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A History of Islamic Societies
Long considered a classic, A History of Islamic Societies is now that much more useful a reference for general readers and scholars alike. Widely praised for its balanced and comprehensive account, Ira Lapidus' work has been fully revised in its coverage of each country and region of the Muslim world through 2001. It incorporates the origins and evolution of Islamic societies and brings into focus the historical processes that gave shape to the manifold varieties of contemporary Islam. The concluding chapters survey the growing influence of the Islamist movements within national states and in their transnational or global dimensions, including the Islamic revival, Islamist politics and terrorism. An updated discussion of the roles of women in Islamic societies is added, with new sections about Afghanistan and Muslims in Europe, America, and the Philippines. Ira M. Lapidus is Professor Emeritus of History at the University of California at Berkeley. His many books and articles include Islam, Politics and Social Movements (University of California Press, 1988) and Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1984).
1002 pages, Paperback
First published January 29, 1988
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July 18, 2012The thing about Lapidus is options: you can learn a lot about the minutiae of Islamic Societies OR you can beat someone senseless with this massive book. Or both. Options.
August 29, 2011
It reads like a textbook and is an obvious Oriental work of scholarship, hence in regards to religious themes, works off of a few questionable premises (e.g. the alleged agreed upon closure of the gate of ijtihad, the Hanbali school being the premier Traditionalist school that is more faithful to the sources of Islamic law than the others, popular Sufism being tied to "Orthodox" Sufism - though the distinction is made, constant references to saint worship, etc.). I imagine much of this is based on the perceptions of the writers Lapidus relied upon (the bibliography alone is about 60 pages). That being said, I believe the book is unparalleled in the scope and encylopedic amount of informative it gives. Ira Lapidus seeks to weave socio-political backdrops into his telling of history and generally avoids making judgments on purely religious matters and for that reason, the book is quite tolerable and is about as objective as a Western scholar can possibly be. It is not a religious history and someone looking or expecting such will be disappointed. Pre-Islamic Arabia, the Prophetic Era and age of the Rightly-Guided Successors are a chapter each and span a mere 50 pages total. Given the period of which he is covering (which represents 800 pages in 10 pt font) one would have to refer to supplemental material to get alternative views on some of the debatable details he mentions.
For example, Abdal Hakim Murad's article "The Spiritual Life of Ottoman Turkey" provides some missing information and clarifications in respect to the strands and role of Sufism in the Ottoman Empire. Ira Lapidus has a very positive view of the orthodoxy and orthopraxy of the Naqshbandi Order - presumably because of the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi role in hadith scholarship during the modern Reform era. Others, however, are not described as frequently in the same light and often little distinction is made between groups like the Qalandariya (which Abdal Hakim Murad clarifies was a heterodox synergic popular movement) and the Shadhilis of North Africa. For instance, the Darqawa are claimed to have had little regard for the "repetition of prayers" (which is presumably dhikr), in favor of Sufic dancing and singing, and are purported to have a legacy of the charismatic strain of Sufi influence. It seems unclear whether or not Ira Lapidus properly understood the relationship between the various personalities. He credits Abu Madyan with reforming Sufism in North Africa, proliferating what he calls the "Sunni-shari'a-Sufi" model, declares Abul Hasan al-Shadhili to be his main heir, and then describes the Darqawa as I have mentioned, implying that they were a shrine-centered popular Berber expression at varous places - perhaps confusing the esteem in which certain Sufis were held by rural populations to be the mark of shrine-worship and popular religion. Even a cursory read of Mawlay al-Arabi's Rasa'il will demonstrate how off such a description is. Though I clearly have personal reasons and biases (or first-hand knowledge depending on your point of view) to be so annoyed at such a characterization, my greater concern is that someone who already has a distorted or ideological view of Sufism and its people will only walk away with increased disgust and/or confirmation.
All that being said, minus an equally comprehensive English alternative amongst Muslim literature, it is indespensible to any student of Muslim history. I gave it a star automatically for the sheer magnitude of what he accomplished, despite mistakes such as the above.
This is my second read (I don't think I completed a first one as I was looking for a more religiously oriented history at the time) and it was recommended to me by a dear friend (along with A History of Arab Peoples - another book which has collected dust on my various book shelves). It is an excellent starting point, but given its length and academic/collegiate style, people who are not interested in history as a discipline may have trouble completing the work and will feel the effects of boredom rather quickly. It isn't one of those books that you can breeze through. His aims in not to entertain, but to inform and I believe the book was written with the specific intention to serve as a university textbook. Of note is his description of the geo-political circumstances which lead to the eventual eclipse of Muslim dominance by a progressive European hegemeny, which seems to be the springboard by which he takes the reader through the rise and fall of the various empires. There is a great deal of emphasis on political and institutional foundations - which again makes the book more of a political science textbook. I imagine that this makes the chapters on the contemporary Muslim world all the more relevant, but that will have to wait until I reach the sections which discuss the contemporary world - God willing.
For example, Abdal Hakim Murad's article "The Spiritual Life of Ottoman Turkey" provides some missing information and clarifications in respect to the strands and role of Sufism in the Ottoman Empire. Ira Lapidus has a very positive view of the orthodoxy and orthopraxy of the Naqshbandi Order - presumably because of the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi role in hadith scholarship during the modern Reform era. Others, however, are not described as frequently in the same light and often little distinction is made between groups like the Qalandariya (which Abdal Hakim Murad clarifies was a heterodox synergic popular movement) and the Shadhilis of North Africa. For instance, the Darqawa are claimed to have had little regard for the "repetition of prayers" (which is presumably dhikr), in favor of Sufic dancing and singing, and are purported to have a legacy of the charismatic strain of Sufi influence. It seems unclear whether or not Ira Lapidus properly understood the relationship between the various personalities. He credits Abu Madyan with reforming Sufism in North Africa, proliferating what he calls the "Sunni-shari'a-Sufi" model, declares Abul Hasan al-Shadhili to be his main heir, and then describes the Darqawa as I have mentioned, implying that they were a shrine-centered popular Berber expression at varous places - perhaps confusing the esteem in which certain Sufis were held by rural populations to be the mark of shrine-worship and popular religion. Even a cursory read of Mawlay al-Arabi's Rasa'il will demonstrate how off such a description is. Though I clearly have personal reasons and biases (or first-hand knowledge depending on your point of view) to be so annoyed at such a characterization, my greater concern is that someone who already has a distorted or ideological view of Sufism and its people will only walk away with increased disgust and/or confirmation.
All that being said, minus an equally comprehensive English alternative amongst Muslim literature, it is indespensible to any student of Muslim history. I gave it a star automatically for the sheer magnitude of what he accomplished, despite mistakes such as the above.
This is my second read (I don't think I completed a first one as I was looking for a more religiously oriented history at the time) and it was recommended to me by a dear friend (along with A History of Arab Peoples - another book which has collected dust on my various book shelves). It is an excellent starting point, but given its length and academic/collegiate style, people who are not interested in history as a discipline may have trouble completing the work and will feel the effects of boredom rather quickly. It isn't one of those books that you can breeze through. His aims in not to entertain, but to inform and I believe the book was written with the specific intention to serve as a university textbook. Of note is his description of the geo-political circumstances which lead to the eventual eclipse of Muslim dominance by a progressive European hegemeny, which seems to be the springboard by which he takes the reader through the rise and fall of the various empires. There is a great deal of emphasis on political and institutional foundations - which again makes the book more of a political science textbook. I imagine that this makes the chapters on the contemporary Muslim world all the more relevant, but that will have to wait until I reach the sections which discuss the contemporary world - God willing.
April 30, 2022
دسم، مثير، رائع بكل معنى الكلمة
September 24, 2022
* I must apologize for this very long review. Although I tried to present only what I considered essential, it went beyond the limit of this reviewing space. I had to put the rest of it in the comment section.
Thank you
This is a university textbook. it covers the History of Islam since it appeared in the Arabian peninsula 1400 years ago, and how it spread across the middle east, near east, central Asia, north Africa, east Asia, south east Asia and east and west Africa. The author follows these societies and how they interacted with Islam, adopted it and in the process used and shaped its different layers. Islam is different for different peoples, even for different social groups. It can be the basis of an empire, a political ideology, a system of beliefs and rituals, a communal bond and organization, a mystical teaching, even a form of political protest and social reform. Islam is in some cases the religion of tribal peoples with no History of a state. In others, it is adopted by urban civilizations with a long history of empires. Each group in each situation gives a different meaning to what is Islam. It is an elusive concept because it can not be summarized by a simple narrative. Thinking Islam cannot be done without addressing the mindboggling variety of its manifestations and the peculiar historical, social and political context of every case.
The concept of a society has a fundamental role and the description of the dynamics of social classes and struggles for power and resources is an important paradigm. A massive change such as islamisation of peoples is the result of interactions between different social, ethnic and linguistic groups, and what they consider as their identity, political legitimization, forms of cultural expression, and even means of political protest. Elites as holders of economic and political power can create or redefine political institutions, impose new identities, while populace with its numbers can spread and consolidate identities and ideas over time, or be a source of political strife and protest, disrupting social order. Minorities are a curious case in which the complexity and ambiguity of what constitutes an identity can be seen.
The History of the Islam can be divided into four main periods. The first one is the appearance of Islam in the Arabian Peninsula, the Arab conquest and the creation of the Umayyad and Abbasid Empires. This is the golden age of Islam where it absorbed existent institutions and transformed them and gave them new meanings. The second period can be considered a sort of middle ages for the Islamic civilization, as political fragmentation became the norm after the fall of the Abbasid Empire. Nevertheless, it was an enormously fruitful period in the History of Islam as key aspects of Islamic identity and civilization were consolidated regardless of the political chaos. The third period is marked by the coming of the gunpowder empires. It is what can be considered the modern period of Islam which saw the reemergence of the centralized empires of the Ottomans, the Safavids, and the Mughals, coupled with a sort of global expansion reaching south East Asia and west and east Africa. The fourth period started by the western domination and the Islamic revival that came out of it, with all the massive political and social changes that created the societies we see today.
The first period of Islam was kicked off by an Arab expansion based and motivated by a religious teaching. The political aspects are intermingled with the religious ones, as the teaching of Muhammad was a sort of political protest against established tribal elites. It is almost a social reform movement that led to the formation of a state. However, this revolution did not lead to the eradication of the institutions it rose against, instead it absorbed them more than what was usually expected. Even Muhammad’s tribal enemies became Muslims by the end of his life, and after few years of civil wars, the power was back in the hands the Quraichi tribal establishment who are now also Muslims. Following the same logic, the tribes absorbed the neighboring Arab kingdoms.
At this point they created a tribe on the scale of a kingdom. Its structure and identity was that of an Arab tribal society. Its values and political legitimization were the traditional magnanimity and generosity of the chieftain, courage in battle, shrewdness in conflict arbitration, equity in rewards and punishment. The cultural and artistic expression was still the Arabic traditional form of poetry. It seems that being a Muslim was closely identified with being an Arab, and the religious teaching had little impact on the self-consciousness of the conquerors.
The conquest of the territory of byzantine near east and Sassanid Persia will mark an important turning point in the History of Islam. Arabs came in contact with new institutions, new religious and linguistic groups, new means of administration and state revenue management. They will appropriate this imperial heritage and combine it with their tribal way of doing things. One should not imagine that the tribes and the empires were separated in the first place; on the contrary they were familiar with each, especially in tampon Lakhmid and Ghassanid Arab kingdoms. But the complete subjugation of the Sassanid and Byzantine empires will usher a new level of merger between the two.
The governing Arab elite presented themselves as the continuation of great empires; they inherited the past glories and combined them with the prestige of the conqueror. But the Arabs had to rule with the help of existent Persian and Byzantine elites. As one cannot start an Empire from scratch, the Arabs depended largely on these administrators who held substantial political power. On the other hand, the Arab soldiers, although in the beginning of the conquest were segregated in garrison towns, gradually intermingled with the locals, becoming merchants, landowners and government officials. This is a common pattern that will repeat itself across all the territories reached by Muslims. They Arabize or Islamize the locals while they adopt local customs and ways. Every time, there is a new layer added to the Islamic identity, depending on its new environment.
The golden age of Islam is a time of consolidation. The Umayyads will consolidate the Arab identity in the middle and near East. The empire will soon outgrow its Arab identity and a panoply of complicated social and political factors will ignite the Abbasid revolution as a response to massive changes brought in by the political instability after the Arab conquest. The Abbasid age, although far from being a period of political stability, is also a period of consolidation, mainly a religious one.
It is only by this time that Islam will start to resemble what we know today. The Ulmayyads already inaugurated what can be called an Imperial Islam, based on patronage of artists, court poets, architectural projects which will create the Islamic symbols of political power. A form of Islam which will be perpetuated in the centuries to come, with the Abbasids, Fatimids, the Iberian Umayyads, the Safavids, the Ottomans and the Mughals. But the melting pot created by the mix of different populations and cultures will create new forms of Islam. By the Abbasid era, fundamental questions about what is it mean to be a Muslim were addressed, and multiple answers were advanced. Political unrest also contributed greatly in the formation of new religious interpretations to the fundamental question of the relationship between religion and power and the legitimization of the ruler.
As a response to this political and ideological turmoil, multiple forms of Islam emerged. The mystics founded their first orders of Sufism. Theologians asked questions about the nature of God, the interpretation of the Quran and the place of human action and will. The veneration of Muhammad become more central inside of Islam, his sayings and the emulating of him started to be considered as crucial in the Islamic belief and way of life. A legalistic tradition also started to take shape among key interpreters of the Quran and the sayings of the prophet, in order to absorb existent practices and customs and integrate them inside of the Islamic world view. A point of crucial importance was Islam as a legitimization for holding political power, and the relationship between rulers and the new religious establishment of interpreters, saints and descendants of the prophet. Some of the Abbasid rulers kept their distance from these controversies, while others actively supported this group or the other. But the collapse of their power will to a great extent determine the place of the religious elites for the subsequent period of the Islamic civilization.
The third period of the Islamic civilization starts after the collapse of the Abbasid Empire. Internal struggles, economic hardships but mainly the failed absorption of Turkic tribal peoples from central Asia, who were imported as slave soldiers will shatter the central authority and the whole region will fall into chaos, while other regions such as Egypt, north Africa and the Iberian peninsula had their own states and caliphate and did not pay the traditional homage to the Abbasid caliphate of Bagdad. These new political elites, being foreign will depend once again on existing elites to rule. This time, it is not the administrators of the Sassanid and Byzantine empires, it is actually the religious establishment who will fulfill the role of middle men between central power and the populace, and uphold the influence in the periphery of the state.
Throughout the Middle Ages, the relationship between the religious establishment and the rulers will be marked by a sort of ambiguity. The religious elites are critical of the rulers for not upholding Islamic principles, yet they accept their authority and collaborate with them in exchange for political stability, financial and economic advantages and privileges. There is a separation between these two institutions, one that is usually marked by hostility, but there is a great degree of collaboration and shared interests.
The most notorious case which can illustrate this ambiguity is that of Sufism. Sufism is organized in orders founded by holy men who teach an esoteric version of Islam, the renunciation of illusionary worldly pleasures in order to achieve the bliss of the union with God, rituals and teachings are giving through a network of teachers and adherents in tombs and shrines scattered across vast regions. But the Sufi orders are also political institutions, through alliance with merchants and tribal chiefs, they control commerce, arbitrate in disputes, own property, collect taxes, provide social welfare services for the poor, educate the young in quranic studies and perpetuate institutions of higher learning in Islamic jurisprudence. The importance of their role at the local level makes Sufi orders a political force and at most times representatives of the central power.
Another institution is that of the guild of the descendants of the prophet. This is a common theme across so many regions of the Islamic world. As from Morocco to Indonesia, and even east and West Africa, so many individuals claim the descent from the prophet as a basis for demands of a share of power. However, in order to co-opt them, rulers usually endow them with economic privileges and authority over the populace in remote regions, in order to dissuade them from further demands.
This distribution of power will mark the Islamic societies to this day. The ruling elites, their representatives and the populace will exist each in their own sphere. The rulers will sponsor a sort of imperial Islam, supporting a religious establishment which give them legitimacy. The rulers can thus be foreigners, slave soldiers as in the case of the Mamluks, and from a different Muslim sect as in the case of Fatimids. The religious establishment, being a non-military and supposedly an apolitical class, accepted the existent regime in order to ensure security, economic privileges and a share in local power. The religious elites uphold what can be called the Sunni Sufi orthodox Islam, a combination of adherence to a Sufi order with conforming to one of the main school of jurisprudence. With their political and social roles, they have a firm grip on the populace and their acceptance of the rulers. The middle men of power are not administrators or officials, wealthy lay landowners or merchants, but a class covered with an enormous religious prestige.
When it comes to the Islam of the populace in the middle ages, it was to a great extent defined by the religious establishment. However there is great variety due to political fragmentation and absence of a central authority which can impose a certain degree of standardization. Popular Islam was a combination of communal bonding in Sufi order, festivals and celebrations of important dates of the Islamic calendar, a belief in the supernatural power and blessing of holy men and tombs of saints.
By the beginning of the modern period, new empires will consolidate central power and put an end to the coming and going of the tribal dynasties and slave soldier states. The Safavids will impose a degree of order among tribal chiefs in Iran. The Ottomans will create a state in Anatolia and the Balkans. The Mughals will create a successful centralized state in the Indian subcontinent. The rise of these powers is marked by the almost total absorption of the religious elites inside of the state, the ability to gain cooperation of tribal chiefs and merchants, and the creation of strong state symbols through an imperial cultural renaissance, expressed in architecture, poetry and literature.
While the historical centers of Islam enjoyed an unprecedented degree of stability, the religion as a whole started to conquer more territory, or consolidate its hold on regions it was already introduced to before. Central Asia and North Africa were already Islamized by the coming and going of tribal conquerors who reproduced the first Arab political experience. Regions like west and east Africa, south East Asia Islam came in contact with Islam through merchants, wonderer holy men and would-be preachers who were looking for new zones of influence. Commerce played a crucial role in spreading Islam, both as a religion and as a form of political organization. The Indian sea trade created a network from east Africa, south Arabia, south India and the archipelagos of southEast Asia. Tran Saharan commerce linked both Muslim North Africa to West Africa and Egypt and Tunisia with east Africa.
In many cases, the arrival of Islam signaled deep socio-political changes. The networks of commerce brought new groups to power who profited from opportunities and demanded for a greater political participation in the name of social justice and political reform according to an Islamic viewpoint. In the case of Africa, new merchant classes organized themselves in the same way their clients were organized, strengthening similarity and trust. Sufi orders exported their influence and created new branches to spread their teachings. In some of African stateless or tribal regions, adopting Islam as a political identity was a political upgrade. In south East Asia, the new merchant class challenged the local landowning traditional aristocracy and adopted Islam differentiating themselves with a new framework of power.
For the locals, conversion to Islam did not always mean a radical transformation in their way of life or system of belief. Everywhere popular Islam was merged with local traditions, natives continued to practice their superstitions and respect their own norms without considering it to be in contradiction with being a Muslim. Even rulers continued to sponsor native festivals for the masses. There was never anything as standardize Islam which was common to all these vast regions and diverse cultures. Conversion to Islam was a redefinition of social affiliation and political realignment of groups moving out to a new economic and political context.
One of the most important manifestations of this state of fact, one which is even more visible today is that of Islam as a social reform movement. A pattern which repeats itself in time and space, is that of disadvantaged groups criticizing the regime in power for failing to adhere to true Islamic principles and implementing real Islamic policies, and therefore legitimizing their attempts to overthrow it in order to achieve a true Islamic way of life only possible through a real Islamic state. This situation creates an ambiguity between what is an expression of social unrest and what is extremist political movements.
The stability of the Muslim empires of the modern era was dependent on particular social and economic parameters, but the economic means and political incentives for guaranteeing the cooperation of all participants was very fragile. Inside of the Ottoman Empire, the military institution whose loyalty was the backbone of the state started to have a self-consciousness of its own power, changing trade opportunities also had an impact on the local elites and their dependence on the central authority. In Persia, the religious Shite establishment liberated itself from state control and allied itself to tribal lords, already eager to impose their own rule on locals. The Mughals already were a curious combination of Muslim warlords and local Hindu elites, and depended on economic factors which were ever changing.
The political upheaval had a direct impact on the practiced form of Islam. The influence of Sufi schools was being scrutinized by dissatisfied groups. Reformists ideas promoting strict literalist views of Islam were imported from Mecca and Medina and used to undermine the influence of the existent religious establishment. The Sufis were accused of being a sort of shrine and tomb worship which had nothing to do the real Islam, legalist were accused of not being observant enough of the true teachings. Again, the social unrest was disguised under a religious symbolism.
This was the political and the religious scene by the time new powers and even greater changes will forever impact Islamic societies. By the end of the XVIII century, European expansion reached the Muslim world. The Indian Ocean trade was dominated by the Portuguese and then the Dutch, the sub-Saharan trade with West Africa became a maritime affair of the British and the French. Egypt, an important ottoman province became a pawn in geopolitical struggles between the British, the French and the Russians to Ottoman demise, the Balkans were becoming independent thanks to European support. The Indian subcontinent was totally subjugated by the British. Central Asia was progressively absorbed by the Russians and the Chinese. European traders broke into Muslim merchant classes and even government officials, proposed their services of modernizing and optimizing administration, finance, commerce and warfare, in exchanged they demanded commercial privileges and special status in legal issues, and thus created a subversion to already weak states.
The contact with westerners exposed the ruling elites to new ideas. The era of multiethnic, multi religious and multi linguistic empires is over. States have become territorial entities legitimized by ethnic, religious and linguistic affinities. Elites faced not only western domination in trade, technical progress, and military superiority but also grave identity questions.
Thank you
This is a university textbook. it covers the History of Islam since it appeared in the Arabian peninsula 1400 years ago, and how it spread across the middle east, near east, central Asia, north Africa, east Asia, south east Asia and east and west Africa. The author follows these societies and how they interacted with Islam, adopted it and in the process used and shaped its different layers. Islam is different for different peoples, even for different social groups. It can be the basis of an empire, a political ideology, a system of beliefs and rituals, a communal bond and organization, a mystical teaching, even a form of political protest and social reform. Islam is in some cases the religion of tribal peoples with no History of a state. In others, it is adopted by urban civilizations with a long history of empires. Each group in each situation gives a different meaning to what is Islam. It is an elusive concept because it can not be summarized by a simple narrative. Thinking Islam cannot be done without addressing the mindboggling variety of its manifestations and the peculiar historical, social and political context of every case.
The concept of a society has a fundamental role and the description of the dynamics of social classes and struggles for power and resources is an important paradigm. A massive change such as islamisation of peoples is the result of interactions between different social, ethnic and linguistic groups, and what they consider as their identity, political legitimization, forms of cultural expression, and even means of political protest. Elites as holders of economic and political power can create or redefine political institutions, impose new identities, while populace with its numbers can spread and consolidate identities and ideas over time, or be a source of political strife and protest, disrupting social order. Minorities are a curious case in which the complexity and ambiguity of what constitutes an identity can be seen.
The History of the Islam can be divided into four main periods. The first one is the appearance of Islam in the Arabian Peninsula, the Arab conquest and the creation of the Umayyad and Abbasid Empires. This is the golden age of Islam where it absorbed existent institutions and transformed them and gave them new meanings. The second period can be considered a sort of middle ages for the Islamic civilization, as political fragmentation became the norm after the fall of the Abbasid Empire. Nevertheless, it was an enormously fruitful period in the History of Islam as key aspects of Islamic identity and civilization were consolidated regardless of the political chaos. The third period is marked by the coming of the gunpowder empires. It is what can be considered the modern period of Islam which saw the reemergence of the centralized empires of the Ottomans, the Safavids, and the Mughals, coupled with a sort of global expansion reaching south East Asia and west and east Africa. The fourth period started by the western domination and the Islamic revival that came out of it, with all the massive political and social changes that created the societies we see today.
The first period of Islam was kicked off by an Arab expansion based and motivated by a religious teaching. The political aspects are intermingled with the religious ones, as the teaching of Muhammad was a sort of political protest against established tribal elites. It is almost a social reform movement that led to the formation of a state. However, this revolution did not lead to the eradication of the institutions it rose against, instead it absorbed them more than what was usually expected. Even Muhammad’s tribal enemies became Muslims by the end of his life, and after few years of civil wars, the power was back in the hands the Quraichi tribal establishment who are now also Muslims. Following the same logic, the tribes absorbed the neighboring Arab kingdoms.
At this point they created a tribe on the scale of a kingdom. Its structure and identity was that of an Arab tribal society. Its values and political legitimization were the traditional magnanimity and generosity of the chieftain, courage in battle, shrewdness in conflict arbitration, equity in rewards and punishment. The cultural and artistic expression was still the Arabic traditional form of poetry. It seems that being a Muslim was closely identified with being an Arab, and the religious teaching had little impact on the self-consciousness of the conquerors.
The conquest of the territory of byzantine near east and Sassanid Persia will mark an important turning point in the History of Islam. Arabs came in contact with new institutions, new religious and linguistic groups, new means of administration and state revenue management. They will appropriate this imperial heritage and combine it with their tribal way of doing things. One should not imagine that the tribes and the empires were separated in the first place; on the contrary they were familiar with each, especially in tampon Lakhmid and Ghassanid Arab kingdoms. But the complete subjugation of the Sassanid and Byzantine empires will usher a new level of merger between the two.
The governing Arab elite presented themselves as the continuation of great empires; they inherited the past glories and combined them with the prestige of the conqueror. But the Arabs had to rule with the help of existent Persian and Byzantine elites. As one cannot start an Empire from scratch, the Arabs depended largely on these administrators who held substantial political power. On the other hand, the Arab soldiers, although in the beginning of the conquest were segregated in garrison towns, gradually intermingled with the locals, becoming merchants, landowners and government officials. This is a common pattern that will repeat itself across all the territories reached by Muslims. They Arabize or Islamize the locals while they adopt local customs and ways. Every time, there is a new layer added to the Islamic identity, depending on its new environment.
The golden age of Islam is a time of consolidation. The Umayyads will consolidate the Arab identity in the middle and near East. The empire will soon outgrow its Arab identity and a panoply of complicated social and political factors will ignite the Abbasid revolution as a response to massive changes brought in by the political instability after the Arab conquest. The Abbasid age, although far from being a period of political stability, is also a period of consolidation, mainly a religious one.
It is only by this time that Islam will start to resemble what we know today. The Ulmayyads already inaugurated what can be called an Imperial Islam, based on patronage of artists, court poets, architectural projects which will create the Islamic symbols of political power. A form of Islam which will be perpetuated in the centuries to come, with the Abbasids, Fatimids, the Iberian Umayyads, the Safavids, the Ottomans and the Mughals. But the melting pot created by the mix of different populations and cultures will create new forms of Islam. By the Abbasid era, fundamental questions about what is it mean to be a Muslim were addressed, and multiple answers were advanced. Political unrest also contributed greatly in the formation of new religious interpretations to the fundamental question of the relationship between religion and power and the legitimization of the ruler.
As a response to this political and ideological turmoil, multiple forms of Islam emerged. The mystics founded their first orders of Sufism. Theologians asked questions about the nature of God, the interpretation of the Quran and the place of human action and will. The veneration of Muhammad become more central inside of Islam, his sayings and the emulating of him started to be considered as crucial in the Islamic belief and way of life. A legalistic tradition also started to take shape among key interpreters of the Quran and the sayings of the prophet, in order to absorb existent practices and customs and integrate them inside of the Islamic world view. A point of crucial importance was Islam as a legitimization for holding political power, and the relationship between rulers and the new religious establishment of interpreters, saints and descendants of the prophet. Some of the Abbasid rulers kept their distance from these controversies, while others actively supported this group or the other. But the collapse of their power will to a great extent determine the place of the religious elites for the subsequent period of the Islamic civilization.
The third period of the Islamic civilization starts after the collapse of the Abbasid Empire. Internal struggles, economic hardships but mainly the failed absorption of Turkic tribal peoples from central Asia, who were imported as slave soldiers will shatter the central authority and the whole region will fall into chaos, while other regions such as Egypt, north Africa and the Iberian peninsula had their own states and caliphate and did not pay the traditional homage to the Abbasid caliphate of Bagdad. These new political elites, being foreign will depend once again on existing elites to rule. This time, it is not the administrators of the Sassanid and Byzantine empires, it is actually the religious establishment who will fulfill the role of middle men between central power and the populace, and uphold the influence in the periphery of the state.
Throughout the Middle Ages, the relationship between the religious establishment and the rulers will be marked by a sort of ambiguity. The religious elites are critical of the rulers for not upholding Islamic principles, yet they accept their authority and collaborate with them in exchange for political stability, financial and economic advantages and privileges. There is a separation between these two institutions, one that is usually marked by hostility, but there is a great degree of collaboration and shared interests.
The most notorious case which can illustrate this ambiguity is that of Sufism. Sufism is organized in orders founded by holy men who teach an esoteric version of Islam, the renunciation of illusionary worldly pleasures in order to achieve the bliss of the union with God, rituals and teachings are giving through a network of teachers and adherents in tombs and shrines scattered across vast regions. But the Sufi orders are also political institutions, through alliance with merchants and tribal chiefs, they control commerce, arbitrate in disputes, own property, collect taxes, provide social welfare services for the poor, educate the young in quranic studies and perpetuate institutions of higher learning in Islamic jurisprudence. The importance of their role at the local level makes Sufi orders a political force and at most times representatives of the central power.
Another institution is that of the guild of the descendants of the prophet. This is a common theme across so many regions of the Islamic world. As from Morocco to Indonesia, and even east and West Africa, so many individuals claim the descent from the prophet as a basis for demands of a share of power. However, in order to co-opt them, rulers usually endow them with economic privileges and authority over the populace in remote regions, in order to dissuade them from further demands.
This distribution of power will mark the Islamic societies to this day. The ruling elites, their representatives and the populace will exist each in their own sphere. The rulers will sponsor a sort of imperial Islam, supporting a religious establishment which give them legitimacy. The rulers can thus be foreigners, slave soldiers as in the case of the Mamluks, and from a different Muslim sect as in the case of Fatimids. The religious establishment, being a non-military and supposedly an apolitical class, accepted the existent regime in order to ensure security, economic privileges and a share in local power. The religious elites uphold what can be called the Sunni Sufi orthodox Islam, a combination of adherence to a Sufi order with conforming to one of the main school of jurisprudence. With their political and social roles, they have a firm grip on the populace and their acceptance of the rulers. The middle men of power are not administrators or officials, wealthy lay landowners or merchants, but a class covered with an enormous religious prestige.
When it comes to the Islam of the populace in the middle ages, it was to a great extent defined by the religious establishment. However there is great variety due to political fragmentation and absence of a central authority which can impose a certain degree of standardization. Popular Islam was a combination of communal bonding in Sufi order, festivals and celebrations of important dates of the Islamic calendar, a belief in the supernatural power and blessing of holy men and tombs of saints.
By the beginning of the modern period, new empires will consolidate central power and put an end to the coming and going of the tribal dynasties and slave soldier states. The Safavids will impose a degree of order among tribal chiefs in Iran. The Ottomans will create a state in Anatolia and the Balkans. The Mughals will create a successful centralized state in the Indian subcontinent. The rise of these powers is marked by the almost total absorption of the religious elites inside of the state, the ability to gain cooperation of tribal chiefs and merchants, and the creation of strong state symbols through an imperial cultural renaissance, expressed in architecture, poetry and literature.
While the historical centers of Islam enjoyed an unprecedented degree of stability, the religion as a whole started to conquer more territory, or consolidate its hold on regions it was already introduced to before. Central Asia and North Africa were already Islamized by the coming and going of tribal conquerors who reproduced the first Arab political experience. Regions like west and east Africa, south East Asia Islam came in contact with Islam through merchants, wonderer holy men and would-be preachers who were looking for new zones of influence. Commerce played a crucial role in spreading Islam, both as a religion and as a form of political organization. The Indian sea trade created a network from east Africa, south Arabia, south India and the archipelagos of southEast Asia. Tran Saharan commerce linked both Muslim North Africa to West Africa and Egypt and Tunisia with east Africa.
In many cases, the arrival of Islam signaled deep socio-political changes. The networks of commerce brought new groups to power who profited from opportunities and demanded for a greater political participation in the name of social justice and political reform according to an Islamic viewpoint. In the case of Africa, new merchant classes organized themselves in the same way their clients were organized, strengthening similarity and trust. Sufi orders exported their influence and created new branches to spread their teachings. In some of African stateless or tribal regions, adopting Islam as a political identity was a political upgrade. In south East Asia, the new merchant class challenged the local landowning traditional aristocracy and adopted Islam differentiating themselves with a new framework of power.
For the locals, conversion to Islam did not always mean a radical transformation in their way of life or system of belief. Everywhere popular Islam was merged with local traditions, natives continued to practice their superstitions and respect their own norms without considering it to be in contradiction with being a Muslim. Even rulers continued to sponsor native festivals for the masses. There was never anything as standardize Islam which was common to all these vast regions and diverse cultures. Conversion to Islam was a redefinition of social affiliation and political realignment of groups moving out to a new economic and political context.
One of the most important manifestations of this state of fact, one which is even more visible today is that of Islam as a social reform movement. A pattern which repeats itself in time and space, is that of disadvantaged groups criticizing the regime in power for failing to adhere to true Islamic principles and implementing real Islamic policies, and therefore legitimizing their attempts to overthrow it in order to achieve a true Islamic way of life only possible through a real Islamic state. This situation creates an ambiguity between what is an expression of social unrest and what is extremist political movements.
The stability of the Muslim empires of the modern era was dependent on particular social and economic parameters, but the economic means and political incentives for guaranteeing the cooperation of all participants was very fragile. Inside of the Ottoman Empire, the military institution whose loyalty was the backbone of the state started to have a self-consciousness of its own power, changing trade opportunities also had an impact on the local elites and their dependence on the central authority. In Persia, the religious Shite establishment liberated itself from state control and allied itself to tribal lords, already eager to impose their own rule on locals. The Mughals already were a curious combination of Muslim warlords and local Hindu elites, and depended on economic factors which were ever changing.
The political upheaval had a direct impact on the practiced form of Islam. The influence of Sufi schools was being scrutinized by dissatisfied groups. Reformists ideas promoting strict literalist views of Islam were imported from Mecca and Medina and used to undermine the influence of the existent religious establishment. The Sufis were accused of being a sort of shrine and tomb worship which had nothing to do the real Islam, legalist were accused of not being observant enough of the true teachings. Again, the social unrest was disguised under a religious symbolism.
This was the political and the religious scene by the time new powers and even greater changes will forever impact Islamic societies. By the end of the XVIII century, European expansion reached the Muslim world. The Indian Ocean trade was dominated by the Portuguese and then the Dutch, the sub-Saharan trade with West Africa became a maritime affair of the British and the French. Egypt, an important ottoman province became a pawn in geopolitical struggles between the British, the French and the Russians to Ottoman demise, the Balkans were becoming independent thanks to European support. The Indian subcontinent was totally subjugated by the British. Central Asia was progressively absorbed by the Russians and the Chinese. European traders broke into Muslim merchant classes and even government officials, proposed their services of modernizing and optimizing administration, finance, commerce and warfare, in exchanged they demanded commercial privileges and special status in legal issues, and thus created a subversion to already weak states.
The contact with westerners exposed the ruling elites to new ideas. The era of multiethnic, multi religious and multi linguistic empires is over. States have become territorial entities legitimized by ethnic, religious and linguistic affinities. Elites faced not only western domination in trade, technical progress, and military superiority but also grave identity questions.
May 5, 2017
This is a famous book. Together with Marshall Hodgson’s three-volume “The Venture of Islam,” it is the touchstone of modern long-form histories of the Islamic world. “A History of Islamic Societies,” as its title implies, covers both history and theology. Given that I like history, and that I have a particular interest in comparative theology (primarily as between Christianity and Islam, with forays into other religions, living and dead), you would think reading this book would be, for me, an ideal way to spend my time. But it nearly defeated me.
It is not that it is a bad book. It is a great book for what it is—a reference book. It has more in common with an encyclopedia than with a narrative history. Oh, it’s not badly written, just very dryly, and organized in a way that makes it much more useful as a reference. If I want to know the history of “Nineteenth Century Turkestan (Transoxania, Khwarizm, and Farghana),” I simply have to turn to pages 345 through 350. “Qajar Iran”—pages 469 to 472. And so on. Most of what you could ever want to know about any society that has ever had a substantial Muslim presence is in this thousand-page book.
But no normal person can remember this torrent of information. Certainly, there are a few people with prodigy memories who can remember a lot of it (though true photographic memory is a myth). And if you are already a true expert, who has been exposed to much or all of this information in the course of prior studies, you may remember portions, particularly those of notable interest to you personally, because the information will serve to reinforce what you already know. For most people, though, reading this or anything else once, in isolation, is likely to result in its near-total disappearance from memory, unless it is reinforced in some way by repetition from some other source.
So the problem with this book is that the casual reader will not remember the facts in this book, other than to the extent they are part of common currency (e.g., Muhammad was the prophet of Islam). Some other facts do fall into that category—maybe not common currency, but they are discussed or referred to frequently enough in the modern era to not just be facts in isolation to the reader (e.g., Shiite Islam dominates in Iran). Unfortunately, the vast majority of facts in this book do not fit into that category, so the time spent reading this book completely through will, unfortunately, almost certainly be wasted.
This is merely one example of a problem with modern reading on any complex topic, such as substantial history or political philosophy. Unless you are immersed in a milieu where you are frequently exposed and re-exposed to the relevant facts and concepts, either directly or tangentially, during study or work as well as in casual conversation and interchange, most people immediately forget most of what they read. In the past, educated people shared, to a certain degree, a common training and outlook, such that numerous literary/historical/political references were universally recognized, often being used as a shorthand. The most common references, unsurprisingly, were episodes from Greek, Roman and English history, as a glance at most fiction or autobiography, as well as academic works, written prior to 1960 will show. Thus, many episodes in history became part of the lingua franca, and new facts connected, even tangentially, to those episodes were easier to remember. But as the core of what used constitutes Western education has expanded (or decayed), and in daily life the options of what to read, and what other entertainment to consume, have also greatly expanded, this common basis of communication has disappeared. This necessarily means that for any complex topic that is not in common currency, the non-professional reader, to remember what he reads and thereby to retain value, either has to create his own repetition, through reading multiple works close in time to each other, or by writing review-type summaries (which is why I am writing this). Or he must somehow find a daily milieu where reinforcement can occur, which I find difficult to believe today exists outside of academic environments.
But this is a book review, not (merely) some meta thoughts about reading. Perhaps it is fortunate that Ira Lapidus wrote this book before Islam became a political football in the West. (I read the second edition, published in 2005; the first edition was published in 1988, and in 2014 a third edition was published). That’s not to say there wasn’t a political angle in 1988. At that point for some years a variety of academics had pushed back against a supposed “Orientalism”—the alleged failure of Western academics, and Westerners in general, to appreciate the virtues and wonders of non-Western societies, together with the supposed tendency of Westerners to ascribe characteristics to non-Western societies marking them as some combination of degenerate and incompetent. While that criticism may make sense and have value if judiciously applied, it is not clear to me that “Eurocentric” bias was, say prior to 1980, the problem we are told it was. After all, earlier writers such as the enormously influential Steven Runciman had long taken an aggressively pro-Muslim, anti-Western and anti-Christian stance, and literate adventurers such as T.E. Lawrence and Wilfred Thesiger had brought appreciation for certain Middle Eastern ways. And given that cultural Marxists are universal liars about the past, and there is a substantial overlap between the enemies of “Orientalism” and cultural Marxists, I’m betting there’s more to the story than we’re told.
So my guess is that supposed 20th Century Eurocentrism is largely a greatly exaggerated caricature. Not to mention that it is pretty clearly the case that since 1200 or so, European societies have been hugely superior to any other world society, by nearly any measure—therefore, largely, criticizing Eurocentrism is like complaining we are anthropocentric because we care more about humans than dolphins. Well, yes. Dolphins are inferior to us, so we study and care about them less than humans, just as other world societies were inferior to, and less important than, Europe for a very long time. Recognizing this is recognizing reality, not an insult. (Whether Europe still has any claim to pride of place is a separate question, and not one that obviously has a pleasing answer to Europeans, or Americans.) But, in any case, Lapidus has little to say about Europe, and this book is not overtly an entry in the anti-“Orientalist” campaigns, since it is as straightforward an account as straightforward gets.
There is another political fly in the ointment, of course. Since 2001, of course, the American picture of Islam has become clouded, on the one hand by many on the right endorsing a superficial and wholly negative view of Islam and Islamic societies, and by many (mostly on the left, but also including many on the right, such as George Bush, and hard-to-place silly men, such as Pope Francis) whitewashing less-pleasant theological characteristics and historical behaviors based on Islam and common in Islamic societies. Both approaches incorrectly view Islamic societies as monolithic and fail to grasp the rich texture of nearly 1500 years of Islam. This book, reference book or not, is an excellent corrective to both tendencies. It is a strictly neutral account of the facts of Islamic societies, which to an open-minded reader makes for a generally positive account of Muslim societies. For, as with any great civilization, one can come up with an endless litany of horrors, since bad behavior characterizes all men, but that should not overly detract from the glories of the civilization.
I will not try to summarize the book, because it is not susceptible to summary. I will note that it is more of a social history than an economic history, and that the book does have some large-scale themes that become evident, even if they are not put front-and-center by the author. First, there is recognition of the incredible multiplicity within Islam (I would say “diversity,” but that word has been ruined). Modestly well-informed Americans are aware of the split between Sunni and Shiite, even if they don’t comprehend its origin and meaning. But a longitudinal view of Muslim history, as Lapidus offers, not only shows the origin and myriad details of that particular division, but many other fault lines and divisions (not necessarily with the same negative consequences), ranging from Sunni schools of law (madhhab); to the rich variety of Sufi practice, belief and impact (frequently as leaders of violence, in contradiction to the “dervish” stereotype); to the many “fundamentalist” movements, such as the Kharijites, dating back to earliest Muslim times but with successors such as the Wahhabis and ISIS today. And that’s just theological diversity—the culture of the Maghreb was very different than that of Persia, which was (and is) very different from that of Southeast Asia, and so on, despite the commonality of Muslim belief. Not to mention that all this is a gross over-simplification of how we got to now—for example, to get to the four current schools of Sunni law (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali) was a long and arduous, not to say tortuous and dangerous, process for thousands of the world’s brightest minds for hundreds of years. All this Lapidus covers in great detail—for example, take this sample summary sentence to a paragraph, “The Ash’aris and the Maturidis steered a middle course between Mu’tazili rationalism and Hanbali literalism.” I find this fascinating. Your mileage may vary.
A second theme is the strength of Islam. While Islam spread mostly by armed conquest, Lapidus notes that “If there is an underlying common factor in the worldwide diffusion of Islam it seems to be its capacity to generate religious fellowship, larger-order communities, and states among peoples otherwise living in highly factionalized or fragmented societies.” Ultimately, whether for the practical reasons of personal advancement, or for spiritual reasons, internal or the external ones of belonging to a larger, in fact worldwide, community, Islam proved attractive to people, both those outside and those under Muslim domination. As more than one person has pointed out, mass conversion of Muslims to any other religion is essentially unheard of, and only part of the reason is the capital punishment frequently meted out throughout history to Muslim apostates. The strength of Muslim bonds of spirit and solidarity must also be important, perhaps more important. Whether, in some counterfactual world, if a new Godfrey of Bouillon were to conquer Muslim lands and establish Christian dominance, over some lengthy period of time mass re-conversions might occur is an interesting question.
In considering such a question, it’s important to remember it took many hundreds of years before the Middle East became as Muslim as it is today. In fact, Lapidus notes that during the Crusades, a substantial majority of the population of the Levant was still Christian. Here, and in many other locations, Lapidus notes that for quite some time, the new Muslim overlords not only did not pursue conversions, they positively discouraged conversions, because that would reduce the tax base (since Muslims were exempt from certain taxes), increase the number of people among whom the booty of war had to be distributed, and erode the distinction between conquerors and conquered. In fact, the usual early practice was to build entirely new garrison cities (amsar; the origin of Fustat (Cairo, sort of) and Basra) to avoid mixing of the masses. Not to mention that the Muslim conquerors had no problem extensively using and working with Christian (and Jewish, and Zoroastrian) elites for everything from scribal services to translation to science to other forms of administration, making no effort to convert them. We in the West tend to see Islam through the prism of Christianity, an evangelizing religion. Theologically Islam requires that Islam dominate around the globe (and most especially never lose any area it has once dominated); usually conversion is a vastly lower priority, if a priority at all. (Failure to appreciate this makes it more difficult to understand modern conflicts with Islam.) Christianity, of course, has usually taken a more evangelization-focused approach (although in the modern world, we have Pope Francis denigrating evangelization, a circumstance entirely bizarre). But for the reasons earlier given relating to the strength of Islam, I would think that if Christianity were to regain its historical approach to evangelization, my guess is that re-conversions of Muslim areas might be possible—but only coupled with conquest, and only over a very long period of time.
A third theme, or rather characteristic, is objectivity. So, for example, unlike Muslim apologists such as Karen Armstrong (a crypto-Muslim falsely claiming to be Christian), Lapidus does not ignore that as part of his early conquests, Muhammad “destroy[ed] his opponents, including the Jewish clans.” But he does not over-emphasize this, or any other of what would be regarded by moderns as bad behavior by Muhammad (or other early Muslims), as, frankly, many American conservatives tend to do today. Any honest observer knows that pre-modern warfare involved a large amount of unpleasantness, including frequent mass killing of the defeated. Richard the Lion-Hearted massacred Saracen prisoners in 1191 when he was besieging Acre, as we are constantly told in an attempt to paint the Crusades in a bad light; we are never reminded that the Mamluks massacred every civilian in the city they could get their hands on during and after the later Siege of Acre in 1291. Such examples are legion. Spending one’s time criticizing such past behavior is a waste of time and shows a personal agenda, one thankfully missing in this book.
I could pick out many other interesting topics from this book to discuss. That’s the nature of reference works, of course—if you take an encyclopedia and open it at random, you are likely to be rewarded, just as you are with this book. To take another random example, something of particular interest to me is something is that is too often forgotten today—why Islam succeeded in rapid early expansion. “The reasons for the relatively rapid success of the Arab-Muslim conquests are not hard to find. The Byzantine and Sasanian empires were both militarily exhausted by several decades of warfare prior to the Aram-Muslim invasions. The Christian populations—the Copts in Egypt, the Monophysites in Syria, and the Nestorians in Iraq—all had long histories of troubled relations with their Byzantine and Sasanian overlords. Their disaffection was important in the cases where Christian-Arab border tribes and military auxiliaries joined the conquerors and where fortified cities capitulated. The conquests, then were due to victories over militarily weakened powers and were consolidated because local populations were content to accept the new regime.” It’s analysis like this (buttressed by plenty of detail) that make this book so worthwhile, on any topic you may care to refer to it for.
By the end of the book, Lapidus takes the story of Islamic societies all the way to the present day (and presumably the third edition takes it a decade beyond the second). I personally am less interested in the modern era, but you can find objective facts and analysis on that era as well in this book, something hard to get if you rely on, say, Wikipedia. Thus, it’s not that I’m not recommending this book—I do recommend this book. I just don’t recommend sitting down and reading it cover to cover. The opportunity cost is too high relative to the information you’re likely to retain. But as a book to have close at hand to beat up people during Facebook discussions, it’s excellent.
It is not that it is a bad book. It is a great book for what it is—a reference book. It has more in common with an encyclopedia than with a narrative history. Oh, it’s not badly written, just very dryly, and organized in a way that makes it much more useful as a reference. If I want to know the history of “Nineteenth Century Turkestan (Transoxania, Khwarizm, and Farghana),” I simply have to turn to pages 345 through 350. “Qajar Iran”—pages 469 to 472. And so on. Most of what you could ever want to know about any society that has ever had a substantial Muslim presence is in this thousand-page book.
But no normal person can remember this torrent of information. Certainly, there are a few people with prodigy memories who can remember a lot of it (though true photographic memory is a myth). And if you are already a true expert, who has been exposed to much or all of this information in the course of prior studies, you may remember portions, particularly those of notable interest to you personally, because the information will serve to reinforce what you already know. For most people, though, reading this or anything else once, in isolation, is likely to result in its near-total disappearance from memory, unless it is reinforced in some way by repetition from some other source.
So the problem with this book is that the casual reader will not remember the facts in this book, other than to the extent they are part of common currency (e.g., Muhammad was the prophet of Islam). Some other facts do fall into that category—maybe not common currency, but they are discussed or referred to frequently enough in the modern era to not just be facts in isolation to the reader (e.g., Shiite Islam dominates in Iran). Unfortunately, the vast majority of facts in this book do not fit into that category, so the time spent reading this book completely through will, unfortunately, almost certainly be wasted.
This is merely one example of a problem with modern reading on any complex topic, such as substantial history or political philosophy. Unless you are immersed in a milieu where you are frequently exposed and re-exposed to the relevant facts and concepts, either directly or tangentially, during study or work as well as in casual conversation and interchange, most people immediately forget most of what they read. In the past, educated people shared, to a certain degree, a common training and outlook, such that numerous literary/historical/political references were universally recognized, often being used as a shorthand. The most common references, unsurprisingly, were episodes from Greek, Roman and English history, as a glance at most fiction or autobiography, as well as academic works, written prior to 1960 will show. Thus, many episodes in history became part of the lingua franca, and new facts connected, even tangentially, to those episodes were easier to remember. But as the core of what used constitutes Western education has expanded (or decayed), and in daily life the options of what to read, and what other entertainment to consume, have also greatly expanded, this common basis of communication has disappeared. This necessarily means that for any complex topic that is not in common currency, the non-professional reader, to remember what he reads and thereby to retain value, either has to create his own repetition, through reading multiple works close in time to each other, or by writing review-type summaries (which is why I am writing this). Or he must somehow find a daily milieu where reinforcement can occur, which I find difficult to believe today exists outside of academic environments.
But this is a book review, not (merely) some meta thoughts about reading. Perhaps it is fortunate that Ira Lapidus wrote this book before Islam became a political football in the West. (I read the second edition, published in 2005; the first edition was published in 1988, and in 2014 a third edition was published). That’s not to say there wasn’t a political angle in 1988. At that point for some years a variety of academics had pushed back against a supposed “Orientalism”—the alleged failure of Western academics, and Westerners in general, to appreciate the virtues and wonders of non-Western societies, together with the supposed tendency of Westerners to ascribe characteristics to non-Western societies marking them as some combination of degenerate and incompetent. While that criticism may make sense and have value if judiciously applied, it is not clear to me that “Eurocentric” bias was, say prior to 1980, the problem we are told it was. After all, earlier writers such as the enormously influential Steven Runciman had long taken an aggressively pro-Muslim, anti-Western and anti-Christian stance, and literate adventurers such as T.E. Lawrence and Wilfred Thesiger had brought appreciation for certain Middle Eastern ways. And given that cultural Marxists are universal liars about the past, and there is a substantial overlap between the enemies of “Orientalism” and cultural Marxists, I’m betting there’s more to the story than we’re told.
So my guess is that supposed 20th Century Eurocentrism is largely a greatly exaggerated caricature. Not to mention that it is pretty clearly the case that since 1200 or so, European societies have been hugely superior to any other world society, by nearly any measure—therefore, largely, criticizing Eurocentrism is like complaining we are anthropocentric because we care more about humans than dolphins. Well, yes. Dolphins are inferior to us, so we study and care about them less than humans, just as other world societies were inferior to, and less important than, Europe for a very long time. Recognizing this is recognizing reality, not an insult. (Whether Europe still has any claim to pride of place is a separate question, and not one that obviously has a pleasing answer to Europeans, or Americans.) But, in any case, Lapidus has little to say about Europe, and this book is not overtly an entry in the anti-“Orientalist” campaigns, since it is as straightforward an account as straightforward gets.
There is another political fly in the ointment, of course. Since 2001, of course, the American picture of Islam has become clouded, on the one hand by many on the right endorsing a superficial and wholly negative view of Islam and Islamic societies, and by many (mostly on the left, but also including many on the right, such as George Bush, and hard-to-place silly men, such as Pope Francis) whitewashing less-pleasant theological characteristics and historical behaviors based on Islam and common in Islamic societies. Both approaches incorrectly view Islamic societies as monolithic and fail to grasp the rich texture of nearly 1500 years of Islam. This book, reference book or not, is an excellent corrective to both tendencies. It is a strictly neutral account of the facts of Islamic societies, which to an open-minded reader makes for a generally positive account of Muslim societies. For, as with any great civilization, one can come up with an endless litany of horrors, since bad behavior characterizes all men, but that should not overly detract from the glories of the civilization.
I will not try to summarize the book, because it is not susceptible to summary. I will note that it is more of a social history than an economic history, and that the book does have some large-scale themes that become evident, even if they are not put front-and-center by the author. First, there is recognition of the incredible multiplicity within Islam (I would say “diversity,” but that word has been ruined). Modestly well-informed Americans are aware of the split between Sunni and Shiite, even if they don’t comprehend its origin and meaning. But a longitudinal view of Muslim history, as Lapidus offers, not only shows the origin and myriad details of that particular division, but many other fault lines and divisions (not necessarily with the same negative consequences), ranging from Sunni schools of law (madhhab); to the rich variety of Sufi practice, belief and impact (frequently as leaders of violence, in contradiction to the “dervish” stereotype); to the many “fundamentalist” movements, such as the Kharijites, dating back to earliest Muslim times but with successors such as the Wahhabis and ISIS today. And that’s just theological diversity—the culture of the Maghreb was very different than that of Persia, which was (and is) very different from that of Southeast Asia, and so on, despite the commonality of Muslim belief. Not to mention that all this is a gross over-simplification of how we got to now—for example, to get to the four current schools of Sunni law (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali) was a long and arduous, not to say tortuous and dangerous, process for thousands of the world’s brightest minds for hundreds of years. All this Lapidus covers in great detail—for example, take this sample summary sentence to a paragraph, “The Ash’aris and the Maturidis steered a middle course between Mu’tazili rationalism and Hanbali literalism.” I find this fascinating. Your mileage may vary.
A second theme is the strength of Islam. While Islam spread mostly by armed conquest, Lapidus notes that “If there is an underlying common factor in the worldwide diffusion of Islam it seems to be its capacity to generate religious fellowship, larger-order communities, and states among peoples otherwise living in highly factionalized or fragmented societies.” Ultimately, whether for the practical reasons of personal advancement, or for spiritual reasons, internal or the external ones of belonging to a larger, in fact worldwide, community, Islam proved attractive to people, both those outside and those under Muslim domination. As more than one person has pointed out, mass conversion of Muslims to any other religion is essentially unheard of, and only part of the reason is the capital punishment frequently meted out throughout history to Muslim apostates. The strength of Muslim bonds of spirit and solidarity must also be important, perhaps more important. Whether, in some counterfactual world, if a new Godfrey of Bouillon were to conquer Muslim lands and establish Christian dominance, over some lengthy period of time mass re-conversions might occur is an interesting question.
In considering such a question, it’s important to remember it took many hundreds of years before the Middle East became as Muslim as it is today. In fact, Lapidus notes that during the Crusades, a substantial majority of the population of the Levant was still Christian. Here, and in many other locations, Lapidus notes that for quite some time, the new Muslim overlords not only did not pursue conversions, they positively discouraged conversions, because that would reduce the tax base (since Muslims were exempt from certain taxes), increase the number of people among whom the booty of war had to be distributed, and erode the distinction between conquerors and conquered. In fact, the usual early practice was to build entirely new garrison cities (amsar; the origin of Fustat (Cairo, sort of) and Basra) to avoid mixing of the masses. Not to mention that the Muslim conquerors had no problem extensively using and working with Christian (and Jewish, and Zoroastrian) elites for everything from scribal services to translation to science to other forms of administration, making no effort to convert them. We in the West tend to see Islam through the prism of Christianity, an evangelizing religion. Theologically Islam requires that Islam dominate around the globe (and most especially never lose any area it has once dominated); usually conversion is a vastly lower priority, if a priority at all. (Failure to appreciate this makes it more difficult to understand modern conflicts with Islam.) Christianity, of course, has usually taken a more evangelization-focused approach (although in the modern world, we have Pope Francis denigrating evangelization, a circumstance entirely bizarre). But for the reasons earlier given relating to the strength of Islam, I would think that if Christianity were to regain its historical approach to evangelization, my guess is that re-conversions of Muslim areas might be possible—but only coupled with conquest, and only over a very long period of time.
A third theme, or rather characteristic, is objectivity. So, for example, unlike Muslim apologists such as Karen Armstrong (a crypto-Muslim falsely claiming to be Christian), Lapidus does not ignore that as part of his early conquests, Muhammad “destroy[ed] his opponents, including the Jewish clans.” But he does not over-emphasize this, or any other of what would be regarded by moderns as bad behavior by Muhammad (or other early Muslims), as, frankly, many American conservatives tend to do today. Any honest observer knows that pre-modern warfare involved a large amount of unpleasantness, including frequent mass killing of the defeated. Richard the Lion-Hearted massacred Saracen prisoners in 1191 when he was besieging Acre, as we are constantly told in an attempt to paint the Crusades in a bad light; we are never reminded that the Mamluks massacred every civilian in the city they could get their hands on during and after the later Siege of Acre in 1291. Such examples are legion. Spending one’s time criticizing such past behavior is a waste of time and shows a personal agenda, one thankfully missing in this book.
I could pick out many other interesting topics from this book to discuss. That’s the nature of reference works, of course—if you take an encyclopedia and open it at random, you are likely to be rewarded, just as you are with this book. To take another random example, something of particular interest to me is something is that is too often forgotten today—why Islam succeeded in rapid early expansion. “The reasons for the relatively rapid success of the Arab-Muslim conquests are not hard to find. The Byzantine and Sasanian empires were both militarily exhausted by several decades of warfare prior to the Aram-Muslim invasions. The Christian populations—the Copts in Egypt, the Monophysites in Syria, and the Nestorians in Iraq—all had long histories of troubled relations with their Byzantine and Sasanian overlords. Their disaffection was important in the cases where Christian-Arab border tribes and military auxiliaries joined the conquerors and where fortified cities capitulated. The conquests, then were due to victories over militarily weakened powers and were consolidated because local populations were content to accept the new regime.” It’s analysis like this (buttressed by plenty of detail) that make this book so worthwhile, on any topic you may care to refer to it for.
By the end of the book, Lapidus takes the story of Islamic societies all the way to the present day (and presumably the third edition takes it a decade beyond the second). I personally am less interested in the modern era, but you can find objective facts and analysis on that era as well in this book, something hard to get if you rely on, say, Wikipedia. Thus, it’s not that I’m not recommending this book—I do recommend this book. I just don’t recommend sitting down and reading it cover to cover. The opportunity cost is too high relative to the information you’re likely to retain. But as a book to have close at hand to beat up people during Facebook discussions, it’s excellent.
June 6, 2019
awesome reading. the story of islam from 7th century to end of 20th. from Morocco to china. great read
March 1, 2015
كتاب موسوعي يضم عرض لأحوال المجتمعات الإسلامية منذ ظهور الإسلام وحتي قيام الدول القومية الحديثة المعاصرة متتبعا تطور وضع الإسلام بهذه المجتمعات وتأثيره فيها وتأثره بها .. الكتاب قائم على السرد التاريخي وترجمته ليست على المستوي المطلوب... أفضل ما في الكتاب الخاتمة التي جاءت في 100 صفحة تقريبا ولكنها ضمت ملخصا وافيا عما دار حوله الكتاب بتوسع قد يصل بالقاريء إلى حد الملل... نخلص من الكتاب إلى أن شكل الاسلام في كل مجتمع ارتبط بوضع المجتمع ذاته قبل مجيء الاسلام له وعلى الطريقة التي دخل الاسلام بها إليه ... وتغير وضع الإسلام في المجتمع ارتبط في الأساس بتغير نظام التعليم ووضع المرأة ..
November 16, 2013
A truly outstanding book. Wide ranging and filled with information yet still very lucid and accessible, If you are looking for an authoritative textbook or reference on Islamic history, I cannot imagine a better resource than this.
Lapidus charts the socio-economic and political evolution of Islamic societies throughout the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and even Europe. He doesn't dive into excessive detail, but makes a slightly more than cursory overview of many important fields. Lapidus is as comfortable contrasting Umayyad and Abbasid taxation policies as he is very clearly discussing the influence of Hellenistic and Persian philosophies on early Muslim thinkers. He lays particular (and, as you'll see later, important) emphasis in the beginning of the book on how pre-Islamic conceptions of governance and civilization were reimagined for the advent of the Arab-Muslim empires to fashion unique but familiar societal structures. The Persians and Byzantines/Romans may have had rich and sophisticated civilizations in place that the early Arab Muslims largely borrowed from, but the Arabs, more than just plagiarists, proved master managers. Considering where they started from and what they accomplished in the span of less than two centuries, their ability to conquer, integrate, and reinvent the administrative and bureaucratic machinery of two major empires and large swathes of territory is nothing short of breathtaking. The evolution of the Arab-centric Umayyad empire to the more Islamic-themed Abbassid was also interesting to read about in how a religion like Islam was utilized (and perhaps necessary) to transform and unite various Middle Eastern identities at the time under a common banner.
One thing I've appreciated most is Lapidus' discussion of Islamic theology and philosophy, which he writes very vividly but clearly for those uninitiated in Greek philosophy. Most books on Islamic philosophy I have encountered fail to properly contextualize many of the thought processes of the society they originate in, instead discussing it abstractly. Lapidus' broad but accessible explanation leading up to the actual subject matter makes it that much more interesting and easy to comprehend and analyze.
In short, whether you are an Islamic/Arabic studies major, a history buff, a cultural anthropologist, or a student of religion, this is a book which you will not regret having at least picked up.
Lapidus charts the socio-economic and political evolution of Islamic societies throughout the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and even Europe. He doesn't dive into excessive detail, but makes a slightly more than cursory overview of many important fields. Lapidus is as comfortable contrasting Umayyad and Abbasid taxation policies as he is very clearly discussing the influence of Hellenistic and Persian philosophies on early Muslim thinkers. He lays particular (and, as you'll see later, important) emphasis in the beginning of the book on how pre-Islamic conceptions of governance and civilization were reimagined for the advent of the Arab-Muslim empires to fashion unique but familiar societal structures. The Persians and Byzantines/Romans may have had rich and sophisticated civilizations in place that the early Arab Muslims largely borrowed from, but the Arabs, more than just plagiarists, proved master managers. Considering where they started from and what they accomplished in the span of less than two centuries, their ability to conquer, integrate, and reinvent the administrative and bureaucratic machinery of two major empires and large swathes of territory is nothing short of breathtaking. The evolution of the Arab-centric Umayyad empire to the more Islamic-themed Abbassid was also interesting to read about in how a religion like Islam was utilized (and perhaps necessary) to transform and unite various Middle Eastern identities at the time under a common banner.
One thing I've appreciated most is Lapidus' discussion of Islamic theology and philosophy, which he writes very vividly but clearly for those uninitiated in Greek philosophy. Most books on Islamic philosophy I have encountered fail to properly contextualize many of the thought processes of the society they originate in, instead discussing it abstractly. Lapidus' broad but accessible explanation leading up to the actual subject matter makes it that much more interesting and easy to comprehend and analyze.
In short, whether you are an Islamic/Arabic studies major, a history buff, a cultural anthropologist, or a student of religion, this is a book which you will not regret having at least picked up.
December 19, 2020
كانت رحلة طويلة و ملحمية مع هذا الكتاب الاستثنائي في تناوله و المجهود المبذول فيه واتساع موضوعاته. يتناول الكتاب التاريخ العام للشعوب الاسلامية مع التركيز على النظم الاجتماعية و مؤسسات الحكم والعلاقة بين المجتمع والنخب الحاكمة/الدولة و علاقة كل ذلك بتطور الفكر السياسي والديني للمسلمين و التيارات الفكرية المختلفة. بشكل عام أجاد الكاتب كلما اقترب من التحليل التاريخي وجانبه التوفيق كلما اقترب من منطقة الحديث عن الاسلام كدين و تفسير بداية الرسالة والنبوة و العقائد الاسلامية.
فائدة الكتاب عظيمة في أنه يزود القارىء بمعرفة عامة عن تاريخ الدول الاسلامية بما يتيح تكوين خلفية وفهم جيد لأصول المشاكل المعاصرة. كما انه يتناول موضوعات من مشارب مختلفة سواء تاريخية أو سياسية أو تتعلق بالفكر السياسي والفلسفي الاسلامي وعلاقة الدين بالدولة وقضايا الدولة الحديثة فيعطي القارىء مفاتيح ورؤوس موضوعات لمن أراد أن يتعمق (في آخر ا��كتاب قسم لترشيحات لقراءات اوسع في كل باب).
يعيب الكتاب تأثر الكاتب، رغم اتقانه واتسامه بدرجة عالية من الإنصاف، بالميراث المسيحي-اليهودي الديني و هو ما ظهر في تفسيراته للأفكار الدينية الاسلامية فجاءت غريبة على القارىء المسلم وكذلك النفس الاستشراقي الخفيف في تناول الانتقال للدولة الحديثة في القرن 19 و عمليات التحديث و الحركات الإسلامية في القرن ال 20. كذلك يعيب الكتاب تركيزه الشديد على الحركات والفكر الصوفي مما اخل بالتناول في بعض المواضع وخرج بالكتاب عن موضوعه في مواضع أخرى. كذلك حاول الكاتب أن يناقش موضوع شديد الاتساع على المستوى الجغرافي و الزم��ي فزل في بعض الاحيان فكان التناول سطحي او غير متناسق. رغم ذلك فالكتاب عظيم و بذل فيه مجهود جبار يستحق التحية والإشادة.
تبقى الإشادة بالترجمة الرائعة والسلسة حتى أني لم اشعر بأن الكتاب مترجم فلد. فاضل كل التحية.
فائدة الكتاب عظيمة في أنه يزود القارىء بمعرفة عامة عن تاريخ الدول الاسلامية بما يتيح تكوين خلفية وفهم جيد لأصول المشاكل المعاصرة. كما انه يتناول موضوعات من مشارب مختلفة سواء تاريخية أو سياسية أو تتعلق بالفكر السياسي والفلسفي الاسلامي وعلاقة الدين بالدولة وقضايا الدولة الحديثة فيعطي القارىء مفاتيح ورؤوس موضوعات لمن أراد أن يتعمق (في آخر ا��كتاب قسم لترشيحات لقراءات اوسع في كل باب).
يعيب الكتاب تأثر الكاتب، رغم اتقانه واتسامه بدرجة عالية من الإنصاف، بالميراث المسيحي-اليهودي الديني و هو ما ظهر في تفسيراته للأفكار الدينية الاسلامية فجاءت غريبة على القارىء المسلم وكذلك النفس الاستشراقي الخفيف في تناول الانتقال للدولة الحديثة في القرن 19 و عمليات التحديث و الحركات الإسلامية في القرن ال 20. كذلك يعيب الكتاب تركيزه الشديد على الحركات والفكر الصوفي مما اخل بالتناول في بعض المواضع وخرج بالكتاب عن موضوعه في مواضع أخرى. كذلك حاول الكاتب أن يناقش موضوع شديد الاتساع على المستوى الجغرافي و الزم��ي فزل في بعض الاحيان فكان التناول سطحي او غير متناسق. رغم ذلك فالكتاب عظيم و بذل فيه مجهود جبار يستحق التحية والإشادة.
تبقى الإشادة بالترجمة الرائعة والسلسة حتى أني لم اشعر بأن الكتاب مترجم فلد. فاضل كل التحية.
July 19, 2016
This book is often more like a History of Europe, Africa, Asia and not only the Islamic societies but the history of countries from Spain to China, all the societies that was involved in the many different periods, Islamic cultures from 600s to the last century. The post 1700s chapters is more like history of European imperialism,colonialism in India, Africa, Iran for examples.
I read it as a course book in my Arabic studies and it is well written, easy to understand when Lapidus wrote like he knew everything about all the Islamic history, cultures big and small and often it became more like a book on political science, military history, economical history. There is alot of in depth analysis for a book that discusses the history of cultures, empires that controlled big part of the world.
I read it as a course book in my Arabic studies and it is well written, easy to understand when Lapidus wrote like he knew everything about all the Islamic history, cultures big and small and often it became more like a book on political science, military history, economical history. There is alot of in depth analysis for a book that discusses the history of cultures, empires that controlled big part of the world.
March 15, 2019
Islamic is so much longer it's never end
We have too respect Islam
We have too respect Islam
April 1, 2022
من امتع ما قرأت عن هذا الكتاب من تلخيص وتفنيد وشرح وتلخيص ما كتبه رضوان السيد عنه :
استمعت إلى أيرا لابيدس Ira M. Lapidus للمرة الأولى في احتفالية ألفية القاهرة عام 1969م. كنت وقتها طالبا بالأزهر في السنة الثالثة، بكلية أصول الدين. وقد عقدت إحدى جلسات المؤتمر بقاعة الإمام محمد عبده، وألقى الشاب الأميركي لابيدس محاضرة عن المذاهب الفقهية في الدولة المملوكية. وما عرفت كتابه العظيم «تاريخ المجتمعات الإسلامية» إلا في التسعينات من القرن الماضي عندما ذهبت للعمل أستاذا زائرا بجامعة هارفارد. وكنت مخيرا في إرشاد الطلاب إلى أحد ثلاثة نصوص: كتاب لابيدس هذا، وكتاب مارشال هودجسون «تجربة الإسلام.. الوعي والتاريخ في حضارة عالمية»، وكتاب هاملتون غب «دراسات في حضارة الإسلام». وكنت أعرف كتابي غب وهودجسون، وما كنت أعرف كتاب لابيدس، فأقبلت على قراءته بشغف، إلى كتابه الآخر الصغير «المدن الإسلامية في العصور الوسطى المتأخرة» (وهو في الأصل أطروحته للدكتوراه). ورغم إعجابي الشديد بالكتاب الكبير آنذاك، فقد نصحت الطلاب بالعودة إلى كتاب هودجسون الذي أذهلني، وأصدرت عنه فيما بعد عددين بمجلة «الاجتهاد» الفصلية التي كنت أصدرها (حتى عام 2004) مع الأستاذ الفضل شلق. ثم نسيت تلك الحقبة كلها في عقد الضياع والمعاناة لأمتنا ومجتمعاتنا (2000 - 2010). ولذلك فقد سررت سرورا بالغا عندما زف إلى الصديق نبيل إيراني، صاحب «دار الكتاب العربي»، خبر ترجمة الكتاب بكامله إلى العربية، من جانب المترجم الممتاز الأستاذ فاضل جتكر، والذي كنت قد عرفت له عشرات الترجمات لكتب بالغة الأهمية في السنوات العشر الأخيرة.
عرف عن الأستاذ لابيدس خلال عمله العلمي، الاهتمام بالحياة الحضرية والمدنية الإسلامية. وهو بخلاف الأساتذة الأميركيين الآخرين ذوي التوجه الأنجلوسكسوني، مهتم بسوسيولوجيا المجتمعات، وليس الدول والإمبراطوريات، شأن الفرنسيين. ولذلك فإن كتابه هذا لا يتضمن نظريات بالغة الشسوع والاتساع، بل إن الواقع أن فصول الكتاب الأولى عن النبي محمد، صلى الله عليه وسلم، وظهور الإسلام والفتوحات والدولة الأموية، لا تظهر إبداعا من نوع خاص، بل إنه اعتمد فيها على المختصين من أمثال عرفان شهيد (فيما يتعلق بالجزيرة قبل الإسلام)، ومونتغومري وات (عن حياة النبي ونشوء الأمة والدولة)، وفلهاوزن (في عهود الراشدين والأمويين). وقد أفاد بالطبع من الدراسات الحديثة في اقتصاديات وإدارة الدولة في القرنين السابع والثامن للميلاد. ميزة هذا القسم من الكتاب السلاسة والإجمال، بحيث يأخذ القارئ العارف بعض الشيء انطباعا جيدا عن قرني الإسلام الأولين. ثم تبدأ الجدة، وتبدأ النظرات الخاصة مع التأريخ للعباسيين، فتتبدى قوة لابيدس في الحديث عن الحياة الحضرية وظهور المدن، وبخاصة بغداد. فلابيدس مذهول بالمدن الكبرى، وبالتنظيمات الإدارية والمالية والسياسية في الدول الكبرى أيضا. وهو يعرف علم الكلام معرفة متوسطة، بيد أنها كافية لقول بعض الجديد في نشوء المعتزلة وأهل السنة. لكنه يعرف الفقه والمدارس الفقهية معرفة دقيقة ومتميزة بدت في كل أجزاء الكتاب. لكن هذا وذاك من العلوم الدينية والأجنبية، يظلان في المرتبة الثانية من اهتمامه. أما المرتبة الأولى فهي محفوظة للتأملات في بناء المدن والدساكر، والإدارة والحياة الاقتصادية والاجتماعية. وبهذا المعنى يفهم الرجل التاريخ الثقافي، الذي هو في الواقع سوسيولوجيا ثقافية في مديات متطاولة، تشبه أعمال مدرسة الحوليات الفرنسية مطبقة في مجال الحضارة والثقافة في عالم الإسلام. بيد أن اهتمامه بالشأن السوسيولوجي، والذي تابعه طوال حياته العلمية، قاده للعناية في دراساته بالتصوف والبيئات التي ظهر فيها، ثم كيف تطور إلى طرق. والطرق هي التي تهمه، لكنه في أزمنة ما قبل الطرق وجد نفسه منجذبا إلى نموذج أبي حامد الغزالي الذي خصه بفصل ماتع. ولأن الشعوب والإثنيات تعني له أكثر مما تعني الدول، فقد انصرف بعد العباسيين للاهتمام بالسلاجقة والمغول والتتار، أصولهم وتنظيماتهم الاجتماعية، وطرائقهم في إقامة الإمبراطوريات. وبالطبع؛ فإن العثمانيين وقعوا في مركز اهتمامه بسبب الدور التاريخي الكبير الذي لعبوه حتى مطلع القرن العشرين. فقد ركز على نشوئهم وأصولهم الإثنية، ومنزلتهم داخل الشعوب التركية، ثم أفاض في الحديث عن مدنهم وإدارتهم وجيوشهم وعلاقتهم بأوروبا والأجزاء التي استولوا عليها منها، وكيف تشكلت في ظلهم إنسانية جديدة. وبحسب خطة الكتاب، فقد كان عليه أن يستعرض تاريخ الدول الإسلامية في الأندلس. ورغم وجود الحواضر الرائعة في تلك البلاد، وظهور ذلك المجتمع الممتزج من المسلمين والمسيحيين واليهود؛ فإن تحركات الشعوب الآسيوية الكبرى، وخاصة الإيرانيين والأتراك، ظلت موضوع عنايته الأكبر. ثم إن الرجل ملتزم بحسب الكتاب بالتأريخ لعالم الإسلام، ولذلك فقد اعتنى كثيرا بآسيا الوسطى التي خرجت منها الشعوب التركية، فأقامت الإمبراطوريات في كل مكان، ومن ضمن ذلك إيران والهند. ومن هذا المنزع مضى إلى المحيط الهندي وشرق آسيا، ثم ألقى نظرة على الإسلام الأفريقي تكوينا وانتشارا، سواء من خلال الحركات الجهادية أو الأخرى الصوفية، وقبل ذلك وبعده حركات التجار وتنقلاتهم.
وقد خصص الجزء الثاني من الكتاب للحقب الحديثة بين القرنين الثامن عشر وإلى سبعينات القرن العشرين. وهذا القسم من الكتاب مساو من حيث الحجم للقسم الأول، لكنه في مجموعه خلاصات استعراضية لا تقول الكثير عن اصطدام الغرب الأوروبي الاستعماري والآخر الإمبريالي بعالم الإسلام، وتنقصها الدقة أحيانا في فهم الحركات الإسلامية الحديثة النهضوية والإحيائية.
يهتم لابيدس كثيرا في القسم الحديث من كتابه بكل من تركيا ومصر وإيران، والتي واجهت اختبارات الاستعمار والحداثة، في أزمنة متقاربة. لكنه وهو يكتب هذه الخلاصات عن ظواهر الحداثة وتحدياتها في هذه الأقطار الكبرى، يظل على وعي قوي بما سبق أن ذكره في القسم الأول من كتابه عن هذه الأقطار والشعوب. ولذا لا تشكل الحداثة في اعتباره قطيعة مع السابق، وإنما يعتبر الأمور ويعرضها في شكل تطورات تستوعب السابق، وتتعاطى مع اللاحق بعقلية مقاربة. ولذلك فإنه - مثل سائر تلامذة غب القدامى - غير معجب بالظواهر الحديثة في ديار الإسلام، ويفضل عليها تلك التقليدية العريقة، التي لا تستدعي الحسرة على أي حال لأنها لن تعود، وإن ظن الإحيائيون الإسلاميون أنهم قادرون على ذلك. وفي هذا الصدد، وبعد عرض تجربة البلدان الإسلامية الثلاثة الكبرى، يأتي إلى الشرق الأوسط، وهو يعني به المشرق العربي. وفي الشرق الأوسط يتحدث عن الظواهر الثلاث: العروبة والأنظمة العسكرية والإسلام. ثم يمضي من هناك إلى الجزيرة العربية، وإلى شمال أفريقيا. بينما ينصب الجزء الأكبر من القسم الثاني هذا على عرض التطورات التي مر بها الإسلام في إندونيسيا، وفي الهند إلى ظهور باكستان، والمشكلات المتفاقمة في أفغانستان، واستتباب الاستيلاء الروسي على آسيا الوسطى، كما يمضي في الجزء المتبقي من القسم الثاني هذا إلى عرض التطورات المستجدة والهائلة التي أعقبت انهيار الاتحاد السوفياتي. ثم يتحدث من بعد عن مصائر الإسلام في الأنحاء الأفريقية، والمسلمين في ديار الهجرة بأوروبا والأميركتين. ولأنه شاء أن يكون كتابه مكتملا أو شاملا؛ فإنه عقد فصلا لصحوة الإسلام أو حركات الصحوة الإسلامية من مصر والسعودية إلى باكستان والهند وأفغانستان. وهو فصل مخيب بعض الشيء فيه بعض الميلودراما، واقتناع عميق بأن المشرق لم يتغير منذ خمسة آلاف سنة، أو ينبغي ألا يتغير أو أن هذا التغيير البادي والمتوتر هو سطحي وقشرة زائلة، وقد أتت به نقائص الحداثة.
انتهى أيرا لابيدس من تأليف كتابه عام 1980. وقد ظهر في طبعته الأولى عام 1988 باعتباره ذيلا على «تاريخ كمبردج للإسلام». لكنه بسبب من سلاسته وشموله أفضل من «تاريخ كمبردج» ذاته. ومنهجه - كما سبق - هو منهج السوسيولوجيا التاريخية ومدرسة الحوليات. وهو يغص بقدر هائل من المعلومات. وقد أورد في ختامه ببليوغرافيا واسعة ونافعة أو لا تزال كذلك رغم قدمها؛ إذ هو في الطبعة الثانية للكتاب عام 2002 لم يضف إليها شيئا. ما عاد التأليف الموسوعي مألوفا بين المستشرين. وهذا كتاب مهم من آثار المرحلة الماضية، لا يزال في قسمه القديم والوسيط شديد التوهج والإمتاع.
استمعت إلى أيرا لابيدس Ira M. Lapidus للمرة الأولى في احتفالية ألفية القاهرة عام 1969م. كنت وقتها طالبا بالأزهر في السنة الثالثة، بكلية أصول الدين. وقد عقدت إحدى جلسات المؤتمر بقاعة الإمام محمد عبده، وألقى الشاب الأميركي لابيدس محاضرة عن المذاهب الفقهية في الدولة المملوكية. وما عرفت كتابه العظيم «تاريخ المجتمعات الإسلامية» إلا في التسعينات من القرن الماضي عندما ذهبت للعمل أستاذا زائرا بجامعة هارفارد. وكنت مخيرا في إرشاد الطلاب إلى أحد ثلاثة نصوص: كتاب لابيدس هذا، وكتاب مارشال هودجسون «تجربة الإسلام.. الوعي والتاريخ في حضارة عالمية»، وكتاب هاملتون غب «دراسات في حضارة الإسلام». وكنت أعرف كتابي غب وهودجسون، وما كنت أعرف كتاب لابيدس، فأقبلت على قراءته بشغف، إلى كتابه الآخر الصغير «المدن الإسلامية في العصور الوسطى المتأخرة» (وهو في الأصل أطروحته للدكتوراه). ورغم إعجابي الشديد بالكتاب الكبير آنذاك، فقد نصحت الطلاب بالعودة إلى كتاب هودجسون الذي أذهلني، وأصدرت عنه فيما بعد عددين بمجلة «الاجتهاد» الفصلية التي كنت أصدرها (حتى عام 2004) مع الأستاذ الفضل شلق. ثم نسيت تلك الحقبة كلها في عقد الضياع والمعاناة لأمتنا ومجتمعاتنا (2000 - 2010). ولذلك فقد سررت سرورا بالغا عندما زف إلى الصديق نبيل إيراني، صاحب «دار الكتاب العربي»، خبر ترجمة الكتاب بكامله إلى العربية، من جانب المترجم الممتاز الأستاذ فاضل جتكر، والذي كنت قد عرفت له عشرات الترجمات لكتب بالغة الأهمية في السنوات العشر الأخيرة.
عرف عن الأستاذ لابيدس خلال عمله العلمي، الاهتمام بالحياة الحضرية والمدنية الإسلامية. وهو بخلاف الأساتذة الأميركيين الآخرين ذوي التوجه الأنجلوسكسوني، مهتم بسوسيولوجيا المجتمعات، وليس الدول والإمبراطوريات، شأن الفرنسيين. ولذلك فإن كتابه هذا لا يتضمن نظريات بالغة الشسوع والاتساع، بل إن الواقع أن فصول الكتاب الأولى عن النبي محمد، صلى الله عليه وسلم، وظهور الإسلام والفتوحات والدولة الأموية، لا تظهر إبداعا من نوع خاص، بل إنه اعتمد فيها على المختصين من أمثال عرفان شهيد (فيما يتعلق بالجزيرة قبل الإسلام)، ومونتغومري وات (عن حياة النبي ونشوء الأمة والدولة)، وفلهاوزن (في عهود الراشدين والأمويين). وقد أفاد بالطبع من الدراسات الحديثة في اقتصاديات وإدارة الدولة في القرنين السابع والثامن للميلاد. ميزة هذا القسم من الكتاب السلاسة والإجمال، بحيث يأخذ القارئ العارف بعض الشيء انطباعا جيدا عن قرني الإسلام الأولين. ثم تبدأ الجدة، وتبدأ النظرات الخاصة مع التأريخ للعباسيين، فتتبدى قوة لابيدس في الحديث عن الحياة الحضرية وظهور المدن، وبخاصة بغداد. فلابيدس مذهول بالمدن الكبرى، وبالتنظيمات الإدارية والمالية والسياسية في الدول الكبرى أيضا. وهو يعرف علم الكلام معرفة متوسطة، بيد أنها كافية لقول بعض الجديد في نشوء المعتزلة وأهل السنة. لكنه يعرف الفقه والمدارس الفقهية معرفة دقيقة ومتميزة بدت في كل أجزاء الكتاب. لكن هذا وذاك من العلوم الدينية والأجنبية، يظلان في المرتبة الثانية من اهتمامه. أما المرتبة الأولى فهي محفوظة للتأملات في بناء المدن والدساكر، والإدارة والحياة الاقتصادية والاجتماعية. وبهذا المعنى يفهم الرجل التاريخ الثقافي، الذي هو في الواقع سوسيولوجيا ثقافية في مديات متطاولة، تشبه أعمال مدرسة الحوليات الفرنسية مطبقة في مجال الحضارة والثقافة في عالم الإسلام. بيد أن اهتمامه بالشأن السوسيولوجي، والذي تابعه طوال حياته العلمية، قاده للعناية في دراساته بالتصوف والبيئات التي ظهر فيها، ثم كيف تطور إلى طرق. والطرق هي التي تهمه، لكنه في أزمنة ما قبل الطرق وجد نفسه منجذبا إلى نموذج أبي حامد الغزالي الذي خصه بفصل ماتع. ولأن الشعوب والإثنيات تعني له أكثر مما تعني الدول، فقد انصرف بعد العباسيين للاهتمام بالسلاجقة والمغول والتتار، أصولهم وتنظيماتهم الاجتماعية، وطرائقهم في إقامة الإمبراطوريات. وبالطبع؛ فإن العثمانيين وقعوا في مركز اهتمامه بسبب الدور التاريخي الكبير الذي لعبوه حتى مطلع القرن العشرين. فقد ركز على نشوئهم وأصولهم الإثنية، ومنزلتهم داخل الشعوب التركية، ثم أفاض في الحديث عن مدنهم وإدارتهم وجيوشهم وعلاقتهم بأوروبا والأجزاء التي استولوا عليها منها، وكيف تشكلت في ظلهم إنسانية جديدة. وبحسب خطة الكتاب، فقد كان عليه أن يستعرض تاريخ الدول الإسلامية في الأندلس. ورغم وجود الحواضر الرائعة في تلك البلاد، وظهور ذلك المجتمع الممتزج من المسلمين والمسيحيين واليهود؛ فإن تحركات الشعوب الآسيوية الكبرى، وخاصة الإيرانيين والأتراك، ظلت موضوع عنايته الأكبر. ثم إن الرجل ملتزم بحسب الكتاب بالتأريخ لعالم الإسلام، ولذلك فقد اعتنى كثيرا بآسيا الوسطى التي خرجت منها الشعوب التركية، فأقامت الإمبراطوريات في كل مكان، ومن ضمن ذلك إيران والهند. ومن هذا المنزع مضى إلى المحيط الهندي وشرق آسيا، ثم ألقى نظرة على الإسلام الأفريقي تكوينا وانتشارا، سواء من خلال الحركات الجهادية أو الأخرى الصوفية، وقبل ذلك وبعده حركات التجار وتنقلاتهم.
وقد خصص الجزء الثاني من الكتاب للحقب الحديثة بين القرنين الثامن عشر وإلى سبعينات القرن العشرين. وهذا القسم من الكتاب مساو من حيث الحجم للقسم الأول، لكنه في مجموعه خلاصات استعراضية لا تقول الكثير عن اصطدام الغرب الأوروبي الاستعماري والآخر الإمبريالي بعالم الإسلام، وتنقصها الدقة أحيانا في فهم الحركات الإسلامية الحديثة النهضوية والإحيائية.
يهتم لابيدس كثيرا في القسم الحديث من كتابه بكل من تركيا ومصر وإيران، والتي واجهت اختبارات الاستعمار والحداثة، في أزمنة متقاربة. لكنه وهو يكتب هذه الخلاصات عن ظواهر الحداثة وتحدياتها في هذه الأقطار الكبرى، يظل على وعي قوي بما سبق أن ذكره في القسم الأول من كتابه عن هذه الأقطار والشعوب. ولذا لا تشكل الحداثة في اعتباره قطيعة مع السابق، وإنما يعتبر الأمور ويعرضها في شكل تطورات تستوعب السابق، وتتعاطى مع اللاحق بعقلية مقاربة. ولذلك فإنه - مثل سائر تلامذة غب القدامى - غير معجب بالظواهر الحديثة في ديار الإسلام، ويفضل عليها تلك التقليدية العريقة، التي لا تستدعي الحسرة على أي حال لأنها لن تعود، وإن ظن الإحيائيون الإسلاميون أنهم قادرون على ذلك. وفي هذا الصدد، وبعد عرض تجربة البلدان الإسلامية الثلاثة الكبرى، يأتي إلى الشرق الأوسط، وهو يعني به المشرق العربي. وفي الشرق الأوسط يتحدث عن الظواهر الثلاث: العروبة والأنظمة العسكرية والإسلام. ثم يمضي من هناك إلى الجزيرة العربية، وإلى شمال أفريقيا. بينما ينصب الجزء الأكبر من القسم الثاني هذا على عرض التطورات التي مر بها الإسلام في إندونيسيا، وفي الهند إلى ظهور باكستان، والمشكلات المتفاقمة في أفغانستان، واستتباب الاستيلاء الروسي على آسيا الوسطى، كما يمضي في الجزء المتبقي من القسم الثاني هذا إلى عرض التطورات المستجدة والهائلة التي أعقبت انهيار الاتحاد السوفياتي. ثم يتحدث من بعد عن مصائر الإسلام في الأنحاء الأفريقية، والمسلمين في ديار الهجرة بأوروبا والأميركتين. ولأنه شاء أن يكون كتابه مكتملا أو شاملا؛ فإنه عقد فصلا لصحوة الإسلام أو حركات الصحوة الإسلامية من مصر والسعودية إلى باكستان والهند وأفغانستان. وهو فصل مخيب بعض الشيء فيه بعض الميلودراما، واقتناع عميق بأن المشرق لم يتغير منذ خمسة آلاف سنة، أو ينبغي ألا يتغير أو أن هذا التغيير البادي والمتوتر هو سطحي وقشرة زائلة، وقد أتت به نقائص الحداثة.
انتهى أيرا لابيدس من تأليف كتابه عام 1980. وقد ظهر في طبعته الأولى عام 1988 باعتباره ذيلا على «تاريخ كمبردج للإسلام». لكنه بسبب من سلاسته وشموله أفضل من «تاريخ كمبردج» ذاته. ومنهجه - كما سبق - هو منهج السوسيولوجيا التاريخية ومدرسة الحوليات. وهو يغص بقدر هائل من المعلومات. وقد أورد في ختامه ببليوغرافيا واسعة ونافعة أو لا تزال كذلك رغم قدمها؛ إذ هو في الطبعة الثانية للكتاب عام 2002 لم يضف إليها شيئا. ما عاد التأليف الموسوعي مألوفا بين المستشرين. وهذا كتاب مهم من آثار المرحلة الماضية، لا يزال في قسمه القديم والوسيط شديد التوهج والإمتاع.
April 11, 2010
This book an absolutely wonderful, comprehensive tomb of the history of Islamic Societies. It will answer every question you have ever had about when this battle happened, or who fought who when. It's detailed, well organized, and Lapidus includes tons of maps, graphs, and table to help illustrate his points. It is the perfect book for any looking to learn about a historically situated Islam.
But Carllee, you say, why only 3 stars? Well, let me tell you ...
To no fault the author, this is a history book. Not a religious studies book. This book will tell you very little about the Prophet Muhammad, his life or ANYTHING about the religion itself. This book is great for history classes but is absolutely inappropriate for a religious studies class. This is not an introduction to Islam. It like studying the founding of America without a mention of the Puritans. It rubs me the wrong way.
The 3 stars comes from my bias as a religious studies scholar - if you like history and have a working knowledge of Islam - you will love this. Otherwise, stay far, far away.
PS It's 1,000 pages in 8 pt font. Ugh.
But Carllee, you say, why only 3 stars? Well, let me tell you ...
To no fault the author, this is a history book. Not a religious studies book. This book will tell you very little about the Prophet Muhammad, his life or ANYTHING about the religion itself. This book is great for history classes but is absolutely inappropriate for a religious studies class. This is not an introduction to Islam. It like studying the founding of America without a mention of the Puritans. It rubs me the wrong way.
The 3 stars comes from my bias as a religious studies scholar - if you like history and have a working knowledge of Islam - you will love this. Otherwise, stay far, far away.
PS It's 1,000 pages in 8 pt font. Ugh.
Currently reading
October 7, 2022Table 7- The vocabulary of Sufism
The anthropology of the soul
'aql- Reasoning faculty, often equivalent to qalb
al-fitra- Pure state of being, before investment of soul in the body
nafs- The passions and appetites to be subdued and ordered by reason
qalb- Heart, soul, seat of knowledge and conscience
The spiritual path
baqa'- Remaining in God
dhawq- Tasting of devine reality
fana'- Annihilation of the self
hal- State of rapture by grace of God
'ibadat and mu'amalat- Ritual and social obligations
'isbq- Love, yearning for God
islam- Submission to God's will
kasbf- Unveiling revelation
maqam- Achieved status on the way to God
ma'rifa- Immediate experience of truth
rida- Contentment; acceptance of the divine will
sabr- Patience in accepting God's will
shukr- gratitude
tawakkul- Trust in God
tawba- Repentance
tawhid- Unity of God and union in God
zuhd- Piety, asceticism, renunciation
The anthropology of the soul
'aql- Reasoning faculty, often equivalent to qalb
al-fitra- Pure state of being, before investment of soul in the body
nafs- The passions and appetites to be subdued and ordered by reason
qalb- Heart, soul, seat of knowledge and conscience
The spiritual path
baqa'- Remaining in God
dhawq- Tasting of devine reality
fana'- Annihilation of the self
hal- State of rapture by grace of God
'ibadat and mu'amalat- Ritual and social obligations
'isbq- Love, yearning for God
islam- Submission to God's will
kasbf- Unveiling revelation
maqam- Achieved status on the way to God
ma'rifa- Immediate experience of truth
rida- Contentment; acceptance of the divine will
sabr- Patience in accepting God's will
shukr- gratitude
tawakkul- Trust in God
tawba- Repentance
tawhid- Unity of God and union in God
zuhd- Piety, asceticism, renunciation
September 19, 2018
أحد أهم الكتب الموسوعية التي قرأتها هذا العام.
الكتاب حجمه كبير للغاية، أكثر من ثلاثين فصلًا يتكلم فيه عن نشأة المجتمع الإسـلامي من البداية، بل تكلم أصلًا عن الحال العربية قبل ظهور الإسـلام.
ومن ثم الاصطدام بالإسـلام من قبل القوى المجتمعية الجاهلية وتفرع أكثر ليحكي عن المجتمعات غير الإسلامية المحيطة بالجزيرة العربية.
في الحقيقة هذا التقسيم يشبه كثيرًا جدًا ما فعله الأستاذ مالك بن نبي في كتاب ماذا خسر العالم بانحطاط المسلمين بالضبط، فالكتابان يشبهان بعضهما كثيرًا في هذا الطرح.
إلا أن طرح لابيدوس أعمق وأقوى، فرغم أعجمية الرجل استطاع أن يلقي الضوء على أكثر من نقطة في المجتمعات الإسـلامية غابت عن كثيرين من المفكرين والمؤرخين المسلمين. الكتاب مهم جدًا لأي أحد يريد أن يقرأ في تاريخ هذه الأمة، وأنا حزين جدًا جدًا لأننا لا نملك عقلية كهذه.
الكتاب حجمه كبير للغاية، أكثر من ثلاثين فصلًا يتكلم فيه عن نشأة المجتمع الإسـلامي من البداية، بل تكلم أصلًا عن الحال العربية قبل ظهور الإسـلام.
ومن ثم الاصطدام بالإسـلام من قبل القوى المجتمعية الجاهلية وتفرع أكثر ليحكي عن المجتمعات غير الإسلامية المحيطة بالجزيرة العربية.
في الحقيقة هذا التقسيم يشبه كثيرًا جدًا ما فعله الأستاذ مالك بن نبي في كتاب ماذا خسر العالم بانحطاط المسلمين بالضبط، فالكتابان يشبهان بعضهما كثيرًا في هذا الطرح.
إلا أن طرح لابيدوس أعمق وأقوى، فرغم أعجمية الرجل استطاع أن يلقي الضوء على أكثر من نقطة في المجتمعات الإسـلامية غابت عن كثيرين من المفكرين والمؤرخين المسلمين. الكتاب مهم جدًا لأي أحد يريد أن يقرأ في تاريخ هذه الأمة، وأنا حزين جدًا جدًا لأننا لا نملك عقلية كهذه.
February 3, 2021
I haven't read this cover to cover, only studied parts of it get an idea about the genesis of this political creed that has inflicted so much suffering on humanity and its impact and spread in India.
December 30, 2022
This is an extraordinary, tour de force, encyclopaedic, excellent piece of work by Ira Lapidus. I’m not lavishing undue praise to the author or the book. The scope of the massive; it covers from Zanzibar to Kazan and Kashgar to Cordoba until the nineteenth century. With the except of Philippines and Sri Lanka, the author covers almost all Islamic societies. Naturally, one would assume that with such a massive scope the book cannot cover all areas of interest in depth. But that’s not the case here. The author dives deep into the history of the region, people, the cultural settings and their encounter with Islam and later colonialism.
The writing style is academic but if you solider on its very much worth it. Reading this book can be a bit of commitment given the scope and length of the book. I originally bought this book 6 years back and I was put off by the length and commitment. But it is worthwhile and highly recommended.
The writing style is academic but if you solider on its very much worth it. Reading this book can be a bit of commitment given the scope and length of the book. I originally bought this book 6 years back and I was put off by the length and commitment. But it is worthwhile and highly recommended.
May 8, 2021
In short, a very formulative and explanatory study on Islam and it's history. However, it lacks depth and detail in case you were as me searching for specific studies or events that would be refreshing to delve into
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August 30, 2019The best book on the subject.
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January 12, 2025Great resource!
April 6, 2011
The right book at the right time for me. Well written with lots of depth butstill tuned for the lay reader. Kind of like a well-written textbook for a course I wish I could take. Comprehensive in exploring the religious and political history of the Islamic middle east. Looking forward to chapters on Islamic Spain, central Asia and South Asia. Great glossary. Not for the faint of heart at 843 pages with no sex or violence or romance or suspense.
April 14, 2010
I'll be honest I haven't actually read this whole book (perhaps more accurately described as a cinderblock). As a resource though it is spectacular and I intend to keep on referencing it in the future. For a comprehensive guide to Islamic societies, movements, and histories it is one of the best I've seen.
May 15, 2011
This has been a delightful read.. It perfectly describes the history of the Middle East from the emergence of Islam until the formation of the contemporary modern states. I would highly recommend it for those who are interested in the history of Middle Eastern politics and Islam.
March 31, 2009
Comprehensive history of the Islamic world. This is a must read for anyone enjoys pontificating on current events.
Want to read
April 16, 2012Pretty readable. Get a comprehensive history of Islam in about 600 pages. Wrote a paper from it and was impressed.
September 21, 2012
Incredibly dense and detailed. All you ever wanted to know and all you didn't realize you wanted to know but are glad to have read it.
November 25, 2013
Read chunks of it for class. Really helpful for a basic grounding in Islam. I need to go back and drink in more of it.
April 7, 2015
Good for overview
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