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160 pages, Paperback
First published April 25, 2013
“Every Communist must grasp the truth, ‘Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.’”
Under Mao’s leadership China was transformed from a weak, disunited country to a power on the world stage. However, his vision for China’s social transformation failed. He did not find a way to make China both egalitarian and prosperous and his efforts to do so visited enormous suffering on his people. (p. 1).
A revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing embroidery; it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle, so temperate, kind, courteous, restrained, and magnanimous. A revolution is an insurrection, an act of violence by which one class overthrows the power of another. (p. 21).
Every Communist must grasp the truth, ‘Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.’ Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party. Yet, having guns, we can create Party organizations . . . We can also create cadres, create schools, create culture, create mass movements. Everything in Yan’an has been created by having guns. All things grow out of the barrel of a gun. According to the Marxist theory of the state, the army is the chief component of state power. (p. 24).
Another lively essay argues in Mao’s earthy style that shit is more useful than dogma: ‘A dog’s shit can fertilise the fields and a man’s can feed the dog. And dogmas? They can neither fertilise the field nor feed the dog. Of what use are they?’ (p. 37).
Many educated Chinese greatly admired the United States, conscious of its wealth and power but also seeing it as the home of freedom and democracy. Many also felt negative about the USSR because the Soviet Red Army had pillaged north-east China of its industrial equipment when it liberated the territory from the Japanese at the end of the war. (p. 50).
The Great Leap was characterized by an extreme anti-expert bias. It was better to be ‘red’ than ‘expert’, and engineers who protested that production targets were impractical or mentioned the technical limitations of machinery could find themselves accused of counter-revolutionary behaviour. (p. 68).
After the violent years of the Cultural Revolution, the idealism that had motivated many Chinese to work hard and to accept privations for the sake of the revolution and the progress it would bring was replaced in many cases by cynical or fearful compliance. (p. 96).
The ideological Mao would surely have condemned the way China has developed. Yet there was also a nationalist Mao who from the time of the May Fourth Movement had longed to see China rich, powerful, and respected among nations. This Mao would perhaps have applauded China’s success, been gladdened by its phenomenal economic growth, and gratified by the spectacle of developed countries vying for its investment funds. (p. 120).