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From Bakunin to Lacan: Anti-Authoritarianism and the Dislocation of Power
In its comparison of anarchist and poststructuralist thought, From Bakunin to Lacan contends that the most pressing political problem we face today is the proliferation and intensification of power. Saul Newman targets the tendency of radical political theories and movements to reaffirm power and authority, in different guises, in their very attempt to overcome it. In his examination of thinkers such as Bakunin, Lacan, Stirner, and Foucault Newman explores important epistemological, ontological, and political questions: Is the essential human subject the point of departure from which power and authority can be opposed? Or, is the humanist subject itself a site of domination that must be unmasked? As it deftly charts this debate's paths of emergence in political thought, the book illustrates how the question of essential identities defines and re-defines the limits and possibilities of radical politics today.
208 pages, Kindle Edition
First published April 11, 2001
17 people are currently reading
641 people want to read
About the author
Saul Newman
32 books58 followersNewman coined the term "post-anarchism" as a general term for political philosophies filtering 19th century anarchism through a post-structuralist lens, and later popularized it through his 2001 book From Bakunin to Lacan. Thus he rejects a number of concepts traditionally associated with anarchism, including essentialism, a "positive" human nature, and the concept of revolution. The links between poststructuralism and anarchism have also been developed by thinkers like Todd May and Lewis Call.
Newman is currently Reader in Political Theory at Goldsmiths College, University of London. He received his B.A. from the University of Sydney, and his Ph.D in political science from the University of New South Wales. His work has been translated into Turkish, Spanish, Italian, German, Portuguese and Serbo-Croatian, and has been the subject of a number of debates amongst anarchist theorists and activists as well as academics.[I]
Newman is currently Reader in Political Theory at Goldsmiths College, University of London. He received his B.A. from the University of Sydney, and his Ph.D in political science from the University of New South Wales. His work has been translated into Turkish, Spanish, Italian, German, Portuguese and Serbo-Croatian, and has been the subject of a number of debates amongst anarchist theorists and activists as well as academics.[I]
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Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews
November 18, 2019
Βασική πραγμάτευση του βιβλίου είναι η εύρεση ενός τόπου (ή τελικά μη-τόπου χοχο) αντίστασης στην εξουσία ο οποίος δεν θα είναι και ο ίδιος εξουσιαστικός και θα αναπαράγει τιην κυριαρχία που θέλει να πολεμήσει.
Ξεκινώντας από τον κλασικό αναρχισμό και περνώντας από Στίρνερ/Φουκώ/Ντελέζ/Ντεριντά έως και τον Λακάν ο Νιούμαν σκιαγραφεί μια θεωρητική πορεία της αναρχικής σκέψης και προτείνει τελικά μια μεγαλύτερη ανοιχτότητα στο όλο εγχείρημα.
Περιεκτικό, σαφές (τιτάνιο επίτευγμα όταν κάνεις καταπιάνεται με Γάλλους...) και έντιμο προς όλους με τους οποίους ασχολέιται.
Ξεκινώντας από τον κλασικό αναρχισμό και περνώντας από Στίρνερ/Φουκώ/Ντελέζ/Ντεριντά έως και τον Λακάν ο Νιούμαν σκιαγραφεί μια θεωρητική πορεία της αναρχικής σκέψης και προτείνει τελικά μια μεγαλύτερη ανοιχτότητα στο όλο εγχείρημα.
Περιεκτικό, σαφές (τιτάνιο επίτευγμα όταν κάνεις καταπιάνεται με Γάλλους...) και έντιμο προς όλους με τους οποίους ασχολέιται.
February 25, 2009
In clear and concise language Newman discusses the potentials and problems of marxist and classical anarchist theory. The discussion uses the critique of sterner as a jumping off point toward post-structrualist thought. He proceeds to outline a path of resistance to power utilizing the work of a number of authors. The description of foucault's views on power are well structured and very readable, though foucault's actual work is quite roundabout. The "differance" of Derrida and the "lack" of Lacan are utilized in striving for a notion of resistance that foucault/deleuze/guattari contradict in their attempts to justify.
Ultimately Newman describes an ethical framework based upon these thinkers that draws from post-structuralist thought and joins disparate movements in a view of resistance that is truly anti-authoritarian.
Ultimately Newman describes an ethical framework based upon these thinkers that draws from post-structuralist thought and joins disparate movements in a view of resistance that is truly anti-authoritarian.
January 17, 2025
In “From Bakunin to Lacan”, Saul Newman delves into the works of thinkers such as Marx, Bakunin, Stirner, Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida, and Lacan (with arguably, Stirner and Lacan being the main protagonists) to interrogate the “place” of power and resistance.
In short: Newman critiques Marxism for ignoring the autonomy of the State and thus reproducing Power, and classical anarchism for having a naive and essentialist view of “human nature” as a “pure place of resistance”, but seeks to go beyond both anarchism and post-structuralism, in the form of a post-anarchist framework.
One problem is apparent from the start: Newman intentionally uses the terms power, authority, and domination interchangeably, which is bound to create confusion, since I consider the distinction between “having power to” (having the ability, positive freedom) and “having power over” (domination, coercion) to be rather significant. While radicals typically oppose the latter form of Power, they may embrace the former since autonomy and positive freedom is dependent on “having power to”.
But anyway. Let's start from the beginning.
Marxism: Newman begins with Marx and argues that Marx positioned the capitalist mode of production as the primary “place of power”, leading him to view the state primarily as a tool of the economic ruling class, thereby overlooking its potential autonomy as an institution. From this position emerged the concepts of the Vanguard Party and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat: the belief that the State had to be seized and used to transition toward Socialism, and eventually to Communism, a stateless, classless, and moneyless society. While Newman acknowledges that Marx's thinking is more nuanced (citing The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte as an example) he argues that Marxist interpretations often ignored these complexities, contributing to the authoritarian outcomes seen in Soviet and other state-socialist experiments.
Classical Anarchism: Turning to classical anarchism, particularly the ideas of Bakunin and Kropotkin, Newman highlights their critique of Marxism, that it would inevitably lead to a “red bureaucracy”. He asserts that classical anarchists viewed the State as the central place of Power, while regarding human nature as fundamentally social, cooperative, and fundamentally good (rational, ethical beings endowed with free will). Nonetheless, human nature is corrupted by the State while at the same time remaining a “pure place of resistance”; capable of fueling radical action. Newman critiques classical anarchism for having an essentialist (and naive) conception of human nature.
However, my understanding is that classical anarchists (and many Marxists, for that matter) often view humans as historical beings, understanding “human nature” as a set of tendencies and potentials, rather than fixed, deterministic, or essentialist traits. Even more puzzling is Newman’s claim that anarchists hold a contradictory view of human nature. Citing Bakunin’s “Power Principle” that “every man carries within himself the germs of the lust for power” suggesting anarchism sees humans as both social and collaborative, yet also hungry for domination. But this is a contradiction only against the strawman the Newman sets up. Instead, I think that it reflects a nuanced understanding of the human condition.
More broadly, I find Newman’s account of classical anarchism to be overly simplistic. He equates it primarily with figures like Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin, without fully considering the breadth of their work nor other thinkers. For a robust, thorough yet accessible deep dive on classical anarchism I would suggest Zoe Baker’s Means and Ends .
Stirner: In any case, Newman then turns to Max Stirner, a chapter I rather enjoyed. He presents Stirner as a precursor to post-structuralist critiques of essentialism and universalism. Stirner not only rejected God and the State but also abstract, fixed ideas and identities such as Morality, Humanity, Human Essence, Freedom and others. Τhese abstractions “spook” the individual’s mind, alienating them from their true interests and controlling their thoughts and actions, often in ways that perpetuate domination.
Building on Stirner’s critique, Newman challenges classical anarchism, arguing that it replaces traditional authorities like God or the State with new abstractions such as “Equality”, “Justice”, “Humanity”, or the “Common Good”. These ideals risk subordinating the individual to external principles, thereby perpetuating domination and suppression of Stirner’s “Unique”.
Another insight from Stirner (foreshadowing Foucault) is that the State cannot rely solely on coercion and brute force; it also depends on our willing participation and obedience, which is facilitated through the shaping of subjectivity by abstract ideals. The State holds power because we allow it.
Marx famously criticized Stirner (“Saint Max”) as an idealist, yet Stirner’s key insight was that the State must first be dismantled in thought before it can be dismantled in practice. Far from contradicting materialist analysis, this view complements it by addressing the ideological forces that sustain material systems of domination.
Newman also explores Stirner’s concept of the “Unique” as a “creative nothing” suggesting that it could serve as a “non-essentialist place of resistance”.
Foucault, Deuluze, Derrida: Newman then turns to Foucault, whose analysis of Power offers both a critique towards classical anarchism and a means to update it. Unlike classical anarchism, which often reduces power to centralized structures like the State or Ruling Class, Foucault conceives of Power as diffuse, productive, and embedded in everyday institutions (schools, prisons, hospitals), social practices, and discourses. Power operates not merely through repression but by shaping knowledge, identities, and behaviors, often controlling individuals through normalization and internalized authority rather than overt coercion.
However, Newman argues that if we take Foucault’s claim that “power is everywhere” seriously, it eliminates the possibility of a “pure” place of resistance, such as an uncorrupted human nature. This raises the crucial question: where, then, can resistance emerge from? Newman contends that Foucault offers no clear or satisfactory answer to this challenge.
Newman goes over Deleuze and Derrida, drawing Deleuze’s insights on desire, rhizomatic structures, and the State as a machine of capture, alongside Derrida’s deconstruction as a method for unraveling foundational assumptions and destabilizing fixed meanings within political and philosophical discourses. However, he contends that neither offers a satisfactory answer to the question of resistance, turning instead to Lacan as the most persuasive “non-essentialist figure of resistance”.
Lacan: For Lacan, “lack” is the fundamental condition of desire, as the subject is inherently incomplete, perpetually striving for an unattainable object. Unlike Hegel's master/slave dialectic, Lacan suggests that the subject externalizes the impossibility of fulfilling its desire onto the Master. The slave “invents” the master, imagining them as the obstacle to their desire: “If only it were not for the master who stands in the way, I would be X.”
This does not (necessarily) deny the material reality of state repression or capitalist exploitation but highlights an additional psychic dimension. Subjectivity is shaped by this dynamic, where even revolutionary subjectivity remains tethered to the Master as a necessary anchor for its desire.
Based on Lacan’s “Four discourses”, Newman argues that Marxism falls into the discourse of the Master, perpetuating dominance, while Anarchism aligns with the discourse of the Hysteric, characterized by a perpetual, unfulfilled desire for recognition or change. The hysteric remains trapped in the master/slave dialectic, unable to escape the binary dynamics of master/slave, power/weakness, autonomy/repression etc.
The discourse of the Analyst offers a potential way out by “traversing the fantasy”. What does this mean for radical politics? Confronting the fantasies that sustain radical thought and action; namely, the utopian vision of a rational and moral social order which is currently distorted by oppressive systems. In practical terms: radicals must confront the deeper complexities of human subjectivity, which is not inherently rational or moral but can also be driven by desire for power and domination.
But wait! How different is that from Bakunin’s “Power Principle” which Newman called the “hidden contradiction” of classical anarchism? And more fundamentally, this criticism makes (partial) sense only when applied to anarchist theory and completely overlooking anarchist praxis. Anarchists tend to emphasize the unity between means and ends, prefigurative politics, the creation of non-hierarchical, horizontal structures, advocate for direct action, direct democracy, and self-management etc., forms of action and organization that not only challenge existing power structures but also create new subjectivities in the process. More relevant here, these structures aim to reduce the potential for exploitation and domination. I think that this tendency reveals a more nuanced understanding of humans and power than Newman suggests, which acknowledges both the potential for cooperation, as well as the dangers of corruption and the abuse of power.
“Post” anarchism?
In the final chapter, Newman seeks to go beyond both anarchism and post-structuralism, introducing post-anarchism, which aims to avoid essentialist foundations, advocating for an ethics without a fixed ground, a minimal ethic (“one should not constrain others' thought or action unnecessarily”), equal liberty, a commitment to individuality and diversity, and so on.
So overall, I found the back-and-forth between Power, Domination, and Authority problematic, coupled with an arguably simplistic (mis)reading of “classical anarchism” (and Marx to some extent), a post-anarchism that isn’t necessarily novel, and what came across as a primarily intellectual exercise, somewhat detached from praxis. Despite all that, I really enjoyed reading this! There are still insights that I found valuable about Power and Resistance and on top of that, Newman succeeds in making complex ideas unexpectedly accessible, especially when it comes to French theory; so, hats off to that!
In short: Newman critiques Marxism for ignoring the autonomy of the State and thus reproducing Power, and classical anarchism for having a naive and essentialist view of “human nature” as a “pure place of resistance”, but seeks to go beyond both anarchism and post-structuralism, in the form of a post-anarchist framework.
One problem is apparent from the start: Newman intentionally uses the terms power, authority, and domination interchangeably, which is bound to create confusion, since I consider the distinction between “having power to” (having the ability, positive freedom) and “having power over” (domination, coercion) to be rather significant. While radicals typically oppose the latter form of Power, they may embrace the former since autonomy and positive freedom is dependent on “having power to”.
But anyway. Let's start from the beginning.
Marxism: Newman begins with Marx and argues that Marx positioned the capitalist mode of production as the primary “place of power”, leading him to view the state primarily as a tool of the economic ruling class, thereby overlooking its potential autonomy as an institution. From this position emerged the concepts of the Vanguard Party and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat: the belief that the State had to be seized and used to transition toward Socialism, and eventually to Communism, a stateless, classless, and moneyless society. While Newman acknowledges that Marx's thinking is more nuanced (citing The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte as an example) he argues that Marxist interpretations often ignored these complexities, contributing to the authoritarian outcomes seen in Soviet and other state-socialist experiments.
Classical Anarchism: Turning to classical anarchism, particularly the ideas of Bakunin and Kropotkin, Newman highlights their critique of Marxism, that it would inevitably lead to a “red bureaucracy”. He asserts that classical anarchists viewed the State as the central place of Power, while regarding human nature as fundamentally social, cooperative, and fundamentally good (rational, ethical beings endowed with free will). Nonetheless, human nature is corrupted by the State while at the same time remaining a “pure place of resistance”; capable of fueling radical action. Newman critiques classical anarchism for having an essentialist (and naive) conception of human nature.
However, my understanding is that classical anarchists (and many Marxists, for that matter) often view humans as historical beings, understanding “human nature” as a set of tendencies and potentials, rather than fixed, deterministic, or essentialist traits. Even more puzzling is Newman’s claim that anarchists hold a contradictory view of human nature. Citing Bakunin’s “Power Principle” that “every man carries within himself the germs of the lust for power” suggesting anarchism sees humans as both social and collaborative, yet also hungry for domination. But this is a contradiction only against the strawman the Newman sets up. Instead, I think that it reflects a nuanced understanding of the human condition.
More broadly, I find Newman’s account of classical anarchism to be overly simplistic. He equates it primarily with figures like Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin, without fully considering the breadth of their work nor other thinkers. For a robust, thorough yet accessible deep dive on classical anarchism I would suggest Zoe Baker’s Means and Ends .
Stirner: In any case, Newman then turns to Max Stirner, a chapter I rather enjoyed. He presents Stirner as a precursor to post-structuralist critiques of essentialism and universalism. Stirner not only rejected God and the State but also abstract, fixed ideas and identities such as Morality, Humanity, Human Essence, Freedom and others. Τhese abstractions “spook” the individual’s mind, alienating them from their true interests and controlling their thoughts and actions, often in ways that perpetuate domination.
Building on Stirner’s critique, Newman challenges classical anarchism, arguing that it replaces traditional authorities like God or the State with new abstractions such as “Equality”, “Justice”, “Humanity”, or the “Common Good”. These ideals risk subordinating the individual to external principles, thereby perpetuating domination and suppression of Stirner’s “Unique”.
Another insight from Stirner (foreshadowing Foucault) is that the State cannot rely solely on coercion and brute force; it also depends on our willing participation and obedience, which is facilitated through the shaping of subjectivity by abstract ideals. The State holds power because we allow it.
Marx famously criticized Stirner (“Saint Max”) as an idealist, yet Stirner’s key insight was that the State must first be dismantled in thought before it can be dismantled in practice. Far from contradicting materialist analysis, this view complements it by addressing the ideological forces that sustain material systems of domination.
Newman also explores Stirner’s concept of the “Unique” as a “creative nothing” suggesting that it could serve as a “non-essentialist place of resistance”.
Foucault, Deuluze, Derrida: Newman then turns to Foucault, whose analysis of Power offers both a critique towards classical anarchism and a means to update it. Unlike classical anarchism, which often reduces power to centralized structures like the State or Ruling Class, Foucault conceives of Power as diffuse, productive, and embedded in everyday institutions (schools, prisons, hospitals), social practices, and discourses. Power operates not merely through repression but by shaping knowledge, identities, and behaviors, often controlling individuals through normalization and internalized authority rather than overt coercion.
However, Newman argues that if we take Foucault’s claim that “power is everywhere” seriously, it eliminates the possibility of a “pure” place of resistance, such as an uncorrupted human nature. This raises the crucial question: where, then, can resistance emerge from? Newman contends that Foucault offers no clear or satisfactory answer to this challenge.
Newman goes over Deleuze and Derrida, drawing Deleuze’s insights on desire, rhizomatic structures, and the State as a machine of capture, alongside Derrida’s deconstruction as a method for unraveling foundational assumptions and destabilizing fixed meanings within political and philosophical discourses. However, he contends that neither offers a satisfactory answer to the question of resistance, turning instead to Lacan as the most persuasive “non-essentialist figure of resistance”.
Lacan: For Lacan, “lack” is the fundamental condition of desire, as the subject is inherently incomplete, perpetually striving for an unattainable object. Unlike Hegel's master/slave dialectic, Lacan suggests that the subject externalizes the impossibility of fulfilling its desire onto the Master. The slave “invents” the master, imagining them as the obstacle to their desire: “If only it were not for the master who stands in the way, I would be X.”
This does not (necessarily) deny the material reality of state repression or capitalist exploitation but highlights an additional psychic dimension. Subjectivity is shaped by this dynamic, where even revolutionary subjectivity remains tethered to the Master as a necessary anchor for its desire.
Based on Lacan’s “Four discourses”, Newman argues that Marxism falls into the discourse of the Master, perpetuating dominance, while Anarchism aligns with the discourse of the Hysteric, characterized by a perpetual, unfulfilled desire for recognition or change. The hysteric remains trapped in the master/slave dialectic, unable to escape the binary dynamics of master/slave, power/weakness, autonomy/repression etc.
The discourse of the Analyst offers a potential way out by “traversing the fantasy”. What does this mean for radical politics? Confronting the fantasies that sustain radical thought and action; namely, the utopian vision of a rational and moral social order which is currently distorted by oppressive systems. In practical terms: radicals must confront the deeper complexities of human subjectivity, which is not inherently rational or moral but can also be driven by desire for power and domination.
But wait! How different is that from Bakunin’s “Power Principle” which Newman called the “hidden contradiction” of classical anarchism? And more fundamentally, this criticism makes (partial) sense only when applied to anarchist theory and completely overlooking anarchist praxis. Anarchists tend to emphasize the unity between means and ends, prefigurative politics, the creation of non-hierarchical, horizontal structures, advocate for direct action, direct democracy, and self-management etc., forms of action and organization that not only challenge existing power structures but also create new subjectivities in the process. More relevant here, these structures aim to reduce the potential for exploitation and domination. I think that this tendency reveals a more nuanced understanding of humans and power than Newman suggests, which acknowledges both the potential for cooperation, as well as the dangers of corruption and the abuse of power.
“Post” anarchism?
In the final chapter, Newman seeks to go beyond both anarchism and post-structuralism, introducing post-anarchism, which aims to avoid essentialist foundations, advocating for an ethics without a fixed ground, a minimal ethic (“one should not constrain others' thought or action unnecessarily”), equal liberty, a commitment to individuality and diversity, and so on.
So overall, I found the back-and-forth between Power, Domination, and Authority problematic, coupled with an arguably simplistic (mis)reading of “classical anarchism” (and Marx to some extent), a post-anarchism that isn’t necessarily novel, and what came across as a primarily intellectual exercise, somewhat detached from praxis. Despite all that, I really enjoyed reading this! There are still insights that I found valuable about Power and Resistance and on top of that, Newman succeeds in making complex ideas unexpectedly accessible, especially when it comes to French theory; so, hats off to that!
November 23, 2010
Wow! Great intro to post-anarchist studies as well as continental philosophy.
April 28, 2011
A good exposition of post structuralist and anarchist thought, centering in on the problem of essentialist conceptualizaton, and the discursive regimes that form around them.
January 14, 2021
A pretty decent examination on the different attempts to invent a place thats not infected by the masters/dominant discourse. It is shown that Lacan finally paves the way to fight against both ethical relativism that neo liberalism supports and fundamentalism.
Recommended reading after this book:
Saul Newman: interrogating the master. This is where he examines lacan in more depth, showing how he managed to craft a discourse that undermines the masters discourse from inside.
Between politics and psychoanalysis
Every book of badiou.
Badiou, along with zizek, under the lacanian prism undertake the task to create an ontology of the event, aka that which creates ex nihilo new emancipatory signifiers / modes of living.
In the end, as Newman and Badiou state we have to act with no a priori affirmation relatively to the result of our acts. And this is the ethical standpoint. We need to move from the side of the 'impossible'. It's not for nothing that Lacan uses the impossible as another name of the Real.
A final point to be Made: in the last section, there is a quote of laclau that humanity eventually after the death of God can create its own history. Imo this is the most important passage of the book. The event creates its past retroactively as zizek states. Also isn't this what happens in analysis? The symptomps (now sinthomes) are historicized/subjectivized so that the person can live affectionately with the Real.
Recommended reading after this book:
Saul Newman: interrogating the master. This is where he examines lacan in more depth, showing how he managed to craft a discourse that undermines the masters discourse from inside.
Between politics and psychoanalysis
Every book of badiou.
Badiou, along with zizek, under the lacanian prism undertake the task to create an ontology of the event, aka that which creates ex nihilo new emancipatory signifiers / modes of living.
In the end, as Newman and Badiou state we have to act with no a priori affirmation relatively to the result of our acts. And this is the ethical standpoint. We need to move from the side of the 'impossible'. It's not for nothing that Lacan uses the impossible as another name of the Real.
A final point to be Made: in the last section, there is a quote of laclau that humanity eventually after the death of God can create its own history. Imo this is the most important passage of the book. The event creates its past retroactively as zizek states. Also isn't this what happens in analysis? The symptomps (now sinthomes) are historicized/subjectivized so that the person can live affectionately with the Real.
May 29, 2019
Highly inspiring book about the potential points of departure and (non-)places of resistance for the postmodernity. Highlighting precisely where post-structuralism shows us, unlike the nihilism it is accused of, potentials for change and - dare I say it - hope.
August 25, 2018
Salute to all new perspectives which help to undermine all kinds of authorities!
June 9, 2018
Książka oferuje przegląd myśli autorytarnej. Napisana w sposób bardzo przystępny i tak, że może służyć za model, jak pisać prace naukowe - każdy rozdział łączy się z poprzednim, ale stanowi odrębną całość, a więc zaczyna się powtórką poprzedniego i kończy podsumowaniem w taki sposób, że kolejni myśliciele w nurcie antyautorytarnym są ze sobą zestawiani. Brakuje kobiet w opracowaniu. Znajoma uznała połączenie Bakunina z Lacanem za nietypowe. Ja za mało wiem, żeby dokonać takiej oceny, ale Newman opisuje przekonywującą etykę i praktykę post-anarchizmu, która inspiruje się różnymi anty-autorytarnymi myślicielami począwszy od Marksa, przez Bakunina, Stirnera, Foucaulta, Deleuze'a i Guatariego, Deridę do Lacana. Przy tym dokonuje solidnej analizy wskazując na zalety różnych stanowisk, ale nie pomijając trudności czy nieścisłości.
Etyka postanarchizmu, która mogłaby służyć w polityce miałaby być nieesencjalistyczna, a zatem niezbinaryzowana. Proponuje singularyzm - jako poszanowanie i afirmowanie indywidualności i różnorodności, przy czym żeni anarchizm z poststrukturalizmem. W ten sposób, jak twierdzi demokratyzuje myśl antyautorytarną: ma być ona demokracją podmiotowości, a nie opartą na podmiotowości. Oznacza to, że do praktyki demokratycznej potrzeba otwartej podmiotowości, która może przyjąć kolejne podmiotowości/indywidualności, czy tez odnosić się do kolejnych problemów, które będą się pojawiać.
Etyka postanarchizmu, która mogłaby służyć w polityce miałaby być nieesencjalistyczna, a zatem niezbinaryzowana. Proponuje singularyzm - jako poszanowanie i afirmowanie indywidualności i różnorodności, przy czym żeni anarchizm z poststrukturalizmem. W ten sposób, jak twierdzi demokratyzuje myśl antyautorytarną: ma być ona demokracją podmiotowości, a nie opartą na podmiotowości. Oznacza to, że do praktyki demokratycznej potrzeba otwartej podmiotowości, która może przyjąć kolejne podmiotowości/indywidualności, czy tez odnosić się do kolejnych problemów, które będą się pojawiać.
April 28, 2022
Undoubtedly, one of the best political books I have ever read.
Although written more than twenty years ago , It shows why philosophy (deep one) is required to become authentical and responsible towards us and towards the world, pointing out the traps in which we have been falling since the nineteenth century (and beyond).
Saul Newman surprises us linking anarchism with Foucault, Deleuze and Lacan, placing their insights under the shadow of one of the most misinterpreted philosophers: Max Stirner.
He also doesn't hesitate in pointing out the profound mistakes of marxism, libertarianism, radical feminism or gay struggles, explaining their flawed assumptions as long as they fall victim of an essentialism ground which absolutizes and shatters terms like freedom, morality or rationality.
Openness, rejection of essential identities, acknowledgwment of the flux of the social signifiers and confrontation with our biased notions about selfdom are some of the advices given by this book.
Although written more than twenty years ago , It shows why philosophy (deep one) is required to become authentical and responsible towards us and towards the world, pointing out the traps in which we have been falling since the nineteenth century (and beyond).
Saul Newman surprises us linking anarchism with Foucault, Deleuze and Lacan, placing their insights under the shadow of one of the most misinterpreted philosophers: Max Stirner.
He also doesn't hesitate in pointing out the profound mistakes of marxism, libertarianism, radical feminism or gay struggles, explaining their flawed assumptions as long as they fall victim of an essentialism ground which absolutizes and shatters terms like freedom, morality or rationality.
Openness, rejection of essential identities, acknowledgwment of the flux of the social signifiers and confrontation with our biased notions about selfdom are some of the advices given by this book.
December 25, 2014
Not entirely sold on Newman. There is something odd about trying to bring post-structuralism to anarchism in a dry analytic tone, but the section on Stirner was such a relief in a sea of simplistic readings of him from both those sympathetic or not
July 14, 2017
This was as I recall a poor attempt to advance the confused concept of "post-left anarchy." Sorry, but it doesn't make sense to bring together a revolutionary like Bakunin with a reactionary pomo thinker like Foucault. Just absurd.
April 6, 2010
Theoretically sound, but I miss a political 'program'
Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews