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War Made New: Weapons, Warriors, and the Making of the Modern World
A monumental, groundbreaking work, now in paperback, that shows how technological and strategic revolutions have transformed the battlefield
Combining gripping narrative history with wide-ranging analysis, War Made New focuses on four “revolutions” in military affairs and describes how inventions ranging from gunpowder to GPS-guided air strikes have remade the field of battle—and shaped the rise and fall of empires.
War Made New begins with the Gunpowder Revolution and explains warfare’s evolution from ritualistic, drawn-out engagements to much deadlier events, precipitating the rise of the modern nation-state. He next explores the triumph of steel and steam during the Industrial Revolution, showing how it powered the spread of European colonial empires. Moving into the twentieth century and the Second Industrial Revolution, Boot examines three critical clashes of World War II to illustrate how new technology such as the tank, radio, and airplane ushered in terrifying new forms of warfare and the rise of centralized, and even totalitarian, world powers. Finally, Boot focuses on the Gulf War, the invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iraq War—arguing that even as cutting-edge technologies have made America the greatest military power in world history, advanced communications systems have allowed decentralized, “irregular” forces to become an increasingly significant threat.
Combining gripping narrative history with wide-ranging analysis, War Made New focuses on four “revolutions” in military affairs and describes how inventions ranging from gunpowder to GPS-guided air strikes have remade the field of battle—and shaped the rise and fall of empires.
War Made New begins with the Gunpowder Revolution and explains warfare’s evolution from ritualistic, drawn-out engagements to much deadlier events, precipitating the rise of the modern nation-state. He next explores the triumph of steel and steam during the Industrial Revolution, showing how it powered the spread of European colonial empires. Moving into the twentieth century and the Second Industrial Revolution, Boot examines three critical clashes of World War II to illustrate how new technology such as the tank, radio, and airplane ushered in terrifying new forms of warfare and the rise of centralized, and even totalitarian, world powers. Finally, Boot focuses on the Gulf War, the invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iraq War—arguing that even as cutting-edge technologies have made America the greatest military power in world history, advanced communications systems have allowed decentralized, “irregular” forces to become an increasingly significant threat.
640 pages, Paperback
First published October 1, 2006
71 people are currently reading
1192 people want to read
About the author
Max Boot
15 books221 followersMax Boot is a historian and biographer, best-selling author, and foreign-policy analyst. He is the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick senior fellow for national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and a weekly columnist for The Washington Post.
Max Boot’s biography of Ronald Reagan, Reagan: His Life and Legend, is his third New York Times bestseller. It was named one of the Ten Best Books of 2024 by the New York Times, and also made best-of-the-year lists from The New Yorker, The Washington Post and The Economist. It has been acclaimed as a "landmark work" (The New York Times), the "definitive biography" (The New Yorker), “magisterial" (The Washington Post), and “enormously readable and scrupulously honest” (The Sunday Times). Max Boot’s previous biography, The Road Not Taken: Edward Lansdale and the American Tragedy in Vietnam, was also a New York Times bestseller and a finalist for the 2019 Pulitzer Prize in biography.
Max Boot’s biography of Ronald Reagan, Reagan: His Life and Legend, is his third New York Times bestseller. It was named one of the Ten Best Books of 2024 by the New York Times, and also made best-of-the-year lists from The New Yorker, The Washington Post and The Economist. It has been acclaimed as a "landmark work" (The New York Times), the "definitive biography" (The New Yorker), “magisterial" (The Washington Post), and “enormously readable and scrupulously honest” (The Sunday Times). Max Boot’s previous biography, The Road Not Taken: Edward Lansdale and the American Tragedy in Vietnam, was also a New York Times bestseller and a finalist for the 2019 Pulitzer Prize in biography.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 57 reviews
April 28, 2021
Book: War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History: 1500 to Today
Author: Max Boot
Publisher: Gotham (19 October 2006)
Language: English
Hardcover: 640 pages
Reading age: 18 years and up
Item Weight: 1 kg 90 g
Dimensions: 16.71 x 4.8 x 24.08 cm
Country of Origin: USA
Price: 4414/-
"Max Boot's book takes hundred of years of tactical battle history and reduces it to an incisive narrative of how war has changed. By providing such a coherent view of the past, he has pointed us toward the future. What is doubly impressive is how he draws surprising, fresh lessons from wars we thought we knew so much about but in fact didn't." -- Robert D. Kaplan, author of Imperial Grunts
The French assault of Italy in 1494 inaugurated the modern age in which warfare, which had been moderately stationary for a thousand years, was to change with incomprehensible and accelerating promptness.
This progression would lead some states to ascendancy, others to nothingness. It would overwhelmingly perturb the balance of power first within Europe and then in the rest of the world, giving rise to the Western hegemony that has not been eclipsed even to this day.
It would modify the very character of the state itself, providing a commanding momentum for the rise of modern governments and their inexorable expansion into the leviathans of the twentieth century. Its impact is still being felt, as armed forces around the world wrestle with the effects of information technology that is reshaping war in ways that are as insightful as they are erratic.
From one perspective, it might seem that in warfare, as in many other realms, change is slow and gradual: that it is characterized, in other words, by a process of continual evolution, not by a few wrenching revolutions.
This is to some extent true; we must not imagine that change was more sudden or sweeping than it actually was, or unduly emphasize novelty at the expense of continuity, which is always considerable. But in the military sphere, just as in science, economics, art, or culture, change is not evenly distributed across space and time.
Sometimes innovations cluster together to produce a major change in the way people live—or, in the case of the military, the way they die. Obvious examples of transformational technologies include the steam engine in the late 18th century and the computer in the late 20th century, both of which spread from one area to another, transforming everything from production to transportation.
When this happens, a revolution is said to have occurred.
This book examines four such instances of great change in warfare over the past five hundred years:
1) The Gunpowder Revolution,
2) The Industrial Revolution,
3) The Second Industrial Revolution, and
4) The Information Revolution.
The author divides his book into the following sections and subsections:
PART I: THE GUNPOWDER REVOLUTION
The Rise of the Gunpowder Age
1. Sail and Shot: The Spanish Armada, July 31–September 21, 1588
2. Missile and Muscle: Breitenfeld and Lützen, September 17, 1631–November 16, 1632
3. Flintlocks and Forbearance: Assaye, September 23, 1803
The Consequences of the Gunpowder Revolution
PART II: THE FIRST INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
The Rise of the Industrial Age
4. Rifles and Railroads: Königgrätz, July 3, 1866
5. Maxim Guns and Dum Dums: Omdurman, September 2, 1898
6. Steel and Steam: Tsushima, May 27–28, 1905
The Consequences of the Industrial Revolution
PART III: THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
The Rise of the Second Industrial Age
7. Tanks and Terror: France, May 10–June 22, 1940
8. Flattops and Torpedoes: Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941
9. Superfortresses and Firebombs: Tokyo, March 9–10, 1945
The Consequences of the Second Industrial Revolution
PART IV: THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION
The Rise of the Information Age
10. Precision and Professionalism : Kuwait and Iraq, January 17–February 28, 1991
11. Special Forces and Horses: Afghanistan, October 7–December 6, 2001
12. Humvees and IEDs: Iraq, March 20, 2003–May 1, 2005
The Consequences of the Information Revolution
PART V: REVOLUTIONS PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE
13. Revolutions to Come
Epilogue: Five Hundred Years and Counting: What the Past Teaches About the Future
Scholars may split hairs about precisely how many revolutions have occurred or when they started and ended. But few would deny that at least the first three were periods when new technology combined with new tactics to redesign the face of battle.
The verdict on the distinctive nature of the ongoing Information Revolution is not yet in, and some caution is necessary in reaching any preliminary conclusions.
To quote the author, ‘This book is intended to present a fair-minded account that brings together past and present to offer fresh insights about the future. It does not attempt to construct a definitive model of how military innovations occur; that is a job for social scientists. Nor is it a manifesto calling for a radical overhaul of the world’s militaries; that is a job for seers and strategists. This is a work of history that attempts a less ambitious but no less challenging task: trying to tell the story of the past five hundred years of war through the prism of four great revolutions that changed the nature of politics and society as much as they changed combat.’
Each section begins with a succinct introduction to make clear that what was happening on the battlefield was only part of far-reaching changes occurring in the wider society. Cannons and muskets were only two of many innovations that swept Europe during the Renaissance; machine guns, rifles, and gunboats were only some of the products mass-produced in factories during the Industrial Revolution; the bombers and tanks of World War II were not too different from civilian airplanes and tractors; and, in our own day, computing power has not only made it possible for the U.S. armed forces to track vast numbers of targets but also made it possible for Wal-Mart to track vast numbers of detergents.
Predictably, there was a lag, ranging from a few decades to a few centuries, between the initial development of a technology and the moment when it transformed the battlefield.
Following each scene-setter, the book observes key battles that show how the revolution in question played out. In describing these developments, the author seeks to avoid the inoffensive language characteristically employed by soldiers and academics alike.
For the Gunpowder Revolution (a shorthand way of describing what other historians call “the military revolution of early modern Europe”), the author has chosen to look at the Battles of the Spanish Armada (1588), Breitenfeld and Lützen (1631, 1632), and Assaye (1803).
The defeat of the Armada was the harbinger to the rise of England and the eclipse of Spain, but how were Elizabeth I’s commanders able to achieve this feat?
By mastery of the emerging technologies of oceangoing sailing ships and heavy cannon. Breitenfeld and Lützen, turning points of the Thirty Years’ War, were the greatest victories won by the Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus.
His forces, armed with matchlock muskets, pikes, and cannons, introduced many of the organizational techniques that still define barracks life today.
Assaye is less known but worth studying for a number of reasons: It was a major early success for Arthur Wellesley, not yet the Duke of Wellington; it was a significant step in the British conquest of India; and, most important for our purposes, it was a demonstration of how European soldiers, armed with flintlock muskets and bayonets and schooled in a “battle culture of forbearance,” could defeat Asian armies that had a major edge in manpower and artillery but a crippling deficit in discipline and tactics.
For the Industrial Revolution (which includes the democratization of warfare associated with the French Revolution), the author has chosen to look at the Battles of Königgrätz (1866), Omdurman (1898), and Tsushima (1905). At Königgrätz (also known as the Battle of Sadowa), one of the most important stepping-stones toward the creation of the German Reich, the Prussians dealt the Austrian Empire a decisive defeat, primarily because their general staff had figured out how to make effective use of new technologies such as railroads and breech-loading rifles.
These technologies, along with others, such as machine guns, quick-firing artillery, and field telephones, were soon incorporated by all the armies of Europe, producing a bloody stalemate on the Western Front between 1914 and 1918.
If the Industrial Revolution did not give one European power a lucid advantage over another, at least not for long, it vastly increased the gap between the West and the Rest, making it relatively easy for a handful of Europeans to conquer much of Asia and Africa.
To illustrate this aspect of the story, the book examines the Battle of Omdurman.
It later became famous because of the participation of a young lieutenant named Winston Churchill, but Omdurman was really notable for General Horatio Herbert Kitchener’s industrial techniques, utilizing railroads, gunboats, and machine guns to make the reconquest of the Sudan a foregone conclusion.
For the Second Industrial Revolution, which transformed warfare in the 1920s and 1930s and whose repercussions were felt in the 1940s, I will examine the fall of France (1940), the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (1941), and the U.S. firebombing of Tokyo (1945). The blitzkrieg is one of the best-known examples of a “military technical revolution”—and one of the most misunderstood by the general public.
It is commonly assumed, based on the ease with which German armies overran Poland, Norway, Denmark, the Low Countries, and France, that they possessed a big technological and numerical edge over their adversaries.
Nothing could be further from the truth; Hitler in fact fielded fewer tanks and aircraft than the British and French, and the quality of the Allied weapons was in many cases higher than the Germans’. The German edge lay in their better aptitude to coordinate their forces, and in their high quality of leadership, training, and morale.
They figured out how to make the best use of the technology of the day; the Allies did not.
The Japanese, at least initially, also had an edge in morale and training. Moreover, by the time of the Pearl Harbor raid, Japan was a world leader in aircraft carriers, naval aviation, torpedoes, and night fighting. Tokyo completely exploited these benefits to obliterate much of the U.S. Pacific Fleet at its anchorage and, during the following six months, to overrun all of the principal Western bases between Hawaii and Australia. Eventually, the German and Japanese advantages were negated, in part by the absolute weight of materiel on the Allied side.
But the Allies also possessed some superior weapons, such as the American long-range bombers, which General Curtis LeMay employed with brutal efficiency to bring Japan to its knees even before the two atomic bombs were dropped.
All of these weapons systems were enhanced by the use of radio, radar, and other inventions of the Second Industrial Age.
The fourth and final revolution examined by the author is the ongoing Information Revolution. To explore its impact, the book looks at the Gulf War (1991), Afghanistan (2001), and the Iraq War (2003–5).
There is some deliberation over whether the Gulf War was the last of the industrial wars or the first of the Information Age wars. There is merit in both views. The clash of tank armies in the desert is reminiscent of the great battles of World War II. But the uneven brunt of “smart” bombs, cruise missiles, satellite navigation systems, and stealth planes suggests that the 1991 clash, rightly belongs to the new era, even if only to its early stages.
As this book explores four military revolutions, five major themes will emerge:
1) Technology alone hardly ever confers an insuperable military edge. Plans, organization, training, leadership, and other products of an effectual bureaucracy are essential to comprehend the complete prospect of new inventions. Consequently, ever since the rise of modern nation-states in the 16th and 17th centuries, shifts in military power have been intimately associated with shifts in governance.
2) Countries able to take advantage of these shifts have been history’s winners while those that have fallen behind in harnessing military innovations have habitually been consigned to inappropriateness or oblivion. Thus, each revolution has been accompanied by a shift in the international balance of power.
3) Even if a country figures out how to yoke military power, it still needs the knowledge to know the capabilities and limitations of its war machine and thus circumvent wasting it on impossible projects, as have too many successful innovators from Charles VIII to Adolf Hitler.
4) Even with the best strategy, tactics, and technology in the world, no military revolution has ever conferred an indefinite advantage upon its early innovators. Rivals inevitably copy what they can and come up with tactics or technologies to blunt the effectiveness of what they cannot produce or acquire.
5) Innovation has been speeding up. It took at least two hundred years for the Gunpowder Revolution to come to fruition (c. 1500–1700); one hundred and fifty years for the First Industrial Revolution (c. 1750–1900); forty years for the Second Industrial Revolution (c. 1900–1940); and just thirty years for the Information Revolution (c. 1970–2000).
That means that keeping up with the pace of change is getting harder than ever, and the risks of getting left behind are rising. Today, there is no room for error.
The most predictive word of caution declared by the author at the very outset is that: Readers should not be misled by the section and chapter headings which highlight innovations such as “gunpowder,” “rifles,” and “tanks.”
The scope of this work is much broader than that.
The weapons mentioned are only a shorthand way of referring to more sweeping changes that occurred at the organizational and doctrinal level.
Author: Max Boot
Publisher: Gotham (19 October 2006)
Language: English
Hardcover: 640 pages
Reading age: 18 years and up
Item Weight: 1 kg 90 g
Dimensions: 16.71 x 4.8 x 24.08 cm
Country of Origin: USA
Price: 4414/-
"Max Boot's book takes hundred of years of tactical battle history and reduces it to an incisive narrative of how war has changed. By providing such a coherent view of the past, he has pointed us toward the future. What is doubly impressive is how he draws surprising, fresh lessons from wars we thought we knew so much about but in fact didn't." -- Robert D. Kaplan, author of Imperial Grunts
The French assault of Italy in 1494 inaugurated the modern age in which warfare, which had been moderately stationary for a thousand years, was to change with incomprehensible and accelerating promptness.
This progression would lead some states to ascendancy, others to nothingness. It would overwhelmingly perturb the balance of power first within Europe and then in the rest of the world, giving rise to the Western hegemony that has not been eclipsed even to this day.
It would modify the very character of the state itself, providing a commanding momentum for the rise of modern governments and their inexorable expansion into the leviathans of the twentieth century. Its impact is still being felt, as armed forces around the world wrestle with the effects of information technology that is reshaping war in ways that are as insightful as they are erratic.
From one perspective, it might seem that in warfare, as in many other realms, change is slow and gradual: that it is characterized, in other words, by a process of continual evolution, not by a few wrenching revolutions.
This is to some extent true; we must not imagine that change was more sudden or sweeping than it actually was, or unduly emphasize novelty at the expense of continuity, which is always considerable. But in the military sphere, just as in science, economics, art, or culture, change is not evenly distributed across space and time.
Sometimes innovations cluster together to produce a major change in the way people live—or, in the case of the military, the way they die. Obvious examples of transformational technologies include the steam engine in the late 18th century and the computer in the late 20th century, both of which spread from one area to another, transforming everything from production to transportation.
When this happens, a revolution is said to have occurred.
This book examines four such instances of great change in warfare over the past five hundred years:
1) The Gunpowder Revolution,
2) The Industrial Revolution,
3) The Second Industrial Revolution, and
4) The Information Revolution.
The author divides his book into the following sections and subsections:
PART I: THE GUNPOWDER REVOLUTION
The Rise of the Gunpowder Age
1. Sail and Shot: The Spanish Armada, July 31–September 21, 1588
2. Missile and Muscle: Breitenfeld and Lützen, September 17, 1631–November 16, 1632
3. Flintlocks and Forbearance: Assaye, September 23, 1803
The Consequences of the Gunpowder Revolution
PART II: THE FIRST INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
The Rise of the Industrial Age
4. Rifles and Railroads: Königgrätz, July 3, 1866
5. Maxim Guns and Dum Dums: Omdurman, September 2, 1898
6. Steel and Steam: Tsushima, May 27–28, 1905
The Consequences of the Industrial Revolution
PART III: THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
The Rise of the Second Industrial Age
7. Tanks and Terror: France, May 10–June 22, 1940
8. Flattops and Torpedoes: Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941
9. Superfortresses and Firebombs: Tokyo, March 9–10, 1945
The Consequences of the Second Industrial Revolution
PART IV: THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION
The Rise of the Information Age
10. Precision and Professionalism : Kuwait and Iraq, January 17–February 28, 1991
11. Special Forces and Horses: Afghanistan, October 7–December 6, 2001
12. Humvees and IEDs: Iraq, March 20, 2003–May 1, 2005
The Consequences of the Information Revolution
PART V: REVOLUTIONS PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE
13. Revolutions to Come
Epilogue: Five Hundred Years and Counting: What the Past Teaches About the Future
Scholars may split hairs about precisely how many revolutions have occurred or when they started and ended. But few would deny that at least the first three were periods when new technology combined with new tactics to redesign the face of battle.
The verdict on the distinctive nature of the ongoing Information Revolution is not yet in, and some caution is necessary in reaching any preliminary conclusions.
To quote the author, ‘This book is intended to present a fair-minded account that brings together past and present to offer fresh insights about the future. It does not attempt to construct a definitive model of how military innovations occur; that is a job for social scientists. Nor is it a manifesto calling for a radical overhaul of the world’s militaries; that is a job for seers and strategists. This is a work of history that attempts a less ambitious but no less challenging task: trying to tell the story of the past five hundred years of war through the prism of four great revolutions that changed the nature of politics and society as much as they changed combat.’
Each section begins with a succinct introduction to make clear that what was happening on the battlefield was only part of far-reaching changes occurring in the wider society. Cannons and muskets were only two of many innovations that swept Europe during the Renaissance; machine guns, rifles, and gunboats were only some of the products mass-produced in factories during the Industrial Revolution; the bombers and tanks of World War II were not too different from civilian airplanes and tractors; and, in our own day, computing power has not only made it possible for the U.S. armed forces to track vast numbers of targets but also made it possible for Wal-Mart to track vast numbers of detergents.
Predictably, there was a lag, ranging from a few decades to a few centuries, between the initial development of a technology and the moment when it transformed the battlefield.
Following each scene-setter, the book observes key battles that show how the revolution in question played out. In describing these developments, the author seeks to avoid the inoffensive language characteristically employed by soldiers and academics alike.
For the Gunpowder Revolution (a shorthand way of describing what other historians call “the military revolution of early modern Europe”), the author has chosen to look at the Battles of the Spanish Armada (1588), Breitenfeld and Lützen (1631, 1632), and Assaye (1803).
The defeat of the Armada was the harbinger to the rise of England and the eclipse of Spain, but how were Elizabeth I’s commanders able to achieve this feat?
By mastery of the emerging technologies of oceangoing sailing ships and heavy cannon. Breitenfeld and Lützen, turning points of the Thirty Years’ War, were the greatest victories won by the Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus.
His forces, armed with matchlock muskets, pikes, and cannons, introduced many of the organizational techniques that still define barracks life today.
Assaye is less known but worth studying for a number of reasons: It was a major early success for Arthur Wellesley, not yet the Duke of Wellington; it was a significant step in the British conquest of India; and, most important for our purposes, it was a demonstration of how European soldiers, armed with flintlock muskets and bayonets and schooled in a “battle culture of forbearance,” could defeat Asian armies that had a major edge in manpower and artillery but a crippling deficit in discipline and tactics.
For the Industrial Revolution (which includes the democratization of warfare associated with the French Revolution), the author has chosen to look at the Battles of Königgrätz (1866), Omdurman (1898), and Tsushima (1905). At Königgrätz (also known as the Battle of Sadowa), one of the most important stepping-stones toward the creation of the German Reich, the Prussians dealt the Austrian Empire a decisive defeat, primarily because their general staff had figured out how to make effective use of new technologies such as railroads and breech-loading rifles.
These technologies, along with others, such as machine guns, quick-firing artillery, and field telephones, were soon incorporated by all the armies of Europe, producing a bloody stalemate on the Western Front between 1914 and 1918.
If the Industrial Revolution did not give one European power a lucid advantage over another, at least not for long, it vastly increased the gap between the West and the Rest, making it relatively easy for a handful of Europeans to conquer much of Asia and Africa.
To illustrate this aspect of the story, the book examines the Battle of Omdurman.
It later became famous because of the participation of a young lieutenant named Winston Churchill, but Omdurman was really notable for General Horatio Herbert Kitchener’s industrial techniques, utilizing railroads, gunboats, and machine guns to make the reconquest of the Sudan a foregone conclusion.
For the Second Industrial Revolution, which transformed warfare in the 1920s and 1930s and whose repercussions were felt in the 1940s, I will examine the fall of France (1940), the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (1941), and the U.S. firebombing of Tokyo (1945). The blitzkrieg is one of the best-known examples of a “military technical revolution”—and one of the most misunderstood by the general public.
It is commonly assumed, based on the ease with which German armies overran Poland, Norway, Denmark, the Low Countries, and France, that they possessed a big technological and numerical edge over their adversaries.
Nothing could be further from the truth; Hitler in fact fielded fewer tanks and aircraft than the British and French, and the quality of the Allied weapons was in many cases higher than the Germans’. The German edge lay in their better aptitude to coordinate their forces, and in their high quality of leadership, training, and morale.
They figured out how to make the best use of the technology of the day; the Allies did not.
The Japanese, at least initially, also had an edge in morale and training. Moreover, by the time of the Pearl Harbor raid, Japan was a world leader in aircraft carriers, naval aviation, torpedoes, and night fighting. Tokyo completely exploited these benefits to obliterate much of the U.S. Pacific Fleet at its anchorage and, during the following six months, to overrun all of the principal Western bases between Hawaii and Australia. Eventually, the German and Japanese advantages were negated, in part by the absolute weight of materiel on the Allied side.
But the Allies also possessed some superior weapons, such as the American long-range bombers, which General Curtis LeMay employed with brutal efficiency to bring Japan to its knees even before the two atomic bombs were dropped.
All of these weapons systems were enhanced by the use of radio, radar, and other inventions of the Second Industrial Age.
The fourth and final revolution examined by the author is the ongoing Information Revolution. To explore its impact, the book looks at the Gulf War (1991), Afghanistan (2001), and the Iraq War (2003–5).
There is some deliberation over whether the Gulf War was the last of the industrial wars or the first of the Information Age wars. There is merit in both views. The clash of tank armies in the desert is reminiscent of the great battles of World War II. But the uneven brunt of “smart” bombs, cruise missiles, satellite navigation systems, and stealth planes suggests that the 1991 clash, rightly belongs to the new era, even if only to its early stages.
As this book explores four military revolutions, five major themes will emerge:
1) Technology alone hardly ever confers an insuperable military edge. Plans, organization, training, leadership, and other products of an effectual bureaucracy are essential to comprehend the complete prospect of new inventions. Consequently, ever since the rise of modern nation-states in the 16th and 17th centuries, shifts in military power have been intimately associated with shifts in governance.
2) Countries able to take advantage of these shifts have been history’s winners while those that have fallen behind in harnessing military innovations have habitually been consigned to inappropriateness or oblivion. Thus, each revolution has been accompanied by a shift in the international balance of power.
3) Even if a country figures out how to yoke military power, it still needs the knowledge to know the capabilities and limitations of its war machine and thus circumvent wasting it on impossible projects, as have too many successful innovators from Charles VIII to Adolf Hitler.
4) Even with the best strategy, tactics, and technology in the world, no military revolution has ever conferred an indefinite advantage upon its early innovators. Rivals inevitably copy what they can and come up with tactics or technologies to blunt the effectiveness of what they cannot produce or acquire.
5) Innovation has been speeding up. It took at least two hundred years for the Gunpowder Revolution to come to fruition (c. 1500–1700); one hundred and fifty years for the First Industrial Revolution (c. 1750–1900); forty years for the Second Industrial Revolution (c. 1900–1940); and just thirty years for the Information Revolution (c. 1970–2000).
That means that keeping up with the pace of change is getting harder than ever, and the risks of getting left behind are rising. Today, there is no room for error.
The most predictive word of caution declared by the author at the very outset is that: Readers should not be misled by the section and chapter headings which highlight innovations such as “gunpowder,” “rifles,” and “tanks.”
The scope of this work is much broader than that.
The weapons mentioned are only a shorthand way of referring to more sweeping changes that occurred at the organizational and doctrinal level.
September 26, 2022
Absolutely fascinating book with more than five hundred years of military history. The smaller details are even more fascinating than the big battles. Max Boot explains the origins of close order drill in modern armies, and how the development of Kevlar brought body armor back to the battlefield after a three hundred year absence. The last few chapters are probably the weakest, but overall and outstanding read for anyone interested in military history.
December 14, 2011
Max Boot procura demonstrar nestes livro o potencial revolucionário de novas armas adaptadas a tácticas que delas tiram partido ao longo da história ocidental. Opta por relatos de batalhas que considera historicamente basilares e acaba por concluir que novos utensílios levam a novas utilizações e, como McLuhan fez bastante mais cedo e a meditar sobre outras problemáticas, que os generais de hoje estão soberbamente preparados para lutar as guerras de ontem.
Se nas primeiras épocas abordadas Boot mantém um tom neutro, assim que chega ao impacto americano começa a resvalar para uma apologia dos arsenais high tech e das estratégias neo-conservadoras, glorificando o desastre iraquiano como um triunfo, sublinhando a fase sem lei das operações no Afeganistão como um sucesso admirável e derrapando no deslumbre pelas armas robóticas que se anunciam nos teatros de operações. A primeira metade deste livro é intrigante, com análises coerentes de contextos históricos a enquadrar relatos bélicos. Infelizmente, as restantes páginas decaem na apologia da pax americana musculada.
Se nas primeiras épocas abordadas Boot mantém um tom neutro, assim que chega ao impacto americano começa a resvalar para uma apologia dos arsenais high tech e das estratégias neo-conservadoras, glorificando o desastre iraquiano como um triunfo, sublinhando a fase sem lei das operações no Afeganistão como um sucesso admirável e derrapando no deslumbre pelas armas robóticas que se anunciam nos teatros de operações. A primeira metade deste livro é intrigante, com análises coerentes de contextos históricos a enquadrar relatos bélicos. Infelizmente, as restantes páginas decaem na apologia da pax americana musculada.
Read
August 1, 2013'Historical surveys of war and the way technological developments change the way it is fought are common—from the tours de force of major military historians like Martin Van Creveld and William O’Neill to potboilers marketed to 12-year-old boys. In his new book, Max Boot certainly aspires to be among the former, and the enthusiastic recommendations on the book’s dust jacket from no less than Sen. John McCain, Robert Kaplan, retired Lt. Gen. Bernard Trainor, and Paul Kennedy certainly add to this impression. But War Made New is remarkably superficial and filled with the most extraordinary lacunae. It ignores—by accident or design—the most important developments in modern military technology.'
Read the full review, "On War It's Not," on our website:
http://www.theamericanconservative.co...
Read the full review, "On War It's Not," on our website:
http://www.theamericanconservative.co...
October 17, 2018
Fantastic book, highly recommended for anyone interested in military history, global politics, etc.
September 18, 2023
Book report for work. Made me significantly more anxious about existential military threats but now I know a lot about what kinds of cannons Gustavus Adolphus used.
November 5, 2024
For such a dense topic Max Boot made it very readable.
April 2, 2022
War Made New, Weapons, Warriors, and the Making of the Modern World
Max Boot, 2006
This 500-page tome has sat on my bookshelf for a number of years. War is not a subject I am usually attracted to but with the onset of the Ukrainian war, I thought, maybe some insights to be gleaned, so I plowed ahead. How do the institutions of politics and government intersect with the development of technology and that almost continuous world-shaping activity through history of war? As in politics can a government lose at war and retain power? Boot divides his book into the four technological revolutions in the last 500 years: the gunpowder revolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the industrial revolution of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the second industrial revolution of the early twentieth and mid twentieth century and the technological revolution of the 1990’s into the 21st century. Each of these revolutions drastically changed the technology of warfare as well as the organization of warfare. Those countries that early adopted, embraced and integrated the technologies into their governmental organizations were the initial victors in the wars they waged. Boot makes clear that economic and world political power are inextricably linked to military power.
How did England a small island nation with a relatively small population and limited resources become the world’s predominate naval, colonial and economic power for over three and a half centuries? Max Boot, senior fellow on various national security councils and regular newspaper columnist, starts his book by taking us back 440 years to a very famous conflict between Spain and England in the naval conflict of the Spanish Armada. Why did the predominate economic, military and naval power of Europe, Spain, lose a battle against the much lesser economic and military power, the small island nation of England? The answer lies in the government of Queen Elizabeth’s promotion, adoption, and effective utilization of a new form of naval warfare: the ship as a standoff artillery platform. Naval conflict of the time was just transitioning from oared galleys to multi-masted, multi-decked much larger sailing vessels. Previous naval conflict used ships to transport individually armed boarding parties, using rams as offensive weapons and utilized primitive artillery primarily as a supporting weapon. Whoever developed a platform that could utilize more effective longer-range artillery could sink ships without allowing close quarters combat. The English understood this, the Spanish didn’t. The English established a government establishment, the Admiralty, that was concerned with developing a professional officer corps, the Spanish drew their officers from the aristocracy without regard to ability. The result: The Spanish armada was led by aristocratic officers who had little combat experience, the English led by such experienced mariners and naval warriors as Sir Francis Drake and John Hawkins who outmaneuvered the Spanish, out gunned them, used fire ships to destroy their ships and with the aid of a North Sea storm send the bulk of the Spanish fleet to the bottom. The destruction of the Armada marks the apex and downward spiral of Spain’s power on the continent and the rise of a new naval and economic power on the world stage. Britain went on from the armada to dominate the naval tactics of sail powered gunships for over three centuries to develop the first navy built around steam powered steel gunships such as HMS Dreadnaught, the first battleship.
England’s rise to world power status although totally dependent on naval hegemony didn’t just entail naval military power. In 1803 a small 3000 strong British military force allied with the British East India Company and led by Major General Aurthur Wellesly, future Duke of Wellington, met a 40,000 strong force of well-armed native Indians of the Marathas Hindu confederacy on the plains of India at a place called Assaye. The highly trained and disciplined English force utilizing Scottish highlander infantry, state of the art of the time rifled, flintlock muskets routed the unprofessional unorganized native force. At the end of this battle, the economic and political subjugation of the Indian subcontinent by the British was almost complete. Boot also cites the battle of Omdurham, Sudan, 1898 where British troops first utilized the Maxim machine gun and Lee Metford breech loading multi-shot rifle. There a force of 12,000 Dervish Muslim well-armed warriors charged British breastworks armed with Maxims and Lee Metfords and the resulting slaughter ran into the thousands. This battle presaged future battles of WWI where infantry and cavalry charged fortified pill boxes armed with machine guns resulting in the slaughter of not thousands but millions.
How does this relate to current events in Ukraine? Much relates to the offensive weapon that came out of the slaughter of WWI, the tank. The tank came out of the second industrial revolution of fossil fuels and steel and was an answer to the defensive weapon of the entrenched machine gun. The tank, a mobile artillery and machine gun platform, is an offensive weapon system, a replacement for massed infantry and cavalry. The tanks vulnerability lies in the fact that large columns of tanks require massive resources, fuel, ammunition, repairs to keep them mobile and viable. Boot details how Hitler forgot this fact when he attacked Russia in 1941. Flush with his success in the battle for France in 1940 he disregarded the vast distances entailed in an invasion of Russia and the difficulty, near impossibility of logistically supplying a large, armored column over great distances without exposing the flanks of the supply chain. Putin may have disregarded this fact also, when he sent a huge, armored column into Ukraine assuming a quick outcome. The result: armored columns 40 miles long stalled, out of food, fuel and ammunition. Putin also seems to have disregarded another fact: there has been a fourth technical revolution since the second industrial revolution. Micro-processors, thermal imaging, explosives technologies have led to weapons costing tens of thousands, held by individual soldiers that can effectively and quickly destroy columns of tanks costing hundreds of millions. The state of the art, Javelin anti-tank weapon the US has supplied to Ukraine is such a weapon. Using thermal imaging, hands off targeting and multiple explosive charges, the Javelin using an up to two-mile, arced trajectory attacks the tank where it is most vulnerable from the top, where it is least armored, where the access hatch is. Using multiple explosive charges to defeat defensive, reactive armor, thermal imaging to hone in on its target, it is a viable weapon night or day. The result: hundreds of Russian tanks and crews destroyed.
What does Boot’s analysis say about a final outcome in Ukraine? As Clausewitz said: “War is politics by other means”. Political, global, economic power stems at least in large part, from military superiority. When a country loses a war, it loses power at least in the nearer term. Putin’s war on Ukraine can be seen as a last-ditch effort to reassert the global power of Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. If he loses, he must know that he will lose what remains of not only the economic and world political power of Russia but also, his own political power if not something more vital. That is probably why he will keep doubling down until he is stopped or defeated. But as this book details, one who does not militarily organize, integrate and utilize the cutting technologies of the day effectively will almost certainly lose in the end.
I can only touch on some of the interesting content of this detail packed and insightful book. I found Boot’s analysis of the effective game-changing military use of aviation and the subsequent rise and fall of Japan and Germany as world military powers during the first part of the 20th century and the rise of post-war United States particularly interesting. As it was written in 2006 it does not include our own military debacles in Iraq and Afghanistan. In any case if you have the fortitude to get through the 500 pages I believe you will have a better understanding of how military power has fundamentally shaped and still shapes the contours of world political and economic power. JACK
Max Boot, 2006
This 500-page tome has sat on my bookshelf for a number of years. War is not a subject I am usually attracted to but with the onset of the Ukrainian war, I thought, maybe some insights to be gleaned, so I plowed ahead. How do the institutions of politics and government intersect with the development of technology and that almost continuous world-shaping activity through history of war? As in politics can a government lose at war and retain power? Boot divides his book into the four technological revolutions in the last 500 years: the gunpowder revolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the industrial revolution of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the second industrial revolution of the early twentieth and mid twentieth century and the technological revolution of the 1990’s into the 21st century. Each of these revolutions drastically changed the technology of warfare as well as the organization of warfare. Those countries that early adopted, embraced and integrated the technologies into their governmental organizations were the initial victors in the wars they waged. Boot makes clear that economic and world political power are inextricably linked to military power.
How did England a small island nation with a relatively small population and limited resources become the world’s predominate naval, colonial and economic power for over three and a half centuries? Max Boot, senior fellow on various national security councils and regular newspaper columnist, starts his book by taking us back 440 years to a very famous conflict between Spain and England in the naval conflict of the Spanish Armada. Why did the predominate economic, military and naval power of Europe, Spain, lose a battle against the much lesser economic and military power, the small island nation of England? The answer lies in the government of Queen Elizabeth’s promotion, adoption, and effective utilization of a new form of naval warfare: the ship as a standoff artillery platform. Naval conflict of the time was just transitioning from oared galleys to multi-masted, multi-decked much larger sailing vessels. Previous naval conflict used ships to transport individually armed boarding parties, using rams as offensive weapons and utilized primitive artillery primarily as a supporting weapon. Whoever developed a platform that could utilize more effective longer-range artillery could sink ships without allowing close quarters combat. The English understood this, the Spanish didn’t. The English established a government establishment, the Admiralty, that was concerned with developing a professional officer corps, the Spanish drew their officers from the aristocracy without regard to ability. The result: The Spanish armada was led by aristocratic officers who had little combat experience, the English led by such experienced mariners and naval warriors as Sir Francis Drake and John Hawkins who outmaneuvered the Spanish, out gunned them, used fire ships to destroy their ships and with the aid of a North Sea storm send the bulk of the Spanish fleet to the bottom. The destruction of the Armada marks the apex and downward spiral of Spain’s power on the continent and the rise of a new naval and economic power on the world stage. Britain went on from the armada to dominate the naval tactics of sail powered gunships for over three centuries to develop the first navy built around steam powered steel gunships such as HMS Dreadnaught, the first battleship.
England’s rise to world power status although totally dependent on naval hegemony didn’t just entail naval military power. In 1803 a small 3000 strong British military force allied with the British East India Company and led by Major General Aurthur Wellesly, future Duke of Wellington, met a 40,000 strong force of well-armed native Indians of the Marathas Hindu confederacy on the plains of India at a place called Assaye. The highly trained and disciplined English force utilizing Scottish highlander infantry, state of the art of the time rifled, flintlock muskets routed the unprofessional unorganized native force. At the end of this battle, the economic and political subjugation of the Indian subcontinent by the British was almost complete. Boot also cites the battle of Omdurham, Sudan, 1898 where British troops first utilized the Maxim machine gun and Lee Metford breech loading multi-shot rifle. There a force of 12,000 Dervish Muslim well-armed warriors charged British breastworks armed with Maxims and Lee Metfords and the resulting slaughter ran into the thousands. This battle presaged future battles of WWI where infantry and cavalry charged fortified pill boxes armed with machine guns resulting in the slaughter of not thousands but millions.
How does this relate to current events in Ukraine? Much relates to the offensive weapon that came out of the slaughter of WWI, the tank. The tank came out of the second industrial revolution of fossil fuels and steel and was an answer to the defensive weapon of the entrenched machine gun. The tank, a mobile artillery and machine gun platform, is an offensive weapon system, a replacement for massed infantry and cavalry. The tanks vulnerability lies in the fact that large columns of tanks require massive resources, fuel, ammunition, repairs to keep them mobile and viable. Boot details how Hitler forgot this fact when he attacked Russia in 1941. Flush with his success in the battle for France in 1940 he disregarded the vast distances entailed in an invasion of Russia and the difficulty, near impossibility of logistically supplying a large, armored column over great distances without exposing the flanks of the supply chain. Putin may have disregarded this fact also, when he sent a huge, armored column into Ukraine assuming a quick outcome. The result: armored columns 40 miles long stalled, out of food, fuel and ammunition. Putin also seems to have disregarded another fact: there has been a fourth technical revolution since the second industrial revolution. Micro-processors, thermal imaging, explosives technologies have led to weapons costing tens of thousands, held by individual soldiers that can effectively and quickly destroy columns of tanks costing hundreds of millions. The state of the art, Javelin anti-tank weapon the US has supplied to Ukraine is such a weapon. Using thermal imaging, hands off targeting and multiple explosive charges, the Javelin using an up to two-mile, arced trajectory attacks the tank where it is most vulnerable from the top, where it is least armored, where the access hatch is. Using multiple explosive charges to defeat defensive, reactive armor, thermal imaging to hone in on its target, it is a viable weapon night or day. The result: hundreds of Russian tanks and crews destroyed.
What does Boot’s analysis say about a final outcome in Ukraine? As Clausewitz said: “War is politics by other means”. Political, global, economic power stems at least in large part, from military superiority. When a country loses a war, it loses power at least in the nearer term. Putin’s war on Ukraine can be seen as a last-ditch effort to reassert the global power of Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. If he loses, he must know that he will lose what remains of not only the economic and world political power of Russia but also, his own political power if not something more vital. That is probably why he will keep doubling down until he is stopped or defeated. But as this book details, one who does not militarily organize, integrate and utilize the cutting technologies of the day effectively will almost certainly lose in the end.
I can only touch on some of the interesting content of this detail packed and insightful book. I found Boot’s analysis of the effective game-changing military use of aviation and the subsequent rise and fall of Japan and Germany as world military powers during the first part of the 20th century and the rise of post-war United States particularly interesting. As it was written in 2006 it does not include our own military debacles in Iraq and Afghanistan. In any case if you have the fortitude to get through the 500 pages I believe you will have a better understanding of how military power has fundamentally shaped and still shapes the contours of world political and economic power. JACK
April 1, 2018
This book took quite a while for me to read, but it was certainly a worthwhile read, and one that has a lot of appeal to it. If you have an encyclopedic interest in military history and various real and supposed military revolutions [1], this book will have much of interest. This is a book that manages to balance several serious concerns, giving praise to the United States and its military (as well as nations like Israel) who have done a good job so far in dealing with the information revolution while also cautioning the American military establishment (and American readers) against overconfidence because the American military is so powerful at present. In general, given the author's complex point and very lengthy discussion, I think that in general the author does a good job at presenting the way in which technology, techniques, and warfare have changed over the past 500 years. Is this book perfect? By no means, but it is a generally good book and that is something to appreciate. For most readers looking for military history and willing to deal with this book's length that will certainly be enough.
Concerning this book's scope, it is epic enough that in order to go into the depth he wishes, the author chooses to limit which battles and campaigns he discusses, making it clear that there is certain selectivity involved. Overall, the book is almost 500 pages in length apart from its lengthy bibliography and endnotes. The book is divided into two parts that look at war in the last 500 years from a viewpoint of there being four revolutions up to the present. First, the author discusses the gunpowder revolution by looking at the battles of the Spanish Armada, the battles of Gustavus Adolphus in the Thirty Years' War, and the battle of Assaye, bookended with the rise of the age and the consequences of the age, which are sections included in all of the other parts as well. Then the author discusses the first industrial revolution with a look at the battle of Koniggratz, the slaughter am Omduram, and Japan's stunning victory at Tsushima. The second industrial age is examined through Germany's conquest of France in 1940, the Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, and the firebombing of Tokyo in March 1945. The fourth part of the book looks at the information revolution and Desert Shield/Storm, Afghanistan, and the Second Iraq War. There is a short fifth section on revolutions to come along with an epilogue and a lot of acknowledgements. Throughout the author gives a great deal of critical analysis about failures and successes and ways that money and power were not always guaranteed ways of leading to victory for nations.
Yet although this book is very good, it is not by any means a perfect book. Part of this comes from the author's own biases, such as a hostility to religion and to moral factors when it comes to the military. One gets the sense that the author is upset that popular support of war and military operations is tied to moral behavior in those operations, leading to more difficulty in achieving outcomes without unacceptable and immoral consequences. The author also shows a strange inability to wrestle with the civilian helpers of war, neglecting the vital importance of civil aviation to US effectiveness in the aerial warfare of World War II or to the general success that came from investment in human elements as well as technological improvement. Although democracy is not necessarily a handmaiden of warfare, those nations that did not increase the achievements and capabilities of their citizenry have consistently failed in warfare over the past few centuries. This is certainly a lesson that contemporary nations would do well to understand and wrestle with.
[1] See, for example:
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2017...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2017...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2017...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2016...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2016...
Concerning this book's scope, it is epic enough that in order to go into the depth he wishes, the author chooses to limit which battles and campaigns he discusses, making it clear that there is certain selectivity involved. Overall, the book is almost 500 pages in length apart from its lengthy bibliography and endnotes. The book is divided into two parts that look at war in the last 500 years from a viewpoint of there being four revolutions up to the present. First, the author discusses the gunpowder revolution by looking at the battles of the Spanish Armada, the battles of Gustavus Adolphus in the Thirty Years' War, and the battle of Assaye, bookended with the rise of the age and the consequences of the age, which are sections included in all of the other parts as well. Then the author discusses the first industrial revolution with a look at the battle of Koniggratz, the slaughter am Omduram, and Japan's stunning victory at Tsushima. The second industrial age is examined through Germany's conquest of France in 1940, the Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, and the firebombing of Tokyo in March 1945. The fourth part of the book looks at the information revolution and Desert Shield/Storm, Afghanistan, and the Second Iraq War. There is a short fifth section on revolutions to come along with an epilogue and a lot of acknowledgements. Throughout the author gives a great deal of critical analysis about failures and successes and ways that money and power were not always guaranteed ways of leading to victory for nations.
Yet although this book is very good, it is not by any means a perfect book. Part of this comes from the author's own biases, such as a hostility to religion and to moral factors when it comes to the military. One gets the sense that the author is upset that popular support of war and military operations is tied to moral behavior in those operations, leading to more difficulty in achieving outcomes without unacceptable and immoral consequences. The author also shows a strange inability to wrestle with the civilian helpers of war, neglecting the vital importance of civil aviation to US effectiveness in the aerial warfare of World War II or to the general success that came from investment in human elements as well as technological improvement. Although democracy is not necessarily a handmaiden of warfare, those nations that did not increase the achievements and capabilities of their citizenry have consistently failed in warfare over the past few centuries. This is certainly a lesson that contemporary nations would do well to understand and wrestle with.
[1] See, for example:
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2017...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2017...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2017...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2016...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2016...
October 24, 2024
Uma história épica e arrebatadora que abrange desde a derrota da Armada Espanhola até a guerra contra o terrorismo, War Made New é uma nova visão provocativa da ascensão do mundo moderno através das lentes da guerra. O aclamado autor Max Boot explora como as inovações em armamento e táticas não apenas transformaram a forma como as guerras são travadas e vencidas, mas também guiaram o curso dos eventos humanos, desde a formação dos primeiros estados modernos até o colapso da União Soviética e a chegada da Al-Qaeda.
Boot argumenta que os últimos cinco séculos de história foram marcados não por mudanças graduais na forma como lutamos, mas sim por quatro revoluções na tecnologia militar — e que as nações que dominaram com sucesso essas revoluções ganharam o poder de redesenhar o mapa do mundo. Boot traz esses momentos de transformação à vida vívida por meio de cenas de combate emocionantes.
"Magistral".
- The New York Times
Para a Era da Pólvora, ele argumenta que a tecnologia de armas de fogo trazida da China destruiu o combate ritualizado da Idade Média, pois inovadores como o rei sueco Gustavus Adolphus e o duque de Wellington incorporaram artilharia e cavalaria de novas maneiras, levando à ascensão das potências ocidentais. Explorando a Revolução Industrial, Boot discute como invenções inovadoras, como a máquina a vapor, levaram a uma rápida mecanização da tecnologia de combate em meados do século XIX e a novos níveis aterrorizantes de derramamento de sangue, da vitória prussiana sobre o Império Austríaco na Batalha de Koniggratz à devastação da frota russa em Tsushima pela marinha japonesa recém-industrializada. Para a Segunda Revolução Industrial, Boot se concentra em como o motor de combustão movido a óleo e o advento da aviação de combate culminaram nos avanços no campo de batalha da Segunda Guerra Mundial, da blitzkrieg alemã na França ao bombardeio americano de Tóquio, o que levaria à ascensão de superpotências globais.
"Brilhantemente elaborado."
- The Wall Street Journal
War Made New conclui com a Revolução da Informação em andamento, começando com a Guerra do Golfo em 1991. Boot descreve como o uso de mísseis guiados de precisão, juntamente com aviões furtivos e mísseis de cruzeiro, concedeu aos Estados Unidos uma vantagem crítica sobre os inimigos no Iraque e no Afeganistão, e também analisa como a última superpotência do mundo pode combater as táticas assimétricas de grupos como a Al-Qaeda.
Uma análise emocionante dos últimos quinhentos anos de guerra, War Made New mudará para sempre nossa compreensão das forças que moldam a civilização humana.
Um livro do Conselho de Relações Exteriores
Avaliações e Endossos:
"Crisp... Boot encontrou muitas coisas persuasivas a dizer sobre como as mudanças na tecnologia e gestão militar afetaram o curso da história europeia e mundial... Novo e convincente... Admiravelmente claro e conciso... Aprendi muito... Bem escrito."
- William H. McNeill, New York Review of Books
"Por [um] dos nossos comentaristas mais talentosos em assuntos militares... Sábio... Gráfico... Boot fornece uma mistura vívida e envolvente de narrativa histórica e análise, mostrando os resultados sangrentos do mundo real de tomadas de decisão abstratas sobre a natureza e o grau de preparação militar de um país... [Um] bom livro... Temos a sorte de ter analistas lúcidos como... Boot, que recorrem à história em vez da tecnologia para fornecer respostas para o futuro... Profundamente informado."
- Victor Davis Hanson, Comentário
"Excelente."
- The Washington Times
Boot argumenta que os últimos cinco séculos de história foram marcados não por mudanças graduais na forma como lutamos, mas sim por quatro revoluções na tecnologia militar — e que as nações que dominaram com sucesso essas revoluções ganharam o poder de redesenhar o mapa do mundo. Boot traz esses momentos de transformação à vida vívida por meio de cenas de combate emocionantes.
"Magistral".
- The New York Times
Para a Era da Pólvora, ele argumenta que a tecnologia de armas de fogo trazida da China destruiu o combate ritualizado da Idade Média, pois inovadores como o rei sueco Gustavus Adolphus e o duque de Wellington incorporaram artilharia e cavalaria de novas maneiras, levando à ascensão das potências ocidentais. Explorando a Revolução Industrial, Boot discute como invenções inovadoras, como a máquina a vapor, levaram a uma rápida mecanização da tecnologia de combate em meados do século XIX e a novos níveis aterrorizantes de derramamento de sangue, da vitória prussiana sobre o Império Austríaco na Batalha de Koniggratz à devastação da frota russa em Tsushima pela marinha japonesa recém-industrializada. Para a Segunda Revolução Industrial, Boot se concentra em como o motor de combustão movido a óleo e o advento da aviação de combate culminaram nos avanços no campo de batalha da Segunda Guerra Mundial, da blitzkrieg alemã na França ao bombardeio americano de Tóquio, o que levaria à ascensão de superpotências globais.
"Brilhantemente elaborado."
- The Wall Street Journal
War Made New conclui com a Revolução da Informação em andamento, começando com a Guerra do Golfo em 1991. Boot descreve como o uso de mísseis guiados de precisão, juntamente com aviões furtivos e mísseis de cruzeiro, concedeu aos Estados Unidos uma vantagem crítica sobre os inimigos no Iraque e no Afeganistão, e também analisa como a última superpotência do mundo pode combater as táticas assimétricas de grupos como a Al-Qaeda.
Uma análise emocionante dos últimos quinhentos anos de guerra, War Made New mudará para sempre nossa compreensão das forças que moldam a civilização humana.
Um livro do Conselho de Relações Exteriores
Avaliações e Endossos:
"Crisp... Boot encontrou muitas coisas persuasivas a dizer sobre como as mudanças na tecnologia e gestão militar afetaram o curso da história europeia e mundial... Novo e convincente... Admiravelmente claro e conciso... Aprendi muito... Bem escrito."
- William H. McNeill, New York Review of Books
"Por [um] dos nossos comentaristas mais talentosos em assuntos militares... Sábio... Gráfico... Boot fornece uma mistura vívida e envolvente de narrativa histórica e análise, mostrando os resultados sangrentos do mundo real de tomadas de decisão abstratas sobre a natureza e o grau de preparação militar de um país... [Um] bom livro... Temos a sorte de ter analistas lúcidos como... Boot, que recorrem à história em vez da tecnologia para fornecer respostas para o futuro... Profundamente informado."
- Victor Davis Hanson, Comentário
"Excelente."
- The Washington Times
February 24, 2021
Read this book for my POL 237 class (Modern Weapons and International Relations).
I’m not a big fan of wars (and 100% uninterested in battles), but it is extremely well written. Provides a good overview of the main RMAs (revolutions in military affairs): Gunpowder Revolution, First Industrial Revolution, Second Industrial Revolution, and the Information Revolution. It also provides a solid point on why he didn’t include the Napoleonic Revolution (he argues that this political revolution in which resulted in nationalism and a conscription-based army could already be seen in some other independent places across Europe).
Anyways, a very good book for people interested in the way warfare has changed throughout the last few centuries and its impacts on society and the State.
I’m not a big fan of wars (and 100% uninterested in battles), but it is extremely well written. Provides a good overview of the main RMAs (revolutions in military affairs): Gunpowder Revolution, First Industrial Revolution, Second Industrial Revolution, and the Information Revolution. It also provides a solid point on why he didn’t include the Napoleonic Revolution (he argues that this political revolution in which resulted in nationalism and a conscription-based army could already be seen in some other independent places across Europe).
Anyways, a very good book for people interested in the way warfare has changed throughout the last few centuries and its impacts on society and the State.
September 4, 2020
Good Overview of Military Technological Progess
This is before Max Boot went off the deep end, so don't worry. This book provides plenty of information about the several "revolutions" that have transformed warfare. It also details important battles showcasing these revolutions in an engaging and descriptive way. The digital version has notes at the end, but no footnotes within the text. However, the notes and bibliography at the end indicate that it is well sourced.
This is before Max Boot went off the deep end, so don't worry. This book provides plenty of information about the several "revolutions" that have transformed warfare. It also details important battles showcasing these revolutions in an engaging and descriptive way. The digital version has notes at the end, but no footnotes within the text. However, the notes and bibliography at the end indicate that it is well sourced.
October 22, 2023
The book talks about the significant warfare revolutions that have taken place since the 1500s. Believes we are currently in the latest course regarding the informational process. Who can identify it and use it to its advantage?
September 19, 2024
The chapters up to and including the battle of Tsushima were interesting and just kind of "mind candy" for anyone interested in military history. Then it kind of turned into "yeah, I get it" for the next couple hundred pages. Wouldn't recommend but was a pretty easy read at least.
June 18, 2019
Very illuminating ,fills in some of the blanks of Iraq and Afghanistan wars.Author is a conservative and it shows but does try to show both sides.
April 19, 2021
takes history for granted without enough curiosity
March 6, 2022
Excellent!
March 17, 2024
A brilliant book that should be read by every senior military leader.
May 18, 2025
Boot’s premise isn’t really original - technological advances change the outcome of wars - but he discusses it in a very lively and informative manner. Well done.
January 24, 2022
Entertaining enough from a neocon
February 26, 2017
Because military innovation spread so rapidly in Europe, the first mover advantage was limited.
Even the poet Belloc understood the advantage of technology - "Whatever happens, we have go the Maxim Gun, and they have not." Though, some armies did not adopt advantages, like the Union initially not taking the Spencer and Sharps repeating rifles because the head of ordnance thought that they would waste ammunition.
For all the advances in planes, Boot claims that the Norden bombsight was the biggest advantage the U.S. had in WWII.
Even the poet Belloc understood the advantage of technology - "Whatever happens, we have go the Maxim Gun, and they have not." Though, some armies did not adopt advantages, like the Union initially not taking the Spencer and Sharps repeating rifles because the head of ordnance thought that they would waste ammunition.
For all the advances in planes, Boot claims that the Norden bombsight was the biggest advantage the U.S. had in WWII.
November 19, 2008
Whenever I pick up a book, newspaper or magazine, my expectation is that I will be learning something new by reading it. So it is always a bit of a let down when a book fails this test, as did "War Made New" by Max Boot. (OK, so I'm getting old and jaded.)
"War Made New" is nothing new, since the ground was already covered by numerous authors, like van Creveld, Dupuy, Weigley, Addington and others. "War Made New" would do just fine as a starter book, but more experienced readers won't lose anything by skipping it.
Boot sticks with the John Keegan method of exposition, looking at the progression of technology and war by settling on episodic chapters that act as mile markers on a long road. Some chapters shine better than others. The B-29s over Japan chapter seemed sidetracked as over half the developmental narrative replayed the air war over Europe. The Iraq War chapter seemed muddled, more recitation than analysis, and seemed to gloss over the propaganda/information war aspects that would seem understandable to a newspaper reporter.
Boot is still very readable, but it is very difficult for a journalist to break away from the who-what-when-where of a story so he can really really dwell on why and how. Here Boot runs uneven, sometimes really explaining how technology and war had progressed in some chapters, and seemingly missing the boat in others. He scores well in his chapters of Gustavus Adolphus at Breitenfeld and Lutzen or von Moltke at Konnigratz. The chapter on Midway proved weak, with more time spent on trends leading to the battle, while giving the battle itself less time than it took to scrag three Japanese carriers. Boot waxes poetic about the technology and tactics, but overlooks doctrine and luck.
I have a feelign this volume will linger on my shelfes for a couple of years before I take it to the used bookstore. At least I bought it used in the first place. The book was OK. It should have been better. It still works as a starter book, though, based on its readability and topic selection.
February 21, 2008
I purchased this book expecting it to be a misguided proclamation of the current overwhelming might of the United States military; however, I was pleasantly surprised that it turned out to be far more insightful and nuanced than I had anticipated. Boot divides modern military history into periods separated by four “revolutions”—Gunpowder, First Industrial, Second Industrial, and Information. I’m generally skeptical of efforts to say “this period was where the transformation took place.” For instance, combined arms warfare has its origins World War I efforts to break the trench warfare dreadlock, but it wasn’t until 1940 that the concept was effectively proven. So when did the revolution occur? Boot skirts this problem by broadening his revolutions to be decades-long periods of innovation, which allows him to have plausible divisions of modern history. Still, I did have a couple of issues with the book. First, Boot’s descriptions of battles seemed somewhat juvenile. Discussions of swords cleaving through bodies like “tender steak” are simply not appropriate for a scholarly book. Secondly, I found his section on the Information Revolution to be fairly boring. Though it’s probably because I’m far more familiar with the capabilities of the modern American military than I am with those of the 19th Century Prussian force, I wish that he had condensed that section where possible. I found many of his conclusions insightful—the book’s concluding section is chalked full of interesting points—and his book has definitely influenced my thinking about the evolution of warfare.
February 7, 2014
"War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History: 1500 to Today," by Max Boot was a book that made me realize that there were many weak and small groups of people could challenge much stronger and better groups. For example, Japan at around 1850 was still keeping out the western influences. But a half a century later, this changed. They became known as one of the superpowers because of its victory in the Russo-Japanese War. A quote explains,"Out of thirty-eight Russian warships that had entered Tsushima Strait, thirty-one had been captured or sunk, including all of the battleships. Russian losses amounted to 4,830 dead, 5,907 captured, and an unknown number wounded. The Japanese lost only 117 officers and men killed and another 583 were wounded. A number of Japanese ships, including the Mikasa, were damaged, and three torpedo boats had been sunk, but not a single battleship or cruiser had been lost"(pg. 191). This shows that the Japanese quickly modernized and defeated a very strong Russian fleet which is pretty impressive. I can infer that the Japanese modernized fleet and well respected men could easily destroy anyone with an "ancient" fleet and horrible conditions because as a rule people with a more advance and untied cause could easily beat the opponent. Another case is the French and the German in 1941. The weaken Germans easily captured France without drastic loses. In conclusion, this book shows how weaken or small armies of countries could match a superpower(U.S.).
September 8, 2015
This was a fascinating, erudite read. The premise of book was to analyze in the author's opinion conflicts and wars in the last 500 years that were revolutionary in changing the course of history from a technological, strategic and social perspective. What seemingly appeared random were synthesized to an excellent conclusion. I read these kind of books because in order to understand the present, I must know the past.
There were essentially four revolutions: gunpowder in which guns replaced the bow and arrow and swords, first industrial revolution in which case steel replaced sail, second industrial revolution in which overwhelming firepower and rapidity won and the information revolution whereupon quality over quantity mattered most. Max Boot carefully selected stories where the victors often won decisively and the reasons for it. Whereas he avoided discussing quagmires (Vietnam) and evenly fought contests (Civil War) where both sides had equal strategy and technology to bear.
What made this an enjoyable read aside from the historical context, was that Max Boot paid particular care to story tell and to character build. He described in colorful detail the individuals involved in these revolutions. People like Gustavus (Sweden), Togo (Japan), LeMay (U.S.) and Schwarzkopf (U.S.), who were quite demonstrative among others. As well the consequences, repercussions, ramifications and evolutions these conflicts caused good and bad.
There were essentially four revolutions: gunpowder in which guns replaced the bow and arrow and swords, first industrial revolution in which case steel replaced sail, second industrial revolution in which overwhelming firepower and rapidity won and the information revolution whereupon quality over quantity mattered most. Max Boot carefully selected stories where the victors often won decisively and the reasons for it. Whereas he avoided discussing quagmires (Vietnam) and evenly fought contests (Civil War) where both sides had equal strategy and technology to bear.
What made this an enjoyable read aside from the historical context, was that Max Boot paid particular care to story tell and to character build. He described in colorful detail the individuals involved in these revolutions. People like Gustavus (Sweden), Togo (Japan), LeMay (U.S.) and Schwarzkopf (U.S.), who were quite demonstrative among others. As well the consequences, repercussions, ramifications and evolutions these conflicts caused good and bad.
January 25, 2011
A very good account of some major changes in warfare since the time Europeans first learned what to do with black powder... only to conclude with two VERY BAD chapters on the latest changes in warfare. Everything that is right with the first 3/4 of the book (level-headed, distanced big-picture view of the historian, accentuated with just enough story-telling and anecdote to make it all come to life) is wrong with the book's last chapters, the ones on the "information technology revolution". That might have something to do with the fact that he picks the latest Afghanistan and Iraq wars as case studies, and prominent chicken hawk Max Boot seems to have too much of an ideological stake in these conflicts to be objective or even distinguish the relevant from the pointless. The concluding "outlook" section seems shallow, US-centric and hastily written. I found the first chapters very enlightening though. Boot gets points for focussing on technological innovations without being techno-deterministic.
August 2, 2013
As a brief survey of a handful of battles from 1500-2005, this book is serviceable. But as a grand unified theory of the major revolutions in military affairs during that time, it fails. Boot generally favors the 'technology drives innovation in warfare' school of thought, but as a exercise in actually proving that thesis, he fails. He broadly divides military revolutions into four epochs since 1500, Gunpowder, First Industrial, Second Industrial, and Information. He then picks 3-4 battles per epoch and attempts to show how these engagements exemplify his various 'revolutions.' Boot never really does it though.
He describes the battles (very briefly), and then just goes off on random tangents about how side A managed to defeat side B wholly independent of the technological revolution that's supposedly the focus of the section. A major disappointment compared to his previous book "Savage Wars of Peace." But there, Boot was simply cataloging America's long history of small scale military interventions. Here, in attempting to "tie it all together," he fails.
He describes the battles (very briefly), and then just goes off on random tangents about how side A managed to defeat side B wholly independent of the technological revolution that's supposedly the focus of the section. A major disappointment compared to his previous book "Savage Wars of Peace." But there, Boot was simply cataloging America's long history of small scale military interventions. Here, in attempting to "tie it all together," he fails.
July 5, 2008
Phenomenal writing combined with concise analysis. Better than The Savage Wars of Peace, itself a great read. You're right in the middle of some of history's grandest battles -- the Spanish Armada v. England's pirates, ascendent Prussia v. Austria, Russian/Japanese navies duking it out. Entertaining chapters also on Gulf War I and the invasion of Afghanistan.
What Guns, Germs and Steel did for environmental determinism and The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers did for economic determinism, Boot's War Made New makes the case for military prowess and creativity -- or lack thereof -- as a country's destiny.
What Guns, Germs and Steel did for environmental determinism and The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers did for economic determinism, Boot's War Made New makes the case for military prowess and creativity -- or lack thereof -- as a country's destiny.
November 24, 2016
Tracing the history of warfare from 1500 to modern day is not an easy task. Boot chooses to break it up and address the pivotal jumps in warfare, revolutions as he calls them. We see the rise of the Arquebus amid pike warfare in the Renaissance, the evolutions of horse and musket warfare, the percussion cap and the train, the repeating rifle and the machine gun, the tank/aircraft, and then the information/accuracy/stealth age we reside in now. Throughout there is detail aplenty for the most avid military enthusiast, while the macro-level analysis will work for those who want the takeaways. I think wargamers and military buffs should read this book for sure, while more mainstream history fans can use it as primer to help them understand a myriad of eras better. A fun and steady read.
April 11, 2011
War Made New uses the theme of differences in warfare technology as the organizing principle for a history of warfare for the last 500 years. Many decisive military confrontations became routs because one side employed weapons, tactics, or organization that were superior to those of their opponents.
War Made New is very readable. It can be treated as a series of vignettes because each battle or “revolution” is independent of the others. On the other hand, it can be read as organic whole because of unifying themes.
Rating: 3.5/5
War Made New is very readable. It can be treated as a series of vignettes because each battle or “revolution” is independent of the others. On the other hand, it can be read as organic whole because of unifying themes.
Rating: 3.5/5
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