Steven Zaloga is an author and defense analyst known worldwide for his articles and publications on military technology. He has written over a hundred books on military technology and military history, including “Armored Thunderbolt: The US Army Sherman in World War II”, one of the most highly regarded histories of the Sherman Tank. His books have been translated into Japanese, German, Polish, Czech, Romanian, and Russian. He was a special correspondent for Jane’s Intelligence Review and is on the executive board of the Journal of Slavic Military Studies and the New York Military Affairs Symposium. From 1987 through 1992, he was the writer/producer for Video Ordnance Inc., preparing their TV series Firepower. He holds a BA in history from Union College and an MA in history from Columbia University.
Mr. Zaloga is also a noted scale armor modeler and is a host/moderator of the World War II Allied Discussion group at Missing-Lynx.com, a modelling website. He is a frequent contributor to the UK-based modeling magazine Military Modelling. He is a member of the Armor Modeling and Preservation Society.
Really interesting book. It traces the early history of the soviet Nuclear program. What's intriguing to learn about is the fact that the Soviet Union, despite testing an atomic device in 1949, lacked an effective delivery system until 1960. The American hysteria over the 'bomber gap' and 'missile gap' in the early cold war was actually a result of inaccurate intelligence. The USSR had no where near the capabilities that the CIA estimated. Even during the cuban missile crisis the Soviets were at an impossible disadvantage in terms of strategic weapons. I thought Zaloga did a good job explaining why the Soviets opted for missiles as their primary delivery method as opposed to bombers.
A fascinating, detailed study of the Soviet efforts to develop strategic weapons capable of threatening - and therefore deterring - the US. Zaloga covers efforts to create atomic and nuclear weapons, long-range bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs. Most interesting is the linkage he establishes between the shortcomings of Soviet strategic systems and Khrushchev's decision to place medium- and intermediate-range missiles in Cuba.