In the mid-80’s, while I was a teenager, my parents bought their first Japanese car. In fact, I learned how to drive in it. Because I was impressed with its fuel economy and reliability, my first car was Japanese, as well, and it didn’t disappoint me. While I was in the Navy, I periodically had to chauffeur a roommate because his Chevy was in the shop for warranty work, something that never happened with my car. Right after I had returned from the First Gulf War, I found out from press statements made by the American car manufacturers and the United Auto Workers that my patriotism was suspect because my choice of a car didn’t line their pockets. I had a sudden urge to by an American-made car. Not! Rather, I was insulted by their arrogance. I still remember President George H.W. Bush meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa to persuade the Japanese to buy American cars. In this meeting, President Bush got sick and vomited on Prime Minister Miyazawa, prompting me to crack jokes like, “Buy our stuff. Do we have to send our president to throw up on your president?” Around this time, I had seen news report that executives at the American car manufacturers didn’t even know that the Japanese drove on the left side of the road and needed their steering wheels on the right side of their cars. Really? Did they even bother to research what their desired customers even wanted or needed?
In this book, published in 1986, Mr. Halberstam chronicles how the once mighty Big Three car makers in Detroit alienated much of their customer base and found themselves fighting for their lives in the face of Japanese competition. He selected Ford as the representative American car manufacturer because it was sufficiently small to be vulnerable to changing market conditions but also sufficiently healthy to not have its very survival threatened, unlike Chrysler. Because Ford was the number two car manufacturer in America, he chose Nissan, the number two car manufacturer in Japan, as the representative Japanese car manufacturer. Although Chrysler is not featured, it gets more attention than General Motors because of the feud between Lee Iacocca, President and later Chairman of Chrysler, and Henry Ford II, who had fired him from his position as President of Ford Motor Company (Iacocca considered turning around Chrysler as an act of revenge against Henry Ford II.).
Because of Henry Ford’s over-emphasis on investment in manufacturing and failure to keep the company’s books in order, Henry Ford II inherited a financial mess when he took over the company. In response, he allowed finance and management experts, rather than car men, to dominate the company under his watch. Unfortunately, these managers turned corporate headquarters into an ivory tower, considering Ford’s development facilities and factories as expenses and not as the key to the company’s revenue. On account of the high cost of entering the car manufacturing business, General Motors, Ford and Chrysler had little competition, and their greatest fear was a strike that would stop production and allow their rivals to claim more market share. As a result, whenever the United Auto Workers threatened a strike, they would usually get the pay or benefits increase they were demanding. At the same time, the factories were being squeezed to keep their costs down while the cost of labor was rising. How did they manage this? By skimping on quality.
The Big Three got away with this for about two decades after World War II because the post-war economic boom led to a rising demand for consumer goods such as cars. In that time period, an affluent family would replace their cars every three or four years. The used cars would be bought by poorer families, who would patch them up to keep them running. As the economy began to stumble in the 60’s and 70’s, however, people began desiring cars that cost less to operate and maintain while the car manufacturers wanted to continue to make the big gas guzzlers that maximized their profits.
World War II had shattered the confidence of the Japanese, the superior American military technology having convinced them that they were not as advanced as they thought they were. Furthermore, their industrial base was in ruins and had to be rebuilt. General MacArthur, in charge of the occupation of Japan and attempting to implement democratic reforms, permitted labor unions, dominated by Communist activists, to become more powerful. However, as the Cold War heated up and American government became more pro-business, he allowed the Japanese to suppress the Communists. With a few more maneuvers, the unions became extensions of the companies themselves, with the union officials enforcing employee discipline.
As Japan started manufacturing cars again, it faced quality problems as well as limitations on the capabilities of the steel industry, which at that time couldn’t make the sub-millimeter sheet metal needed for car bodies. As a result, the millimeter-thick sheet metal made for heavy but rugged cars. Having learned of an off-road race in Australia, an individual at Nissan pushed for and got management approval for an entry into the race. After the rugged car won the race, management decided that they were ready for the export market and sent staff to the U.S. to learn the market and start making the arrangements to market cars and trucks under the brand name Datsun to avoid dishonoring the name “Nissan” should the effort fail. Issues they encountered included:
• Unlike the Japanese, Americans drive on the right side of the road, and need steering wheels on the left.
• Cars that were adequate for the bad roads in Japan were underpowered for the highways of the U.S., and their brakes were substandard.
• The batteries in the cars were undersized and incapable of providing sufficient cold cranking amps to start the cars in the winter in northern states. Unlike Japan, in which a car was a prized possession, whose owners often covered in blankets overnight, Americans left their cars outside and exposed to the elements yet expected them to start on demand.
• Unlike the Japanese, Americans often chose to use trucks as passenger vehicles and not exclusively for the transport of cargo. Such customers would welcome features such as air conditioning that would make driving them more comfortable.
As members of a highly insular culture, the Nissan management had a hard time understanding why Americans used their cars differently from the Japanese and thought that a car good enough for Japan was good enough for America, it took a lot of persuading by staff stationed in the U.S. to get them to modify their product lines to produce cars and trucks that could compete in America, often at the cost of damage to their careers, but they eventually changed the attitudes of their management.
A particularly entertaining episode involved the first sporty car marketed by Nissan in America. The head of Nissan liked the musical My Fair Lady and decreed that this new sports car would be called the Fair Lady. In America, the name tag was pried off and replaced with one listing the company’s internal designation, 240Z. The car was a great success. If you ever wondered how Nissan came up with the Z-series nomenclature, now you know.
As Japanese car manufacturers such as Nissan improved their quality changed their export product lines such that they were producing cars suitable for the American market, they began claiming an ever-increasing market share in America. Customers who were dissatisfied with the high operating and maintenance costs of American-made gas guzzlers whose poor quality was a maintenance headache welcomed the fuel-efficient Japanese cars that were less likely to break down. It is highly ironic that the Japanese car-makers overcame their own insular culture and changed the way they did business for the sake of a customer base an ocean away while American car-makers refused to acknowledge the legitimate grievances of customers in their own country.
The American car manufacturers deserved every bit of the reckoning brought on by competition from Japan, but they did have one legitimate grievance of their own. Japan’s protectionist policies presented huge obstacles to entering the Japanese car market. That Detroit would have been willing make cars that Japanese might want to buy is highly questionable to me, but a nation reliant on other countries’ openness should be willing to offer a quid pro quo.
I thoroughly enjoyed this book and learned a lot from it. Because the book focuses on car manufacturing, that is the focus of the review, but the book also discusses the dynamics leading to the export of manufacturing jobs, not just those associated with the automotive industry, from America starting in the 70’s and accelerating in the 80’s.