific thoughts and feelings of historical figures without reference to documented sources.
Glantz is also known as an opponent of Viktor Suvorov's thesis, which he endeavored to rebut with the book Stumbling Colossus.
He lives with his wife Mary Ann Glantz in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The Glantzes' daughter Mary E. Glantz, also a historian, has written FDR And The Soviet Union: The President's Battles Over Forei
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
July 5, 2022
一樣，可讀性不高，但做為資料卻是“巨人的肩膀”。作者寫本書是針對“蘇聯是否曾想在41年對德先制攻擊”的論爭做回應，而同時也了答覆了“為何史達林無視各種即將開戰的現象堅持不會被攻擊”。確實，蘇聯隨著國際局勢已經開始在備戰，但它的擴張與動員速度，是其社會跟工業經濟無法負荷的，加上「大清洗」嚴重傷害了紅軍的骨幹，這些要恢復至少要五年以上。深知這點的史達林評估至少42年夏天之前都無法跟久經沙場的德軍抗衡，所以才努力地避免讓希特勒想對他動手，更遑論“先制攻擊”，無論這是多一廂情願。至於德國，儘管情報有很多缺失，但它們確實已經發現巨人正在覺醒，如果非要一戰的話，趁早下手是“正確”的，因為一旦等紅軍改革完後，它將會是一股可怕的軍事機器。
November 11, 2010
Another excellent reference, but just a reference. Even Glantz's opinions appear to be expressed as facts and statistics.
November 10, 2018
The numbers are still shocking. Between the outbreak of WWII in September 1939 and the day of the German attack in June 1941, the USSR increased the theoretical size of its Red Army from 1.5 million to 5.4 million men, having little doubt that war was coming. But in the three months after Operation Barbarossa, the Red Army lost 2.8 million men, and in six months it would lose 4.3 million. Dead, wounded and missing, to be sure; but for Red Army soldiers, becoming a prisoner of war was a virtual death sentence.
Glantz explored the archives to better understand the causes of a defeat of this magnitude. His book is filled with numbers, statistics, lists, tables, and it is more than a little dry. But it reveals that a major cause of the defeat was this rapid expansion itself, and the failure of the Soviet economy to support it: There were not enough weapons for all these soldiers, and not even enough uniforms; there was not enough ammunition and not enough food. The support and transport services were not up to the task of supplying this huge force, and failed to bring supplies and materiel to the front. Of the 16,000 modern tanks that this reformed army would require, some 90% still had to be built. Units that had equipment were often forced to leave part of it behind because they had no transport. Most had to make do with much less than half of their equipment, and the reserves that were hastily called up to stem the tide were even less fortunate.
A disastrous situation was worsened by a lack of leadership and training. Stalin's purges in the pre-war period had cost the Red Army about 50,000 officers, including 80% to 90% of the senior commanders at army, corps and division level. The combination of this indiscriminate slaughter with a rapid expansion of the army left inexperienced and poorly trained officers in charge almost everywhere. The soldiers were often no better trained, and some units that were equipped with modern tanks lost half or more of them on the march, because the drivers had received only a few hours of training and could not operate them properly. As repair and recovery services were lacking too, these accidental losses frequently became definitive.
Between all the statistics, information about the consequences "on the ground" is scarce. Glantz briefly tells the story of a unit equipped with heavy, modern KV tanks: As they had no ammunition, they proceeded to ram the lighter German tanks. They had some success with this until they ran out of fuel as well, and then enemy sappers blew up the immobilised giants one by one. However, as Glantz admits, information on the Soviet soldier as an individual is scarce in the archives. So one has to make do with reports from commanding officers, such as Major General Ermakov, who soberly commented that the situation of his 2nd Rifle Corps was "rather difficult" because it had (a) no ammunition, (b) no fuel, (c) no food, (d) no transport (...), (e) no communications (...), (f) no hospitals. And all this while the German army was rapidly advancing on his position.
In between the remorseless statistics is some interesting information on how this army was organised (or attempted to be organised) with attention for the changes introduced after observing the German victories in 1939 and 1940. Changes in leadership resulted in structural reforms as well as force expansion, with renewed thinking about the use of tanks, artillery and aircraft. Glantz doesn't mention it, but German forces in 1941 were often surprised by the tactical initiative and skill shown by their opponent, even if it was completely irrelevant in the bigger picture. One does get the strong impression, however, that all this focus on the newest weaponry resulted in a fatal neglect of the army's logistics and rear services.
It makes for grim reading. But with all its reports, tables and statistics, it is not very engaging. Glantz does make an effort to establish responsibility and points the finger squarely at the Communist party and Stalin. The latter's refusal in June 1941 to believe entire mountain ranges of evidence that pointed to imminent war, seems to less inspired by "acute paranoia", as Glantz call it, than by desperate wishful thinking to avoid responsibility for a looming disaster.
Glantz does conclude that in the end, the Soviet Union's ability to mobilise huge forces and to continue to mobilise huge forces was decisive. The Third Reich expected to defeat the USSR in a few months (which is why it neglected to winter-proof most of its army) and indeed in those few months it did manage to wipe out virtually the entire Red Army as it had existed in the western sector. But it failed to anticipate the ability of the USSR to create another army, an even bigger one, to fight on.
Glantz explored the archives to better understand the causes of a defeat of this magnitude. His book is filled with numbers, statistics, lists, tables, and it is more than a little dry. But it reveals that a major cause of the defeat was this rapid expansion itself, and the failure of the Soviet economy to support it: There were not enough weapons for all these soldiers, and not even enough uniforms; there was not enough ammunition and not enough food. The support and transport services were not up to the task of supplying this huge force, and failed to bring supplies and materiel to the front. Of the 16,000 modern tanks that this reformed army would require, some 90% still had to be built. Units that had equipment were often forced to leave part of it behind because they had no transport. Most had to make do with much less than half of their equipment, and the reserves that were hastily called up to stem the tide were even less fortunate.
A disastrous situation was worsened by a lack of leadership and training. Stalin's purges in the pre-war period had cost the Red Army about 50,000 officers, including 80% to 90% of the senior commanders at army, corps and division level. The combination of this indiscriminate slaughter with a rapid expansion of the army left inexperienced and poorly trained officers in charge almost everywhere. The soldiers were often no better trained, and some units that were equipped with modern tanks lost half or more of them on the march, because the drivers had received only a few hours of training and could not operate them properly. As repair and recovery services were lacking too, these accidental losses frequently became definitive.
Between all the statistics, information about the consequences "on the ground" is scarce. Glantz briefly tells the story of a unit equipped with heavy, modern KV tanks: As they had no ammunition, they proceeded to ram the lighter German tanks. They had some success with this until they ran out of fuel as well, and then enemy sappers blew up the immobilised giants one by one. However, as Glantz admits, information on the Soviet soldier as an individual is scarce in the archives. So one has to make do with reports from commanding officers, such as Major General Ermakov, who soberly commented that the situation of his 2nd Rifle Corps was "rather difficult" because it had (a) no ammunition, (b) no fuel, (c) no food, (d) no transport (...), (e) no communications (...), (f) no hospitals. And all this while the German army was rapidly advancing on his position.
In between the remorseless statistics is some interesting information on how this army was organised (or attempted to be organised) with attention for the changes introduced after observing the German victories in 1939 and 1940. Changes in leadership resulted in structural reforms as well as force expansion, with renewed thinking about the use of tanks, artillery and aircraft. Glantz doesn't mention it, but German forces in 1941 were often surprised by the tactical initiative and skill shown by their opponent, even if it was completely irrelevant in the bigger picture. One does get the strong impression, however, that all this focus on the newest weaponry resulted in a fatal neglect of the army's logistics and rear services.
It makes for grim reading. But with all its reports, tables and statistics, it is not very engaging. Glantz does make an effort to establish responsibility and points the finger squarely at the Communist party and Stalin. The latter's refusal in June 1941 to believe entire mountain ranges of evidence that pointed to imminent war, seems to less inspired by "acute paranoia", as Glantz call it, than by desperate wishful thinking to avoid responsibility for a looming disaster.
Glantz does conclude that in the end, the Soviet Union's ability to mobilise huge forces and to continue to mobilise huge forces was decisive. The Third Reich expected to defeat the USSR in a few months (which is why it neglected to winter-proof most of its army) and indeed in those few months it did manage to wipe out virtually the entire Red Army as it had existed in the western sector. But it failed to anticipate the ability of the USSR to create another army, an even bigger one, to fight on.
May 19, 2017
Glantz earns a four star rating from me due to the originality of his research and work. Looking at the Soviet army prior to 1941 is usually limited to Finland, or the one or two books (usually heavily error prone) on Nomonhon. However, a staff level planning view of what the Soviet Army leadership were thinking and how their plans matched or did not to the reality of war is fascinating. It is a must read for any student of the Eastern Front in WW2 on this basis alone.
However, there are some glaring omissions which almost made me give it a 3 star. The massive support that the Soviet Union provided Germany with from August of 1939 through June 1941 is omitted along wiht the severe war scare with Japan. Glantz has unfortunately carried over a singular narrative that has the focus entirely on Germany even when Germany was the biggest ally and Stalin was more worried about the UK or Japan. This is not reflected in his research and it would make a fine update or even a second book to delve into the continency plans for the UK and Japanese conflict with Germany as ally from the period 1939 to 1941. The battle assessments from Finland, the border with Manchuria (indeed, even the invasion of Manchuria by the Soviet Union in 1927-1928), the excursions into China to exterminate the ethnic Kyrgystani and other ethnic groups from territory Russia recently captured and occupied, would be additional material necessary to understand more in depth the views of the General Staff in their assessment and planning process.
Despite these omissions, the book remains an excellent reference to understand the buildup to WW2 for the Soviet Union.
However, there are some glaring omissions which almost made me give it a 3 star. The massive support that the Soviet Union provided Germany with from August of 1939 through June 1941 is omitted along wiht the severe war scare with Japan. Glantz has unfortunately carried over a singular narrative that has the focus entirely on Germany even when Germany was the biggest ally and Stalin was more worried about the UK or Japan. This is not reflected in his research and it would make a fine update or even a second book to delve into the continency plans for the UK and Japanese conflict with Germany as ally from the period 1939 to 1941. The battle assessments from Finland, the border with Manchuria (indeed, even the invasion of Manchuria by the Soviet Union in 1927-1928), the excursions into China to exterminate the ethnic Kyrgystani and other ethnic groups from territory Russia recently captured and occupied, would be additional material necessary to understand more in depth the views of the General Staff in their assessment and planning process.
Despite these omissions, the book remains an excellent reference to understand the buildup to WW2 for the Soviet Union.
August 30, 2022
Colonel David Glantz analyzes how the largest, best-trained, and highly equipped army in Europe and possibly the world could have been so unprepared for the Second World War. This is an excellent history with minutiae translated from Russian into English. If you have an interest in the Soviet Front during the Second World War Mr. Glantz is the undisputed expert.
November 3, 2008
Crammed with statistical detail and a little bit repetitive, but a sobering overview of Soviet military readiness on the eve of World War 2. One of the hypothesis Glantz is answering in this book is one posed by some revisionist historians who argue that the German attack was pre-emptive and the Soviets were the ones who were about to wage aggressive warfare. As Glantz shows, the Soviets were woefully unprepared for the German attack with most of their forces not up to full strength. And as a result of the Stalinist purges, their leadership was also not ready for the task of leading any kind of attack (let alone a defense against the German onslaught). Despite the tremendous defeats in the early part of the war, the Soviets were basically able to trade bodies and space for time to build their military. The survivors of the brutal year of 1941 became the core of a reborn Soviet army that marched to victory all the way to Berlin. This book is highly technical and isn't a good introduction to the topic of the east front in WW2, but if you have some background in the topic it is worth at least skimming this for some keen insights. Glantz cites many sources that would be interesting to follow-up on.
July 25, 2013
Read like a manual at times. Reminds me of the Wehrmacht in 1945. Every single reasonable idea a Soviet general had was summarily rejected by Stalin. Hitler later played the same game to disastrous effect for Germany. I guess these demagogues just can't resist.
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews