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Leadership, Management and Command: Rethinking D-Day
The author argues that the successes and failures of D-Day, on both sides, cannot be explained by comparing the competing strategies of each side. Instead he provides an account of the battle through the overarching nature of the relationship between the leaders and their followers.
- GenresLeadership
Kindle Edition
First published November 17, 2007
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March 10, 2019
‘The most puzzling thing about the British Army is how it managed to survive the Second World War at all… At the beginning of the Second World War it remained grossly under-funded thanks to years of government parsimony; it was not organised for continental European offensive action but for Imperial defence; it was led by an officer corps that retained its preference of the amateur gentleman over the professional. … the British Army persisted in its habit of retaining the highest ratio of officers to soldiers in any major army of the team. … the British army seldom trusted its own soldiers to lead themselves and that proved to be their greatest weakness.’
Grint’s primary thesis is that “the success and failures of D-Day, on both sides, cannot be explained by comparing the competing strategies of each side because this implies a level of determinism that is unsustainable either theoretically or empirically.’ A more robust account of the battle is provided through the overarching nature of the relationship between leaders and followers. The way a very large number of individuals on both sides took and enacted decisions on the day amidst the fog of war.
In his opening chapters Grint highlights how the experience of past wars shaped the cultures of both opposing forces.
Following Prussian defeats at the hands of Napoleon the German Wehrmacht’s policy shifted from Befehlstaktik (an uncompromising order) to Auftragstaktik (mission command). Von Moltke was clear that “A favourable situation will never be exploited if commanders wait for orders". By contrast the Anglo-American forces continued to used uncompromising orders, limiting the initiative of their officers and troops. Following the size limitations after WW1, the Germans sought to create leaders at all levels. Culturally the Wehrmacht encouraged everyone to salute everyone else, irrespective of rank. In Anglo-American forces soldiers were required to salute officers.
The British army’s biases and inability to imagine the future contributed to Britain’s lack of preparedness for World War 2. For example the British Secretary of State for War likened his ‘unpalatable’ decision to mechanize eight cavalry regiments as akin to ‘asking a great musical performer to throw away his violin and devote himself to the gramophone’; students at the cavalry school received £526 per person in support compared to just £84 per person for students at the tank school; and how the army rejected the successful 6-lb gun as a tank weapon because it had been derived from a navy design. This combination of inferiority of weapons together with inferiority of training and leadership was to continue to result in British defeats and unnecessary battle causalities. However not all Generals suffered from these limitations. Grint fails to highlight the highly flexible approach that O’Connor, supported by Wavell, adopted in the desert campaign.
The French fear post WW1 that its army “would do the dirty work of the anti-republic conservative elements” resulted in an army of conscripts with only one year’s compulsory service. This limited experience meant that the French Army did not have the capability to conduct an offensive strategy against Germany in 1939-40.
Grint’s book will challenge those who myopically believe that the US army was the best fighting force in World War 2. At the outbreak of WW2 the US army was “a third rate military power” with only three effective divisions (compared to the 140 odd in each of the German and Anglo-French forces in May 1940. Even as late as Jan 1941, the US could muster a mere 75,000 combat troops ready for action. The US choice of primary tank was no better. Patton chose the under-armoured, high profiled, inflammable Sherman tank over the better M26 Pershing – “one of the most disastrous decisions of World War II.” Throughout the entire war the US first line troops were the least educated, the least skilled, the least trusted to take their own decisions, and the most likely to become casualties compared to the German and British forces. The US infantry rifle companies would be called upon to fight Hitler’s Wehrmacht, “the most professionally skilful army of modern times” with men who were, in all too many cases, the least impressive material America had summoned to the colours.”
As Grint notes, ‘Where the Allies armies selected the best qualified out of the infantry combat units, the German army tended to select them into combat units.’
Having provided an introduction to the weapons, training and culture of each of the main protagonists, Grint then focuses on leadership, management and command in the context of the D-Day invasion of Normandy. Late in the text Grint introduces his heuristic:
• Wicked (novel) problems require Leadership which asks relevant questions;
• Tame problems require Management which engage processes to drive outcomes;
• Critical problems require Command, which provides answers to drive actions.
In discussing ‘Wicked’ problems Grint highlights how improbable, in some ways, D-Day was at all. As a late as December 1943, just six months before D-Day, no Supreme Commander had been appointed. A US exercise in April 1944, Operation Tiger, resulted in over 1,000 US casualties, including 150 who were killed as the ‘defending’ American troops fired into rather than over the troops in a live fire exercise. The “shadow of Passchendaele and Dunkerque” hung over Churchill who, even as late as May 1944, was “more and more certain that an invasion of France as planned must fail”, fearing 70,000 deaths on D-Day alone. Even the Allied Overlord plan was based on the optimistic assumption that the German defenders would withdraw from the Normandy coast, despite the experience of Anzio. And it discounted the challenge the Anglo-American forces would faces from the bocage countryside just inland from the beaches. ‘On D-Day it was often the tactical actions of Allied junior officers, NCOs and ordinary soldiers that snatched victory from the jaws of defeat where their leaders’ strategic plan was failing.’
By contrast German war-games in February 1944 had revealed how vulnerable Germany was to a Normandy landing, but the German high command chose to ignore this as they debated whether to adopt the traditional approach of concentrating forces out of range of naval fire, so that they could counter-attack in strength (Guderian and von Rundstedt’s view), or disperse the forces to defeat the invasion on the beaches (Rommel’s view).
Grint's chapter on Tame problems and management highlights how ultimately logistics, rather than heroism, was the arbiter of fate in Normandy as the naval and air bombardment proved ineffective, and many German machine gunners only stopped firing when they ran out of ammunition. Grint points out that the German army was theoretically strong enough to deal effectively with any Allied threat from the west, but the defence was only viable if it could move a sufficient concentration of forces to the invasion area faster than the Allies could. In the end the German abandonment of its successful Auftragstaktik meant subordinates were ignored, and the opportunity to defeat the invasion was lost.
Ultimately, to be successful Grint concludes that “it is important to have a judicious and subtle blend of all three decision modes: Leadership, Management and Command”.
Although this book is well foot-noted, there are a number of times when Grint makes significant claims which are not supported by any references. In contrast Grint’s constant reference in the text to other authors should have been in the footnotes – in the text it serves only to distract. The decline in editing standards is, sadly, all too evident in this book. At times Grint is inaccurate (references to the US 85th Airborne Division should, of course, have been to the 82nd Airborne; and when France fell, Canada did NOT become Britain’s most significant ally. India, Australia, and even South Africa, were at this time making a far more significant contribution), verbose (26 pages on the Omaha landing), repetitive, irrelevant (Churchill’s attempt to land ashore on D-Day), or unnecessary (comments on other authors’ supposed errors). All of these matters should have been resolved with greater editorial input.
Despite these niggles, Grint’s book is an engaging read and highlights how success and failure were ‘fleetingly and tantalizingly available to both sides’ on 6 June 1944.
Grint’s primary thesis is that “the success and failures of D-Day, on both sides, cannot be explained by comparing the competing strategies of each side because this implies a level of determinism that is unsustainable either theoretically or empirically.’ A more robust account of the battle is provided through the overarching nature of the relationship between leaders and followers. The way a very large number of individuals on both sides took and enacted decisions on the day amidst the fog of war.
In his opening chapters Grint highlights how the experience of past wars shaped the cultures of both opposing forces.
Following Prussian defeats at the hands of Napoleon the German Wehrmacht’s policy shifted from Befehlstaktik (an uncompromising order) to Auftragstaktik (mission command). Von Moltke was clear that “A favourable situation will never be exploited if commanders wait for orders". By contrast the Anglo-American forces continued to used uncompromising orders, limiting the initiative of their officers and troops. Following the size limitations after WW1, the Germans sought to create leaders at all levels. Culturally the Wehrmacht encouraged everyone to salute everyone else, irrespective of rank. In Anglo-American forces soldiers were required to salute officers.
The British army’s biases and inability to imagine the future contributed to Britain’s lack of preparedness for World War 2. For example the British Secretary of State for War likened his ‘unpalatable’ decision to mechanize eight cavalry regiments as akin to ‘asking a great musical performer to throw away his violin and devote himself to the gramophone’; students at the cavalry school received £526 per person in support compared to just £84 per person for students at the tank school; and how the army rejected the successful 6-lb gun as a tank weapon because it had been derived from a navy design. This combination of inferiority of weapons together with inferiority of training and leadership was to continue to result in British defeats and unnecessary battle causalities. However not all Generals suffered from these limitations. Grint fails to highlight the highly flexible approach that O’Connor, supported by Wavell, adopted in the desert campaign.
The French fear post WW1 that its army “would do the dirty work of the anti-republic conservative elements” resulted in an army of conscripts with only one year’s compulsory service. This limited experience meant that the French Army did not have the capability to conduct an offensive strategy against Germany in 1939-40.
Grint’s book will challenge those who myopically believe that the US army was the best fighting force in World War 2. At the outbreak of WW2 the US army was “a third rate military power” with only three effective divisions (compared to the 140 odd in each of the German and Anglo-French forces in May 1940. Even as late as Jan 1941, the US could muster a mere 75,000 combat troops ready for action. The US choice of primary tank was no better. Patton chose the under-armoured, high profiled, inflammable Sherman tank over the better M26 Pershing – “one of the most disastrous decisions of World War II.” Throughout the entire war the US first line troops were the least educated, the least skilled, the least trusted to take their own decisions, and the most likely to become casualties compared to the German and British forces. The US infantry rifle companies would be called upon to fight Hitler’s Wehrmacht, “the most professionally skilful army of modern times” with men who were, in all too many cases, the least impressive material America had summoned to the colours.”
As Grint notes, ‘Where the Allies armies selected the best qualified out of the infantry combat units, the German army tended to select them into combat units.’
Having provided an introduction to the weapons, training and culture of each of the main protagonists, Grint then focuses on leadership, management and command in the context of the D-Day invasion of Normandy. Late in the text Grint introduces his heuristic:
• Wicked (novel) problems require Leadership which asks relevant questions;
• Tame problems require Management which engage processes to drive outcomes;
• Critical problems require Command, which provides answers to drive actions.
In discussing ‘Wicked’ problems Grint highlights how improbable, in some ways, D-Day was at all. As a late as December 1943, just six months before D-Day, no Supreme Commander had been appointed. A US exercise in April 1944, Operation Tiger, resulted in over 1,000 US casualties, including 150 who were killed as the ‘defending’ American troops fired into rather than over the troops in a live fire exercise. The “shadow of Passchendaele and Dunkerque” hung over Churchill who, even as late as May 1944, was “more and more certain that an invasion of France as planned must fail”, fearing 70,000 deaths on D-Day alone. Even the Allied Overlord plan was based on the optimistic assumption that the German defenders would withdraw from the Normandy coast, despite the experience of Anzio. And it discounted the challenge the Anglo-American forces would faces from the bocage countryside just inland from the beaches. ‘On D-Day it was often the tactical actions of Allied junior officers, NCOs and ordinary soldiers that snatched victory from the jaws of defeat where their leaders’ strategic plan was failing.’
By contrast German war-games in February 1944 had revealed how vulnerable Germany was to a Normandy landing, but the German high command chose to ignore this as they debated whether to adopt the traditional approach of concentrating forces out of range of naval fire, so that they could counter-attack in strength (Guderian and von Rundstedt’s view), or disperse the forces to defeat the invasion on the beaches (Rommel’s view).
Grint's chapter on Tame problems and management highlights how ultimately logistics, rather than heroism, was the arbiter of fate in Normandy as the naval and air bombardment proved ineffective, and many German machine gunners only stopped firing when they ran out of ammunition. Grint points out that the German army was theoretically strong enough to deal effectively with any Allied threat from the west, but the defence was only viable if it could move a sufficient concentration of forces to the invasion area faster than the Allies could. In the end the German abandonment of its successful Auftragstaktik meant subordinates were ignored, and the opportunity to defeat the invasion was lost.
Ultimately, to be successful Grint concludes that “it is important to have a judicious and subtle blend of all three decision modes: Leadership, Management and Command”.
Although this book is well foot-noted, there are a number of times when Grint makes significant claims which are not supported by any references. In contrast Grint’s constant reference in the text to other authors should have been in the footnotes – in the text it serves only to distract. The decline in editing standards is, sadly, all too evident in this book. At times Grint is inaccurate (references to the US 85th Airborne Division should, of course, have been to the 82nd Airborne; and when France fell, Canada did NOT become Britain’s most significant ally. India, Australia, and even South Africa, were at this time making a far more significant contribution), verbose (26 pages on the Omaha landing), repetitive, irrelevant (Churchill’s attempt to land ashore on D-Day), or unnecessary (comments on other authors’ supposed errors). All of these matters should have been resolved with greater editorial input.
Despite these niggles, Grint’s book is an engaging read and highlights how success and failure were ‘fleetingly and tantalizingly available to both sides’ on 6 June 1944.
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