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The Price is Wrong: Why Capitalism Won't Save the Planet
"Standard theories of the causes of climate breakdown will not survive this book. Readers will be all the wiser."
—Andreas Malm, author of How to Blow Up a Pipeline
Why the market will never solve the climate crisis
What if our understanding of capitalism and climate is back to front? What if the problem is not that transitioning to renewables is too expensive, but that saving the planet is not sufficiently profitable?
This is Brett Christophers' claim. The global economy is moving too slowly toward sustainability because the return on green investment is too low.
Today's consensus is that the key to curbing climate change is to produce green electricity and electrify everything possible. The main economic barrier in that project has seemingly been removed. But while prices of solar and wind power have tumbled, the golden era of renewables has yet to materialize.
The problem is that investment is driven by profit, not price, and operating solar and wind farms remains a marginal business, dependent everywhere on the state's financial support.
We cannot expect markets and the private sector to solve the climate crisis while the profits that are their lifeblood remain unappetizing. But there is an alternative to providing surrogate green profits through to take energy out of the private sector's hands.
An essential intervention, The Price Is Wrong is as politically far-reaching as it is factually illuminating.
—Andreas Malm, author of How to Blow Up a Pipeline
Why the market will never solve the climate crisis
What if our understanding of capitalism and climate is back to front? What if the problem is not that transitioning to renewables is too expensive, but that saving the planet is not sufficiently profitable?
This is Brett Christophers' claim. The global economy is moving too slowly toward sustainability because the return on green investment is too low.
Today's consensus is that the key to curbing climate change is to produce green electricity and electrify everything possible. The main economic barrier in that project has seemingly been removed. But while prices of solar and wind power have tumbled, the golden era of renewables has yet to materialize.
The problem is that investment is driven by profit, not price, and operating solar and wind farms remains a marginal business, dependent everywhere on the state's financial support.
We cannot expect markets and the private sector to solve the climate crisis while the profits that are their lifeblood remain unappetizing. But there is an alternative to providing surrogate green profits through to take energy out of the private sector's hands.
An essential intervention, The Price Is Wrong is as politically far-reaching as it is factually illuminating.
565 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 2024
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August 25, 2024
Christophers’ past work demonstrates a commitment to delving into the nitty gritty of the workings of capitalism, trawling though the operations of corporations and smaller scale business to show how the system is moving towards a rentier model, rooted in monopoly control of assets and out to gouge the biggest profits it can out of trading operations.
This time the focus is on the electricity generation sector and all its various components. There is an urgency about placing these operations under close scrutiny because it has been made central to the agreements reached during the COP process. Switch all energy use to electricity and then decarbonise its generation sums up the ambitions of the signatory governments to keeping global warming below 2 degrees by the end of the century. The question then has to be, do we have an electricity generating centre that is up to the job?
On paper it looks promising. Christophers acknowledges the significant achievement is reducing the unit cost of electricity generated by renewables below that of fossil fuel in recent years. But he challenges the idea that the advance made by the wind and solar sector in particular is sufficient to seal the deal on the direction power corporates will take in the future. His argument hinges on exposing the fallacy that is reduction in production costs that drives the competitiveness of industries – a view that is central to supply-side economics. His point is that when investors look at where they are going to put their money when it comes to new technologies the relative cost of the goods or services being produced is only one factor taken into consideration. Far more important is the size and reliability of the return on capital invested – aka profit – which they hope to pass on as dividends to their shareholders.
At this point the book gets very technical. Power generation in recent decades has moved away from being regarded as infrastructure costs to be borne by the state (in the case of the US it never was) and instead has been privatised in most countries. In order to construct something that looks like a free market in which competition can be relied upon to drive down costs, governments have relied on a ‘de-bungling’ of the industry, separating into companies involved in the generation of power, purchase in wholesale markets, and distributers in local networks. Keeping all these parts working in tandem requires a consistency of supply and predictable revenues to keep all parties happy. It turns out that the unit price of energy is not a particularly important part of the equation.
The issues that have to be address are considerable. One of these is the fluctuations in the cost of energy supply over the course of time periods which are typically as short as 24 hours. The industry segments this into 30 minute time slots which might during a period of low demand, be costed at £40 per MWh, rising to a high of £225 when demand reaches peak levels. In Europe most of the trading is done in spot markets, with generators bidding to be included among the successful applicants in what is known as the merit system. To be included means selling the energy produced at that time and vice versa if the bid is not accepted.
Christophers explains that renewal generators suffer greater consequences for not making the cut in this system than their fossil fuel competitors. This is because the producers of renewal energy cannot reduce their costs for that time slot if they fail to find a buyer. For them, energy is produced whenever the wind blows or the sunshines, and, assuming this happens during a period when there is no buyer, then the energy is simply lost. The fossil fuel generator on the other hand is able to mitigate the loss of a purchaser by powering down their system and saving on the use of the coal or gas used for production.
An addition risk for renewables comes from the times when their bid has been successful, but the wind or solar conditions do not permit the production of the electricity. When this happens contractual clauses kick in which require the company to purchase the energy they are committed to providing from another provider – either a renewable or fossil company.
The consequence of this is that the revenue streams for renewable companies is much more unpredictable than that of the fossil generators. This makes them less attractive to institutional investors on whom they depend on to finance the initial cost of installing wind and solar arrays. To overcome this disadvantage renewable energy production has been depended from the onset by government support which has come in varying forms. In the US Investment Tax Credits encourage financial institutions to take the plunge in investing, with the Europeans generally favouring Feed-in-Tariffs. Christophers explains in detail what these various systems entail. They all come down to the same point however – that the huge gains in reducing the the unit cost of producing electricity by renewables has depended on some form of financial support from national authorities.
In short, despite the lower cost of production, renewables cannot compete with fossil fuels without a financial commitment by governments to even out the playing field. Yet governments have difficulty in understanding this fundamental fact. The Cameron government in the UK was led to think that the drop in production costs had meant that renewables could compete on price alone and no longer needed support from the public purse. The uncertainty this induced has dimmed enthusiasm for investment in renewable generation with the result that decarbonisation by 2050 is looking increasingly difficult.
For Christophers, it is the structure of capitalist markets that are jeopardising efforts to reach the COP carbon reduction targets. The viability of an enterprise hinges on its profitability and investors will always look askance at any proposition that cannot guarantee revenues sufficient to pay off capital costs with an adequate return for the risk assumed. Renewable generated electricity, being a natural force which can only come into existence in accordance with the laws of physics (atmospheric conditions that allows the wind to blow and the sun to shine). On that score is falls into the category of being a ‘fictitious commodity’ in Polyani’s sense of being, like the human capacity to labour or the fecundity of the land, a gift of nature rather than a good emerging from an industrial process. When it is rendered up to market forces to establish its ‘value’, this appears as a ‘price’ only when acted on by social forces which help fix its final shape. For electricity, these social forces have come about from the debundling of the industry which took place in the early days of neoliberal reform.
The paradox we are now in is that continued progress towards the decarbonisation of electricity generation depends on continued financial support from government at levels which are deplored by the imperatives of the free market. This is becoming unsustainable as a backlash gathers against a sector which is failing to produce the returns on capital investment that the financial sector expects to see. The solutions seems to be that we abandon the idea of electricity that can be produced as a classic commodity in normal market conditions, and instead go back to seeing it as a part of social infrastructure, like roads, railways and harbours, which only come into existence through the political will of a community to support them.
This time the focus is on the electricity generation sector and all its various components. There is an urgency about placing these operations under close scrutiny because it has been made central to the agreements reached during the COP process. Switch all energy use to electricity and then decarbonise its generation sums up the ambitions of the signatory governments to keeping global warming below 2 degrees by the end of the century. The question then has to be, do we have an electricity generating centre that is up to the job?
On paper it looks promising. Christophers acknowledges the significant achievement is reducing the unit cost of electricity generated by renewables below that of fossil fuel in recent years. But he challenges the idea that the advance made by the wind and solar sector in particular is sufficient to seal the deal on the direction power corporates will take in the future. His argument hinges on exposing the fallacy that is reduction in production costs that drives the competitiveness of industries – a view that is central to supply-side economics. His point is that when investors look at where they are going to put their money when it comes to new technologies the relative cost of the goods or services being produced is only one factor taken into consideration. Far more important is the size and reliability of the return on capital invested – aka profit – which they hope to pass on as dividends to their shareholders.
At this point the book gets very technical. Power generation in recent decades has moved away from being regarded as infrastructure costs to be borne by the state (in the case of the US it never was) and instead has been privatised in most countries. In order to construct something that looks like a free market in which competition can be relied upon to drive down costs, governments have relied on a ‘de-bungling’ of the industry, separating into companies involved in the generation of power, purchase in wholesale markets, and distributers in local networks. Keeping all these parts working in tandem requires a consistency of supply and predictable revenues to keep all parties happy. It turns out that the unit price of energy is not a particularly important part of the equation.
The issues that have to be address are considerable. One of these is the fluctuations in the cost of energy supply over the course of time periods which are typically as short as 24 hours. The industry segments this into 30 minute time slots which might during a period of low demand, be costed at £40 per MWh, rising to a high of £225 when demand reaches peak levels. In Europe most of the trading is done in spot markets, with generators bidding to be included among the successful applicants in what is known as the merit system. To be included means selling the energy produced at that time and vice versa if the bid is not accepted.
Christophers explains that renewal generators suffer greater consequences for not making the cut in this system than their fossil fuel competitors. This is because the producers of renewal energy cannot reduce their costs for that time slot if they fail to find a buyer. For them, energy is produced whenever the wind blows or the sunshines, and, assuming this happens during a period when there is no buyer, then the energy is simply lost. The fossil fuel generator on the other hand is able to mitigate the loss of a purchaser by powering down their system and saving on the use of the coal or gas used for production.
An addition risk for renewables comes from the times when their bid has been successful, but the wind or solar conditions do not permit the production of the electricity. When this happens contractual clauses kick in which require the company to purchase the energy they are committed to providing from another provider – either a renewable or fossil company.
The consequence of this is that the revenue streams for renewable companies is much more unpredictable than that of the fossil generators. This makes them less attractive to institutional investors on whom they depend on to finance the initial cost of installing wind and solar arrays. To overcome this disadvantage renewable energy production has been depended from the onset by government support which has come in varying forms. In the US Investment Tax Credits encourage financial institutions to take the plunge in investing, with the Europeans generally favouring Feed-in-Tariffs. Christophers explains in detail what these various systems entail. They all come down to the same point however – that the huge gains in reducing the the unit cost of producing electricity by renewables has depended on some form of financial support from national authorities.
In short, despite the lower cost of production, renewables cannot compete with fossil fuels without a financial commitment by governments to even out the playing field. Yet governments have difficulty in understanding this fundamental fact. The Cameron government in the UK was led to think that the drop in production costs had meant that renewables could compete on price alone and no longer needed support from the public purse. The uncertainty this induced has dimmed enthusiasm for investment in renewable generation with the result that decarbonisation by 2050 is looking increasingly difficult.
For Christophers, it is the structure of capitalist markets that are jeopardising efforts to reach the COP carbon reduction targets. The viability of an enterprise hinges on its profitability and investors will always look askance at any proposition that cannot guarantee revenues sufficient to pay off capital costs with an adequate return for the risk assumed. Renewable generated electricity, being a natural force which can only come into existence in accordance with the laws of physics (atmospheric conditions that allows the wind to blow and the sun to shine). On that score is falls into the category of being a ‘fictitious commodity’ in Polyani’s sense of being, like the human capacity to labour or the fecundity of the land, a gift of nature rather than a good emerging from an industrial process. When it is rendered up to market forces to establish its ‘value’, this appears as a ‘price’ only when acted on by social forces which help fix its final shape. For electricity, these social forces have come about from the debundling of the industry which took place in the early days of neoliberal reform.
The paradox we are now in is that continued progress towards the decarbonisation of electricity generation depends on continued financial support from government at levels which are deplored by the imperatives of the free market. This is becoming unsustainable as a backlash gathers against a sector which is failing to produce the returns on capital investment that the financial sector expects to see. The solutions seems to be that we abandon the idea of electricity that can be produced as a classic commodity in normal market conditions, and instead go back to seeing it as a part of social infrastructure, like roads, railways and harbours, which only come into existence through the political will of a community to support them.
Read
October 25, 2025Such a thorough job, well-researched and well-argued. The introduction really does tell you the conclusion pretty clearly, and I think that was enough for me. I don't think I will finish it because I will not remember the details and statistics, albeit I want to.
September 15, 2024
Being focused on the role of renewables in the provision of electricity rather than climate change writ large, this was a narrower book than I was expecting, and in terms of substantive content it's in reality just a long article that's been fleshed out to book form.
But, taking the book as it is, the author makes a comprehensive and convincing case about the limitations of the profit motive in navigating the complex relationship between renewable technologies and the structure of electricity markets. His essential argument is that, despite relative pricing suggesting that solar and wind will in time come to dominate electricity provision, without significant and ongoing government intervention there will never be enough private investment into renewables to allow us to meet our obligations on decarbonisation, because left to market dynamics private renewable provision does not deliver enough reliable and consistent profit to mitigate its risk profile.
As that summary might suggest, there's a level of economic wonkery in this book that may not be to everyone's taste, but given that the devil is very much in the details on this topic, it's a necessary approach to take, and thankfully the author's writing style avoids the impenetrable academic jargon that can often ruin books of this nature (looking at you, Mann and Wainwright's "Climate Leviathan").
But, taking the book as it is, the author makes a comprehensive and convincing case about the limitations of the profit motive in navigating the complex relationship between renewable technologies and the structure of electricity markets. His essential argument is that, despite relative pricing suggesting that solar and wind will in time come to dominate electricity provision, without significant and ongoing government intervention there will never be enough private investment into renewables to allow us to meet our obligations on decarbonisation, because left to market dynamics private renewable provision does not deliver enough reliable and consistent profit to mitigate its risk profile.
As that summary might suggest, there's a level of economic wonkery in this book that may not be to everyone's taste, but given that the devil is very much in the details on this topic, it's a necessary approach to take, and thankfully the author's writing style avoids the impenetrable academic jargon that can often ruin books of this nature (looking at you, Mann and Wainwright's "Climate Leviathan").
July 30, 2024
Honestly pretty boring (more telling of my interests than the book), but introduced an important concept re: energy transition: that cost of renewables does not necessarily translate to profits of renewables projects, and that profits ultimately determine financing.
Ending on the NY BRPA takes a different tone in late 2024, when much of the BRPA has been stalled out, many renewable projects have had their funding pulled, and the NYPA/Justin Driscoll refuse to take up the challenge themselves.
Ending on the NY BRPA takes a different tone in late 2024, when much of the BRPA has been stalled out, many renewable projects have had their funding pulled, and the NYPA/Justin Driscoll refuse to take up the challenge themselves.
June 17, 2024
Best "documentary" I have read in many years.
If you wish to understand how the energy-business works and why the socalled green transition has not taken place yet, this book is an absolute fantastisc read. You will blown away with facts.
The amount of data and evidence laying the ground for this book is stunning - there is very little doubt left to hook into when finished. The writing style is easy and the author does a tremendous job describing to the reader what, how and things happen.
"If price indeed drives energy technology adoption, and if renewables are now cheapest, why is government economic support for renewables still so important – or at least, still seen to be indispensable?"
"..the reality is that not all electricity is the same. To be sure, an electron is an electron is an electron. But the power produced by different types of power plants actually varies in several critical respects that are essential to understand when one is grappling with the complex political economy of the decarbonization of the electricity sector. All electrons are identical, certainly, but they come ‘packaged’ very differently."
"As Anwar Shaikh, among others, has observed, political economy fundamentally turns not on price but on profit. Thus, unlike supply-side neoclassicism or demand-side Keynesianism, political economy is – to use Shaikh’s felicitous turn of phrase – ‘profit-side’. What does this actually mean? It means, as Shaikh says, that, for political economists, the production of goods or services ‘is always initiated on the basis of prospective profit’"
If you wish to understand how the energy-business works and why the socalled green transition has not taken place yet, this book is an absolute fantastisc read. You will blown away with facts.
The amount of data and evidence laying the ground for this book is stunning - there is very little doubt left to hook into when finished. The writing style is easy and the author does a tremendous job describing to the reader what, how and things happen.
"If price indeed drives energy technology adoption, and if renewables are now cheapest, why is government economic support for renewables still so important – or at least, still seen to be indispensable?"
"..the reality is that not all electricity is the same. To be sure, an electron is an electron is an electron. But the power produced by different types of power plants actually varies in several critical respects that are essential to understand when one is grappling with the complex political economy of the decarbonization of the electricity sector. All electrons are identical, certainly, but they come ‘packaged’ very differently."
"As Anwar Shaikh, among others, has observed, political economy fundamentally turns not on price but on profit. Thus, unlike supply-side neoclassicism or demand-side Keynesianism, political economy is – to use Shaikh’s felicitous turn of phrase – ‘profit-side’. What does this actually mean? It means, as Shaikh says, that, for political economists, the production of goods or services ‘is always initiated on the basis of prospective profit’"
September 20, 2025
Qua boek / de literaire kwaliteiten 3 en een halve ster, het is eigenlijk vrij saai. Maar qua inhoud is het boek echt precies voor mij geschreven en heel interessant dus gewoon 5 sterren. De titel is een beetje misleidend, het boek heeft een hele specifieke claim: de elektriciteitsmarkt (en de economie rondom elektriciteits productie) werkt niet voor zon en wind. Zonder eeuwige subsidies of radicale markthervormingen gaat de energietransitie nooit lukken.
Christophers kent de markt duidelijk goed, en gaat heel erg de diepte in. Omdat een groot deel hiervan basically mijn werk is was dat af en toe wel vermoeiend, maar het gaf me wel veel vertrouwen dat hij weet waar hij het over heeft.
Verder was dit boek echt basically een integrale aanval op zowel mijn studie als alle theorieën die in mijn werk populair zijn, wat het super interessant maar ook vrij deprimerend maakte. Zn pleidooi is dat met alles wat we nu doen en geloven we er gewoon niet gaan komen, en ik vrees dat hij een punt heeft.
Aan het einde hinte hij op wat hij eigenlijk wil: een radicaal andere elektriciteitsmarkt met veel maar rol voor de staat. Was leuk geweest als hij dat nog wat verder had uitgediept. Het riep bij nog wel af en toe vragen op die ik meer beantwoord had willen zien worden.
Maarja, het is een boek dat me in ieder geval echt aan het denken heeft gezet en dat nog wel iets langer zal doen.
Christophers kent de markt duidelijk goed, en gaat heel erg de diepte in. Omdat een groot deel hiervan basically mijn werk is was dat af en toe wel vermoeiend, maar het gaf me wel veel vertrouwen dat hij weet waar hij het over heeft.
Verder was dit boek echt basically een integrale aanval op zowel mijn studie als alle theorieën die in mijn werk populair zijn, wat het super interessant maar ook vrij deprimerend maakte. Zn pleidooi is dat met alles wat we nu doen en geloven we er gewoon niet gaan komen, en ik vrees dat hij een punt heeft.
Aan het einde hinte hij op wat hij eigenlijk wil: een radicaal andere elektriciteitsmarkt met veel maar rol voor de staat. Was leuk geweest als hij dat nog wat verder had uitgediept. Het riep bij nog wel af en toe vragen op die ik meer beantwoord had willen zien worden.
Maarja, het is een boek dat me in ieder geval echt aan het denken heeft gezet en dat nog wel iets langer zal doen.
February 3, 2025
If you want an in-depth understanding of the electricity market this may be the book for you. It’s a little dry, but I’m going it 4 stars because it does an extremely good job explaining the problem we’re facing, even if I wish it had been a bit shorter
The TLDR is that market forces won’t allow for the development of cheap, efficient, renewable energies to serve as our primary source of power because there simply isn’t enough profit margin to be made off it. The solution is to nationalize the market as government will need to lead if we’re going to see any meaningful change in the way we consume electricity in terms of fossil fuels
The TLDR is that market forces won’t allow for the development of cheap, efficient, renewable energies to serve as our primary source of power because there simply isn’t enough profit margin to be made off it. The solution is to nationalize the market as government will need to lead if we’re going to see any meaningful change in the way we consume electricity in terms of fossil fuels
January 7, 2025
By no means a light read, both in terms of subject matter and the book’s ultimate conclusion about the state of efforts to decarbonize the electricity sector, but essential to understanding the challenges of widespread renewable energy deployment. As is often the case, the desire to deregulate seems to have led to many (but not all) of these issues…
February 24, 2025
A thorough and well argued explanation of why the market won’t save us. As an energy professional, I found this explanation of the current state of the electricity transition informative and insightful.
October 8, 2025
Snowpiercer-style future here we come babeyyyy
4.4/5
4.4/5
February 18, 2025
The author is confused about modern economic thought, and as a result, the whole book falls apart. There is a strong Marxian bias.
The main argument presented in the book is that policymakers have been too focused on generation costs (LCOE), which is true. However, the author then concludes that since the cost of generating 1 MWh of renewable electricity is now below that of fossil-generated electricity, the entire "neoliberal" electricity markets framework must be wrong. He fails to understand that:
1. LCOE was not intended to capture all costs.
2. LCOE varies substantially with the discount rate used. Since projects are undertaken by developers with different "hurdle costs," differences in the timing of cash flows ultimately determine whether a project is truly "not as expensive."
3. As readers, we gain nothing by thinking about the Marxian framework of the "fetishism of LCOE."
4. The author does not distinguish between the average LCOE, which the metric is meant to represent, and the actual LCOE of an individual project.
5. LCOE is only a shortcut to get insight into the economics of electricity generation. Modern economics implies looking into the actual price (the capture price) together with the costs. In other words, LCOE is a necessary condition, not a sufficient one
The author dismisses, without much evidence, the more plausible argument that government obstruction—such as building permits, environmental approvals, and interconnection queue delays—plays a significant role in the bad economics of renewable generation. Instead, he points his finger at banking. He claims that banks look at profitability, and since profitability is unclear, many projects do not make the cut. However, he fails to see that even if LCOE is lower on average, a bank will have more information about a specific project's location, capture price, and building costs than what is used in calculating LCOE.
The book’s biggest flaw is its outdated understanding of economics. The author still divides economic thought into "supply-side" (neoliberal), "demand-side" (Keynesian), and "profit-side" (classical). This framework leads him into multiple paradoxes. For example, he argues that higher profits (extra-normal profits) drive more investment and thus "cannibalize" profit—an idea supported by standard economic theory. Another major mistake is his belief that uncertainty was introduced by liberalizing prices, as if uncertainty is not an inherent part of variable demand and increasingly variable supply. Price variability is an objective reality—the real issue is who bears its costs. Making uncertainty visible is actually beneficial, as it creates incentives for technological improvements (such as better battery storage) and allows financial markets to transfer these risks to those willing to bear them. The author dismisses all of this as too complicated for developers to understand—laughable, considering that where there is money to be made, companies find a way.
What this book does well is providing a beginner-friendly overview of electricity markets. What it does poorly is the economics. I would recommend that interested readers pick up Renewable Energy Finance: Powering the Future instead, even if it is older.
The main argument presented in the book is that policymakers have been too focused on generation costs (LCOE), which is true. However, the author then concludes that since the cost of generating 1 MWh of renewable electricity is now below that of fossil-generated electricity, the entire "neoliberal" electricity markets framework must be wrong. He fails to understand that:
1. LCOE was not intended to capture all costs.
2. LCOE varies substantially with the discount rate used. Since projects are undertaken by developers with different "hurdle costs," differences in the timing of cash flows ultimately determine whether a project is truly "not as expensive."
3. As readers, we gain nothing by thinking about the Marxian framework of the "fetishism of LCOE."
4. The author does not distinguish between the average LCOE, which the metric is meant to represent, and the actual LCOE of an individual project.
5. LCOE is only a shortcut to get insight into the economics of electricity generation. Modern economics implies looking into the actual price (the capture price) together with the costs. In other words, LCOE is a necessary condition, not a sufficient one
The author dismisses, without much evidence, the more plausible argument that government obstruction—such as building permits, environmental approvals, and interconnection queue delays—plays a significant role in the bad economics of renewable generation. Instead, he points his finger at banking. He claims that banks look at profitability, and since profitability is unclear, many projects do not make the cut. However, he fails to see that even if LCOE is lower on average, a bank will have more information about a specific project's location, capture price, and building costs than what is used in calculating LCOE.
The book’s biggest flaw is its outdated understanding of economics. The author still divides economic thought into "supply-side" (neoliberal), "demand-side" (Keynesian), and "profit-side" (classical). This framework leads him into multiple paradoxes. For example, he argues that higher profits (extra-normal profits) drive more investment and thus "cannibalize" profit—an idea supported by standard economic theory. Another major mistake is his belief that uncertainty was introduced by liberalizing prices, as if uncertainty is not an inherent part of variable demand and increasingly variable supply. Price variability is an objective reality—the real issue is who bears its costs. Making uncertainty visible is actually beneficial, as it creates incentives for technological improvements (such as better battery storage) and allows financial markets to transfer these risks to those willing to bear them. The author dismisses all of this as too complicated for developers to understand—laughable, considering that where there is money to be made, companies find a way.
What this book does well is providing a beginner-friendly overview of electricity markets. What it does poorly is the economics. I would recommend that interested readers pick up Renewable Energy Finance: Powering the Future instead, even if it is older.
August 30, 2024
Unfortunately I was a bit slow on getting my hand on this book, even though I was looking forward to its release as someone who has worked 9 years in the EU’s State aid control authority in the field of energy. It was quite refreshing to read such an on-point explanation on the rollout of European renewable support schemes in the past 15 years r so. Nevertheless, the book also provides several illustrations of the story of renewable penetration in North America, Asia and even in Africa.
This book is a must read for everyone who works in the decarbonization/transition of power markets! Never judge a book by the cover so the saying goes, and indeed, don’t discount it quickly by its subtitle. As Mr Christophers explains it in the book, the subtitle could be replaced by the following: “if private capital, circulating in markets, is still failing to decarbonise global electricity generation sufficiently rapidly even with all the support it has gotten and is getting from governments, and even with technology costs having fallen as far and as fast as they have, it is surely as clear a sign as possible that capital is not designed the job.”
And this is the key finding of the book: it is a very thorough and well-argued analysis on the evolution and current state of electricity markets and their failing since the growing penetration of weather dependent renewables. Mr Christophers delivers a cool-headed assessment on the profitability deficit of these technologies that the market in its current form cannot deliver on its own. His findings are very clear and well supported and should serve as a warning for everyone in policy making who has been drinking the Kool-Aid of the falling LCOE of renewables for too long.
It's not that new renewable investments aren’t made, but not at the pace it would be needed to meet the undertaken targets. The penetration of weather dependent renewables puts a downward pressure on price making in the current power market design, and with less and less marginal price setting fossil assets the price of electricity will further drop. This will render renewable investments less attractive to capital providers: who are in it for the money, i.e. high returns. And that’s what these investments can’t deliver. Corporate PPA’s won’t change the entire game as they cover only a segment of all news investments, coming mainly from offtaker sectors who are ready to lock in prices for a longer period in order to greenwash their activities.
Mr. Christophers makes it clear in the beginning that he won’t provide solutions in the book as it’s rather the task of policy makers, especially if the solution entails the shift in the prevailing view of considering electricity as a commodity. If we want to keep it as a commodity exchanged in markets, then the market design (which was set up before the mass arrival of weather dependent renewables) should change, otherwise capital markets will not put their money in new renewables investments at the speed and scale which is needed to transit away from fossil fuels.
I look forward to what the design of GB Energy can bring into the discussion.
This book is a must read for everyone who works in the decarbonization/transition of power markets! Never judge a book by the cover so the saying goes, and indeed, don’t discount it quickly by its subtitle. As Mr Christophers explains it in the book, the subtitle could be replaced by the following: “if private capital, circulating in markets, is still failing to decarbonise global electricity generation sufficiently rapidly even with all the support it has gotten and is getting from governments, and even with technology costs having fallen as far and as fast as they have, it is surely as clear a sign as possible that capital is not designed the job.”
And this is the key finding of the book: it is a very thorough and well-argued analysis on the evolution and current state of electricity markets and their failing since the growing penetration of weather dependent renewables. Mr Christophers delivers a cool-headed assessment on the profitability deficit of these technologies that the market in its current form cannot deliver on its own. His findings are very clear and well supported and should serve as a warning for everyone in policy making who has been drinking the Kool-Aid of the falling LCOE of renewables for too long.
It's not that new renewable investments aren’t made, but not at the pace it would be needed to meet the undertaken targets. The penetration of weather dependent renewables puts a downward pressure on price making in the current power market design, and with less and less marginal price setting fossil assets the price of electricity will further drop. This will render renewable investments less attractive to capital providers: who are in it for the money, i.e. high returns. And that’s what these investments can’t deliver. Corporate PPA’s won’t change the entire game as they cover only a segment of all news investments, coming mainly from offtaker sectors who are ready to lock in prices for a longer period in order to greenwash their activities.
Mr. Christophers makes it clear in the beginning that he won’t provide solutions in the book as it’s rather the task of policy makers, especially if the solution entails the shift in the prevailing view of considering electricity as a commodity. If we want to keep it as a commodity exchanged in markets, then the market design (which was set up before the mass arrival of weather dependent renewables) should change, otherwise capital markets will not put their money in new renewables investments at the speed and scale which is needed to transit away from fossil fuels.
I look forward to what the design of GB Energy can bring into the discussion.
April 29, 2024
Wake up, the new Brett Christophers book absolutely shredding the political economy and its inability to actually improve society in any meaningful way just dropped. It has all the deep economic commentary, facts and figures, and of course banger anti-capitalist commentary you've come to expect from Christophers incredibly analytical lens. Never thought I'd be this annoyed reading about energy markets but here we are. Also appreciated the introduction to Polanyi. Nationalize the energy market for pete's sake.
February 25, 2025
A slow burn, this book eventually ignites in a 5-star final chapter.
The author takes 10 chapters to develop their arguments, creating a strongly supported case, and enabling them to end with a punch. While those early chapters provide a comprehensive overview of the international electricity markets, they can become a tad boring at times. Especially because the writing can be a bit self-descriptive.
The final chapter is worth the wait though, with the author making a strong case for the need of a state-led energy transition, which seems more relevant than ever with oil majors abandoning their renewables targets due to lacking profitability [the guardian].
In his own words:
I highly recommend to read the book, but for people who are discouraged by the 500+ pages, some of my highlighted quotes. Hopefully they can serve as a persuasive introduction to the book's key arguments.
The author takes 10 chapters to develop their arguments, creating a strongly supported case, and enabling them to end with a punch. While those early chapters provide a comprehensive overview of the international electricity markets, they can become a tad boring at times. Especially because the writing can be a bit self-descriptive.
The final chapter is worth the wait though, with the author making a strong case for the need of a state-led energy transition, which seems more relevant than ever with oil majors abandoning their renewables targets due to lacking profitability [the guardian].
In his own words:
if private capital, circulating in markets, is still failing to decarbonize global electricity generation sufficiently rapidly even with all the support it has gotten and is getting from governments, and even with technology costs having fallen as far and as fast as they have, it is surely as clear a sign as possible that capital is not designed to do the job.
I highly recommend to read the book, but for people who are discouraged by the 500+ pages, some of my highlighted quotes. Hopefully they can serve as a persuasive introduction to the book's key arguments.
And so we remain in a paradoxical world that seems, at least, ripe for reform. The economists and economic commentators mentioned above do not quite put it in these terms, but the reality today in liberalized electricity systems such as Europe's is that, to secure financing, renewables developers ordinarily do everything they can - whether it be through feed-in tariffs, corporate power purchase agreements or financial hedges - to avoid selling their output at the market price. This, in fact, is arguably the market's signal feature - a form, if you like, of categorical negation: we have a market that perversely requires certain increasingly significant participants to systematically evade its own price signals.
the state is in fact already deeply implicated in the project of electricity decarbonization. Through renewables capacity auctions and feed-in tariffs and the like, it plays a fundamental role not just in shaping the pace and form of decarbonization, but also in funding it. Only it typically does not own and control the assets and income streams that eventuate; it takes the risks - actively removing them from the shoulders of reluctant developers and financiers - yet seldom gets any of the pecuniary rewards. If the state is already doing so much, to drive electricity decarbonization, does it not make sense, critics of electricity's current political-economic configuration have long asked, that the financial and operational ledger should be evened up?
Markets never will cohere 'naturally' and unproblematically in this setting. Doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results may not always amount to insanity, but nonetheless attempts to 'reform' and 'improve' the electricity market are doomed, and, as the climate crisis escalates, such attempts summon a mishmash of fearful metaphorical imagery. 'Roads to nowhere' is certainly one such image. 'Fiddling while Rome burns' might be more apposite yet.
May 21, 2025
"If private capital circulating in markets is still failing to decarbonize global electricity generation sufficiently rapidly, even with all the support it has gotten and is getting from governments, and even with technology costs having fallen as far and as fast as they have, it is surely as clear a sign as possible that capital is not designed to do the job."
The core of this book is a rebuttal to the the techno-optimist proclamation that the hardest work in decarbonizing energy has already been done, and that the path towards decarbonization is in the capable hands of the free market. The Abundance Movement techbro argument goes, 'the per-unit price (levelized cost of energy or LCOE) of renewable energy is low and decreasing, and therefore in an efficient energy market, sufficient incentive exists for firms to phase out fossil fuel power generation and phase in renewables.'
This argument fails, Christophers explains, because it is profit, not price, that determines a power plant's "bankability" - the capacity to raise capital for the costly up-front development of renewables. Even if a wind turbine or solar panel generates cheap electricity day after day, the risk ratios and return on investment are less enticing for investors than a natural gas or coal plant (or innumerable other investment opportunities constantly bombarding bankers). The economic disincentives described here explain how renewables can have a low LCOE but also screech to a halt in development as soon as government support is reduced or withdrawn. To support this argument, the author draws on an exhaustive supply of historical examples, interviews with developers, financiers (who openly disregard LCOE), politicians, and grid operators.
What lagging renewables development has occurred is primarily due to government interference, not the beneficence of rational actors in an unfettered marketplace. Christophers offers many examples of renewables projects that appear to be subsidy-free but enjoy all kinds of direct and indirect government support.
The problem with expecting capitalism to solve the climate crisis, the author reasons, is that electricity is a "fictitious commodity." It does not behave like shoes or iPhones but nonetheless has had market logic forcibly imposed on it in a way we do not see for other public goods like sewers or roads. Treating green energy as a commodity is the essential reason why we are failing to meet Paris Agreement targets.
Although outside of the scope of the book, the author does offer an alternative. Where markets fail, the government must step in. And so, the answer to decarbonization is in some form of command economy: renewables must be created directly by governments, or governments must commandeer private industry to do the job. This is by far the shortest part of the book, and Christophers does not assess the political feasibility of this, aside from acknowledging the grim political landscape in America, the UK, and other countries.
This book was exhaustively well-sourced, methodical in its reasoning, and at times horrifically boring. Despite finding the premise compelling and wanting to learn more, I almost put it down twice. Its 565 pages are not for the faint of heart. Readers and potential readers should prepare accordingly.
The core of this book is a rebuttal to the the techno-optimist proclamation that the hardest work in decarbonizing energy has already been done, and that the path towards decarbonization is in the capable hands of the free market. The Abundance Movement techbro argument goes, 'the per-unit price (levelized cost of energy or LCOE) of renewable energy is low and decreasing, and therefore in an efficient energy market, sufficient incentive exists for firms to phase out fossil fuel power generation and phase in renewables.'
This argument fails, Christophers explains, because it is profit, not price, that determines a power plant's "bankability" - the capacity to raise capital for the costly up-front development of renewables. Even if a wind turbine or solar panel generates cheap electricity day after day, the risk ratios and return on investment are less enticing for investors than a natural gas or coal plant (or innumerable other investment opportunities constantly bombarding bankers). The economic disincentives described here explain how renewables can have a low LCOE but also screech to a halt in development as soon as government support is reduced or withdrawn. To support this argument, the author draws on an exhaustive supply of historical examples, interviews with developers, financiers (who openly disregard LCOE), politicians, and grid operators.
What lagging renewables development has occurred is primarily due to government interference, not the beneficence of rational actors in an unfettered marketplace. Christophers offers many examples of renewables projects that appear to be subsidy-free but enjoy all kinds of direct and indirect government support.
The problem with expecting capitalism to solve the climate crisis, the author reasons, is that electricity is a "fictitious commodity." It does not behave like shoes or iPhones but nonetheless has had market logic forcibly imposed on it in a way we do not see for other public goods like sewers or roads. Treating green energy as a commodity is the essential reason why we are failing to meet Paris Agreement targets.
Although outside of the scope of the book, the author does offer an alternative. Where markets fail, the government must step in. And so, the answer to decarbonization is in some form of command economy: renewables must be created directly by governments, or governments must commandeer private industry to do the job. This is by far the shortest part of the book, and Christophers does not assess the political feasibility of this, aside from acknowledging the grim political landscape in America, the UK, and other countries.
This book was exhaustively well-sourced, methodical in its reasoning, and at times horrifically boring. Despite finding the premise compelling and wanting to learn more, I almost put it down twice. Its 565 pages are not for the faint of heart. Readers and potential readers should prepare accordingly.
April 6, 2024
I'm a big fan of Christophers' books and was excited to see he was writing on a topic related to the climate crisis. It provides a very deep dive into how the energy market works (or more accurately, doesn't). If you are interested in really understanding the nuances and mechanics of this, then this book is for you. For me, I found it far too detailed. I would have loved to see a bit more forest for the trees here.
The book answers the question, in substantial detail: why, if the costs for developing renewables (specifically wind and solar) have become so cheap, are we not seeing substantially more market adoption? His answer is that renewables aren't sufficiently profitable, and therefore the private sector is still hesitant to build them, and moreover, bankers are reluctant to bankroll them. The reason that renewables aren't very profitable, despite falling costs, is very complex, and the Price is Wrong goes into laborious detail to explain it. But essentially it comes down to the way that energy markets have been designed by policymakers.
The short conclusion that Christophers draws is that energy is really a fictitious commodity, not a natural commodity, and thus requires all sorts of constant interventions and tweaking from the state in order to act in some way that might resemble a market. The price mechanism is the most salient example - there is hardly anything natural about how energy prices work. So while the neoliberal, free-market ideologues insist that price signals in the energy sector will solve all problems - from the 2022 energy crisis in Europe after Putin waged war on Ukraine, to the growing need to decarbonize the energy system - the reality couldn't be further from the truth.
If we take seriously the need to decarbonize our energy systems, the market isn't up to the task. Renewable energy projects are going to have to be planned, financed and operated by states. But not because renewable companies are raking in extraordinary profits, but precisely because they aren't very profitable projects, and market actors continue to invest in more profitable fossil fuels.
The book answers the question, in substantial detail: why, if the costs for developing renewables (specifically wind and solar) have become so cheap, are we not seeing substantially more market adoption? His answer is that renewables aren't sufficiently profitable, and therefore the private sector is still hesitant to build them, and moreover, bankers are reluctant to bankroll them. The reason that renewables aren't very profitable, despite falling costs, is very complex, and the Price is Wrong goes into laborious detail to explain it. But essentially it comes down to the way that energy markets have been designed by policymakers.
The short conclusion that Christophers draws is that energy is really a fictitious commodity, not a natural commodity, and thus requires all sorts of constant interventions and tweaking from the state in order to act in some way that might resemble a market. The price mechanism is the most salient example - there is hardly anything natural about how energy prices work. So while the neoliberal, free-market ideologues insist that price signals in the energy sector will solve all problems - from the 2022 energy crisis in Europe after Putin waged war on Ukraine, to the growing need to decarbonize the energy system - the reality couldn't be further from the truth.
If we take seriously the need to decarbonize our energy systems, the market isn't up to the task. Renewable energy projects are going to have to be planned, financed and operated by states. But not because renewable companies are raking in extraordinary profits, but precisely because they aren't very profitable projects, and market actors continue to invest in more profitable fossil fuels.
September 18, 2025
For years experts and pundits have been telling us that wind and solar are cheaper than any other form of electricity generation. True. Why, then, are renewables not being added fast enough to avoid catastrophic global warming? In the Price Is Wrong: Why Capitalism Won't Save the Planet, Brett Christophers explains.
What so many people get wrong is focusing on price--Levelized Cost of Electricity--to be precise. But in a capitalist economic system, what really drives investment is expected profit. After decades of neoliberal restructuring and privatization, the entities responsible for developing wind and solar projects are often independent power producers, not traditional utilities. They rely on loans from financial institutions to fund their projects. And they have to prove to these lenders that they will be able to pay them back plus interest.
In modern electricity markets, especially ones that incorporate variable sources like wind and solar, prices are extremely volatile. And the fierce competition and low barrier to entry in the renewable power space mean that profits are actually quite low--much lower than their fossil fuel peers who have decades of infrastructure and monopoly power that allows them to extract greater profits.
To avoid this market volatility and prove they can pay back loans, renewables developers sign power purchase agreements with corporations like Amazon or Google. Plus, there's a whole alphabet soup of government policies to provide price stability for renewables developers: FiT, CfD, ITC, etc.
Christophers argues that electricity is what Karl Polanyi would call a fictitious commodity. It has a market framework imposed upon it, but is not really amenable to such a structure. Modern electricity markets are a contrivance. They rely on massive bureaucracies, increasingly complex rules, elaborate government support systems, and good behavior from participants (ahem Enron). Even after all of that we are still nowhere near the pace of renewables rollout necessary to avoid catastrophe.
This book shows how the electric sausage is made. Quite technical. I work in the renewable power sector so this was especially compelling for me.
What so many people get wrong is focusing on price--Levelized Cost of Electricity--to be precise. But in a capitalist economic system, what really drives investment is expected profit. After decades of neoliberal restructuring and privatization, the entities responsible for developing wind and solar projects are often independent power producers, not traditional utilities. They rely on loans from financial institutions to fund their projects. And they have to prove to these lenders that they will be able to pay them back plus interest.
In modern electricity markets, especially ones that incorporate variable sources like wind and solar, prices are extremely volatile. And the fierce competition and low barrier to entry in the renewable power space mean that profits are actually quite low--much lower than their fossil fuel peers who have decades of infrastructure and monopoly power that allows them to extract greater profits.
To avoid this market volatility and prove they can pay back loans, renewables developers sign power purchase agreements with corporations like Amazon or Google. Plus, there's a whole alphabet soup of government policies to provide price stability for renewables developers: FiT, CfD, ITC, etc.
Christophers argues that electricity is what Karl Polanyi would call a fictitious commodity. It has a market framework imposed upon it, but is not really amenable to such a structure. Modern electricity markets are a contrivance. They rely on massive bureaucracies, increasingly complex rules, elaborate government support systems, and good behavior from participants (ahem Enron). Even after all of that we are still nowhere near the pace of renewables rollout necessary to avoid catastrophe.
This book shows how the electric sausage is made. Quite technical. I work in the renewable power sector so this was especially compelling for me.
December 26, 2024
This book is incredibly dense, but very well-researched on how the free market is the wrong tool for solving the issue of deploying renewables.
Some of the key insights:
1. While the LCOE (levelized cost of energy i.e. the average cost of generating electricity over the lifetime of an energy source) of renewables have plummeted, the profitability of its plants have not, making it an unattractive investment for large financial institutions.
2. Much of renewable development has been reliant on government interventions to stabilize its source of income & guarantee profitability. However, governments are withdrawing renewable support which might be detrimental to the renewable industries, under unreliable assumptions (e.g. falling LCOE cost like above).
3. Renewables are obvious net good for society (carbon-free electricity generation, much cheaper cost of producing energy, increase country's energy self-sufficiency), but it does not work in our current energy market, which has been built to support fossil fuel generation, not new intermittent energy sources.
4. 'Solving' this energy problem requires consolidation of government intervention on the energy market, whether in the form of feed-in tariffs or tax credits, not relying on market forces.
One can argue that because renewables do not generate reliable profit, it should not be built. But I want to ask the opposite question: what are we trying to generate profit for, if not for the well-being of the people? If it is obvious that renewables are net goods for society, then maybe we should think about changing the market, not the other way around.
Some of the key insights:
1. While the LCOE (levelized cost of energy i.e. the average cost of generating electricity over the lifetime of an energy source) of renewables have plummeted, the profitability of its plants have not, making it an unattractive investment for large financial institutions.
2. Much of renewable development has been reliant on government interventions to stabilize its source of income & guarantee profitability. However, governments are withdrawing renewable support which might be detrimental to the renewable industries, under unreliable assumptions (e.g. falling LCOE cost like above).
3. Renewables are obvious net good for society (carbon-free electricity generation, much cheaper cost of producing energy, increase country's energy self-sufficiency), but it does not work in our current energy market, which has been built to support fossil fuel generation, not new intermittent energy sources.
4. 'Solving' this energy problem requires consolidation of government intervention on the energy market, whether in the form of feed-in tariffs or tax credits, not relying on market forces.
One can argue that because renewables do not generate reliable profit, it should not be built. But I want to ask the opposite question: what are we trying to generate profit for, if not for the well-being of the people? If it is obvious that renewables are net goods for society, then maybe we should think about changing the market, not the other way around.
January 12, 2025
Fantastic. While technological change has made renewable electricity generation cheaper than fossil fuels, this alone will not be enough to save the planet, because renewable projects bring less profits. The reason is that in the renewable industry there is more competition and virtually no economic rents. This explains the paradox that despite lower costs, investment in renewable energy is still lower than in fossil fuel infraestructure. Hence, the profitability of renewable projects is contingent on government subsidies, which, not only come and go, but also tend to generate bubbles and eventually squeeze profits all over again (see the author's analysis of the Spanish case). The big picture is that there is a contradiction between the profit imperative and the climate. The political conclusions that follow are obvious.
I really appreciate Christophers' willingness to study the nitty gritty, technical aspects of a topic in order to get the political economy right. The evidence he brings forward is damning, though it is a bit scattered. Since the writing of this book, a couple investigations in the New York Times and the Financial Times have reached the exact same conclusion. It has been absolutely vindicated. Overall, this is probably the most important book on climate I have ever read. The evidence collected should be put into a long article for polemic purposes.
I really appreciate Christophers' willingness to study the nitty gritty, technical aspects of a topic in order to get the political economy right. The evidence he brings forward is damning, though it is a bit scattered. Since the writing of this book, a couple investigations in the New York Times and the Financial Times have reached the exact same conclusion. It has been absolutely vindicated. Overall, this is probably the most important book on climate I have ever read. The evidence collected should be put into a long article for polemic purposes.
July 24, 2025
The key takeaways I got from the book
-Renewable energy deployment isn't actually that profitable because while the unit cost of the technology may and the land cost in unpopulated areas may be low the transmission costs of taking the generated energy to populated areas is more expensive. This leads to low and volatile returns, 5–8%, while fossil fuels deliver 15% consistently.
-Renewable energy markets are highly competitive, which drives down costs for consumers but also profits for developers, ironically what they lack is a cartel like OPEC to keep profits up.
-The industry is completely dependent on state subsidies to exist, otherwise it would be too risky to invest in.
-Decades of privatization and un-bundling of energy systems haven't delivered the scale of renewable infrastructure needed. Energy markets were designed for fossil fuels.
-An entrepreneur who asks for a bank loan for a green energy project does not know for sure how much he'll sell the energy for. He might as well just leave the money in the bank or invest in fossil fuels instead
-In China this process is going better because it's not only seen but treated as a state project and green energy projects have a more ambiguous relationship to profit because investment is state directed. But there are other difficulties like competition between local governments.
-Renewable energy deployment isn't actually that profitable because while the unit cost of the technology may and the land cost in unpopulated areas may be low the transmission costs of taking the generated energy to populated areas is more expensive. This leads to low and volatile returns, 5–8%, while fossil fuels deliver 15% consistently.
-Renewable energy markets are highly competitive, which drives down costs for consumers but also profits for developers, ironically what they lack is a cartel like OPEC to keep profits up.
-The industry is completely dependent on state subsidies to exist, otherwise it would be too risky to invest in.
-Decades of privatization and un-bundling of energy systems haven't delivered the scale of renewable infrastructure needed. Energy markets were designed for fossil fuels.
-An entrepreneur who asks for a bank loan for a green energy project does not know for sure how much he'll sell the energy for. He might as well just leave the money in the bank or invest in fossil fuels instead
-In China this process is going better because it's not only seen but treated as a state project and green energy projects have a more ambiguous relationship to profit because investment is state directed. But there are other difficulties like competition between local governments.
December 9, 2024
I almost didn't read this book because the introduction specifies that the topic of the book is narrower than the subtitle would have you believe: Christophers doesn't talk about capitalism per se, he talks about electricity (wind and solar specifically) and how, despite the now cheap prices of them, the logic of capitalism always going for the lowest cost/highest profit doesn't hold because we have not switched to mostly/exclusively electricity. So the premise of the book is why is this the case, and why is government subsidy still required for capitalists to invest in green technology? I decided to give it a chance though because it does still address an aspect of capitalism vs environment. And I was glad I read it when I finished it because it is very educating, but it is very dense. I wasn't bored when I read this book but I fell asleep several times. I felt like Christophers repeated his points very frequently, and called on more examples than he needed to to make his points. It just dragged on, and his tendency to have subclauses within subclauses within subclauses within sentences didn't help matters. Written a little more 'layman' in style it would be an excellent read.
Read
September 21, 2024Questo libro è riuscito in un'impresa che neanche libro con il doppio delle pagine ci sono riusciti: farmelo abbandonare prima di finirlo. È il primo libro che non finisco da quando ho cominciato a leggere seriamente.
L'argomento è interessante ed estremamente attuale: l'economia della transizione "verde" per quanto riguarda l'energia. Nonostante l'abbassamento enorme del costo degli impianti di energia rinnovabile, sono poco attrattivi per gli investitori perché non garantiscono profitti consistenti e adeguati a causa della loro intermittenza. A causa di questo la velocità della transizione non è minimamente adeguata per gli obiettivi fissati durante l'accordo di Parigi.
Un libro "ammazzato" dallo stile dello scrittore che, a causa del voler riempire pagine e pagine di parole giusto per (come si faceva alle elementari per allungare il tema), dimostra di avere zero capacità di arrivare al punto. Il tutto viene esposto nel modo più prolisso possibile, con continue ripetizioni, frasi ampollose e un ritmo della narrazione assolutamente glaciale.
Questo libro ha urgente bisogno di un editore perché lì dentro c'è dell'ottimo materiale, annegato da un mare di ridondanza.
L'argomento è interessante ed estremamente attuale: l'economia della transizione "verde" per quanto riguarda l'energia. Nonostante l'abbassamento enorme del costo degli impianti di energia rinnovabile, sono poco attrattivi per gli investitori perché non garantiscono profitti consistenti e adeguati a causa della loro intermittenza. A causa di questo la velocità della transizione non è minimamente adeguata per gli obiettivi fissati durante l'accordo di Parigi.
Un libro "ammazzato" dallo stile dello scrittore che, a causa del voler riempire pagine e pagine di parole giusto per (come si faceva alle elementari per allungare il tema), dimostra di avere zero capacità di arrivare al punto. Il tutto viene esposto nel modo più prolisso possibile, con continue ripetizioni, frasi ampollose e un ritmo della narrazione assolutamente glaciale.
Questo libro ha urgente bisogno di un editore perché lì dentro c'è dell'ottimo materiale, annegato da un mare di ridondanza.
October 24, 2024
A Marxian analysis of electricity markets and renewable energy systems - a topic extremely dear to both my heart and my profession! It makes judging/reviewing this book a bit difficult. On one hand, I found swathes of it somewhat dry and uneven and meandering, but perhaps mainly because I was already intimately familiar with the topic; on the other hand, there were a lot of interesting threads and snippets that I really liked, but I'm not sure if they would be parsable for somebody not already well-versed in matters of electricity and energy markets.
But overall, I'll give this high marks because this is a difficult topic to write about, despite its importance, and ultimately it does do a good job of at least introducing the most important concepts around how modern power markets work, and the incentives and behaviors of renewable energy system developers; and most importantly, a critical analysis of the way profit-oriented systems are hindering decarbonization.
And also, if nothing else, I'm really glad the book came out hard against LCOE. Enough with all the talk about LCOE! Talk actual system costs and what is actually physically happening on the grid, or GTFO
But overall, I'll give this high marks because this is a difficult topic to write about, despite its importance, and ultimately it does do a good job of at least introducing the most important concepts around how modern power markets work, and the incentives and behaviors of renewable energy system developers; and most importantly, a critical analysis of the way profit-oriented systems are hindering decarbonization.
And also, if nothing else, I'm really glad the book came out hard against LCOE. Enough with all the talk about LCOE! Talk actual system costs and what is actually physically happening on the grid, or GTFO
March 20, 2025
Brett Christophers, professor ved Uppsala universitet, gir en imponerende oversikt over bredden i hvordan fornybare strømprosjekter har blitt regulert, finansiert og realisert globalt de siste 10-20 årene. I boken er han likevel skuffet over at utviklingen går alt for sakte til å stoppe avkarboniseringen av elektrisitetsproduksjon. Gjennomgående i boken argumenterer han relativt overbevisende for at det er lag på lag med markedssvikt som fører til dette og at fornybar-prosjekter, til tross for den massive prisnedgangen de siste årene, rett og slett ikke er lønnsomme nok.
Var ikke imponert over første og siste kapittel. Det første fordi det var en generell gjennomgang av fornybarlandskapet som IEA og Nat Bullard har gjort mye bedre. Det siste fordi der synes jeg han hoppper vel fort til konklusjonen at vi bør ha flere store statlige aktører innen strømproduksjon.
Språket i boken er litt for omstendelig og lider av mange komma og innskutte setninger.
Uansett, en veldig god gjennomgang av hvordan investering i fornybar infrastruktur skjer i praksis. Topp én av bøker jeg skulle ønske jeg hadde lest før jeg begynte i ICP.
Var ikke imponert over første og siste kapittel. Det første fordi det var en generell gjennomgang av fornybarlandskapet som IEA og Nat Bullard har gjort mye bedre. Det siste fordi der synes jeg han hoppper vel fort til konklusjonen at vi bør ha flere store statlige aktører innen strømproduksjon.
Språket i boken er litt for omstendelig og lider av mange komma og innskutte setninger.
Uansett, en veldig god gjennomgang av hvordan investering i fornybar infrastruktur skjer i praksis. Topp én av bøker jeg skulle ønske jeg hadde lest før jeg begynte i ICP.
September 3, 2024
This book is quite heavy on detail, but I learned an awful lot about electricity markets. At times I regretted starting to read this in my vacation, because if you’re not familiar with the way electricity is priced, how investment decisions are taken, how subsidy schemes work etc. the book is not the kind of light reading you like to do by the pool.
That said the book paints a very pessimistic picture of the green transition in the production of electricity, which could arguably be seen as the most important area for our shift to decarbonised energy. Even though we’re definitely moving in the right direction, the shift is nowhere near strong enough, and fossil fuels still dominate.
I tend to agree that the mechanisms described in the book (volatile profits, reliance on bank funding, uncertain subsidy framework) are not favourable for renewables, and Christopher is probably right that the current market design is flawed. But the question remains how to move back to government ownership of generating capacity in an era so dominated by market solutions.
That said the book paints a very pessimistic picture of the green transition in the production of electricity, which could arguably be seen as the most important area for our shift to decarbonised energy. Even though we’re definitely moving in the right direction, the shift is nowhere near strong enough, and fossil fuels still dominate.
I tend to agree that the mechanisms described in the book (volatile profits, reliance on bank funding, uncertain subsidy framework) are not favourable for renewables, and Christopher is probably right that the current market design is flawed. But the question remains how to move back to government ownership of generating capacity in an era so dominated by market solutions.
February 7, 2025
This book is a detailed analysis of all challenges facing renewable electricity around the world. The author explains how so many elements of electricity ecosystem are not setup to benefit renewables development. The author explains how projected are financed, how regulated and deregulated electricity markets are structured, and various gov subsidies tried around the word.
Ultimately the main point the author makes is that PRICE is not the thing holding back renewable electricity but rather PROFIT. Renewables are inherently less profitable for a number of reasons. I liked this book because 1) I am a climate change nerd and 2) I felt the author was very neutral which is difficult when writing about all the ways renewable electricity is challenged.
If you want a full understanding of renewable electric ecosystem this is a good read.
Ultimately the main point the author makes is that PRICE is not the thing holding back renewable electricity but rather PROFIT. Renewables are inherently less profitable for a number of reasons. I liked this book because 1) I am a climate change nerd and 2) I felt the author was very neutral which is difficult when writing about all the ways renewable electricity is challenged.
If you want a full understanding of renewable electric ecosystem this is a good read.
August 20, 2024
A bit of a challenging read since it is a very wonky book, but I feel like I now have a pretty good understanding of electricity markets and the challenges associated with the green transition. Christophers' argument is pretty straightforward: the main setback is that profit margins in the renewable sector are just too low and, as a result, it will not attract adequate investment or financing via loans for the building of infrastructure and the generation of electricity from renewables. It is crazy that even a hundred years after the Bolshevik revolution, Lenin's goal of establishing workers control/power and electrification are still relevant today!
July 10, 2025
The book is very narrow – only about the pol. econ. of electricity generation – and has a simple point – renewables are cheap but not profitable. It is, thus, and considering its length, rather boring.
I have nothing to say, however, against the book’s argumentative heft. Christophers is one of the few Verso-left writers that really is worth reading. He’s thorough, clear, pedagogical, and doesn’t throw “neoliberalism” and “capitalism” at every problem.
Here he produces a fantastic case study in the messiness of economics and the limits of theoretical knowledge and models, that is also an example of “uncorrectable” market failure and a point in favour of economic centralised planning.
I have nothing to say, however, against the book’s argumentative heft. Christophers is one of the few Verso-left writers that really is worth reading. He’s thorough, clear, pedagogical, and doesn’t throw “neoliberalism” and “capitalism” at every problem.
Here he produces a fantastic case study in the messiness of economics and the limits of theoretical knowledge and models, that is also an example of “uncorrectable” market failure and a point in favour of economic centralised planning.
May 16, 2024
This book is the sharpest and most compelling analysis of electricity markets and renewable energy I’ve read. Completely agree with his argument on the paradoxes of profits in renewable energy and electricity as fictitious commodity, and handles very well scales of inequality between Europe/China/India/etc. Stylistically it is very dense and some of the arguments were buried at the end of each chapter - wish it had been edited slightly differently to be more widely accessible for general readers.
May 25, 2024
How capitalism cannot solve-the climate crisis
One doesn’t have to be a Marxist to understand why finance capital and for-profit energy markets cannot solve the climate crisis. There simply is no money in it. At least not in comparison with what they have been reaping in the last 150 years. Capitalism is not going to kill the Goose that has been laying all those golden eggs, Mr Christopher’s book is an extraordinary effort to demonstrate there is not enough profit in it.
One doesn’t have to be a Marxist to understand why finance capital and for-profit energy markets cannot solve the climate crisis. There simply is no money in it. At least not in comparison with what they have been reaping in the last 150 years. Capitalism is not going to kill the Goose that has been laying all those golden eggs, Mr Christopher’s book is an extraordinary effort to demonstrate there is not enough profit in it.
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