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Respect for Nature
The description for this book, Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics, will be forthcoming.
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First published January 1, 1986
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
April 27, 2008
This is a classic in environmental ethics; Taylor's presentation is methodical and clear, and an excellent example of a Kantian approach to the incorporation of other animals into the human ethical system.
However, I do disagree with basic premises of his analysis. He draws stark lines between humans and nature, between moral and non-moral agents, and in so doing fails to adequately consider those issues that would complicate this picture: non-human species with highly developed social lives and potential species-specific codes of conduct, for instance. His use of 'nature' is also slippery; really, he appears to mean 'wild,' which is actually quite different in meaning from 'natural.' Much of his argument seems unselfconsciously premised on the value of 'wild' things, without exploration of the source of that value.
Taylor's book came early on in the field, however. Many environmental ethicists and philosophers are now beginning to handle such questions more carefully, and they can do so in part because Taylor and others helped set out solid ground for them to work upon.
However, I do disagree with basic premises of his analysis. He draws stark lines between humans and nature, between moral and non-moral agents, and in so doing fails to adequately consider those issues that would complicate this picture: non-human species with highly developed social lives and potential species-specific codes of conduct, for instance. His use of 'nature' is also slippery; really, he appears to mean 'wild,' which is actually quite different in meaning from 'natural.' Much of his argument seems unselfconsciously premised on the value of 'wild' things, without exploration of the source of that value.
Taylor's book came early on in the field, however. Many environmental ethicists and philosophers are now beginning to handle such questions more carefully, and they can do so in part because Taylor and others helped set out solid ground for them to work upon.
March 21, 2018
HIGHLIGHTS:
“Humans and nonhumans alike are viewed together as integral parts of one unified whole in which all living things are functionally interrelated. Finally, when our awareness focuses on the individual lives of plants and animals, each is seen to share with us the characteristic of being a teleological center of life striving to realize its own good in its own unique way.”
“[Hence] We being to look at other species as we look at ourselves, seeing them as beings which have a good they are striving to realize just as we have a good we are striving to realize. We accordingly develop the disposition to view the world from the standpoint of their good as well as from the standpoint of our own good.”
“Now if the groundlessness of the claim that humans are inherently superior to other species were brought clearly before our minds, we would not remain intellectually neutral toward that claim but would reject it as being fundamentally at variance with our total world outlook. In the absence of any good reasons for holding it, the assertoon of human superiority would then appear simply as the expression of an irrational and self-serving prejudice that favors one particular species over several million others”.
“There is no reason, moreover, why plants and animals, including whole species populations and life communities, cannot be accorded legal rights under my theory. To grant them legal protection could be interpreted as giving them legal entitlement to be protected, and this, in fact, would be a means by which a society that subscribed to the ethics of respect for nature could give public recognition to their inherent worth.”
“The biocentric look on nature is the single most important idea in establishing the justifiability of the attitude of respect for nature. . . . The inherent worth of an entity does not depend on its merits. In human affairs, we are all familiar with the principle that one’s worth as a person does not vary with one’s merits or lack of merits. The same can hold true of animals and plants. To regard such entities as possessing inherent worth entails disregarding their merits and deficiencies, whether they are being judged from a human standpoint or from the standpoint of their own species.”
“We who live in modern democracies no longer believe in such hereditary social distinctions. Indeed, we wholeheartedly condemn them on moral grounds as being fundamentally unjust.”
“The vast majority of people in modern democracies, however, do not maintain an egalitarian outlook when it comes to comparing human beings with other living things. Most people consider our own species to be superior to all other species and this superiority is understood to be a matter of inherent worth, not merit. . . . The parallel with hereditary social classes is very close.”
“I now wish to argue that this structure of concepts and beliefs is completely groundless. . . . The philosophical traditions themselves rest on very questionable assumptions or else simply beg the question. I briefly consider three of the main traditions to substantiate the point. These are classical Greek humanism, Cartesian dualism, and the Judeo-Christian concept of the GReat Chain of Being.”
Greek Definition of man as a Rational Animal
“Rationality was then seen to be the key to our superiority over animals. . . . The point to consider here is that this view does not actually provide an argument for human superiority but rather makes explicit the framework of thought that is implicitly used by those who think of humans as inherently superior to non-humans. . . . But when we consider rationality from the standpoint of the first three elements of the ecological outlook, we see that its value lies in its importance for human life. other creatures achieve their species-specific good without the need of rationality, although they often make use of capacities that humans lack. So the humanistic outlook of classical Greek thought does not give us a neutral (nonquestion-begging) ground on which to construct a scale of degrees of inherent worth possessed by different species of living things.”
Cartesian Dualism of Soul and Body
“Superiority that is supposed to derive from the fact that we have souls while animals do not. Animals are mere automata and lack the divine element that makes us spiritual beings. . . . I only add the point that, even if humans are composed of an immaterial unextended soul and a material, extended body, this in itself is not a reason to deem them of greater worth than entities that are only bodies. Why is a soul substance a thing that adds value to its possessor? Unless some theological reasoning is offered here (which many, including myself, would find unacceptable on epistemological grounds), no logical connection is evident.”
Judeo-Christian Concept of the Great Chain of Being
“Humans are superior to animals and plants because their Creator has given them a higher place on the chain. . . . Human beings ‘made in God’s image.’ are inherently superior to animals and plants by virtue of their being closer (in their essential nature) to God. The metaphysical and epistemological difficulties with this conception of a hierarchy of entities are, in my mind, insuperable. Without entering into this matter here, I only point out that if we are unwilling to accept the metaphysics of traditional judaism and Christianity we are again left without good reasons for holding to the claim of inherent human superiority.”
“Humans and nonhumans alike are viewed together as integral parts of one unified whole in which all living things are functionally interrelated. Finally, when our awareness focuses on the individual lives of plants and animals, each is seen to share with us the characteristic of being a teleological center of life striving to realize its own good in its own unique way.”
“[Hence] We being to look at other species as we look at ourselves, seeing them as beings which have a good they are striving to realize just as we have a good we are striving to realize. We accordingly develop the disposition to view the world from the standpoint of their good as well as from the standpoint of our own good.”
“Now if the groundlessness of the claim that humans are inherently superior to other species were brought clearly before our minds, we would not remain intellectually neutral toward that claim but would reject it as being fundamentally at variance with our total world outlook. In the absence of any good reasons for holding it, the assertoon of human superiority would then appear simply as the expression of an irrational and self-serving prejudice that favors one particular species over several million others”.
“There is no reason, moreover, why plants and animals, including whole species populations and life communities, cannot be accorded legal rights under my theory. To grant them legal protection could be interpreted as giving them legal entitlement to be protected, and this, in fact, would be a means by which a society that subscribed to the ethics of respect for nature could give public recognition to their inherent worth.”
“The biocentric look on nature is the single most important idea in establishing the justifiability of the attitude of respect for nature. . . . The inherent worth of an entity does not depend on its merits. In human affairs, we are all familiar with the principle that one’s worth as a person does not vary with one’s merits or lack of merits. The same can hold true of animals and plants. To regard such entities as possessing inherent worth entails disregarding their merits and deficiencies, whether they are being judged from a human standpoint or from the standpoint of their own species.”
“We who live in modern democracies no longer believe in such hereditary social distinctions. Indeed, we wholeheartedly condemn them on moral grounds as being fundamentally unjust.”
“The vast majority of people in modern democracies, however, do not maintain an egalitarian outlook when it comes to comparing human beings with other living things. Most people consider our own species to be superior to all other species and this superiority is understood to be a matter of inherent worth, not merit. . . . The parallel with hereditary social classes is very close.”
“I now wish to argue that this structure of concepts and beliefs is completely groundless. . . . The philosophical traditions themselves rest on very questionable assumptions or else simply beg the question. I briefly consider three of the main traditions to substantiate the point. These are classical Greek humanism, Cartesian dualism, and the Judeo-Christian concept of the GReat Chain of Being.”
Greek Definition of man as a Rational Animal
“Rationality was then seen to be the key to our superiority over animals. . . . The point to consider here is that this view does not actually provide an argument for human superiority but rather makes explicit the framework of thought that is implicitly used by those who think of humans as inherently superior to non-humans. . . . But when we consider rationality from the standpoint of the first three elements of the ecological outlook, we see that its value lies in its importance for human life. other creatures achieve their species-specific good without the need of rationality, although they often make use of capacities that humans lack. So the humanistic outlook of classical Greek thought does not give us a neutral (nonquestion-begging) ground on which to construct a scale of degrees of inherent worth possessed by different species of living things.”
Cartesian Dualism of Soul and Body
“Superiority that is supposed to derive from the fact that we have souls while animals do not. Animals are mere automata and lack the divine element that makes us spiritual beings. . . . I only add the point that, even if humans are composed of an immaterial unextended soul and a material, extended body, this in itself is not a reason to deem them of greater worth than entities that are only bodies. Why is a soul substance a thing that adds value to its possessor? Unless some theological reasoning is offered here (which many, including myself, would find unacceptable on epistemological grounds), no logical connection is evident.”
Judeo-Christian Concept of the Great Chain of Being
“Humans are superior to animals and plants because their Creator has given them a higher place on the chain. . . . Human beings ‘made in God’s image.’ are inherently superior to animals and plants by virtue of their being closer (in their essential nature) to God. The metaphysical and epistemological difficulties with this conception of a hierarchy of entities are, in my mind, insuperable. Without entering into this matter here, I only point out that if we are unwilling to accept the metaphysics of traditional judaism and Christianity we are again left without good reasons for holding to the claim of inherent human superiority.”
600-699-applied-science
December 18, 2019170
February 10, 2021
Have some very good ideas and explanations for how humans and nature should interact. Would recommend if you want to know how to better respect nature.
August 17, 2007
This book is about why animals and plants deserve respect. It's got some flaws, but is pretty well argued. Over all, it makes a lot of sense.
December 29, 2013
Very thorough discussion of the role of environmental ethics.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews