A Realist Conception of Truth

by William P. Alston

One of the most important Anglo-American philosophers of our time here joins the current philosophical debate about the nature of truth. William P. Alston formulates and defends a realist conception of truth, which he calls alethic realism (from aletheia , Greek for truth). This idea holds that the truth value of a statement (belief or proposition) depends on whether what the statement is about is as the statement says it is. Michael Dummett and Hilary Putnam are two of the prominent and widely influential contemporary philosophers whose anti-realist ideas Alston attacks.

Genres: Philosophy, Reference

288 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1996

About the author

William Payne Alston (November 29, 1921 – September 13, 2009) was an American philosopher. He made influential contributions to the philosophy of language, epistemology, and Christian philosophy. He earned his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago and taught at the University of Michigan, Rutgers University, University of Illinois, and Syracuse University.

Reviews

[Jacob Aitken · Rating 3 out of 5]

Alston begins on a promising note: defend the reality of truth as corresponding to an extra-mental state of affairs. His Thesis: alethic realism; sees truth in the sense of a statement is true iff what is said to be the case actually is the case (Alston 5). Interestingly, Alston contrasts his model with epistemic accounts of truth--those accounts that see truth has needing internal access or justification.

Does he deliver? Kind of. Some chapters are quite complex (convoluted?) and I am not entirely sure what is going on (more on that below). Other chapters, such as the ones on justification and metaphysical realism, are quite fascinating, but even then there is a problem: Alston will then say the conclusion to the previous discussion isn’t necessary to alethic realism. Not surprisingly, this is a disappointment to the reader.

Alston’s two sub-theses:
Our concept of a propositions is a concept of the content of a belief (2).
Our basic grip on propositions is by way of their furnishing content for illocutionary acts and propositional attributes (Alston 20).

Alston calls this position an “inchoate correspondence theory,” and I think he is correct in where he takes it. From here he examines alternative models offered by Quine, Putnam and others. To be honest, I am not entirely sure what those discussions were about.

Evaluation

My confusion over the book’s “flow” is not unique to me. Alston mentions another review who admitted the same thing (quoted on p. 263). I agree with a mild form of epistemological realism, and I even agree with a moderate metaphysical realism. I simply think Alston could have established his thesis in only 150 pages, if that.

[John · Rating 4 out of 5]

Those who contend that (a) propositions don't matter, but experiences/convictions/actions do; or (b) propositions matter, but only as they help us shape our environment according to our preferences; or (c) "truth" is inescapably and only a matter of communal or individual outlooks and interests need to wrestle with this book.

William Alston powerfully defends truth in the commonsense version that goes back to Aristotle: to say of a thing that is that it is, and to say of what is not that it is not, is to tell the truth (Metaphysics). It is a sign of our epistemologically troubled time that a distinguished philosopher would have to write a whole book to defend a basic understanding of truth as "telling it like it is," so to speak, but he did and he did.

The book does take pains to deal with major philosophical opponents along the way, and that is necessary for guild-disputes and wearisome for the rest of us. But it is first-rate argumentation, and I don't really see how anyone can disagree with Alston who doesn't, indeed, insist that "man is the measure of all things" in a pretty radical sense.

[John Reis · Rating 3 out of 5]

The title tells it all. Alston is offering a minimalist theory of truth modelled on a correspondence theory, but he is not offering a full-blown correspondence theory. In Chapter One, a quarter of the book, he offers 18 different variations on what he calls his alethic definition of truth. He defends his minimalist conception from the claim that is deflationary. He spends a great deal of time taking on Dummett’s verification theory of truth. He shows this is wrong. He does say Dummett could use his realist conception in his own project.

The book is also survey of other theories of truth and realism and anti-realism.

[Charles · Rating 5 out of 5]

A must read for any student of modern developments in theories of truth