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This View of Life: The World of an Evolutionist
Book by Simpson, George Gaylord
308 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1966
14 people want to read
About the author
George Gaylord Simpson
159 books15 followersGeorge Gaylord Simpson, Ph.D. (Geology, Yale University, 1926), was Professor of Geosciences at the University of Arizona from 1968 until his retirement in 1982. Previously was Curator of the Museum of Comparative Zoology at Harvard University 1959–1970, Curator of the Department of Geology and Paleontology at the American Museum of Natural History 1945–1959, and Professor of Zoology at Columbia University.
He was awarded the Linnean Society of London's prestigious Darwin-Wallace Medal in 1958. Simpson also received the Royal Society's Darwin Medal 'In recognition of his distinguished contributions to general evolutionary theory, based on a profound study of palaeontology, particularly of vertebrates,' in 1962. In 1966, Simpson received the Golden Plate Award of the American Academy of Achievement.
He was awarded the Linnean Society of London's prestigious Darwin-Wallace Medal in 1958. Simpson also received the Royal Society's Darwin Medal 'In recognition of his distinguished contributions to general evolutionary theory, based on a profound study of palaeontology, particularly of vertebrates,' in 1962. In 1966, Simpson received the Golden Plate Award of the American Academy of Achievement.
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
September 27, 2024
THE FAMED EVOLUTIONARY THINKER LOOKS AT THE "BROADER" ISSUES
George Gaylord Simpson (1902-1984) was one of the most influential American paleontologists of the twentieth century. His major works include 'Tempo and Mode in Evolution,' 'The Major Features of Evolution,' 'The Meaning of Evolution,' etc.
He wrote in the Preface to this 1964 book, "We have achieved considerable knowledge of the history of life and of the processes involved in it, of the course and causes of evolution. Such knowledge inevitably modifies our concepts of the universe around us and of ourselves. It impinges on prescientific and nonscientific philosophical and theological concepts still dominant in the subjective worlds of many of us. An adjustment is necessary for anyone reasonable enough not simply to close his eyes to this development. Most pressing and difficult is the problem of purpose---or apparent purpose---in the universe, among living things, and in our own lives... finally, it is irresistible to speculate and to extrapolate. If evolution produced first life and finally man here on earth, may it not have done so elsewhere in the vastness of space?"
He says, "Physical effects have physical causes... We no longer live in a capricious world. We may expect the universe to deal consistently, even if not fairly, with us. If the unusual happens, we need no longer blame ... a whimsical god or devil... but may look confidently for an unusual or hitherto unknown physical cause. That is, perhaps, an act of faith, but it is not superstition. Unlike recourse to the supernatural, it is validated by thousands of successful searches for verifiable causes. This view depersonalizes the universe and makes it more austere, but it also makes it dependable." (Pg. 5)
He rejects Vitalism: "The sort of testable evidence that would suggest vitalism or finalism would be the steady progression of life, and of each of its evolving lineages, toward a final and transcendentally worthy goal. That is not, in fact, what the known record of life's history shows. There is no clear over-all progression. Organisms diversify into literally millions of species, than the vast majority of those species perish and other millions take their places for an eon until they, too, are replaced. If that is a foreordained plan, it is an oddly ineffective one.
"Single lineages... often do show rather steady change, but indefinitely. They become extinct, or, if they survive, the directions and rates of their evolution change. They evolve exactly as if they were adapting as best they could to a changing world, and not at all as if they were moving toward a set goal. As for the directedness that does indeed characterize vital processes, it is amply explicable by natural selection without requiring any less mundane cause." (Pg. 23)
He dismisses "mutationism," which "was based on exceptional mutations, relatively rare in themselves and still more rarely likely to produce lasting evolutionary effects. Most mutations do not produce large, readily visible effects comparable to the distinctions between different species... the whole genetical system of an individual is a delicately balanced adjusted, interacting, integrated unit. Introduction of a radically different element into that system will almost always upset its delicate integration and produce an ill-adapted or monstrous individual or quite likely prevent any development at all of the individual." (Pg. 70-71)
He states, "immanent characteristics of the material universe have not changed in the course of time. By that postulate all the immanent characteristics exist today and so can, in principle, be observed or, more precisely, inferred as generalization and laws from observations. It is in this sense that that present is the key to the past." (Pg. 132)
He argues, "now that we know that evolution is a fact, we can no longer accept [Sir Charles Bell's] simple solution of the problem of adaptation as reflecting the purpose of a Creator manifested in the separate creation of each species of animal or plant. Whether or not we can explain the evolution of adaptation has no necessary bearing on the truth of evolution. The proofs that we have not accumulated, quite aside from attempted explanations of adaptation, are fully sufficient. Competent modern biologists may differ as to the meaning or mechanism of adaptations and yet all agree that these did, somehow, arise by evolution." (Pg. 193)
Of attempts to explain evolution by "some guiding force controlling evolution," he suggests, "Such a force was postulated by students disillusioned with both Darwinism and Lamarckism. [Hans] Dreisch called it 'entelechy'; [Henri] Bergson called it the elan vital; Osborn called it 'aristogenesis' ... Teilhard called in 'noogenesis'... Their proponents were (and are) profound and able students. Yet in essence what they are all saying is little more than 'The cause of evolution is the force that causes evolution.' Attempts to define this force usually amount to no more than a description of the way these students suppose evolution to occur, which really leads to no comprehension of how or why it occurs in this way." (Pg. 198-199)
He speculates, "the set of facts known ... demonstrates beyond any possible doubt that these almost impossibly improbable genetic combinations are in fact so common in nature as to be nearly universal. The only possible way to reconcile the facts of genetics with the facts of adaptation is to find some force or process in nature that is capable of generating a high degree of improbability... [or] assuring that an outcome that is genetically extremely improbable will nevertheless become usual.
"This force has been identified beyond reasonable doubt, and it turns out to be an old friend, natural selection, but natural selection on a new basis and in a new role... It is not merely the negative process of elimination of the unfit by ensuring that they will have fewer offspring than the fit; it is the positive and creative process that was left out of the picture by the Darwinists and that was sought by the Lamarckians, the vitalists, and others." (Pg. 207-208)
This book will interest most students of evolutionary theory, and its implications.
George Gaylord Simpson (1902-1984) was one of the most influential American paleontologists of the twentieth century. His major works include 'Tempo and Mode in Evolution,' 'The Major Features of Evolution,' 'The Meaning of Evolution,' etc.
He wrote in the Preface to this 1964 book, "We have achieved considerable knowledge of the history of life and of the processes involved in it, of the course and causes of evolution. Such knowledge inevitably modifies our concepts of the universe around us and of ourselves. It impinges on prescientific and nonscientific philosophical and theological concepts still dominant in the subjective worlds of many of us. An adjustment is necessary for anyone reasonable enough not simply to close his eyes to this development. Most pressing and difficult is the problem of purpose---or apparent purpose---in the universe, among living things, and in our own lives... finally, it is irresistible to speculate and to extrapolate. If evolution produced first life and finally man here on earth, may it not have done so elsewhere in the vastness of space?"
He says, "Physical effects have physical causes... We no longer live in a capricious world. We may expect the universe to deal consistently, even if not fairly, with us. If the unusual happens, we need no longer blame ... a whimsical god or devil... but may look confidently for an unusual or hitherto unknown physical cause. That is, perhaps, an act of faith, but it is not superstition. Unlike recourse to the supernatural, it is validated by thousands of successful searches for verifiable causes. This view depersonalizes the universe and makes it more austere, but it also makes it dependable." (Pg. 5)
He rejects Vitalism: "The sort of testable evidence that would suggest vitalism or finalism would be the steady progression of life, and of each of its evolving lineages, toward a final and transcendentally worthy goal. That is not, in fact, what the known record of life's history shows. There is no clear over-all progression. Organisms diversify into literally millions of species, than the vast majority of those species perish and other millions take their places for an eon until they, too, are replaced. If that is a foreordained plan, it is an oddly ineffective one.
"Single lineages... often do show rather steady change, but indefinitely. They become extinct, or, if they survive, the directions and rates of their evolution change. They evolve exactly as if they were adapting as best they could to a changing world, and not at all as if they were moving toward a set goal. As for the directedness that does indeed characterize vital processes, it is amply explicable by natural selection without requiring any less mundane cause." (Pg. 23)
He dismisses "mutationism," which "was based on exceptional mutations, relatively rare in themselves and still more rarely likely to produce lasting evolutionary effects. Most mutations do not produce large, readily visible effects comparable to the distinctions between different species... the whole genetical system of an individual is a delicately balanced adjusted, interacting, integrated unit. Introduction of a radically different element into that system will almost always upset its delicate integration and produce an ill-adapted or monstrous individual or quite likely prevent any development at all of the individual." (Pg. 70-71)
He states, "immanent characteristics of the material universe have not changed in the course of time. By that postulate all the immanent characteristics exist today and so can, in principle, be observed or, more precisely, inferred as generalization and laws from observations. It is in this sense that that present is the key to the past." (Pg. 132)
He argues, "now that we know that evolution is a fact, we can no longer accept [Sir Charles Bell's] simple solution of the problem of adaptation as reflecting the purpose of a Creator manifested in the separate creation of each species of animal or plant. Whether or not we can explain the evolution of adaptation has no necessary bearing on the truth of evolution. The proofs that we have not accumulated, quite aside from attempted explanations of adaptation, are fully sufficient. Competent modern biologists may differ as to the meaning or mechanism of adaptations and yet all agree that these did, somehow, arise by evolution." (Pg. 193)
Of attempts to explain evolution by "some guiding force controlling evolution," he suggests, "Such a force was postulated by students disillusioned with both Darwinism and Lamarckism. [Hans] Dreisch called it 'entelechy'; [Henri] Bergson called it the elan vital; Osborn called it 'aristogenesis' ... Teilhard called in 'noogenesis'... Their proponents were (and are) profound and able students. Yet in essence what they are all saying is little more than 'The cause of evolution is the force that causes evolution.' Attempts to define this force usually amount to no more than a description of the way these students suppose evolution to occur, which really leads to no comprehension of how or why it occurs in this way." (Pg. 198-199)
He speculates, "the set of facts known ... demonstrates beyond any possible doubt that these almost impossibly improbable genetic combinations are in fact so common in nature as to be nearly universal. The only possible way to reconcile the facts of genetics with the facts of adaptation is to find some force or process in nature that is capable of generating a high degree of improbability... [or] assuring that an outcome that is genetically extremely improbable will nevertheless become usual.
"This force has been identified beyond reasonable doubt, and it turns out to be an old friend, natural selection, but natural selection on a new basis and in a new role... It is not merely the negative process of elimination of the unfit by ensuring that they will have fewer offspring than the fit; it is the positive and creative process that was left out of the picture by the Darwinists and that was sought by the Lamarckians, the vitalists, and others." (Pg. 207-208)
This book will interest most students of evolutionary theory, and its implications.
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July 16, 2021In het Nederlands: het wereldbeeld van een evolutionist, Aula 358
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