Forgiveness and Mercy

Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Law

by Jeffrie G. Murphy, Jean Hampton

This book focuses on the degree to which certain moral and legal doctrines are rooted in specific passions that are then institutionalized in the form of criminal law. A philosophical analysis is developed of the following questions: When, if ever, should hatred be overcome by sympathy or compassion? What are forgiveness and mercy and to what degree do they require--both conceptually and morally--the overcoming of certain passions and the motivation by other passions? If forgiveness and mercy indeed are moral virtues, what role, if any, should they play in the law?

Genres: Philosophy

208 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1988

Reviews

[Christopher Iacovetti · Rating 4 out of 5]

MURPHY

What forgiveness is not: [1] excusing, [2] justifying, or [3] showing mercy.

What it is: "the forswearing of resentment," where [a] "resentment" = a passion defending the value of self-respect (p. 13); and [b] the forswearing is done on specifically "moral grounds" (rather than, e.g., grounds pertaining to the loss of memory or to considerations of psychological well-being).

HAMPTON

What forgiveness is not: [1] a purely internal/emotional change in the victim (as in Murphy), [2] condonation (as, at least allegedly, in Aurel Kolnai), or [3] excusing (see p. 84n).

What it is: a process involving [1] psychological preparation for a "change of heart" and [2] a change of heart vis-a-vis the wrongdoer. Each of these two steps contains three sub-components. Step [1] involves [a] regaining confidence in one's worth by [b] giving up "spiteful and malicious" hatred and thereby [c] overcoming/transcending resentment. Step [2] involves [a] "overthrowing" indignation toward the action as well as "moral hatred" toward the wrongdoer; [b] "disregarding" the wrong as part of one's moral evaluation of the wrongdoer; and finally [c] seeing the wrongdoer as "still decent, not rotten" ⁠— i.e., as someone with whom renewed relationship is at least theoretically possible.

NOTES

For Hampton, resentment clearly has the wrong done, rather than the wrongdoer, as its object. Is the reverse true for Murphy?

Hampton seems to associate Step [2] in her forgiveness-process with Murphy's account of "forswearing resentment." But doesn't his account line up more directly with Step [1c]?

One key difference between Murphy and Hampton: For Murphy, forgiveness follows and is made possible by the divorcing of wrong from wrongdoer (e.g., through the wrongdoer's repentance). For Hampton, forgiveness consists essentially in the realization that the wrongdoer is not and *has never been* equal to the wrong she's done.

But two overriding similarities: [1] In both cases, though, the object of forgiveness ⁠— the wrongdoer ⁠— is forgiveness because and precisely inasmuch as she *is not* her deed. Forgiveness thus relies on a non-identity or non-identifiability between doer and deed (as also in Kolnai). [2] The worry that motivates both Murphy and Hampton to insist on this "non-identifiability" as a precondition for forgiveness is essentially Kolnai's worry: viz., collapsing forgiveness into condonation (or, in Murphy's idiom, into a concession to the "symbolic message" communicated by the wrong).

[Nathan Battey · Rating 2 out of 5]

When there is no objective moral standard, everything becomes relative and a matter of personal preference. This is a book on forgiveness, mercy, and hatred that is grounded in philosophy and human wisdom - thereby lacking any substantial or lasting impact on the subject. Both writers (though taking contrasting points of view) recognize that there are issues with their positions and do not fee they have reach an insurmountable conclusion.