Interpretations of Fascism by A. James Gregor

by A. James Gregor

This volume constitutes a survey of social science efforts to explain the fascist phenomenon. Interpretations of Fascism provides a review of the efforts that have been made to date to interpret and explain the phenomenon. It addresses itself specifically to those efforts undertaken to provide a social science explanation of Mussolini's Fascism. Dealing with the special application of social science methods to a specific problem, the book provides a special perspective from which to examine fascism in a comparative context. The book should be useful for college courses in political theory, comparative politics, democracy and dictatorship, economic and political change, and modern European history.

Genres: Politics, Nonfiction, History

Paperback

First published January 1, 1974

About the author

Anthony James Gregor (April 2, 1929 – August 30, 2019) was a Professor of Political Science Emeritus at the University of California, Berkeley, well known for his research on fascism, Marxism, and national security.

Reviews

[Dominic · Rating 4 out of 5]

“We have been studying fascism for half a century and the number of competent works devoted to the ideology of Mussolini’s Fascism could be counted on one hand.”

Gregor wrote these words in the first publication of this book in 1974. The later Transaction Edition published in 1996 with a new introduction mentions that the contents of the book have held up well. As I read this in 2025, I would still maintain that this book is a great resource and still very relevant to the study of fascism.

The Limitations of Fascist Studies

It seems that despite seeing this word thrown around everywhere, no one can actually tell us what it means. This is not a new phenomenon, either. Social scientists and historians, ever since WWII, have attempted to give a lexical definition or at the very least coherently explain what fascism is but have failed miserably. This book outlines the most popular interpretations of fascism throughout history, assesses their accuracy and plausibility, and provides criticism (spoiler alert: they’re all inadequate).

Before getting into the theories themselves, Gregor speaks of the limitations of social sciences in general when trying to provide classification and lexical definitions of political theory and the like. Social sciences do not have the advantage that the hard sciences do, where data can be empirically verified and reported stance-independent without bias (this does not mean that the data cannot be manipulated, or that it can’t be deceptively portrayed or reported, but that the data contents themselves are without contention).

“‘Theory,’ in the most general sense of the term, becomes critical to the collection, processing, and interpretation of data - it provides a handle on ‘understanding’ and ‘explaining’ - and it constitutes the foundation for the ultimate defense of the entire effort.” Gregor informs us that to “understand” and “theorize” about political science, or other social sciences, we must first grasp the causal elements, and also make the distinction between “definition” and “explanation.”

One cannot understand anything without being able to identify the causal elements of such a thing in question. Therefore, any account of fascism must demonstrate the causes of the outbreak of the fascist phenomen. Furthermore, explaining something is not the same as defining it. For example, Leon Trotsky in his Fascism: What It Is - How to Fight It, attempts to give a lexical definition by stating the following: “The Fascist movement in Italy was a spontaneous movement of large masses… directed and financed by big capitalist powers.” This is hardly a definition, but rather just an explanation of what he perceives to be the necessary constituent parts of fascism (which Gregor later explains are entirely wrong, and are just communist propaganda).

So then, when examining each interpretation, we must look beyond mere explanations, and also look for causation. Further, those who seek to define fascism must be able to demonstrate how it is distinct from other political regimes and philosophy. Much of what is said, for example, can be equally said for other nations and ideology, so we must be able to single out the unique features of fascism.

Fascism as Moral Crisis

For both fascists and anti-fascists, the moral failings of a nation serve as a call to action towards fascism. But the moral failings could refer to several different things: liberty and universal moralism (including people who “lost faith not only in rational liberalism but in Marxism as well”), a lower quality of living, and national humiliation. As mentioned, both fascists and anti-fascists agree with these causal factors, but they disagree with the response. Fascists saw the failures of Marxism, of liberalism, and of the loss of national pride as means to overthrow the former two and strengthen the latter, whereas the anti-fascists saw the solution to the failings of Marxism to be the implementation of more Marxism (inevitably, communism), more liberty and liberal morality, and focus on individual welfare rather than the strength of the nation.

While this account does provide a convincing causal element, it is lacking due to the fact that it doesn’t tell us why the upset masses resorted to fascism instead of something else, even if that something else is non-political (Gregor himself even asks why these people turning to drugs and alcohol wouldn’t be equally as explanatory). The communists, for example, echoed all of these same points and saw communism as the answer (even though Marxism had failed to them, it could be improved, or it had not been done right, etc). The interpretation of fascism as a moral crisis is once again an empty explanation, and that is being generous considering many of the anti-fascists are comically obtuse.

Fascism as the Consequence of Psychological Disabilities

This interpretation is the most difficult to take seriously because it relies on Freudian psychology, and draws absurd conclusions based on these ideas.

Pop quiz: what do most theoreticians of this interpretation have in common?

The general idea when it comes to Freudian psychosexual development is that children (boys, most often interpreted) contend with their father for the love of their mother. This generates several effects, including rage, jealousy, homosexuality (Peter Nathan calls fascism a “masculine, homosexual movement”), but most importantly to the Freudians, an anti-revolutionary mindset. This is because the children wish to imitate their fathers because they possess the qualities and attributes that attracted the mother. This is what makes children conservative, not revolutionary. They want to preserve these things, rather than transcend them.

In case anyone actually takes this seriously, there are a couple points to make. It firstly faces the same objection as the moral crisis, which is the fact that fascism is not the only outlet for the people who suffer from this disorder. This leads to the next point, which is that since these men, Nathan in particular, claim that all children suffer from this, the conclusion would be that all people are fascist, yet they are not. This means the psychosexual theory itself is insufficient. Thirdly, what if someone’s feelings towards their parents are not in line with the Freudian theory? For example, what if a child hates his mother? Further, what if he hates his mother but loves his father? What about the inverse, where he loves his mother but detests the specific qualities of his father? The theory in general suffers from so many alternate possibilities that it can’t possibly be taken seriously for a so-called reactionary political theory.

Fascism as the Consequence of the Rise of “Amorphous Masses”

Another strange and ambiguous interpretation. It essentially sees the general masses as a conglomerate of chaos and disorder, yet paradoxically seeking to be ruled by authority. This theory overall is the antithesis of the previous Freudian one. Gregor says, “Rather than the product of an irrepressible sense of Oedipal guilt and a masochistic desire to be dominated, Fascism is the result of an ungovernable intemperance and a sense of dominance.” If there is one saving aspect to this, it is the fact that many people may have lost their existential purpose due to “nineteenth century liberalism and technology”, as Ortega puts it. They wonder as lost souls in search of a saving grace through political and social means, but they do not know what that thing is.

Once again, this theory faces much of the same criticism as the others, in the sense that it does not provide any unique or distinguishing features from other political and social parties who shared the same difficulties. The upset masses also led to the founding of the United States Republic and Communist Vietnam… Why aren’t they fascist? The descriptions these theoreticians use are also very generic and border on the line of propaganda. To take one example, Ortega describes fascism as “a form of government [that] exemplifies the traits of ‘mass-man.’ It is a form of government that is violent, irrational, ignorant, inconstant, and arbitrary as the masses are violent, irrational, ignorant, inconstant, and arbitrary.” These sound like BLM members, not fascists.

Fascism as the Consequence of Class Struggle

There is some truth to this theory, which is not controversial to say considering economics plays a part in all political reform, even if it is not at the forefront. It’s also important to note that many of the original fascists were Marxists, and although the two eventually split and showed abhorrence for one another, there are still many things in common (see: The Faces of Janus: Marxism and Fascism in the Twentieth Century). The issue, however, is this interpretation does not focus on the fascists displaying class consciousness in a positive light in favor of the working class, but rather comes from communists who paint fascism as a pro-capitalist, pro-bourgeoisie movement. The facts, however, show otherwise.

“Nowhere in his book does Dutt attempt an analysis that might provide empirical support for the claim that ‘finance capital’ dominated Italian industry, trade, or agriculture during the period prior to, during or after World War I. As a matter of fact, Italian banking institutions were understood to have so little influence over Italian economic life that the first theoreticians with whom we have been concerned - Aquila and Zetkin - construed Fascism to have been a victory of ‘industrial capital’ over ‘agrarian and finance capital.’ Dutt, without having inspected the Italian economic system, simply uncritically accepted what had by that time become an article of ‘Marxist-Leninist’ faith: finance capital dominates contemporary capitalism.” Later in this same chapter, Gregor provides statistical and economic information demonstrating that Fascist Italy saved and revitalized the Italian economy, and benefited its citizens overall. Dutt and his companions made huge claims without evidence, effectively perpetuating Marxist propaganda.

Fascism as a Function of a Particular Stage of Economic Development

This interpretation is admittedly a bit over my head and difficult to understand. It deals with Rostow’s five stages of growth for a society to reach its fullest potential. They are as follows:

Traditional society
A society in which the preconditions for economic ‘take-off’ manifest themselves
The ‘take-off’ itself
Society in which there is a sustained drive toward maturity
A society that enjoys high mass consumption

Fascism as Totalitarianism

Perhaps the most recognizable interpretation is the concept of totalitarianism. Ask someone to define totalitarianism and you will get the same vague descriptions you get when asking someone to define fascism. These include things like censorship, restriction of individual liberties, control over industry, education, banking, etc., a “charismatic leader,” and military expansion.

Were feudal overlords and tribal kings totalitarian? If so, how is this a unique feature of fascism? Do liberal countries implement heavy restrictions and/or limitations of industry, agriculture, and education? If so, are they fascist? Volodymyr Zelenskyy shuts down opposition political parties… is he a fascist? It’s also amusing to see how people take the “charismatic leader” feature so seriously, as if it is this deep, scary, novel phenomenon. Which world leaders are not charismatic in some sense? They wouldn’t be in the positions they are if they weren’t.

Conclusion

These of course are basic outlines. The book itself goes into great detail, perhaps too much for some of these interpretations, and walks the reader through what other political scientists and sociologists have written about each one. Despite the inadequacy of each, some critics of fascism may refer to an eclectic account of these things to define fascism. In other words, it’s not that fascism is only totalitarian, but that it is totalitarian, a consequence of moral degradation, and a rise in the amorphous masses, or any other combination. Gregor acknowledges these eclectic outlines, but many of the same criticisms apply. Show me the eclectic account of fascism, and I’ll show you other political regimes that are the same and yet are not described as fascist.

My biggest issue with the book is that Gregor himself never gives us the true definition of fascism. It seems that everyone was given their chance to tell us what fascism is except for the fascists themselves. It is surprising that no primary writings of Mussolini or even Mosely were cited. Giovanni Gentile was mentioned minimally, not nearly enough to get his thoughts on the matter. It is still a great book nonetheless, however readers should be aware of this in case they have the same expectations I had going into it. Based on my research on Gregor and his work, it appears that Mussolini's Intellectuals: Fascist Social and Political Thought is much more in line with what I was looking for but couldn’t find here, which is an actual definition and outline of fascism itself.

[Michael · Rating 3 out of 5]

First published in 1974, this book came at a time when Gregor could rightly say that there was “nothing in English to compare…” to Ernst Nolte’s and Renzo de Felice’s theories regarding fascism. In making that observation, however, Gregor probably set for himself too high of a bar. This volume does represent an advance over previous efforts at synthesizing an understanding of fascism from previous theoretical approaches, but Gregor’s own limitations prevent it from being groundbreaking to the same degree as Nolte or de Felice.

Gregor, a political scientist, suffers from what I term “Hard Science Envy” to an extreme degree. He is uniformly dismissive of Humanities-influenced approaches to understanding, and is particularly snide in attacking historical narratives and historians’ work with theory. Thus, rather than drawing upon previous work on fascism and trying to synthesize the best parts of previous efforts, he devotes most of this book to trashing the work of others when their theoretical bases fail to demonstrate the rigorous precision and accuracy of a thesis in physics. Unsurprisingly, he ends by basically asserting that no workable theory of fascism exists, but then offers no superior theory of his own for the analysis of others. He simply suggests that such a theory “might” be drawn from “the more sophisticated accounts” of contemporary Marxism, and that hopefully such an account might “provide a body of theory that entails the appearance of descriptive properties like those employed by the concept of ‘totalitarianism’.” Talk about hedging your bets!

I’d be tempted to let it lie there, on the assumption that no one today would take seriously anyone who relies on Marxist explanations for social or political phenomena, except that there have apparently been reprints of this book in recent years, suggesting that some professors can’t find anything better even today. Where it seems to me that Gregor, and others fixated on reducing study of the past to a “science” in the hard-science-model sense fail is in failing to take the participants in the phenomena they study at their own word. Thus, he winds up using Fascist Italy, and only Fascist Italy, as the baseline for study of fascism. Never mind the fact that millions of Europeans (and others) defined themselves as Fascists and developed their own trajectories for fascism, Gregor single-mindedly focuses on the one “paradigm instance” of indisputable fascism. Furthermore, since we aren’t analyzing what they said, but rather what they did, a predisposition for economic theory is readily established.

Gregor does have to be credited with realizing that not all Marxist theories of fascism are “sophisticated.” He readily perceives, for example that Clara Zetkin’s account was largely plagiarized from Giulio Aquila, but where he goes instead presents new problems. Instead of fascism as a final phase of capitalism, brutally attempting to preserve itself, it becomes for his favored Marxists a stage in economic development, one through which not all nations must pass, but one which becomes necessary for certain slower-developing economies as they attempt to industrialize rapidly in order to catch up to existing capitalist powers. By combining this with the theory of “totalitarianism,” he can be said to be comparing Mussolini and Stalin, but he does so only obliquely here. In that sense, his hard-and-fast use of Italy as the paradigm saves him from falling into the situation of calling nearly all modern political dictatorships (Peron, Castro, Nasser, etc) fascisms, and so once again he winds up critiquing even the theory he likes into non-existence.

This book probably is of historical use, in studying early attempts at creating a workable theory of fascism, but it ultimately doesn’t hold up against more recent studies that allow for the slipperiness of narrative and discursive analysis of fascist writings. Gregor wants to live in a world where political theories are discreet entities that can be studied outside of their historical context and apart from the people who made them. This was a common enough idea in the quantification-heavy 1960s and 1970s, but it probably wouldn’t even convince any physicists, who work with rather fuzzier entities like quarks and quantum particles today.