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The Dimensions of Ethics: An Introduction to Ethical Theory
The Dimensions of Ethics offers a concise but wide-ranging introduction to moral philosophy. In clear and engaging fashion, the author first examines the scope of ethical theory, and explores central metaethical questions such as the issue of relativism, and the relationship between morality and religion. He then turns to an exploration of five theoretical approaches (utilitarianism, the deontological approach of Kant, the ethical pluralism of Ross, virtue ethics, and feminist ethics), in each case providing a consideration of various objections that have been advanced as well as a sympathetic exposition of the core principles of each approach. Throughout he uses a wide range of examples, and integrates references to issues in applied ethics with his discussions of ethical theory.
- GenresPhilosophyNonfiction
256 pages, Paperback
First published March 27, 2003
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
November 27, 2023
"For him the duty to be fair is just as ultimate as the duty to maximize good consequences. Ross’s theory is an example of what we will call a pluralistic theory of obligation. Putting it simply, such a theory is one which does not posit a single, fundamental obligation (or principle) in relation to which all other obligations (or principles) are secondary or derivative. This defi ning feature raises a serious diffi culty for one who advocates a pluralistic theory of obligation: What are we to do in situations where our ultimate obligations appear to confl ict with one another?"
"A monistic theory of obligation avoids this diffi culty of confl icting obligations by positing one fundamental obligation, and one corresponding rule or principle defi ning that obligation. Examples include the principle of utility, the categorical imperative, and possibly the principle of fairness."
"First, a theory can suggest that the good and bad consequences of our conduct have absolutely no bearing whatsoever on their moral assessment. Such a theory, which we will call a strong deontological theory, can operate wholly independently of a theory of value. The reason is simple: our duty is not to maximize what is ultimately of value, and so we need not have a theory which tells us what that is. Kant appears to advocate a strong deontological theory of obligation."
"A deontological theory of obligation need not, however, follow Kant’s lead in denying the relevance of consequences altogether. There is a second, and perhaps much more plausible, kind of deontological theory which makes the far weaker claim that consequences are not the only factors of moral relevance. In other words, we have other ultimate obligations in addition to our duty to maximize good and minimize bad consequences. According to the mixed deontological theory of W.D. Ross the principle of beneficence, which requires promoting the good of others in our actions, is only one of many ultimate principles determining our moral obligations."
"Cognitivists hold that moral utterances typically purport to assert true moral propositions which can be grasped and judged by way of our cognitive faculties. Although the types of reasons offered to support the following two judgments would no doubt be different, a cognitivist will insist that “The Pope lives in Rome” and “Hitler’s policies concerning the Jewish people were morally wrong” each expresses a true proposition. Furthermore, he will insist that the truth of each of these two propositions is, at least in theory, capableof demonstration. The fi rst purports to describe a physical fact about the world and would be backed up by empirical evidence. The second asserts a moral fact, which would be supported by the offering of moral reasons. But in each instance the person intends to express an “objective truth” which is capable both of being grasped and understood and of being supported by appropriate reasons or evidence.
Some philosophers find cognitivism highly problematic for a number of reasons. Among the most infl uential is the claim that there is widespread disagreement on most moral questions. Indeed, there is little agreement on how we should go about trying to answer moral questions! Some people are consequentialists, others are deontologists. Some emphasize rights, others virtues. If moral judgments do assert propositions capable of being judged as true or false, then would we not expect to see far greater consensus on moral questions? Would we not at least have more agreement on how to go about trying to achieve consensus? For these and other reasons, philosophers like A.J. Ayer, C.L. Stevenson, and R.M. Hare developed alternative non-cognitivist theories about the meaning of moral utterances."
"Ayer held that moral utterances simply express the emotions of the speaker. For that reason alone they are non-cognitive in nature. My saying “Abortion is wrong” is rather like my saying “Abortion — Boo!!” I express my negative emotion towards the practice of abortion in much the same way as when I yell “Boo!!” following the goalie’s having surrendered the fifth straight goal of the period. One must be careful here: there is a crucial difference between expressing an emotion and stating that one has it. Ayer’s view is that moral utterances do the former, not the latter. If one held that the role of a moral utterance is to state that one has a particular emotion about subjects like abortion, lying, or attempting to exterminate the Jews of Europe, then moral judgments would express propositions capable of truth or falsity. A description of one’s emotions is still a description, and can be judged accurate or inaccurate, true or false. But this is not Ayer’s position."
"According to the moral relativist, moral beliefs are relative to whatever standards a particular society or individual happens to have accepted. And there is, on this view, no objective moral basis for the selection made; no valid exercise of moral reasoning which could justify the standards chosen. And the reason is simple: if we were to use moral reasoning, we would have to use the very standards we wanted to justify. But this would be circular, and circular arguments provide no reason to believe their conclusions."
"A second argument in favour of Moral Relativism seizes on the fact that it is seldom possible to demonstrate, to the satisfaction of all open-minded, reasonable individuals of good will and integrity, that one’s moral standards and beliefs are correct. According to defenders of this second argument, the main reason that there is little consensus on moral standards is the absence of an agreed procedure or method of moral reasoning by which individuals can demonstrate to one another the correctness of their moral views. Unlike, say, the natural sciences, where, it is said, there are such agreed procedures, acceptable to the entire scientifi c community, for demonstrating conclusions, moral reasoning affords no comparable methodology. In contrast with the sciences, one fi nds within the moral realm a plethora of moral codes, belief systems and theories... But without the possibility of demonstration, moral views can be nothing more than matters of opinion (Moral Subjectivism). "
"This Moral Ground version of Divine Command theory says that the grounds for our moral claims lie in God’s will or commands. If X is morally right, this is because God has commanded that we do X. In other words, the reason why we should do X is the sheer fact that God commanded us to do X. The reason why principle P is a valid moral standard is that God has commanded P.
In addition to the Moral Ground version of Divine Command theory, there is a second theory, easily confused with the fi rst.2 On this particular version, God does indeed always command us to do the morally right thing. But his commanding us to do X is not what makes X the morally right thing to do. In other words, X is not morally right because God commanded X. Rather, God commands us to do X because it is the morally right thing to do. Being a supremely perfect being, with unlimited knowledge and benevolence, God knows the true standards of morality and lets us know what these are."
"A monistic theory of obligation avoids this diffi culty of confl icting obligations by positing one fundamental obligation, and one corresponding rule or principle defi ning that obligation. Examples include the principle of utility, the categorical imperative, and possibly the principle of fairness."
"First, a theory can suggest that the good and bad consequences of our conduct have absolutely no bearing whatsoever on their moral assessment. Such a theory, which we will call a strong deontological theory, can operate wholly independently of a theory of value. The reason is simple: our duty is not to maximize what is ultimately of value, and so we need not have a theory which tells us what that is. Kant appears to advocate a strong deontological theory of obligation."
"A deontological theory of obligation need not, however, follow Kant’s lead in denying the relevance of consequences altogether. There is a second, and perhaps much more plausible, kind of deontological theory which makes the far weaker claim that consequences are not the only factors of moral relevance. In other words, we have other ultimate obligations in addition to our duty to maximize good and minimize bad consequences. According to the mixed deontological theory of W.D. Ross the principle of beneficence, which requires promoting the good of others in our actions, is only one of many ultimate principles determining our moral obligations."
"Cognitivists hold that moral utterances typically purport to assert true moral propositions which can be grasped and judged by way of our cognitive faculties. Although the types of reasons offered to support the following two judgments would no doubt be different, a cognitivist will insist that “The Pope lives in Rome” and “Hitler’s policies concerning the Jewish people were morally wrong” each expresses a true proposition. Furthermore, he will insist that the truth of each of these two propositions is, at least in theory, capableof demonstration. The fi rst purports to describe a physical fact about the world and would be backed up by empirical evidence. The second asserts a moral fact, which would be supported by the offering of moral reasons. But in each instance the person intends to express an “objective truth” which is capable both of being grasped and understood and of being supported by appropriate reasons or evidence.
Some philosophers find cognitivism highly problematic for a number of reasons. Among the most infl uential is the claim that there is widespread disagreement on most moral questions. Indeed, there is little agreement on how we should go about trying to answer moral questions! Some people are consequentialists, others are deontologists. Some emphasize rights, others virtues. If moral judgments do assert propositions capable of being judged as true or false, then would we not expect to see far greater consensus on moral questions? Would we not at least have more agreement on how to go about trying to achieve consensus? For these and other reasons, philosophers like A.J. Ayer, C.L. Stevenson, and R.M. Hare developed alternative non-cognitivist theories about the meaning of moral utterances."
"Ayer held that moral utterances simply express the emotions of the speaker. For that reason alone they are non-cognitive in nature. My saying “Abortion is wrong” is rather like my saying “Abortion — Boo!!” I express my negative emotion towards the practice of abortion in much the same way as when I yell “Boo!!” following the goalie’s having surrendered the fifth straight goal of the period. One must be careful here: there is a crucial difference between expressing an emotion and stating that one has it. Ayer’s view is that moral utterances do the former, not the latter. If one held that the role of a moral utterance is to state that one has a particular emotion about subjects like abortion, lying, or attempting to exterminate the Jews of Europe, then moral judgments would express propositions capable of truth or falsity. A description of one’s emotions is still a description, and can be judged accurate or inaccurate, true or false. But this is not Ayer’s position."
"According to the moral relativist, moral beliefs are relative to whatever standards a particular society or individual happens to have accepted. And there is, on this view, no objective moral basis for the selection made; no valid exercise of moral reasoning which could justify the standards chosen. And the reason is simple: if we were to use moral reasoning, we would have to use the very standards we wanted to justify. But this would be circular, and circular arguments provide no reason to believe their conclusions."
"A second argument in favour of Moral Relativism seizes on the fact that it is seldom possible to demonstrate, to the satisfaction of all open-minded, reasonable individuals of good will and integrity, that one’s moral standards and beliefs are correct. According to defenders of this second argument, the main reason that there is little consensus on moral standards is the absence of an agreed procedure or method of moral reasoning by which individuals can demonstrate to one another the correctness of their moral views. Unlike, say, the natural sciences, where, it is said, there are such agreed procedures, acceptable to the entire scientifi c community, for demonstrating conclusions, moral reasoning affords no comparable methodology. In contrast with the sciences, one fi nds within the moral realm a plethora of moral codes, belief systems and theories... But without the possibility of demonstration, moral views can be nothing more than matters of opinion (Moral Subjectivism). "
"This Moral Ground version of Divine Command theory says that the grounds for our moral claims lie in God’s will or commands. If X is morally right, this is because God has commanded that we do X. In other words, the reason why we should do X is the sheer fact that God commanded us to do X. The reason why principle P is a valid moral standard is that God has commanded P.
In addition to the Moral Ground version of Divine Command theory, there is a second theory, easily confused with the fi rst.2 On this particular version, God does indeed always command us to do the morally right thing. But his commanding us to do X is not what makes X the morally right thing to do. In other words, X is not morally right because God commanded X. Rather, God commands us to do X because it is the morally right thing to do. Being a supremely perfect being, with unlimited knowledge and benevolence, God knows the true standards of morality and lets us know what these are."
January 3, 2018
It was an amazing read. It has been in the queue for quite a long time. A complete and quite inter-related explanation of all the ethical concepts (normative and meta in particular) has been presented with utmost care. I like the way the book goes from the beginning itself.
Around 250 pages - read - it was a light and short read for the guys like me but it will not be correct to say that this book was really a 'short-read type' because of its concepts and clarity to all those. Though, it took some unusual time for me to complete this book as I started reading it last year in August but unfortunately had to left then due to some circumstances (Of course a chosen one). However, with a manifold increase in the interest of mine in the multitude of subjects for reading I just read it and will definitely consider it "re-read" book for myself and definitely a good read for everyone.
Although it is a kind of 'subjective' book on the subject issue of Ethics and Ethical theory, morality and moral et al, it is no doubt a handsome pickup for any kind of a guy - at least to deviate a normal kind of reading which will not only amaze your thinking process but also shape it in a new way.
There are lots of stuff that we use in our daily life but hardly ever ponder over them. All such terms, concepts, usual thinkings have been perfectly provided in the book and that too in an amusing way. One will definitely enjoy it and find it no difficulty in understanding the concepts as well as the relating to the personal life.
Huge thanks to the author - Wilfrid J. Waluchow - for writing this book.
Around 250 pages - read - it was a light and short read for the guys like me but it will not be correct to say that this book was really a 'short-read type' because of its concepts and clarity to all those. Though, it took some unusual time for me to complete this book as I started reading it last year in August but unfortunately had to left then due to some circumstances (Of course a chosen one). However, with a manifold increase in the interest of mine in the multitude of subjects for reading I just read it and will definitely consider it "re-read" book for myself and definitely a good read for everyone.
Although it is a kind of 'subjective' book on the subject issue of Ethics and Ethical theory, morality and moral et al, it is no doubt a handsome pickup for any kind of a guy - at least to deviate a normal kind of reading which will not only amaze your thinking process but also shape it in a new way.
There are lots of stuff that we use in our daily life but hardly ever ponder over them. All such terms, concepts, usual thinkings have been perfectly provided in the book and that too in an amusing way. One will definitely enjoy it and find it no difficulty in understanding the concepts as well as the relating to the personal life.
Huge thanks to the author - Wilfrid J. Waluchow - for writing this book.
December 16, 2014
A very clear introduction to meta-ethics and normative ethics. Everything is easy to follow an a reflective continuum where the author is constantly inter-relating all the concepts. The objections and merits of each ethical theory are clear.
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June 10, 2018Thanks
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews