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FDR and the Jews
Nearly seventy-five years after World War II, a contentious debate lingers over whether Franklin Delano Roosevelt turned his back on the Jews of Hitler's Europe. Defenders claim that FDR saved millions of potential victims by defeating Nazi Germany. Others revile him as morally indifferent and indict him for keeping America's gates closed to Jewish refugees and failing to bomb Auschwitz's gas chambers.
In an extensive examination of this impassioned debate, Richard Breitman and Allan J. Lichtman find that the president was neither savior nor bystander. In FDR and the Jews , they draw upon many new primary sources to offer an intriguing portrait of a consummate politician-compassionate but also pragmatic-struggling with opposing priorities under perilous conditions. For most of his presidency Roosevelt indeed did little to aid the imperiled Jews of Europe. He put domestic policy priorities ahead of helping Jews and deferred to others' fears of an anti-Semitic backlash. Yet he also acted decisively at times to rescue Jews, often withstanding contrary pressures from his advisers and the American public. Even Jewish citizens who petitioned the president could not agree on how best to aid their co-religionists abroad.
Though his actions may seem inadequate in retrospect, the authors bring to light a concerned leader whose efforts on behalf of Jews were far greater than those of any other world figure. His moral position was tempered by the political realities of depression and war, a conflict all too familiar to American politicians in the twenty-first century.
In an extensive examination of this impassioned debate, Richard Breitman and Allan J. Lichtman find that the president was neither savior nor bystander. In FDR and the Jews , they draw upon many new primary sources to offer an intriguing portrait of a consummate politician-compassionate but also pragmatic-struggling with opposing priorities under perilous conditions. For most of his presidency Roosevelt indeed did little to aid the imperiled Jews of Europe. He put domestic policy priorities ahead of helping Jews and deferred to others' fears of an anti-Semitic backlash. Yet he also acted decisively at times to rescue Jews, often withstanding contrary pressures from his advisers and the American public. Even Jewish citizens who petitioned the president could not agree on how best to aid their co-religionists abroad.
Though his actions may seem inadequate in retrospect, the authors bring to light a concerned leader whose efforts on behalf of Jews were far greater than those of any other world figure. His moral position was tempered by the political realities of depression and war, a conflict all too familiar to American politicians in the twenty-first century.
459 pages, Hardcover
First published March 19, 2012
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January 15, 2016
Breitman and Lichtman have written an exhaustively researched and well-written book about a topic that has elicited much controversy within the Jewish community. They neither vilify FDR for America’s limited, sluggish efforts to take in Jewish refugees from Hitler nor do they absolve him of any responsibility for the death of millions. Overall, they conclude that Roosevelt could have done more but given the circumstances under which he labored, he did more than any other government leader at the time to try to save Jews and deserves some credit.
Perhaps Breitman and Lichtman’s major contribution is that they tell, in detail, the history of the plight of Jewish refugees from Europe in the 1930’s and 40’s and the forces that kept the United States largely shut off as a destination for them. As I read this account, it was “déjà vu all over again”--I could not help but see some parallels between the plight of Jewish refugees from the Nazis and the problems faced by immigrants and refugees from the Middle East and Latin America today.
Specifically:
• There was widespread, politically potent anti-immigrant feeling in the U.S., with immigrants seen as stealing American jobs.
• Ethnic and religious stereotyping of refugees and immigrants was common.
• The President’s readiness to expend political capital by taking action rose and fell during his time in office (e.g., he stalled out because of political headwinds during the lead-up to an election).
• In the 1930’s, immigration opponents complained that Jews, out of self-interest, were overdramatizing the dangers of Nazi anti-Semitism in order to justify an end run around the immigration quotas.
• Politicians sympathetic to the refugees’ plight tried to get Congress to legislate an exemption from the immigration quotas and waiting list that would permit children to enter the country. This effort was met with an outcry that this was just the first step to weaken the immigration control system.
• During a time of war, a leading (and effective) argument put forward against allowing refugees from Hitler into the U.S. was that it would result in the entry of subversives, spies, and saboteurs.
The authors describe the political and social circumstances that pushed hard against efforts to open America’s doors to Jews wanting to leave Europe and that limited Roosevelt’s room for maneuver. Anti-Jewish prejudice, xenophobia, anti-immigrant sentiment among both the labor movement and right wing groups, and the widespread desire, post World War I, to avoid further entanglement in foreign matters, were all highly prevalent in American society. Trying to alter the strict quotas that by law functioned to restrict Jewish immigration was politically impossible throughout Roosevelt’s 12 years in office. Not just Roosevelt but some prominent Jewish leaders argued that efforts to alter the quota system would produce a backlash that would lead to even greater restrictions. After Hitler came to power, the Neutrality Act, a law that forbade the U.S. government from getting involved in European conflicts, shackled Roosevelt in his growing desire to act diplomatically and materially against the Nazis and their allies.
The authors trace four different periods in Roosevelt’s presidency. READ BELOW if you are interested in a summary.
This outstanding book succeeds in clarifying the historical record and tells a compelling story in the process. It also offers portraits of many individuals who took part in these events, including Jewish activists and leaders, representing different constituencies and points of view. The book offers a coherent and balanced account of what each person did and didn’t do and how this fit into the overall picture.
SUMMARY OF THE FOUR PERIODS IN ROOSEVELT’S PRESIDENCY RE: JEWISH REFUGEES
Period #1: During the first three years in office, Roosevelt focused all his energy and political capital on leading the country out of the Depression. He steered clear of any political initiatives that might be seen as challenging the quotas or specifically advocating for Jewish causes.
Period #2:Following Roosevelt’s landslide reelection in late 1936, three years followed in which Roosevelt became personally active and took initiatives, within the limits of the political realities, to help Jewish refugees. Convinced that the quotas could not be altered, he tried to clear away various obstacles that had slowed Jewish immigration to a trickle to ensure that the maximum number of European Jews (50,000) who could enter the U.S. under the quota system would be able to get in. Recognizing that the need was much greater, he also sought to find other countries that would take in Jewish refugees. Part of this effort was the Evian conference, which notoriously produced a negative response from every country except the Dominican Republic. In 1938, Roosevelt evidently personally convinced Cuban strongman Fulgencio Batista to open his country for to shiploads of Jews fleeing Germany, and between 5,000 and 6,000 found refuge there; another group of 7,000 to 8,000 Jews made it to Chile before that government cracked down on immigration.
In June, 1939, rival Cuban officials abruptly ended Batista’s welcoming policy in Cuba by refusing to allow 734 of the 937 of the passengers on the S.S. St. Louis to land in Havana. The authors demonstrate that critics have unfairly maligned Roosevelt for this heavily mythologized episode. Roosevelt had American officials track the ship to make sure the passengers were safe while making intense efforts to persuade other countries to accept the refugees. Eventually, Britain, France and the Netherlands, and Belgium agreed to each take in a portion of the refugees. The St. Louis refugees wrote Roosevelt, effusively thanking him for his efforts on their behalf. Subsequently, after the war started, the Nazis overran France, Belgium and the Netherlands and a portion of the St. Louis passengers were deported and killed in the death camps. Nonetheless, all but 254 of the St. Louis passengers escaped the Nazi dragnet.
The kindertransports that enabled 10,000 thousand Jewish children to leave the Continent for Britain inspired a similar proposal in the U.S. In 1939, the Roosevelt Administration encouraged allies in Congress to introduce legislation that would enable Jewish children who were refugees to enter the U.S. outside of the quota system. This proposal, which Eleanor Roosevelt publically supported, precipitated a wave of opposition that effectively doomed its chances for passage, and the Roosevelt administration did not push for it.
Period #3: From late 1939, with Roosevelt running in a tight race for reelection and the war now underway in Europe, until 1944, deep in the war, Roosevelt’s willingness to try to act on behalf of Jewish refugees diminished considerably. Roosevelt’s paramount priority during this period was to end American neutrality, aid Britain in fighting the Nazis, and subsequently to wage war full tilt against the Axis powers. Nazi propaganda loudly accused Roosevelt of siding with Britain and later of fighting Germany, purely because of nefarious Jewish influence. Consequently, Roosevelt wanted to avoid taking actions that appeared motivated primarily by Jewish concerns.
Meanwhile, Breckenridge Long and other State Department officials actively impeded Jewish immigration. Long justified this policy by voicing concern that the Nazis would use the entry of Jewish refugees as a cover to infiltrate spies and saboteurs, including both Nazi agents and Jews coerced into spying because of threats to their relatives back home. One such case was widely reported in the New York Times and other newspapers, and concern about potential politically damaging and morale-affecting incidents of this nature influenced Roosevelt’s decisions.
Despite news emerging in 1942 and 1943 about the Nazi death camps, the Roosevelt administration maintained the position that the best way to save Jewish lives was to prosecute the war single-mindedly and defeat the Germans as quickly as possible. The proposal to bomb the gas chambers or the railroad lines leading to the concentration camps, which at a certain point in 1944 became technically feasible, was rejected by War Department officials and was never presented to Roosevelt. Breitman and Lichtman contend that this option might not have saved many Jewish lives. They argue that in order to prevent Jews from arriving at Auschwitz, the Allies would have had to divert precious aviation resources for a sustained and labor-intensive bombing campaign, not just a sortie or two, and also that the Nazis were determined to exterminate the Jews and had other methods for mass murder, besides use of the gas chambers, available to them.
Period #4: As it became clear that the war wouldn’t end quickly, Roosevelt sided with administration officials who wanted to do more to rescue Jewish refugees. A group led by his long-time deputy, Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr., and other Treasury officials, Jews and non-Jews among them, pushed hard against the State Department and succeeded in establishing the War Refugee Board in early 1944. The Board’s activities, which led to the rescue of an estimated 200,000 Jews, included covert sponsorship of Raoul Wallenberg ‘s mission to save Jews in Hungary. The Roosevelt Administration issued warnings to Central European governments allied with the Nazis that continued collaboration in the murder of Jews would be severely punished once the war ended. American officials authorized negotiations with Nazis about trading Jews for heavy equipment, with no intention of doing so, but nonetheless to buy time. Roosevelt took a public position supporting the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine and during the waning days of his life in early 1945, he met with the Saudi King Faisal in an ill-fated effort to persuade the King to accept a Zionist state.
Perhaps Breitman and Lichtman’s major contribution is that they tell, in detail, the history of the plight of Jewish refugees from Europe in the 1930’s and 40’s and the forces that kept the United States largely shut off as a destination for them. As I read this account, it was “déjà vu all over again”--I could not help but see some parallels between the plight of Jewish refugees from the Nazis and the problems faced by immigrants and refugees from the Middle East and Latin America today.
Specifically:
• There was widespread, politically potent anti-immigrant feeling in the U.S., with immigrants seen as stealing American jobs.
• Ethnic and religious stereotyping of refugees and immigrants was common.
• The President’s readiness to expend political capital by taking action rose and fell during his time in office (e.g., he stalled out because of political headwinds during the lead-up to an election).
• In the 1930’s, immigration opponents complained that Jews, out of self-interest, were overdramatizing the dangers of Nazi anti-Semitism in order to justify an end run around the immigration quotas.
• Politicians sympathetic to the refugees’ plight tried to get Congress to legislate an exemption from the immigration quotas and waiting list that would permit children to enter the country. This effort was met with an outcry that this was just the first step to weaken the immigration control system.
• During a time of war, a leading (and effective) argument put forward against allowing refugees from Hitler into the U.S. was that it would result in the entry of subversives, spies, and saboteurs.
The authors describe the political and social circumstances that pushed hard against efforts to open America’s doors to Jews wanting to leave Europe and that limited Roosevelt’s room for maneuver. Anti-Jewish prejudice, xenophobia, anti-immigrant sentiment among both the labor movement and right wing groups, and the widespread desire, post World War I, to avoid further entanglement in foreign matters, were all highly prevalent in American society. Trying to alter the strict quotas that by law functioned to restrict Jewish immigration was politically impossible throughout Roosevelt’s 12 years in office. Not just Roosevelt but some prominent Jewish leaders argued that efforts to alter the quota system would produce a backlash that would lead to even greater restrictions. After Hitler came to power, the Neutrality Act, a law that forbade the U.S. government from getting involved in European conflicts, shackled Roosevelt in his growing desire to act diplomatically and materially against the Nazis and their allies.
The authors trace four different periods in Roosevelt’s presidency. READ BELOW if you are interested in a summary.
This outstanding book succeeds in clarifying the historical record and tells a compelling story in the process. It also offers portraits of many individuals who took part in these events, including Jewish activists and leaders, representing different constituencies and points of view. The book offers a coherent and balanced account of what each person did and didn’t do and how this fit into the overall picture.
SUMMARY OF THE FOUR PERIODS IN ROOSEVELT’S PRESIDENCY RE: JEWISH REFUGEES
Period #1: During the first three years in office, Roosevelt focused all his energy and political capital on leading the country out of the Depression. He steered clear of any political initiatives that might be seen as challenging the quotas or specifically advocating for Jewish causes.
Period #2:Following Roosevelt’s landslide reelection in late 1936, three years followed in which Roosevelt became personally active and took initiatives, within the limits of the political realities, to help Jewish refugees. Convinced that the quotas could not be altered, he tried to clear away various obstacles that had slowed Jewish immigration to a trickle to ensure that the maximum number of European Jews (50,000) who could enter the U.S. under the quota system would be able to get in. Recognizing that the need was much greater, he also sought to find other countries that would take in Jewish refugees. Part of this effort was the Evian conference, which notoriously produced a negative response from every country except the Dominican Republic. In 1938, Roosevelt evidently personally convinced Cuban strongman Fulgencio Batista to open his country for to shiploads of Jews fleeing Germany, and between 5,000 and 6,000 found refuge there; another group of 7,000 to 8,000 Jews made it to Chile before that government cracked down on immigration.
In June, 1939, rival Cuban officials abruptly ended Batista’s welcoming policy in Cuba by refusing to allow 734 of the 937 of the passengers on the S.S. St. Louis to land in Havana. The authors demonstrate that critics have unfairly maligned Roosevelt for this heavily mythologized episode. Roosevelt had American officials track the ship to make sure the passengers were safe while making intense efforts to persuade other countries to accept the refugees. Eventually, Britain, France and the Netherlands, and Belgium agreed to each take in a portion of the refugees. The St. Louis refugees wrote Roosevelt, effusively thanking him for his efforts on their behalf. Subsequently, after the war started, the Nazis overran France, Belgium and the Netherlands and a portion of the St. Louis passengers were deported and killed in the death camps. Nonetheless, all but 254 of the St. Louis passengers escaped the Nazi dragnet.
The kindertransports that enabled 10,000 thousand Jewish children to leave the Continent for Britain inspired a similar proposal in the U.S. In 1939, the Roosevelt Administration encouraged allies in Congress to introduce legislation that would enable Jewish children who were refugees to enter the U.S. outside of the quota system. This proposal, which Eleanor Roosevelt publically supported, precipitated a wave of opposition that effectively doomed its chances for passage, and the Roosevelt administration did not push for it.
Period #3: From late 1939, with Roosevelt running in a tight race for reelection and the war now underway in Europe, until 1944, deep in the war, Roosevelt’s willingness to try to act on behalf of Jewish refugees diminished considerably. Roosevelt’s paramount priority during this period was to end American neutrality, aid Britain in fighting the Nazis, and subsequently to wage war full tilt against the Axis powers. Nazi propaganda loudly accused Roosevelt of siding with Britain and later of fighting Germany, purely because of nefarious Jewish influence. Consequently, Roosevelt wanted to avoid taking actions that appeared motivated primarily by Jewish concerns.
Meanwhile, Breckenridge Long and other State Department officials actively impeded Jewish immigration. Long justified this policy by voicing concern that the Nazis would use the entry of Jewish refugees as a cover to infiltrate spies and saboteurs, including both Nazi agents and Jews coerced into spying because of threats to their relatives back home. One such case was widely reported in the New York Times and other newspapers, and concern about potential politically damaging and morale-affecting incidents of this nature influenced Roosevelt’s decisions.
Despite news emerging in 1942 and 1943 about the Nazi death camps, the Roosevelt administration maintained the position that the best way to save Jewish lives was to prosecute the war single-mindedly and defeat the Germans as quickly as possible. The proposal to bomb the gas chambers or the railroad lines leading to the concentration camps, which at a certain point in 1944 became technically feasible, was rejected by War Department officials and was never presented to Roosevelt. Breitman and Lichtman contend that this option might not have saved many Jewish lives. They argue that in order to prevent Jews from arriving at Auschwitz, the Allies would have had to divert precious aviation resources for a sustained and labor-intensive bombing campaign, not just a sortie or two, and also that the Nazis were determined to exterminate the Jews and had other methods for mass murder, besides use of the gas chambers, available to them.
Period #4: As it became clear that the war wouldn’t end quickly, Roosevelt sided with administration officials who wanted to do more to rescue Jewish refugees. A group led by his long-time deputy, Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr., and other Treasury officials, Jews and non-Jews among them, pushed hard against the State Department and succeeded in establishing the War Refugee Board in early 1944. The Board’s activities, which led to the rescue of an estimated 200,000 Jews, included covert sponsorship of Raoul Wallenberg ‘s mission to save Jews in Hungary. The Roosevelt Administration issued warnings to Central European governments allied with the Nazis that continued collaboration in the murder of Jews would be severely punished once the war ended. American officials authorized negotiations with Nazis about trading Jews for heavy equipment, with no intention of doing so, but nonetheless to buy time. Roosevelt took a public position supporting the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine and during the waning days of his life in early 1945, he met with the Saudi King Faisal in an ill-fated effort to persuade the King to accept a Zionist state.
March 17, 2013
One of the most contentious debates pertaining to World War II deals with Franklin D. Roosevelt’s role in trying to mitigate the horrors of the Holocaust. Many argue that Roosevelt was a political animal who based his position on the plight of world Jewry on political calculation and did little to offset Nazi terror; others argue that FDR did as much as possible based on conditions domestically and abroad. In the new book, FDR AND THE JEWS, Richard Breitman and Allan J. Lichtman address all aspects of FDR’s policies during the Holocaust synthesizing most if not all the relevant secondary and primary sources with a layer of new material. The authors reach the conclusion that FDR’s views were consistent throughout the war and he was “politically and emotionally stingy when it came to the plight of the Jews-even given that he had no easy remedies for a specific Jewish tragedy in Europe.” (210) The authors argue that “FDR avoided positions that might put at risk his broader goals of mobilizing anti-Nazi opposition and gaining freedom to act in foreign affairs,” (151) for example dealing with the refugee crisis, the issue of Palestine, immigration, and organizing the defeat of Nazi Germany. The authors describe in detail the fear of domestic anti-Semitism, especially in the State Department; the inability of American Jews to present a united front; the role of the War Department; and presidential politics. Overall, the reader is presented a picture of a president who had a great deal on his plate during the war and did as much as he could given the political and military situation in Europe in trying to bring to an end the horrors that beset the Jews during the Second World War. Overall, the book is an exceptionally detailed work that is worthy of an academic as well as a general audience as it centers in on the important issue that remains with us today; what is the “appropriate response of an American president to humanitarian crises abroad?” (327)
July 21, 2013
Was FDR good for the Jews? As they say, it's complicated. The authors did an amazing amount of research and concluded there were 4 phases to FDR's relationship to Jews. First term he was too afraid to do anything because of political opposition in Congress. Second term he was much more aggressive. Still he was hamstrung by anti-Semites at the State Dept. Later we started the War Refugee Board which probably saved 200,000 Jews. Towards the end he was focused on wining the war and the War Dept. was not about to be distracted by humanitarian aims. Even the bombing of the rail lines to Auschwitz or the gas chambers was out of the question and probably wouldn't have saved any lives. Still he supported the creation of Israel as a Jewish homeland. He probably did more than any other leaders at the time. In context, he was probably the best we could hope for.
February 8, 2019
I did not like this book, at all, but I can understand where the authors are coming from, even if what they are saying is often a contradictory mess. The authors of this book really only care about the well-being and social power of Jews. They have no particular interest in constitutionality, or the importance within republic regimes of responding to the beliefs and opinions of the governed. In their mind, those who do something for the Jews are to be praised and those who are hostile to the Jewish people in any way are to be condemned. Their self-interest fills all of the pages of this lengthy (more than 300 page) book, and the fact that the authors are not only stridently Jewish but also leftist made this book a chore. It's by no means the worst book I've read recently, but it is not a book I enjoyed reading or can recommend to others. For me, legitimate government behavior includes a respect for the thoughts of the people as well as constitutional law, and if the people as a whole are not big on open borders and generosity to refugees, and if those refugees wish to corrupt the political order of a host nation by making it more socialist, then I'm not going to be very friendly to those would-be immigrants, no matter who they are.
This book is divided into sixteen chapters. The authors begin with a look at the rise and fall of FDR in the period of his early political career (1), as well as his return starting in 1928 when he won the position as governor of New York over a Jewish Republican (2). The authors then move on to this relationships with dictators (3), immigration wars (4), and the transitions based on elections (5). The authors discuss the logistical problems of moving millions of people (6) and the efforts of the United States to encourage settlement of Jews in South America (7). The authors look at the declining feeling of European Jews as war approached (8), and as security concerns became more serious (9), as well as the difficulties of Jews within wartime America (10). There is a talk about debated remedies for the dire position of European Jews (11), the troubled relationship between Zionism and the Arab world (12), and the actions of the War Refugee Board (13). The authors then end by discussing negotiations and rescue of Jews in Hungary (14), the end of World War II and Roosevelt's life (15), and some perspectives on the period as a whole (16).
A great deal of muddle of this book results from the fact that the authors are extremely biased towards FDR and desire to bolster his reputation while addressing his political unreliability. They show far too much interest in the behavior of FDR's various court Jews (in more than one sense of the term) as well as lamenting the high degree of anti-Semitism that existed in the United States and other places. In many cases the authors want to have their cake and eat it too, talking on the one hand about Jews being predominantly democratic because the Republican party didn't have anything to offer them (which has never been true) while at the same time trying to downplay the political issues that Jews were involved in. The authors appear to evaluate everyone, from Jewish community leaders to other politicians, based on how leftist they are, which means that the authors' evaluations are all a mess, and not worth taking seriously. Even those readers who are fond towards the well-being of Jews but not very fond of leftist politics will find little to enjoy in this hopeless mess.
This book is divided into sixteen chapters. The authors begin with a look at the rise and fall of FDR in the period of his early political career (1), as well as his return starting in 1928 when he won the position as governor of New York over a Jewish Republican (2). The authors then move on to this relationships with dictators (3), immigration wars (4), and the transitions based on elections (5). The authors discuss the logistical problems of moving millions of people (6) and the efforts of the United States to encourage settlement of Jews in South America (7). The authors look at the declining feeling of European Jews as war approached (8), and as security concerns became more serious (9), as well as the difficulties of Jews within wartime America (10). There is a talk about debated remedies for the dire position of European Jews (11), the troubled relationship between Zionism and the Arab world (12), and the actions of the War Refugee Board (13). The authors then end by discussing negotiations and rescue of Jews in Hungary (14), the end of World War II and Roosevelt's life (15), and some perspectives on the period as a whole (16).
A great deal of muddle of this book results from the fact that the authors are extremely biased towards FDR and desire to bolster his reputation while addressing his political unreliability. They show far too much interest in the behavior of FDR's various court Jews (in more than one sense of the term) as well as lamenting the high degree of anti-Semitism that existed in the United States and other places. In many cases the authors want to have their cake and eat it too, talking on the one hand about Jews being predominantly democratic because the Republican party didn't have anything to offer them (which has never been true) while at the same time trying to downplay the political issues that Jews were involved in. The authors appear to evaluate everyone, from Jewish community leaders to other politicians, based on how leftist they are, which means that the authors' evaluations are all a mess, and not worth taking seriously. Even those readers who are fond towards the well-being of Jews but not very fond of leftist politics will find little to enjoy in this hopeless mess.
April 8, 2013
Published by Harvard University Press and written by two history professors from American University, this is a scholarly work that examines FDR's attitudes and policies towards Jews from his early days as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, to his time as Governor of New York and ultimately, and most importantly during his 12+ years as president.
Thoroughly researched and heavily footnoted, FDR and the Jews is a thoughtful and balanced assessment of the man who led this country during one of the most dangerous and tumultuous periods of our history. Faced with the challenges of rescuing an economy mired in depression and then winning a war that threatened the future of much of the world, FDR is portrayed as a skilled politician who understood the plight of European Jewry while also recognizing the limitations he faced in trying to respond to a crisis of unprecedented proportions.
The authors do an excellent job of describing the domestic (and global) factors that influenced FDR's thinking and policies during the years of his presidency, including significant opposition to immigration, strong anti-Semitism, especially among some in Congress and in the State Department, and the lack of unity among the various Jewish groups lobbying for U.S. action to counter Nazi atrocities.
Ultimately, the authors conclude that FDR was neither a savior nor a bystander, that he did take specific actions to rescue hundreds of thousands of Jews, but that his primary focus was on winning the war, an objective that would also deny Hitler his goal of annihilating the Jewish people.
This book is an excellent response to the Monday-morning quarterbacks who have condemned FDR's limited response to what we now call the Holocaust without fully appreciating the dynamics at play during the years of his presidency.
Thoroughly researched and heavily footnoted, FDR and the Jews is a thoughtful and balanced assessment of the man who led this country during one of the most dangerous and tumultuous periods of our history. Faced with the challenges of rescuing an economy mired in depression and then winning a war that threatened the future of much of the world, FDR is portrayed as a skilled politician who understood the plight of European Jewry while also recognizing the limitations he faced in trying to respond to a crisis of unprecedented proportions.
The authors do an excellent job of describing the domestic (and global) factors that influenced FDR's thinking and policies during the years of his presidency, including significant opposition to immigration, strong anti-Semitism, especially among some in Congress and in the State Department, and the lack of unity among the various Jewish groups lobbying for U.S. action to counter Nazi atrocities.
Ultimately, the authors conclude that FDR was neither a savior nor a bystander, that he did take specific actions to rescue hundreds of thousands of Jews, but that his primary focus was on winning the war, an objective that would also deny Hitler his goal of annihilating the Jewish people.
This book is an excellent response to the Monday-morning quarterbacks who have condemned FDR's limited response to what we now call the Holocaust without fully appreciating the dynamics at play during the years of his presidency.
September 30, 2014
This book presents a thorough analysis of Roosevelt's actions and policies regarding the plight of Jews caught in the grip of Nazi persecution. The purpose the authors had for writing this book was to investigate seemingly contradictory actions by FDR regarding the Jewish plight. Some historians have criticized him for not doing enough to end the Holocaust while others believe he did what he could. Breitman and Lightman's research reveals that Roosevelt's decision making process was based upon the current events of specific times during his presidency. There were times when he was unable to offer aid due to other pressing priorities, whether they were domestic or foreign. However, he was very concerned about the fate of the Jews in Europe and, when he was able to offer aid, he did so. This book is very well written and gives excellent insight into a president who had to cope with many dire issues throughout his 12 years in office.
July 3, 2021
This book is a scholarly summary of FDR's Jewish policy throughout his presidency. The authors present four different Roosevelt's. Identifying these four phases of his approach is a helpful metric. Also included are surrounding influences, political appointees, international diplomatic relations, and main characters. Sometimes, its easy to get the names and connections lost or misplaced. I found the later portions of the book more interesting, especially in relation to Britain, Zionism, and Palestine.
The authors try to display a fair-handed reckoning of all the details. In past decades, Roosevelt has been charged with failing to do enough to rescue Jews prior to and during WWII. Specifically, he has been charged with failing to bomb the tracks to Auschwitz. The authors do a good job of pushing back against the historical "arm-chair quarterbacking" that fails to see events in context. They do point out areas he could have done better, but over-all they are pleased with his handling. They point out that he did more for the Jews than any other major leader during that time.
There were sections that were bland and a little "off in the weeds" so to speak. Their approach is solid with scholarly sourcing and careful thought. The final chapter is worth the book, and is a great summary for the less-than-committed reader.
The authors try to display a fair-handed reckoning of all the details. In past decades, Roosevelt has been charged with failing to do enough to rescue Jews prior to and during WWII. Specifically, he has been charged with failing to bomb the tracks to Auschwitz. The authors do a good job of pushing back against the historical "arm-chair quarterbacking" that fails to see events in context. They do point out areas he could have done better, but over-all they are pleased with his handling. They point out that he did more for the Jews than any other major leader during that time.
There were sections that were bland and a little "off in the weeds" so to speak. Their approach is solid with scholarly sourcing and careful thought. The final chapter is worth the book, and is a great summary for the less-than-committed reader.
May 2, 2013
This was an excellent and thoroughly researched book that treats the subject fairly and objectively. As a long-time admirer of FDR, I read the book with some trepidation, fearing that in the end I would be disappointed in Roosevelt the man. In fact, FDR comes off fairly well as his actions, decisions, and statements are all placed within the context of an extremely complex morass of politics, issues, competing demands, and the sheer immensity of the historical task at hand -- to defeat Hitler and win the war, while continuing to struggle with a severely depressed economy and a host of problems at home. FDR was extremely popular historically with American Jews for good reason - he was the first president to genuinely and substantially involve Jews in American political life and government; many of his closest friends and advisers were jewish and, while he was far from perfect or completely free of prejudice, he was far more progressive and open minded than most. In hindsight, it is easy to make the case that he should have done more to allow greater and more liberal jewish immigration onto U.S. shores during the 1930's, or that he should have authorized U.S. bombing of the rail lines leading to the concentration camps, but in reality he had to contend with a strongly isolationist and anti-immigrant nation (and Congress) and the military was uniformly opposed to any action that deviated even a little from the objectives of military victory as soon as possible. It is hard to imagine any U.S. president making different decisions than FDR on some of the more controversial matters, and after reading this fine book by Richard Breitman and Allan Licthtman (both professors at American University), I am left with a positive image of FDR as a politically-astute president whose heart was mostly in the right place, and who did more to fight bigotry, prejudice, and anti-Semitism than any world leader at that time.
June 3, 2013
Short version, as summed up by the caption to one of the photos: Hitler cared more about killing the Jews than the Allies did about saving them.
Longer version: This book is mostly, but not entirely, exculpatory of Roosevelt, instead laying most of the Allies' indifference to the Jewish plight on the anti-Semitic department of State and indifference on behalf of the British. Now, the first part is largely true. In the 1930s and 1940s anti-Semitism was much more common in the US than it is now (and it's still a very common thing, even if not at the same level). As for the second, crucial difference between the US and Britain: Britain was being bombed, the contiguous US was not, and the sheer amount of land the US had meant that it would have been much more feasible for the US to have taken in refugees (certainly in much greater numbers than they did) than Britain; however the Depression had crippled the US economy, and Roosevelt was the President of the United States; not the Policeman of the World. His job was, first and foremost, to cater to American interests. Unfortunately, US interests and Jewish interests, despite his personal sympathies, were not necessarily the same thing.
FDR and the Jews' epilogue is a chilling reminder that while we always say Never Again, we never actually mean it. Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia/Serbia, Sudan—all of these things came *after* the Holocaust, and with the exception of the penultimate of the above examples, we did jack shit about them.
The first chapter is very weakly written; you'll get the same amount of information reading FDR's entry on Wikipedia. Recommend starting with Chapter 2.
Longer version: This book is mostly, but not entirely, exculpatory of Roosevelt, instead laying most of the Allies' indifference to the Jewish plight on the anti-Semitic department of State and indifference on behalf of the British. Now, the first part is largely true. In the 1930s and 1940s anti-Semitism was much more common in the US than it is now (and it's still a very common thing, even if not at the same level). As for the second, crucial difference between the US and Britain: Britain was being bombed, the contiguous US was not, and the sheer amount of land the US had meant that it would have been much more feasible for the US to have taken in refugees (certainly in much greater numbers than they did) than Britain; however the Depression had crippled the US economy, and Roosevelt was the President of the United States; not the Policeman of the World. His job was, first and foremost, to cater to American interests. Unfortunately, US interests and Jewish interests, despite his personal sympathies, were not necessarily the same thing.
FDR and the Jews' epilogue is a chilling reminder that while we always say Never Again, we never actually mean it. Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia/Serbia, Sudan—all of these things came *after* the Holocaust, and with the exception of the penultimate of the above examples, we did jack shit about them.
The first chapter is very weakly written; you'll get the same amount of information reading FDR's entry on Wikipedia. Recommend starting with Chapter 2.
December 18, 2018
FDR and the Jews by Breitman and Lichtman provides an account of FDR’s efforts to assist Europe’s Jews in the face of anti-Semitism and isolationism that provided huge hurdles. The American Jewish community was splintered on how publicly they and FDR should denounce Hitler’s genocide if there remained a chance to help Jews escape. A sympathetic portrayal of FDR written in dry academic prose.
April 23, 2013
Superb scholarship by two AU historians who are masters of their respective fields. This study convincingly argues that FDR was neither a bystander during what we now call the Holocaust nor a faultless savior of Jews. Full review to come.
July 27, 2017
This analysis is the best I've read regarding what the United States could have done to help stop the genocide attempted during World War II. Specifically, the authors explain President Roosevelt's actions in the context of those times.
May 21, 2014
An excellent, balanced book that shows that, on trying to save Europe's Jews, FDR was neither calloused and indifferent nor a saint.
The authors divide his presidency into four, roughly but not exactly matching his four terms in office, and look at what he did in each period. They also refute a number of myths, including one medium-sized and one big one.
The first roughly matches his first term. The second runs to about the time of the St. Louis liner in 1939. The third runs to about the time Nazi Germany overran Hungary in spring 1944. And, the fourth from there.
The authors note that the US economy was the first FDR's main concern. Even so, they say that he probably could have done a little bit more in chiding Hitler or more. That said, no country wanted to take in a lot of refugees in general during the Great Depression. That's not to mention anti-Semitism in the US, which was at roughly the level of pre-Vichy France, on average, I think we could say. If I were to give a grade, it would be a C-minus.
On the refugees, post-1924 immigration law had strict country quotas, and an anti-immigrationist Congress, not even counting hardcore segregationists, was in little mood to lift those quotas. This is something to remember later on.
Reassured of re-election, FDR II did challenge the Germans more, and did work, within in the system, to work around those quotas, and to pressure the British to do all they would and could to open up Palestine. FDR was also the only world leader to recall his country's ambassador for consultations after Kristallnacht. A solid B-plus, maybe higher, if I'm giving grades.
The St. Louis liner incident, while leading to FDR III, is more complex than many histories appear. Cuban strongman Bautista did not have absolute control of his country's wheels of power, and Cuba's president and foreign minister rejected the backdoor deal he had cut with Americans with some connection with FDR.
Myth says that all of the passengers went back to Germany and most died in the Holocaust. Reality is that while all went back to Europe, none went to Germany and almost 3/4 survived.
That said, why didn't FDR do more? Because, at this time, he was trying to get Congress to loosen up the Neutrality Act. He was afraid that intervening in the St. Louis would make the desired Neutrality Act changes look too narrowly pro-Jewish.
As the authors note, FDR III was about having the US ready for war, helping Britain be ready for war, and fight the war after September 1939, etc. Jewish issues in Europe were focused through this prism.
At the same time, FDR was already working around the anti-Semites among career staff in the State Department to do something to keep Jewish immigration hopes alive. At the same time, this is when Breckenridge Long, anti-Semitism at State personified, was appointed to one of the top political, non-careerist positions there. The authors don't make clear if this was part of solidifying his in-party stance before officially running for a third term (which he seems to have decided on after Kristallnacht) or what; that's a minor missing point.
After war started, it became harder to do much about Jews still in occupied Nazi territory. But, there was Vichy, before the North African invasion, Spain, and the moral voice of the Vatican. FDR did a moderate job with all.
Grade for FDR III? Flat C?
FDR IV, as noted, was at the tail end of the war. Here we run into the big myth, one that the authors note President George W. Bush perpetuated on a visit to Auschwitz: FDR decided not to bomb Auschwitz, or rail lines from Hungary.
After the Nazis took over Hungary, they did all they could, with Admiral Horthy slowing things for a while in the summer of 1944, to kill its 800,000 or so Jews. Why didn't FDR order bombing of the train lines to Auschwitz or even, even at the cost in Jewish life, Auschwitz itself? (Even some Jews supported this.)
First, FDR himself never heard about this. The idea of doing this got killed in upper levels of the War Department and Army. The authors note that John McCloy's late-life comments otherwise are highly self-serving and unreliable. (After April 1944 or so, the rail lines themselves were very reachable, and Auschwitz itself barely so, by bombers from Italy.)
Possible anti-Semitism of military folks aside, they were already overloaded with targeting requests for their bombers. And both they and FDR felt that winning the war was the surest way to save Jews.
Beyond that, the Nazis quite likely would have found some other way to kill Jews. Pre-Auschwitz, they used guns and mobile CO2 vans in the USSR, after all.
The Nazis then thought about negotiating over Hungary's Jews. But the price in US military material plus ideas of a separate peace with the West were far too high to pay, and were otherwise shady.
After that, Hungarians themselves tried some negotiations, but the Nazis ultimately quashed them. As any Jews set free would have to cross German-occupied territory, that was the end of that.
Otherwise, FDR's War Refugee Board, created at this time, did have regular contact with Raoul Wallenberg and helped him with his mission. The authors say that 100,000 Jews may have been saved from Hungary, and 200,000 overall.
Yes, a small amount out of 6 million, or even 800,000. But not negligible.
The fourth FDR gets a solid B.
In all of this, FDR continued to run the multiple gantlets (that's the right spelling, folks) of anti-Semitism in general, anti-Semitism and anti-immigrationism in Congress, and the fractiousness of various Jewish organizations, all while pushing against what seemed like the rock of Sisyphus, the anti-Semitism at State.
This isn't a whitewash by the authors; it's an honest evaluation of what FDR did, and didn't do, and why, and whether he could have done more.
Over all four terms, within the realities of American politics, the Depression and war, he probably gets a B, no lower than a B-minus.
===
As for FDR's alleged anti-Semitism? This is largely not true, but rather, people who want to guilt-trip FDR for not doing much, much more to save European Jews, and who pick certain comments of his out of context and distort them. Many of them use Peter Bergson, who comes off in this book as having a tiny following within Palestine and being generally untrustworthy, as a "foil" to show just what FDR could have done. Hogwash. Bergson did help push for the War Refugee Board. He did show other American Jews that they could perhaps be more vocal. Otherwise, he was regarded as an irritant by Jews in both the US and Palestine.
The authors divide his presidency into four, roughly but not exactly matching his four terms in office, and look at what he did in each period. They also refute a number of myths, including one medium-sized and one big one.
The first roughly matches his first term. The second runs to about the time of the St. Louis liner in 1939. The third runs to about the time Nazi Germany overran Hungary in spring 1944. And, the fourth from there.
The authors note that the US economy was the first FDR's main concern. Even so, they say that he probably could have done a little bit more in chiding Hitler or more. That said, no country wanted to take in a lot of refugees in general during the Great Depression. That's not to mention anti-Semitism in the US, which was at roughly the level of pre-Vichy France, on average, I think we could say. If I were to give a grade, it would be a C-minus.
On the refugees, post-1924 immigration law had strict country quotas, and an anti-immigrationist Congress, not even counting hardcore segregationists, was in little mood to lift those quotas. This is something to remember later on.
Reassured of re-election, FDR II did challenge the Germans more, and did work, within in the system, to work around those quotas, and to pressure the British to do all they would and could to open up Palestine. FDR was also the only world leader to recall his country's ambassador for consultations after Kristallnacht. A solid B-plus, maybe higher, if I'm giving grades.
The St. Louis liner incident, while leading to FDR III, is more complex than many histories appear. Cuban strongman Bautista did not have absolute control of his country's wheels of power, and Cuba's president and foreign minister rejected the backdoor deal he had cut with Americans with some connection with FDR.
Myth says that all of the passengers went back to Germany and most died in the Holocaust. Reality is that while all went back to Europe, none went to Germany and almost 3/4 survived.
That said, why didn't FDR do more? Because, at this time, he was trying to get Congress to loosen up the Neutrality Act. He was afraid that intervening in the St. Louis would make the desired Neutrality Act changes look too narrowly pro-Jewish.
As the authors note, FDR III was about having the US ready for war, helping Britain be ready for war, and fight the war after September 1939, etc. Jewish issues in Europe were focused through this prism.
At the same time, FDR was already working around the anti-Semites among career staff in the State Department to do something to keep Jewish immigration hopes alive. At the same time, this is when Breckenridge Long, anti-Semitism at State personified, was appointed to one of the top political, non-careerist positions there. The authors don't make clear if this was part of solidifying his in-party stance before officially running for a third term (which he seems to have decided on after Kristallnacht) or what; that's a minor missing point.
After war started, it became harder to do much about Jews still in occupied Nazi territory. But, there was Vichy, before the North African invasion, Spain, and the moral voice of the Vatican. FDR did a moderate job with all.
Grade for FDR III? Flat C?
FDR IV, as noted, was at the tail end of the war. Here we run into the big myth, one that the authors note President George W. Bush perpetuated on a visit to Auschwitz: FDR decided not to bomb Auschwitz, or rail lines from Hungary.
After the Nazis took over Hungary, they did all they could, with Admiral Horthy slowing things for a while in the summer of 1944, to kill its 800,000 or so Jews. Why didn't FDR order bombing of the train lines to Auschwitz or even, even at the cost in Jewish life, Auschwitz itself? (Even some Jews supported this.)
First, FDR himself never heard about this. The idea of doing this got killed in upper levels of the War Department and Army. The authors note that John McCloy's late-life comments otherwise are highly self-serving and unreliable. (After April 1944 or so, the rail lines themselves were very reachable, and Auschwitz itself barely so, by bombers from Italy.)
Possible anti-Semitism of military folks aside, they were already overloaded with targeting requests for their bombers. And both they and FDR felt that winning the war was the surest way to save Jews.
Beyond that, the Nazis quite likely would have found some other way to kill Jews. Pre-Auschwitz, they used guns and mobile CO2 vans in the USSR, after all.
The Nazis then thought about negotiating over Hungary's Jews. But the price in US military material plus ideas of a separate peace with the West were far too high to pay, and were otherwise shady.
After that, Hungarians themselves tried some negotiations, but the Nazis ultimately quashed them. As any Jews set free would have to cross German-occupied territory, that was the end of that.
Otherwise, FDR's War Refugee Board, created at this time, did have regular contact with Raoul Wallenberg and helped him with his mission. The authors say that 100,000 Jews may have been saved from Hungary, and 200,000 overall.
Yes, a small amount out of 6 million, or even 800,000. But not negligible.
The fourth FDR gets a solid B.
In all of this, FDR continued to run the multiple gantlets (that's the right spelling, folks) of anti-Semitism in general, anti-Semitism and anti-immigrationism in Congress, and the fractiousness of various Jewish organizations, all while pushing against what seemed like the rock of Sisyphus, the anti-Semitism at State.
This isn't a whitewash by the authors; it's an honest evaluation of what FDR did, and didn't do, and why, and whether he could have done more.
Over all four terms, within the realities of American politics, the Depression and war, he probably gets a B, no lower than a B-minus.
===
As for FDR's alleged anti-Semitism? This is largely not true, but rather, people who want to guilt-trip FDR for not doing much, much more to save European Jews, and who pick certain comments of his out of context and distort them. Many of them use Peter Bergson, who comes off in this book as having a tiny following within Palestine and being generally untrustworthy, as a "foil" to show just what FDR could have done. Hogwash. Bergson did help push for the War Refugee Board. He did show other American Jews that they could perhaps be more vocal. Otherwise, he was regarded as an irritant by Jews in both the US and Palestine.
December 3, 2020
FDR and The Jews by Richard Breitman/Allan J. Lichtman
Please give my Amazon review a helpful vote - https://www.amazon.com/gp/customer-re...
Much of contemporary history writing combines the worst of moral posturing and Monday Morning Quarterbacking. Historical figures are hectored for failing to live up to the expectations of writers decades later who have no responsibility for balancing a plethora of ends to limited means. These critics adopt the fulsome tones of moral outrage in condemning the historical figure for not abandoning everything to the particular concern the critic has. Pope Pius XII is an example of such a target.
A lesson of history is that people in the past are amazingly like us. They are not callous monsters. They care about the things we care about. They are not Gods. They have to make difficult decisions. Books that miss this point are not really books of history, but books of moral apologetics.
This book is a book of history. The authors maintain an even-hand in discussing President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's relationship with American and international Jews. They offer a definite insight into the political issues that tied a most political president. I was often amazed at how much they were willing to excuse or justify with respect to Roosevelt's policies that would have gotten Pope Pius XII branded "Hitler's Pope."
Throughout his political career, Roosevelt had substantial but not total Jewish support. He may have had deeply ingrained Patrician American cultural attitudes about the Jews (as he had about Catholics) but he also had close personal relationships with Jews that speak against the claim that he was an antisemite.
One interesting turn of events is that FDR's run for governor of New York in 1928 was against a Jewish Republican candidate. FDR may have been helped in securing the nomination because of Jewish fears that having a Catholic ( Al Smith was running for president) and a Jew on the same ticket was unwise in that it could provoke antisemitism and Jews were concerned at splitting the Jewish vote by having two Jews run for the same office. Nonetheless, the Republican party was the Protestant party and, shades of today, the Republican Jewish candidate, Albert Ottinger, was accused of covering up the antisemitism of Republicans.
The authors often explain FDR's "Jewish decisions" based on political constraints that particularly involve Jewish fears that some pro-Jewish policy will provoke antisemitism. (This was also a theme in "The Collaboration" where Jews in Hollywood often spiked anti-Nazi/pro-Jewish themes in movies out of fear that it would intensify antisemitism in America or Germany.)
The authors divide FDR's Jewish policies into four periods based on his terms of office. During the first period, FDR was dealing with depression. At the same time, the Nazi repression of Jews in Germany was ramping up. While FDR and his advisors generally favored loosening Jewish immigration, their concern was that implementing pro-Jewish immigration policies would increase antisemitism against native Jews, and, in fact, there was an upsurge of pro-Nazi organizations during this period. (See p. 26-27.) This last fact should not be overstated, however, since the membership of such organizations remained small; America had a low level antisemitic fever, at worst.
During this period, FDR did litle to assist the Jews of Germany or to speak out against Nazi persecutions. The authors believe that FDR could have spoken out against Nazi antisemitism but chose not to get distracted from his mission of dealing with the Depression. (Was this wrong? Would Americans have wondered why the President was more concerned with the fate of foreigners than his own people? Could this have turned public opinion against FDR such that there would have been no third term? We don't know, obviously.)
After his landslide re-election, FDR did become more engaged in helping Jews by loosening quotas and backing settlement in foreign countries. FDR's efforts to loosen immigration regulations in favor of Jews was often stymied by the professional bureaucrats in the State Department. (Shades of the Deep State even then.) Likewise, FDR did not throw his weight behind a bill to open up more immigration slots for Jewish child refugees because he was dealing with the Neutrality Bill. FDR was a pragmatic politician and chose his fights.
Interesting facts emerge in the author's discussions. The 1932 election was decisive. Democrats picked up a majority of Black votes for the first time in history and not a single Jewish Republican remained in office. (p. 85.) 1936 ratified the realignment as Blacks voted for Democrats as a majority again, and 3/4s of Jews and Catholics voted for Democrats. (p. 94.)
The third term saw the beginning of World War II. In general, FDR's focus became winning a military victory. Military resources were not diverted to disrupting the Holocaust. FDR's military leaders advised against such diversions on the grounds that it would delay or risk overall victory over Germany and that the Jews's best hope of survival lay with the earliest defeat of Nazi Germany as could be reasonably managed. The authors note that FDR probably never engaged with such tactical decisions, that Jewish organizations at the time were silent on such issues, and that such diversions would have been ineffective since Nazis could have returned to their former practice of mass shootings.
The final FDR policy was still developing and seemed to back Jewish national ambitions.
Readers of this book will definitely pick up on the contingencies and limitations of history. Jews were not monolithic in their policy positions. Prior to the Holocaust, there were many anti-zionist Jews. Jewish organizations split on various issues. Jews were often the strongest counselors of restraint on the fear that more aggressive pro-Jewish policies would spark an antisemitic backlash.
This book is a very good survey of the period and the subject. Names and facts are thrown at the reader with energy. Following the narrative is sometimes difficult because of the great attention to detail. It probably deserves a re-reading and a place on the bookshelf as a resource whenever the subject of American Jewish policy during the Roosevelt administration comes up. I can well imagine that people looking for the satisfaction of finding another moral monster to despise will be disappointed; it appears that FDR was a human being who had to weigh uncertainties and make the best decision he could with what he knew.
Please give my Amazon review a helpful vote - https://www.amazon.com/gp/customer-re...
Much of contemporary history writing combines the worst of moral posturing and Monday Morning Quarterbacking. Historical figures are hectored for failing to live up to the expectations of writers decades later who have no responsibility for balancing a plethora of ends to limited means. These critics adopt the fulsome tones of moral outrage in condemning the historical figure for not abandoning everything to the particular concern the critic has. Pope Pius XII is an example of such a target.
A lesson of history is that people in the past are amazingly like us. They are not callous monsters. They care about the things we care about. They are not Gods. They have to make difficult decisions. Books that miss this point are not really books of history, but books of moral apologetics.
This book is a book of history. The authors maintain an even-hand in discussing President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's relationship with American and international Jews. They offer a definite insight into the political issues that tied a most political president. I was often amazed at how much they were willing to excuse or justify with respect to Roosevelt's policies that would have gotten Pope Pius XII branded "Hitler's Pope."
Throughout his political career, Roosevelt had substantial but not total Jewish support. He may have had deeply ingrained Patrician American cultural attitudes about the Jews (as he had about Catholics) but he also had close personal relationships with Jews that speak against the claim that he was an antisemite.
One interesting turn of events is that FDR's run for governor of New York in 1928 was against a Jewish Republican candidate. FDR may have been helped in securing the nomination because of Jewish fears that having a Catholic ( Al Smith was running for president) and a Jew on the same ticket was unwise in that it could provoke antisemitism and Jews were concerned at splitting the Jewish vote by having two Jews run for the same office. Nonetheless, the Republican party was the Protestant party and, shades of today, the Republican Jewish candidate, Albert Ottinger, was accused of covering up the antisemitism of Republicans.
The authors often explain FDR's "Jewish decisions" based on political constraints that particularly involve Jewish fears that some pro-Jewish policy will provoke antisemitism. (This was also a theme in "The Collaboration" where Jews in Hollywood often spiked anti-Nazi/pro-Jewish themes in movies out of fear that it would intensify antisemitism in America or Germany.)
The authors divide FDR's Jewish policies into four periods based on his terms of office. During the first period, FDR was dealing with depression. At the same time, the Nazi repression of Jews in Germany was ramping up. While FDR and his advisors generally favored loosening Jewish immigration, their concern was that implementing pro-Jewish immigration policies would increase antisemitism against native Jews, and, in fact, there was an upsurge of pro-Nazi organizations during this period. (See p. 26-27.) This last fact should not be overstated, however, since the membership of such organizations remained small; America had a low level antisemitic fever, at worst.
During this period, FDR did litle to assist the Jews of Germany or to speak out against Nazi persecutions. The authors believe that FDR could have spoken out against Nazi antisemitism but chose not to get distracted from his mission of dealing with the Depression. (Was this wrong? Would Americans have wondered why the President was more concerned with the fate of foreigners than his own people? Could this have turned public opinion against FDR such that there would have been no third term? We don't know, obviously.)
After his landslide re-election, FDR did become more engaged in helping Jews by loosening quotas and backing settlement in foreign countries. FDR's efforts to loosen immigration regulations in favor of Jews was often stymied by the professional bureaucrats in the State Department. (Shades of the Deep State even then.) Likewise, FDR did not throw his weight behind a bill to open up more immigration slots for Jewish child refugees because he was dealing with the Neutrality Bill. FDR was a pragmatic politician and chose his fights.
Interesting facts emerge in the author's discussions. The 1932 election was decisive. Democrats picked up a majority of Black votes for the first time in history and not a single Jewish Republican remained in office. (p. 85.) 1936 ratified the realignment as Blacks voted for Democrats as a majority again, and 3/4s of Jews and Catholics voted for Democrats. (p. 94.)
The third term saw the beginning of World War II. In general, FDR's focus became winning a military victory. Military resources were not diverted to disrupting the Holocaust. FDR's military leaders advised against such diversions on the grounds that it would delay or risk overall victory over Germany and that the Jews's best hope of survival lay with the earliest defeat of Nazi Germany as could be reasonably managed. The authors note that FDR probably never engaged with such tactical decisions, that Jewish organizations at the time were silent on such issues, and that such diversions would have been ineffective since Nazis could have returned to their former practice of mass shootings.
The final FDR policy was still developing and seemed to back Jewish national ambitions.
Readers of this book will definitely pick up on the contingencies and limitations of history. Jews were not monolithic in their policy positions. Prior to the Holocaust, there were many anti-zionist Jews. Jewish organizations split on various issues. Jews were often the strongest counselors of restraint on the fear that more aggressive pro-Jewish policies would spark an antisemitic backlash.
This book is a very good survey of the period and the subject. Names and facts are thrown at the reader with energy. Following the narrative is sometimes difficult because of the great attention to detail. It probably deserves a re-reading and a place on the bookshelf as a resource whenever the subject of American Jewish policy during the Roosevelt administration comes up. I can well imagine that people looking for the satisfaction of finding another moral monster to despise will be disappointed; it appears that FDR was a human being who had to weigh uncertainties and make the best decision he could with what he knew.
March 26, 2019
I just finished the book. This is a minor edit of my previous review. Richard Breitman seeks, in this book, to dull the edge of writing over the last 50 or so years that challenged and criticized FDR's efforts during the 1930's and 1940's on behalf of the Jews. Early writing cast him as a hero. Indeed Jews, early on, were extremely admiring of FDR. Aside from a few scattered advisory or court picks, no President had previously involved a large number of Jews in his administration. Grant, I understand, may be an exception but I digress.
Starting with Morse's 1967 book While Six Million Died the literature has become sharply more critical. This book seeks to argue that, worried about American anti-Semitism FDR was limited to tweaking the administrative system to allow in about 20,000 more Jews per year. Maybe I can be convinced otherwise, but I believe this assertion is inane. If you believe this book, Cordell Hull, the anti-Semitic Secretary of State had more power over the issue than did FDR, the President. FDR was enormously popular and he could have used his powers of moral suasion and "bully pulpit" for better results, if indeed he wanted them. The book also explains why he signed three "Neutrality Acts" under compulsion. Remember, his party had the majority in both houses of Congress and I'm sure he could have found one-third of the members of one house to sustain a veto. Or pressured to ensure that the bill never reached his desk.
The book divides Roosevelt into four phases on his handling of Jewish issues during his Presidency, roughly but not exactly corresponding to his terms in office. He was, according to the book, apathetic during Periods 1 and 3, and more dynamic on the issue in Periods 2 and 4. The distinctions, frankly, are a stretch. The final period was more or less forced by the growing revelations of the horrors of the Holocaust. Still, he shrank from bombing the camps and the rail lines leading to them. The book does not give enough weight to worries that dealing with surviving displaced persons was going to be a major challenge. He does not give enough weight to his waffling on the creation of what is now known as the State of Israel.
I think the book overdoes the apologia for FDR, who I consider to be virtually an enabler of the Holocaust. Sadly, so was Churchill.
Starting with Morse's 1967 book While Six Million Died the literature has become sharply more critical. This book seeks to argue that, worried about American anti-Semitism FDR was limited to tweaking the administrative system to allow in about 20,000 more Jews per year. Maybe I can be convinced otherwise, but I believe this assertion is inane. If you believe this book, Cordell Hull, the anti-Semitic Secretary of State had more power over the issue than did FDR, the President. FDR was enormously popular and he could have used his powers of moral suasion and "bully pulpit" for better results, if indeed he wanted them. The book also explains why he signed three "Neutrality Acts" under compulsion. Remember, his party had the majority in both houses of Congress and I'm sure he could have found one-third of the members of one house to sustain a veto. Or pressured to ensure that the bill never reached his desk.
The book divides Roosevelt into four phases on his handling of Jewish issues during his Presidency, roughly but not exactly corresponding to his terms in office. He was, according to the book, apathetic during Periods 1 and 3, and more dynamic on the issue in Periods 2 and 4. The distinctions, frankly, are a stretch. The final period was more or less forced by the growing revelations of the horrors of the Holocaust. Still, he shrank from bombing the camps and the rail lines leading to them. The book does not give enough weight to worries that dealing with surviving displaced persons was going to be a major challenge. He does not give enough weight to his waffling on the creation of what is now known as the State of Israel.
I think the book overdoes the apologia for FDR, who I consider to be virtually an enabler of the Holocaust. Sadly, so was Churchill.
March 17, 2014
I disagree with the idea of there being "four" Roosevelts (the authors delineate these mainly by terms), as I don't think someone as gifted as Franklin Roosevelt molted from one term to another in response to the rising peril of German Jews --- and that seems to be largely what the book is about, until the last few chapters look at Wallenberg and the Hungarian genocidal action, very interesting, along with a brisk discussion of why it is pointless to blame the President for the Allied failure to bomb the death camp at Auschwitz or the railway lines leading to it. Breitman is correct. The Nazis didn't need operational gas chambers to continue the Holocaust, with multiple thousands added to the grisly total after Auschwitz was abandoned.
The villain is the State Department, which emerges as riddled with anti-Semites hellbent for leather on stopping anything that would have brought more Jews into the United States between 1933 and 1942, when our involvement in the War precluded the chance of further American immigration assistance. The heroine, and the person I want to read about next, is Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, who seems to have waged toe-to-toe war with Undersecretary of State Breckinridge Long and Secretary Hull about saving as many as possible.
Roosevelt caused a lot of good to happen --- in retrospect not enough, but a lot --- behind the scenes, largely because he was preoccupied with the Depression for most of his first term, and surprisingly less importantly, because he did not want to alienate potential Democratic voters into an anti-Semitic backlash. The authors make a serviceable case that Roosevelt's concern for the German Jews proceeded from genuine humanitarian concerns and equally genuine contempt for Hitler and the gangsters who had seized Germany.
There is also a cursory discussion of the settlement of Palestine. The Arab/Jewish conflict predates all of this, including Hitler. There is a poignant moment at the end when Roosevelt meets with King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia on the way back from Yalta, and basically tells the King that, yes, yes, this will all work out. This at the same time the King is telling him that Muslims despise Jews, and that they will never yield on the question of the Jewish homeland. Did Roosevelt have a plan that he would have unveiled? No evidence, and of course three months later he was dead.
It is also fascinating to follow Eleanor Roosevelt's transition from the kind of anti-Semite one would have expected a woman of her social class to be to the woman who will chair the committee that produces the United Nations Declaration of Rights in 1948.
An interesting (although dry) look at the ins-and-outs of this particular issue as part of the Roosevelt presidency. Of course, its relevance to the situation eighty years later goes without saying.
The villain is the State Department, which emerges as riddled with anti-Semites hellbent for leather on stopping anything that would have brought more Jews into the United States between 1933 and 1942, when our involvement in the War precluded the chance of further American immigration assistance. The heroine, and the person I want to read about next, is Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, who seems to have waged toe-to-toe war with Undersecretary of State Breckinridge Long and Secretary Hull about saving as many as possible.
Roosevelt caused a lot of good to happen --- in retrospect not enough, but a lot --- behind the scenes, largely because he was preoccupied with the Depression for most of his first term, and surprisingly less importantly, because he did not want to alienate potential Democratic voters into an anti-Semitic backlash. The authors make a serviceable case that Roosevelt's concern for the German Jews proceeded from genuine humanitarian concerns and equally genuine contempt for Hitler and the gangsters who had seized Germany.
There is also a cursory discussion of the settlement of Palestine. The Arab/Jewish conflict predates all of this, including Hitler. There is a poignant moment at the end when Roosevelt meets with King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia on the way back from Yalta, and basically tells the King that, yes, yes, this will all work out. This at the same time the King is telling him that Muslims despise Jews, and that they will never yield on the question of the Jewish homeland. Did Roosevelt have a plan that he would have unveiled? No evidence, and of course three months later he was dead.
It is also fascinating to follow Eleanor Roosevelt's transition from the kind of anti-Semite one would have expected a woman of her social class to be to the woman who will chair the committee that produces the United Nations Declaration of Rights in 1948.
An interesting (although dry) look at the ins-and-outs of this particular issue as part of the Roosevelt presidency. Of course, its relevance to the situation eighty years later goes without saying.
February 22, 2019
FDR and the Jews by Richard Breitman explores yet again the issue of what FDR did to help the Jews during WWII and whether he did enough. There are plenty of books out there on pretty much every side of this argument. This one comes down fairly central leaning towards saying he did as much as he could. The arguments against ask why didn't the US and allies bomb the death camps or at least the trains and tracks leading into these camps. Why didn't they issue more visas to accept more Jewish refugees who were facing certain death. In support of FDR, the author states that the allies generally agreed that they needed to focus on ending the war as quickly as possible and thus save more lives. What seems to be clear throughout the book is that FDR weighed every decision carefully in a political environment that included getting re-elected, not losing control of congress, and not to look too supportive of the Jews in a generally anti-semite society in America at that time. After a fairly thorough discussion of facts and opinions of various players of that time, there still was not much disclosure of FDR's true beliefs about the Jews and how they were being systematically eradicated in Europe. This was widely known by the allies but yet, other than clandestine operations by conscientious individuals who saved many likes as personal risk to themselves. While this book adds more discussion and facts, there may never be a final conclusion about FDR's actions and whether he should have done more to save lives.
November 30, 2016
This book follows FDR and his handling of the Halocaust. When FDR assumed the presidency, the country was mired in the Great Depression. His first concern was domestic issues. He protested the treatment of Jews in Germany but there was little else he could do. As the world moved closer to war, his room for action was further tied by the passage of the Neutrality Acts which severely limited his options in foreign policy. He faced a strong isolationist conservative block in Congress. He didn't want to jeopardize his ability to pass his domestic program to bring the country out of depression.
Once the war started his main goal was to win the war. Just as Lincoln couldn't make the civil war just about slavery, FDR couldn't turn the war into a crusade to save the Jews. He faced a strong current of anti Semitic feeling in America. His own State Department had a strong antisemitic stain. Many of his efforts were delayed or shelved by men in the state department. When the reports of extermination of the Jews began to reach him, he was in no position militarily to rescue the victims. Even the Jewish community was divided on what actions should be taken. The book closely traces the steps taken by FDR to rescue Jews and the forces he had to contend with in these efforts.
Once the war started his main goal was to win the war. Just as Lincoln couldn't make the civil war just about slavery, FDR couldn't turn the war into a crusade to save the Jews. He faced a strong current of anti Semitic feeling in America. His own State Department had a strong antisemitic stain. Many of his efforts were delayed or shelved by men in the state department. When the reports of extermination of the Jews began to reach him, he was in no position militarily to rescue the victims. Even the Jewish community was divided on what actions should be taken. The book closely traces the steps taken by FDR to rescue Jews and the forces he had to contend with in these efforts.
June 12, 2014
World War II engulfed the globe. Hitler's desire to garner power, establish a better and stronger Germany, and wish to eradicate the world of Jews dominated world news as each nation struggled to fight or to gain the necessary support to fight. In the United States, while our casus belli doesn't take place until December 7, 1941, FDR was hard at work at rebuilding the economy and winning both Congressional and public support for an increased US role in World War II, whether that be through the Lend Lease Act or through active fighting. Unfortunately, despite knowledge that SOMETHING egregious was happening and eventually evidence that mass murder were definitely transpiring, it seemed as if Great Britain and the US were just not inclined to help save the portion of the population earmarked for extermination. Breitman and Lichtman, both historians at American University, paint a different portrait of FDR and the US, detailing, exhaustively, instead the four stages of FDR's policy regarding the Jews in Europe.
More detail to follow.
More detail to follow.
March 29, 2013
Breitman and Lichtman did a fairly good job in avoiding the cult of personality that surrounds FDR, usually authors love him or hate him, especially when discussing the question of did he do all that he could. However I disagree with the authors' thesis of the four Roosevelts. My research on the subject points to a Roosevelt who was an master politician, a constituency panderer, who real could have cared less about the plight of refugees unless action would have produced a favorable outcome. The two examples that stand out in this regard are the fate of the Rogers-Wagner Bill admitting refugee children– unfavorable politically FDR didn't push back and so was not passed– and the conclusion of ordeal of the S.S. Quanza– politically opportune for FDR so refugees found sanctuary.
February 5, 2014
It takes me a lot longer to read non-fiction than fiction, but this book just hit home with me on multiple levels. I've always held FDR with such high regard and it always bothered me that some of my Jewish friends would refer to him as an Anti-Semite. This book doesn't really shy away from the fact that FDR was indifferent to the Jewish plight and the Holocaust, but I think it sheds a ton of light on FDR's relationship to the Jews and it reminded me, very much of the relationship Lincoln had with African Americans pre-Civil War. You know what you're getting into when you see judge this book by its cover and if it's something you're curious about then it's definitely worth your time.
May 14, 2015
I started this book immediately after finishing Doris Goodwin's No Ordinary Time, which covered the same historical facts but concentrated on FDR's relationship with his wife, rather than his relationship with Jews. This was a well written, well researched and very scholarly book. Not as much fun as Doris' book, but covers a lot of ground that she did not cover in great detail. My conclusion after all this reading is that FDR was a great president and a great man.
January 30, 2016
Ran out of time and interest for this book. Could not be renewed, and discussion is set for 3/28 anyway. Read the first 2.5 chapters and the final concluding chapter, which really was a summary of the whole thing -- if I'd have known that in the beginning, that's where I would have gone immediately.
The topic should have been interesting enough, but the writing was turgid -- could it be because there were two authors and no style came through? Anyway, reminded me of a bad textbook.
The topic should have been interesting enough, but the writing was turgid -- could it be because there were two authors and no style came through? Anyway, reminded me of a bad textbook.
December 27, 2014
This scholarly book was well researched and written. There was a lot of detail, mostly showing that the many efforts on behalf of European Jews that were made by various groups in the United States all met with the same bureaucratic stonewalling. However, it was balanced, putting Roosevelt's actions and inactions in perspective.
November 20, 2013
An apology for FDR's lack of commitment to saving Jewish lives in WW II? You decide. Listen to my interview with Richard Breitman on The Halli Casser-Jayne Show, today, Nov. 20, 3 pm ET. If you can't make it the podcast is always available. http://bit.ly/U4EEMd
November 5, 2013
Very dense - not a quick read. I learned quite a lot.
Read
November 13, 2013Good balance, especially compared to the other books such as The abandonment of the Jews.
February 13, 2017
Many revelations.
January 20, 2020
"FDR and the Jews" by Breitman and Lichtman (464 pages, 2013). Found this to be an excellent book, revealing deeply ingrained anti-Semitism in the State Department as well as the British government bureaucracy. One quote attributed to the "Morgenthau Diaries" that caught this reader's attention (page 233);
"Treasury officials tried to get a sympathetic ambassador, John Winant, in London to clear away British obstruction of the World Jewish Congress proposals (to save Jews in German controlled Europe). They learned however, that 'The British Foreign Office is concerned with the difficulties of disposing of any considerable number of Jews should they be rescued from enemy occupied territory.... For this reason they are reluctant to agree to any approval being expressed even of the preliminary financial arrangements.' In effect, the Foreign Office preferred to let Jews die in place, rather than try to find havens for them elsewhere."
With respect to the Jews, the book sets out to describe "four FDR's" during his presidency.
FDR the bystander, involved more in the deep economic concerns of the Depression and unable (or unwilling) to address the rise of Hitler and the brutal oppression of Germany's Jews.
FDR the activist, loosening immigration laws during a very restrictive period. Modest changes allowed visas for a small number of Jews to enter the country but even these were mostly unfilled by the State Dept.
Diminished activism characterized the third FDR. Seeking to de-emphasize the plight of the Jews, the president sought to deal with the German propaganda machine that attempted to blame possible US intervention as a "Jewish War". The president made a bet that the war would be over quickly which would be the Jews salvation.
The fourth FDR was the most interventionist, bypassing his own State Dept which was rife with antisemitism, instead creating a War Refugee Board in Treasury. This effort is thought to have saved at least 200,000 Jews utilizing a number of tools to create policies that favored humanitarian aide.
The last main chapter's focus (14): Why the US and Allies did not more aggressively attack rail lines feeding Auschwitz from Hungary. And why did Auschwitz (and other death camps) escape attack? To start, Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, seeking to pressure FDR as well as document the State Dept. cover up of the Holocaust, had John Pehle co-author a report on this subject which became known as “Report to the Secretary on the Acquiescence of This Government in the Murder of Jews”; this report resulted in the formation of the War Refugee Board which Pehle led. Pehle developed policies that aided a number of causes, the most expansive, the Wallenberg effort in Hungary.
His (Pehle’s) advocacy, for the US military to intervene, was answered though with “The most effective relief to victims of enemy persecution is the early defeat of the Axis, an undertaking to which we must devote every resource at our disposal.” (page 282) This proved an empty refrain given the proximity of Allied resources to possible death camp targets, specifically Auschwitz. The authors write (page 285) “The raids on industrial targets in Upper Silesia did not prove that Allied targeting of the gas chambers … would have success in hitting such precise targets". They did expose [previous] justifications as hollow, however. "In August and September 1944, American planes were available and already bombing targets near death factories.” And this; “By late summer 1944, the US Fifteenth Air Force, based on Fogia, Italy, was bombing industrial targets … including some in the Auschwitz complex of camps. A female employee at IG Farben synthetic rubber plant at Auschwitz-Monowitz wrote her brother, ‘On [8/20/1944] we had a heavy attack on Auschwitz…1,200 bombs’ [less than five miles from the gas chambers].
Pehle also took the initiative to release the Vrba-Wexler report to the press in October, 1944 in an effort to influence public opinion. Still, the authors surmise that bombing raids on the gas chambers and rail lines would not have been easy and would likely not have stopped the Nazi’s from their murderous plans; they note (page 286) “Everything we know about Nazi leaders indicates…when it came to killing Jews, they were resourceful.”
The decision to bomb for humanitarian purposes (save Jews in death camps) was left to military leaders who were loathe to allocate resources to a population that World leaders could not agree to accept as émigrés. What FDR did though (quoting historian Rebecca Erbeling) was for the first time “found[ed] a non-military government agency to save the lives of civilians being murdered by a wartime enemy.” As stated previously, this likely saved approximately 200,000 Jews from certain annihilation.
Edward M. Janes
"Treasury officials tried to get a sympathetic ambassador, John Winant, in London to clear away British obstruction of the World Jewish Congress proposals (to save Jews in German controlled Europe). They learned however, that 'The British Foreign Office is concerned with the difficulties of disposing of any considerable number of Jews should they be rescued from enemy occupied territory.... For this reason they are reluctant to agree to any approval being expressed even of the preliminary financial arrangements.' In effect, the Foreign Office preferred to let Jews die in place, rather than try to find havens for them elsewhere."
With respect to the Jews, the book sets out to describe "four FDR's" during his presidency.
FDR the bystander, involved more in the deep economic concerns of the Depression and unable (or unwilling) to address the rise of Hitler and the brutal oppression of Germany's Jews.
FDR the activist, loosening immigration laws during a very restrictive period. Modest changes allowed visas for a small number of Jews to enter the country but even these were mostly unfilled by the State Dept.
Diminished activism characterized the third FDR. Seeking to de-emphasize the plight of the Jews, the president sought to deal with the German propaganda machine that attempted to blame possible US intervention as a "Jewish War". The president made a bet that the war would be over quickly which would be the Jews salvation.
The fourth FDR was the most interventionist, bypassing his own State Dept which was rife with antisemitism, instead creating a War Refugee Board in Treasury. This effort is thought to have saved at least 200,000 Jews utilizing a number of tools to create policies that favored humanitarian aide.
The last main chapter's focus (14): Why the US and Allies did not more aggressively attack rail lines feeding Auschwitz from Hungary. And why did Auschwitz (and other death camps) escape attack? To start, Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, seeking to pressure FDR as well as document the State Dept. cover up of the Holocaust, had John Pehle co-author a report on this subject which became known as “Report to the Secretary on the Acquiescence of This Government in the Murder of Jews”; this report resulted in the formation of the War Refugee Board which Pehle led. Pehle developed policies that aided a number of causes, the most expansive, the Wallenberg effort in Hungary.
His (Pehle’s) advocacy, for the US military to intervene, was answered though with “The most effective relief to victims of enemy persecution is the early defeat of the Axis, an undertaking to which we must devote every resource at our disposal.” (page 282) This proved an empty refrain given the proximity of Allied resources to possible death camp targets, specifically Auschwitz. The authors write (page 285) “The raids on industrial targets in Upper Silesia did not prove that Allied targeting of the gas chambers … would have success in hitting such precise targets". They did expose [previous] justifications as hollow, however. "In August and September 1944, American planes were available and already bombing targets near death factories.” And this; “By late summer 1944, the US Fifteenth Air Force, based on Fogia, Italy, was bombing industrial targets … including some in the Auschwitz complex of camps. A female employee at IG Farben synthetic rubber plant at Auschwitz-Monowitz wrote her brother, ‘On [8/20/1944] we had a heavy attack on Auschwitz…1,200 bombs’ [less than five miles from the gas chambers].
Pehle also took the initiative to release the Vrba-Wexler report to the press in October, 1944 in an effort to influence public opinion. Still, the authors surmise that bombing raids on the gas chambers and rail lines would not have been easy and would likely not have stopped the Nazi’s from their murderous plans; they note (page 286) “Everything we know about Nazi leaders indicates…when it came to killing Jews, they were resourceful.”
The decision to bomb for humanitarian purposes (save Jews in death camps) was left to military leaders who were loathe to allocate resources to a population that World leaders could not agree to accept as émigrés. What FDR did though (quoting historian Rebecca Erbeling) was for the first time “found[ed] a non-military government agency to save the lives of civilians being murdered by a wartime enemy.” As stated previously, this likely saved approximately 200,000 Jews from certain annihilation.
Edward M. Janes
January 26, 2021
This is a detailed account of the attitudes, challenges, and accomplishments of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in regards to the Jews during the age of Hitler, the Nazis, and World War II. It plays out against the backdrop of the Great Depression, isolationism at home, antisemitism everywhere, and worldwide reluctance to accept and shelter hundreds of thousands of endangered people. Roosevelt's legacy of humanitarianism has been subject to debate even to this day, and this book provides a close examination of the issues which inform that debate.
Of necessity, this topic is complex. The interaction of government agencies, the outside interest groups, the foreign actors, and the ever-changing priorities of nations at war, make it so. This book lays it out quite well, managing complexity by maintaining its focus on its central question, and not becoming a compendium of all things Roosevelt. Even so, I found myself referencing earlier pages, and looking things up on the internet to supplement my understanding. The first few chapters read quickly, but as the war approached, my pace slowed. Still, I would highly recommend this as a reference for both those familiar with WW2 history, as well as those, such as I, who are seeking a good place to start learning about it.
If I could add another half a star, I would!
Of necessity, this topic is complex. The interaction of government agencies, the outside interest groups, the foreign actors, and the ever-changing priorities of nations at war, make it so. This book lays it out quite well, managing complexity by maintaining its focus on its central question, and not becoming a compendium of all things Roosevelt. Even so, I found myself referencing earlier pages, and looking things up on the internet to supplement my understanding. The first few chapters read quickly, but as the war approached, my pace slowed. Still, I would highly recommend this as a reference for both those familiar with WW2 history, as well as those, such as I, who are seeking a good place to start learning about it.
If I could add another half a star, I would!
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