Much like the men themselves, the essays in this collection are of variable quality. The big takeaway for me is that Britain produced very few generals of note in the Second World War (Brooke, Alexander, Montgomery and Slim stand out in this regard). The rest vary from steady and competent to disastrous.
Brooke is a particular standout figure, and personifies the firm diplomacy that was essential to ensuring the smooth functioning of the Allied war effort. He was also particularly well suited to acting as a brake and complement to Churchill:
“As head of the British Army, Brooke commanded the admiration - and often induced the fear of all. He was quick in mind, speech and temper, master of his profession, uncompromising in upholding what he believed right and intolerant of pettiness, procrastination or incompetence. But, although formidable, Brooke was at heart a kind and sensitive human being, one loved by his few intimates, one for the gentle and understanding gesture where it was appropriate, one who took infinite trouble with ostensibly unimportant people, one who could talk directly and as one man to another with anybody of whatever degree, one totally without pomposity…Brooke - Field-Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke in the aftermath of the War - was the greatest Chief of the Imperial General Staff ever produced by the British Army. It was his destiny to come to authority at exactly the right hour; an hour when the country was in fearful peril, and was being certainly sustained but sometimes endangered by the mercurial genius of Churchill. Alanbrooke was the perfect complement to that genius. He and Churchill formed an incomparable partnership in the higher direction of the Second World War.”
Lord Carver’s essay on Montgomery is another standout, and is a very stimulating summary of the factors that contributed to his success.. Carver pinpoints the suitability of Monty to the Allied philosophy of war when commenting that he “made caution and calculation the bedrock of his military art. The essence of it was that one should not commit oneself to a battle until one has assembled the forces, land and air, and the logistic resources to support them, which will make it possible to penetrate a vital point of the enemy's defence, and then to keep up the pressure by feeding in more forces, so that one retains the initiative.” For the Western Allies, liberal democracies with huge material superiority and a policy of ‘steel not flesh,’ this was the approach most likely to deliver success.
Timing also favoured Monty, both in his Second World War service (“except for the brief interlude of his command of the 3rd Division in the British Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium in 1940, circumstances favoured the application of his principles. From the time that he assumed command of Eighth Army in Egypt in August 1942 until the end of the war, he enjoyed an overwhelming superiority of resources over the enemy, and was hardly ever liable to have his plans or operations seriously disturbed by a counter-thrust.”) and in his earlier service in the First World War (“He was lucky not only to survive at the time, but because a severe wound at that early stage of the war led to his service on the staff for the rest of it. Had he returned to a battalion in the front line, his chances of survival would have been small, and his experience in succession as a brigade-major, GSO2, first at a divisional then at a corps headquarters, and finally, in 1918, as GSO1, virtually chief of staff, of a division, provided him with an experience at different levels of command of planning and executing operations involving all arms, which was the foundation of his military expertise.”).
Carver points to Monty’s experience in 1918 as “especially formative. In a series of successful offensive operations, from August until the armistice, he proved what meticulous planning and carefully controlled execution could achieve, in contrast to his experience on the Somme and at Passchendaele. Ingrained in his attitude to war, henceforward, was that soldiers' lives must not be squandered in ill-planned, sloppily executed operations, based on failure to take all relevant factors into account; but that results could not be achieved without casualties, from which he would not flinch if they promised results. To send men to their death for no gain, or through failure to think the problem through, or as a result of inefficiency in execution, was unforgivable.”
These experiences were distilled after the war and applied to great effect from 1942 onwards. Montgomery was undoubtedly prickly, vain, even odd, but this essay hasn’t changed my opinion that he was still the single most effective British general of the Second World War.
Much of the rest of the book feels a little dated, but there is still enough of value here to interest the afflicted!