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Haigs Command: A Reassessment
Denis Winter sets out to expose and analyze a major historical fraud. His theme is the Western Front in Haig's time - from the Somme to the Armistice - and he has uncovered evidence that the documents from which previous histories have been written are tampered-with and often entirely rewritten versions of the truth. For example, a daily war diary was kept by all units up to GHQ and these were often altered by the cabinet office and crucial appendices totally removed; cabinet war minutes were likewise rewritten, With reference to whole meetings often removed. Records such as Haig's own diary were also tampered with, and Denis Winter even claims to have found documents which the war's official historian thought he had deliberately destroyed in the 1940s. Denis Winter's material includes minutes of "missing" cabinet meetings, and other material.
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First published September 1, 1991
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June 12, 2025
When I read this book I was impressed by what he had to because like any people particularly of an older generation I grew up went to school when Haig's reputation was at its nadir. It has come in for reassessment but the distaste for the way WWI was confused and the trench warfare and terrible casualties means there is a strong resistance to looking at Haig in anything but a negative way. Consequently there has been a lively debate amongst historians pro and anti Haig recent years. I have no attention of even describing any of the debate and view is that Haig while not the monster of disregard for soldiers lives that has been presented was a flawed commander.
So what of this book? I thought it very interesting and revelatory but upon examination it turns out that it is deeply flawed. This is not my opinion but that of a great many historians, many who have low opinions of Haig but who have highlighted considerable problems about the accuracy and reliability of the author's use of documents. When the basis of Mr. Winter's book is that Haig had tampered with official records and his and other war diaries then it is essential that his references and use of documents must be above question. I have read a number of very serious and detailed reviews of the books which makes it clear that the book is unreliable. Low as my opinion of Haig may be there is no point in using tainted work to prove a point. The problem is once an author is shown to be either carelessly or deliberately inaccurate in what he quotes from archives, even if only on a few occasions, then you can not trust anything unless it has even double checked. For that reason this book is worse then useless.
So what of this book? I thought it very interesting and revelatory but upon examination it turns out that it is deeply flawed. This is not my opinion but that of a great many historians, many who have low opinions of Haig but who have highlighted considerable problems about the accuracy and reliability of the author's use of documents. When the basis of Mr. Winter's book is that Haig had tampered with official records and his and other war diaries then it is essential that his references and use of documents must be above question. I have read a number of very serious and detailed reviews of the books which makes it clear that the book is unreliable. Low as my opinion of Haig may be there is no point in using tainted work to prove a point. The problem is once an author is shown to be either carelessly or deliberately inaccurate in what he quotes from archives, even if only on a few occasions, then you can not trust anything unless it has even double checked. For that reason this book is worse then useless.
November 8, 2017
It would be the understatement of the century to say Denis Winter has an extremely poor opinion of Douglas Haig. I can’t say I have come across a tract so unrelenting in its dismissiveness of a historical figure: the man, his character, his deeds and his justification of them. I came to this book ready to have my prejudices against Haig confirmed. By the time I finished it, I was almost desperate for some minor thing that would give succour to me thinking otherwise.
If one fifth of Winter’s critique of Haig were true, it would be a damning indictment. If it is all true, then the historical record of his conduct in WWI is an abomination of biblical proportions. The only mitigation of Haig’s war crimes lies in the prevailing class system, patronage and chauvinism that allowed for them, nurtured them, and ultimately forgave them. Some mitigation.
In charge of the British army for most of WWI, Haig presided over a litany of misadventure, failure, incompetent blunderings and foolhardy, arrogant mishandlings that would be comic if their consequences – the death of almost 1 million British soldiers alone – were not so grave. That the slaughter of so many innocents on the Somme, in Paschendale and in the later battles for Cambrai and Amiens is not described as a holocaust can only be down to the fact that no apparent deliberate malice was involved. But is one really absolved from that because of indifference, or the arrogance of putting one's own fortunes before the lives of those under one's charge? Malice we find almost easier to understand. An evil individual something of a known quantity. But what of one who hides their errors behind mistruths, who distorts the historical record so that their failures do not become manifest? A man who evinces no guilt in the face of clear responsibility, or a man whose sole concern after not only failing to bring the war to a satisfactory conclusion but not helping prevent another, is to save face?
Winter’s treatment of Haig’s Command is at times difficult to read. Partly because of Haig’s obfuscation, partly because of his fellow conspirators’ efforts at the same. The counter-narrative he puts forward is at times slow and painstaking because of the need to piece together disparate information from manifold sources to correct the distortion of the historical record. It is a diligent and honest testimony that stands in sharp contrast to its subject matter.
In short Haig was an obtuse, vain, self-interested, arrogant, clumsy, duplicitous brute. He applied the wrong tactics in the service of a misguided strategy. He did not learn from his mistakes, did not understand or take heed of the evidence confronting him. He sent men to their deaths needlessly, he blamed others for his failings and lied when held to account. That his name was, until 2006, still associated with the fund set up to help ex-servicemen, only goes to show how enduring the political system that allowed for that was. Whenever his name is mentioned, we should collectively hang our heads in shame.
If one fifth of Winter’s critique of Haig were true, it would be a damning indictment. If it is all true, then the historical record of his conduct in WWI is an abomination of biblical proportions. The only mitigation of Haig’s war crimes lies in the prevailing class system, patronage and chauvinism that allowed for them, nurtured them, and ultimately forgave them. Some mitigation.
In charge of the British army for most of WWI, Haig presided over a litany of misadventure, failure, incompetent blunderings and foolhardy, arrogant mishandlings that would be comic if their consequences – the death of almost 1 million British soldiers alone – were not so grave. That the slaughter of so many innocents on the Somme, in Paschendale and in the later battles for Cambrai and Amiens is not described as a holocaust can only be down to the fact that no apparent deliberate malice was involved. But is one really absolved from that because of indifference, or the arrogance of putting one's own fortunes before the lives of those under one's charge? Malice we find almost easier to understand. An evil individual something of a known quantity. But what of one who hides their errors behind mistruths, who distorts the historical record so that their failures do not become manifest? A man who evinces no guilt in the face of clear responsibility, or a man whose sole concern after not only failing to bring the war to a satisfactory conclusion but not helping prevent another, is to save face?
Winter’s treatment of Haig’s Command is at times difficult to read. Partly because of Haig’s obfuscation, partly because of his fellow conspirators’ efforts at the same. The counter-narrative he puts forward is at times slow and painstaking because of the need to piece together disparate information from manifold sources to correct the distortion of the historical record. It is a diligent and honest testimony that stands in sharp contrast to its subject matter.
In short Haig was an obtuse, vain, self-interested, arrogant, clumsy, duplicitous brute. He applied the wrong tactics in the service of a misguided strategy. He did not learn from his mistakes, did not understand or take heed of the evidence confronting him. He sent men to their deaths needlessly, he blamed others for his failings and lied when held to account. That his name was, until 2006, still associated with the fund set up to help ex-servicemen, only goes to show how enduring the political system that allowed for that was. Whenever his name is mentioned, we should collectively hang our heads in shame.
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February 25, 2021Denis Winter's first book was on the experiences of the Tommy and, I believe, well received, so I approached his book on Haig a little cautiously - in that it could be critical of Haig not through reasoned argument, but due to the emotional attachment to the subjects in his first book. The end product was a real Winter of discontent: this account is as about as impartial as I would expect of a history of Aston Villa penned by Trevor Francis; indeed, the litany of errors Winter ascribes to Haig makes Geoffrey Palmer's portrayal of him in Blackadder look like a genius. For myself, I am disappointed Winter failed to link Haig with global warming and the financial crash of 2008. To make personal observations, such as Winter's use of sources seeming irregular, seems churlish as this account has no real discussion; it will be a bible for the anti-Haig faction and, as such, simply be ignored by the Haigists. I wanted something challenging, confronting all sides - the only challenge with this was to get through it.
December 5, 2020
If the Korean War is America’s forgotten war, then the First World War may be the even more forgotten war for most of this country. In Europe, where the scars of war still dot the landscape, where cemeteries still mark the advance of the armies, and where village centers have monuments to those lost in 1914-18, the war is not forgotten. One of the major figures in that war was Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-chief of the British Armies from 1916 to the end of the war. His performance as commander, especially in the bloodbaths that were the Somme and Passchendaele. Denis Winter’s book, written in 1991 with newly released sources, paints a picture that is more troubling than had previously been known.
Winter was able to review newly released sources from Great Britain, but also did extensive research in the archives in Australia and the United States, where he realized that significant portions of the story have been hidden from view for years. In fact, Winter notes that “three conclusions emerged after processing this material. The first was that Haig had systematically falsified the record of his military career,” including his diary. Second, “that the official record of the war…had been systematically distorted both during the war as propaganda and after it, in the official history.” And finally, “huge gaps in the war’s documentation remain.” (pgs. 4-5).
According to Winter, Haig’s career owed more to who he knew, rather than any special skill. He received a 20% markup on his grades at Sandhurst, and his performance in the Boer War as a staff officer was solid but not outstanding and served in India following the end of the conflict. His performance in the early years of World War I, were poor, and the defeat at Loos in 1915 rests squarely on his shoulders. Winters writes that Haig’s “period of command, first of a corps, then of an army, had exposed grave professional weakness in a man whose rise had always owed more to intrigue and patronage than to any evidence of talent as a soldier.” (p.41)
When it comes to the battles of 1916-17, Winter is clear in his belief that Haig’s objective had been to fight a wearing out battle on the Somme, while the true breakthrough battle would be fought in Flanders. His inability to manage the battle and the British Army’s tactics – “which assumed war in the eighteenth-century style,” contributed to the brutal slaughter along the river Somme. (p. 61)
As 3rd Ypres approached, Haig and the British Army did little in the way of learning from the previous fighting of 1914-1916. For Winter, “what Haig should have been working towards, as the French and Germans perceived by 1917, were flexible barrages, infiltration methods and training in small groups. Haig’s orders demonstrate that all were beyond his grasp.” (p. 98) Instead, thousands of British and Commonwealth soldiers would be sacrificed in the mud of Flanders, even after all hope of a breakout victory was gone.
One of the weaknesses in the system that produced Haig was the widespread anti-intellectualism that permeated the British Army. One staff officer in the years before the war, “had made a point of questioning all of the officers and found out that 95 per cent had never read a military book of any sort.” (p. 134). This current of anti-intellectualism would continue even after the war had ended, as Elizabeth Keir noted in her book, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars. Officers were promoted based on time in service, rather than ability – and then only from the Old Army. Added to this, British policy worked against establishing a strong esprit de corps in the army as “drafts were thus sent as individuals to the first unit calling for men – a practice which effectively destroyed any comradeship which might have developed during training.” (p. 147).
Most appallingly was the British government’s desire to erase the truth of what happened during these years. “The quantity of deception and downright lying dealt out by the British official historian makes astonishing reading today…Edmonds had been given very precise instructions on method and story when he began his work, and when the work was completed thirty years later that commission had been faithfully executed.” (p. 254-255).
Winter’s work helps to reframe the role that Sir Douglas Haig played in the Great War. There is not a lot of positive views here on Haig, and if you are looking for a more balanced view of the Field Marshal, you may want to look at Douglas Haig and the First World War, by J. P. Harris. But Winter has scoured archives has presents a disturbing picture of the lengths a nation will go to hide the truth. Everyone interested in the First World War should read this book.
Winter was able to review newly released sources from Great Britain, but also did extensive research in the archives in Australia and the United States, where he realized that significant portions of the story have been hidden from view for years. In fact, Winter notes that “three conclusions emerged after processing this material. The first was that Haig had systematically falsified the record of his military career,” including his diary. Second, “that the official record of the war…had been systematically distorted both during the war as propaganda and after it, in the official history.” And finally, “huge gaps in the war’s documentation remain.” (pgs. 4-5).
According to Winter, Haig’s career owed more to who he knew, rather than any special skill. He received a 20% markup on his grades at Sandhurst, and his performance in the Boer War as a staff officer was solid but not outstanding and served in India following the end of the conflict. His performance in the early years of World War I, were poor, and the defeat at Loos in 1915 rests squarely on his shoulders. Winters writes that Haig’s “period of command, first of a corps, then of an army, had exposed grave professional weakness in a man whose rise had always owed more to intrigue and patronage than to any evidence of talent as a soldier.” (p.41)
When it comes to the battles of 1916-17, Winter is clear in his belief that Haig’s objective had been to fight a wearing out battle on the Somme, while the true breakthrough battle would be fought in Flanders. His inability to manage the battle and the British Army’s tactics – “which assumed war in the eighteenth-century style,” contributed to the brutal slaughter along the river Somme. (p. 61)
As 3rd Ypres approached, Haig and the British Army did little in the way of learning from the previous fighting of 1914-1916. For Winter, “what Haig should have been working towards, as the French and Germans perceived by 1917, were flexible barrages, infiltration methods and training in small groups. Haig’s orders demonstrate that all were beyond his grasp.” (p. 98) Instead, thousands of British and Commonwealth soldiers would be sacrificed in the mud of Flanders, even after all hope of a breakout victory was gone.
One of the weaknesses in the system that produced Haig was the widespread anti-intellectualism that permeated the British Army. One staff officer in the years before the war, “had made a point of questioning all of the officers and found out that 95 per cent had never read a military book of any sort.” (p. 134). This current of anti-intellectualism would continue even after the war had ended, as Elizabeth Keir noted in her book, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars. Officers were promoted based on time in service, rather than ability – and then only from the Old Army. Added to this, British policy worked against establishing a strong esprit de corps in the army as “drafts were thus sent as individuals to the first unit calling for men – a practice which effectively destroyed any comradeship which might have developed during training.” (p. 147).
Most appallingly was the British government’s desire to erase the truth of what happened during these years. “The quantity of deception and downright lying dealt out by the British official historian makes astonishing reading today…Edmonds had been given very precise instructions on method and story when he began his work, and when the work was completed thirty years later that commission had been faithfully executed.” (p. 254-255).
Winter’s work helps to reframe the role that Sir Douglas Haig played in the Great War. There is not a lot of positive views here on Haig, and if you are looking for a more balanced view of the Field Marshal, you may want to look at Douglas Haig and the First World War, by J. P. Harris. But Winter has scoured archives has presents a disturbing picture of the lengths a nation will go to hide the truth. Everyone interested in the First World War should read this book.
December 29, 2024
Another harsh attack on a man unable to defend himself for he was long dead when Winter made this book. Winter is not simply anti-Haig - he hates Haig! This book was a clear reaction to the growing strength of the pro-Haig historiography and Winter has jumped in the ring throwing a barrage of haymakers insisting the anti-Haig school is right. What will follow is an assessment of Winter's main arguments. Winter makes many bold claims but his three biggest are:
One:
The British government tried to 'cover up' the history of the First World War by letting Haig falsify official records, such as his diary. (p.255) Winter makes this conspiracy theorist-esque claim quite quickly:
"The official record of the war – political as well as military – had been systematically distorted both during the war as propaganda and after it, in the official history… All documents passed on the Public Record Office were carefully vetted so as to remove those which contradicted the official line." (p.4)
Historian John Hussey debunked this nonsense in 'Stand To' Issue No. 92 by back-tracking the sources Winter claimed to correctly cite. In short, Winter misquotes loads of "evidence" from the Australian and Canadian archives and various exchanges between Haig and others like Historian James Edmond. Gary Sheffield also makes it clear that Haig's diary was not altered and was publicly accessible as early as the 1960s so Winter's claims are, to quote Hussey, "downright lying".
Two:
Winter would have fought a better Somme offensive than Haig. While making his claims, Winter also makes sure to be as tonally dismissive to Haig as he can. For instance, he says Haig had "three basic weaknesses: a faulty selection of battlefield, an inability to break the crust of the enemy’s defensive positions at the outset and a failure to exploit such fleeting opportunities for breakthrough which appeared." (p.151) and makes a stark claim that Haig fought the Somme because he wanted to make a weakness at Passchendaele (p.79, 84).
The latter has already been debunked in numerous works as early at Simkins (1991) and supported as recently as Lloyd (2021) that the Somme was fought to relieve the French from immense pressure at Verdun. As for the former, one reads historians to learn what did happen, not to learn what may have happened if the writer was Haig with post-war hindsight (and magically having ideas pre-WW2 generals didn't have yet). Although having not read them in their entirety, one can confidently say Middlebrook or Phillcot's narrative of the Somme offensive would be a much better read than Winter's.
Three:
Haig was promoted to Commander in Chief during WW1 because...the other men fancied him.
Check out this quote from Winter's book: "Thus Haig's rapid promotion owed little to proven professional competence and much to good fortune with patrons. Wood, Kitchener and Escher were all men of substance and their support had pushed Haig far ahead of his rivals, but at a price. The frisson of homosexuality attaching to each of his patrons gave ammunition to jealous rivals, all the more because of a strong dislike of women which he made little effort to conceal." (p.33) and also saying Kitchener was "attracted by the striking physique and blue eyes of a young Hussar [Haig]" (p.32). The not so subtle implict intention with characterising the pair in this way makes a reader of the 21st century groan at the clear point scoring Winter was scraping for with certain readers of the early 1990s.
With this so called "reassessment", Winter had an agenda: to convince millions to hate Haig. In doing so, he failed to do what any work of history (and historian) really should: present the evidence and come to a reasonable judgement based on such evidence while doing as best as possible to be honest and fair in the assessment. Winter has completely neglected any sense of balance and such makes his work, even without the fact checking, difficult to deem reliable.
To anyone seeking an honest depiction of Haig's work...nah chief, this ain't it.
One:
The British government tried to 'cover up' the history of the First World War by letting Haig falsify official records, such as his diary. (p.255) Winter makes this conspiracy theorist-esque claim quite quickly:
"The official record of the war – political as well as military – had been systematically distorted both during the war as propaganda and after it, in the official history… All documents passed on the Public Record Office were carefully vetted so as to remove those which contradicted the official line." (p.4)
Historian John Hussey debunked this nonsense in 'Stand To' Issue No. 92 by back-tracking the sources Winter claimed to correctly cite. In short, Winter misquotes loads of "evidence" from the Australian and Canadian archives and various exchanges between Haig and others like Historian James Edmond. Gary Sheffield also makes it clear that Haig's diary was not altered and was publicly accessible as early as the 1960s so Winter's claims are, to quote Hussey, "downright lying".
Two:
Winter would have fought a better Somme offensive than Haig. While making his claims, Winter also makes sure to be as tonally dismissive to Haig as he can. For instance, he says Haig had "three basic weaknesses: a faulty selection of battlefield, an inability to break the crust of the enemy’s defensive positions at the outset and a failure to exploit such fleeting opportunities for breakthrough which appeared." (p.151) and makes a stark claim that Haig fought the Somme because he wanted to make a weakness at Passchendaele (p.79, 84).
The latter has already been debunked in numerous works as early at Simkins (1991) and supported as recently as Lloyd (2021) that the Somme was fought to relieve the French from immense pressure at Verdun. As for the former, one reads historians to learn what did happen, not to learn what may have happened if the writer was Haig with post-war hindsight (and magically having ideas pre-WW2 generals didn't have yet). Although having not read them in their entirety, one can confidently say Middlebrook or Phillcot's narrative of the Somme offensive would be a much better read than Winter's.
Three:
Haig was promoted to Commander in Chief during WW1 because...the other men fancied him.
Check out this quote from Winter's book: "Thus Haig's rapid promotion owed little to proven professional competence and much to good fortune with patrons. Wood, Kitchener and Escher were all men of substance and their support had pushed Haig far ahead of his rivals, but at a price. The frisson of homosexuality attaching to each of his patrons gave ammunition to jealous rivals, all the more because of a strong dislike of women which he made little effort to conceal." (p.33) and also saying Kitchener was "attracted by the striking physique and blue eyes of a young Hussar [Haig]" (p.32). The not so subtle implict intention with characterising the pair in this way makes a reader of the 21st century groan at the clear point scoring Winter was scraping for with certain readers of the early 1990s.
With this so called "reassessment", Winter had an agenda: to convince millions to hate Haig. In doing so, he failed to do what any work of history (and historian) really should: present the evidence and come to a reasonable judgement based on such evidence while doing as best as possible to be honest and fair in the assessment. Winter has completely neglected any sense of balance and such makes his work, even without the fact checking, difficult to deem reliable.
To anyone seeking an honest depiction of Haig's work...nah chief, this ain't it.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
May 28, 2024
Winter let all the Haig acolytes and BEF tub-thumpers off the hook. It's like reading Tariq Ali's book on Churchill--overkill that lets the fanboys easily dismiss the thing because it is so one-sided. This frustrates me enormously because Winter is more right than wrong, in my informed opinion, but blows it by going to extreme. A whole generation of British (let's be honest, English) historians have, since this book was written, done their damnedest to portray the BEF and its leadership in the most glowing light possible. No more donkeys: these were the very model of modern Major Generals, thank you very much! I've seen intelligent PhDs address the Western Front Association with such fawning praise for Haig, his lieutenants, and all those Tommy Atkins that it's a wonder they didn't hit the Bosch for six and chase them all the way to Berlin in 1916! I'm an American and can't stand flag-waving "God Bless America" historiography. The British equivalent leaves me equally annoyed. Winter had a chance to deflate the Haig bubble. He missed his chance.
September 17, 2022
This was a real eye opener and very disturbing. Apart from Ohh What A Lovely War which highlighted how brutal and calous the way the ordinary troops were treated while the generals were living a comfortable life. This confirms that the armies lack of skilled men in organising the logistics to supply the men fighting at the front and the poor decision making. Even now there are files which are still classified making it impossible to get at the truth. This book expains how the information was obtained from the records kept by the colonial and American forces. This throws serious doubt on the current interpretation of the history of the First World War.
June 7, 2022
Military Historian Denis Winter reappraises Douglas Haig's performance on the Western Front. Haig has been seen as an incompetent butcher of his men. Haig and his reputation are broken down into their base level. Primary sources are examined, in this case, the Haigs War diary written contemporaneously as opposed to "post hoc". Professor Winter while not opposed to revisionist history and sometimes will use it, he is incredibly open and forthright as well as fair.
January 23, 2015
A condemnation of the British military leadership in WW1. Haig seems to be a good example of what a very poor military in the late 19th, early 20th century produced. To add insult to injury, after the war the British government set out to ensure that the public would never see how incompetent its military was.
January 31, 2015
Denis winter is a very thorough author who knows this time period and theme beyond a doubt. It can be a little dry at times but for those interested in WW1 this is an outstanding resource. His book, "Death's Men" is also a must read for those who enjoy this genre.
April 27, 2008
i learned what Comander Haig did while the first world war started.
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