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Cambridge Handbooks in Psychology
The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness
The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness is the first of its kind in the field, and its appearance marks a unique time in the history of intellectual inquiry on the topic. After decades during which consciousness was considered beyond the scope of legitimate scientific investigation, consciousness re-emerged as a popular focus of research towards the end of the last century, and it has remained so for nearly 20 years. There are now so many different lines of investigation on consciousness that the time has come when the field may finally benefit from a book that pulls them together and, by juxtaposing them, provides a comprehensive survey of this exciting field. An authoritative desk reference, which will also be suitable as an advanced textbook.
981 pages, ebook
First published January 1, 2007
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
September 3, 2019
Dense, difficult, and nearly exhaustive
The first two chapters are nearly impenetrable, but such is the nature of philosophers writing on consciousness. If I were to give awards for impenetrable literature I would award third place to political and economic philosophers (think Marx and Veblen), second place to corporate lawyers, and the grand prize to anyone writing on consciousness, with a special award to philosophers writing on consciousness. (Even Daniel Dennett–not a contributor to this volume--can be annoying!).
The first problem is defining consciousness itself. Most of the contributors to this heavy (3.6 pounds--don't drop it on your toe!) tome give, or at least attempt, some sort of definition; however often their definitions are so highly qualified and so thoroughly couched in technical language that the general reader is not further informed. This is clearly a book for specialists, the "handbook" in the title notwithstanding. ("hand.book n. 1. a concise manual or reference book providing specific information or instruction about a subject" --the American Heritage Dictionary).
But concise this handbook is not. There is little to no instruction that I could find, but there is information and plenty of it. Almost a thousand pages long, with each page containing two dense columns, this is the sort of book that will never be read from cover to cover by any but the most masochistic of readers. For those whose professional work requires being up to date on the latest thinking about consciousness, this book may be of some real value as a reference. The author index contains about 3,500 individual names! The subject index covers 42 double-column pages. Furthermore, each essay (there are 31 of them) contains book and article references, in all hundreds of them. And there are some footnotes. I think this is impressive. Perhaps the indices and references are the most valuable parts of the book. I say perhaps because, to be honest, I was not able to read more than a small portion of the book.
There are three parts, "The Cognitive Science of Consciousness," "The Neuroscience of Consciousness," and "Quantum Approaches to Consciousness." The latter part consists of only one chapter by Henry Stapp. It contains a subtle corrective to the standard interpretation of the famous finger-lifting experiment by B. Libet. In this experiment, Libet showed that a willed action, such as willing a finger to lift, is preceded by a readiness potential that appears BEFORE the conscious experience of willing appears. Consequently, free will appears to be an illusion. I don't think this set well with Stapp and so he has a quantum corrective beginning on page 899. Unfortunately I wasn't able to understand it. It appears that the willed probability of action was there before the readiness potential.
There was a lot more I didn't understand, and I am not so sure the fault is entirely mine. I did understand, as in Uriah Kriegel's essay "Philosophic Theories of Consciousness: Contemporary Western Perspectives," that the consciousness problem that is notoriously difficult relates to what D.J. Chalmers called "the hard problem" and what Kriegel calls "phenomenal consciousness." Kriegel writes, "there is a sense of 'conscious' in which a mental state is conscious when and only when there is 'something it is like' [italics in original] for the subject--from the inside--to have it. Thus, when I take a spoonful of honey, there is a very specific--sweet, smooth, honey-ish, if you will--way it is like for me to have the resulting conscious experience." (p. 36)
Another example of phenomenal consciousness would be the subjective experience of the color red. This aspect of consciousness, as opposed to what I call the identity and awareness aspects of consciousness, is what is most mysterious. This is the aspect of consciousness that I believe is the bugaboo for most people, including many philosophers. Quite simply there is no way that such subjective experiences can ever become objective. The experience of the red that I see may or may not be the same as the experience you have; and there is no way that we can say for sure whether our experiences are the same or different.
Now let me quickly give my definition of consciousness as the term is generally used. It has three aspects: The first is awareness of the world (including awareness of our self and our processes, that is, self-awareness). The second is self-identity. Notice that awareness of self is different from identification with self. The third is experience or sensation: the feelings we get when we experience the world. This is what Kriegel calls "phenomenal consciousness."
It would be useful if all writers on consciousness defined just which aspect of consciousness they are talking about. Without clear definitions we are speaking in babblese like postmodern theorists or corporate lawyers trying to obscure and muddle the true message to be conveyed. I am sorry to report that some parts of this book that I did read seemed muddled. Perhaps in this case, though, the fault really is mine. Nonetheless I am willing to bet that sometime in the future people will look back and wonder what all the gobbledygook was about. I am somehow reminded of the medieval preoccupation of clerics with the problem of how many angels could dance on the head of a pin.
--Dennis Littrell, author of “The World Is Not as We Think It Is”
The first two chapters are nearly impenetrable, but such is the nature of philosophers writing on consciousness. If I were to give awards for impenetrable literature I would award third place to political and economic philosophers (think Marx and Veblen), second place to corporate lawyers, and the grand prize to anyone writing on consciousness, with a special award to philosophers writing on consciousness. (Even Daniel Dennett–not a contributor to this volume--can be annoying!).
The first problem is defining consciousness itself. Most of the contributors to this heavy (3.6 pounds--don't drop it on your toe!) tome give, or at least attempt, some sort of definition; however often their definitions are so highly qualified and so thoroughly couched in technical language that the general reader is not further informed. This is clearly a book for specialists, the "handbook" in the title notwithstanding. ("hand.book n. 1. a concise manual or reference book providing specific information or instruction about a subject" --the American Heritage Dictionary).
But concise this handbook is not. There is little to no instruction that I could find, but there is information and plenty of it. Almost a thousand pages long, with each page containing two dense columns, this is the sort of book that will never be read from cover to cover by any but the most masochistic of readers. For those whose professional work requires being up to date on the latest thinking about consciousness, this book may be of some real value as a reference. The author index contains about 3,500 individual names! The subject index covers 42 double-column pages. Furthermore, each essay (there are 31 of them) contains book and article references, in all hundreds of them. And there are some footnotes. I think this is impressive. Perhaps the indices and references are the most valuable parts of the book. I say perhaps because, to be honest, I was not able to read more than a small portion of the book.
There are three parts, "The Cognitive Science of Consciousness," "The Neuroscience of Consciousness," and "Quantum Approaches to Consciousness." The latter part consists of only one chapter by Henry Stapp. It contains a subtle corrective to the standard interpretation of the famous finger-lifting experiment by B. Libet. In this experiment, Libet showed that a willed action, such as willing a finger to lift, is preceded by a readiness potential that appears BEFORE the conscious experience of willing appears. Consequently, free will appears to be an illusion. I don't think this set well with Stapp and so he has a quantum corrective beginning on page 899. Unfortunately I wasn't able to understand it. It appears that the willed probability of action was there before the readiness potential.
There was a lot more I didn't understand, and I am not so sure the fault is entirely mine. I did understand, as in Uriah Kriegel's essay "Philosophic Theories of Consciousness: Contemporary Western Perspectives," that the consciousness problem that is notoriously difficult relates to what D.J. Chalmers called "the hard problem" and what Kriegel calls "phenomenal consciousness." Kriegel writes, "there is a sense of 'conscious' in which a mental state is conscious when and only when there is 'something it is like' [italics in original] for the subject--from the inside--to have it. Thus, when I take a spoonful of honey, there is a very specific--sweet, smooth, honey-ish, if you will--way it is like for me to have the resulting conscious experience." (p. 36)
Another example of phenomenal consciousness would be the subjective experience of the color red. This aspect of consciousness, as opposed to what I call the identity and awareness aspects of consciousness, is what is most mysterious. This is the aspect of consciousness that I believe is the bugaboo for most people, including many philosophers. Quite simply there is no way that such subjective experiences can ever become objective. The experience of the red that I see may or may not be the same as the experience you have; and there is no way that we can say for sure whether our experiences are the same or different.
Now let me quickly give my definition of consciousness as the term is generally used. It has three aspects: The first is awareness of the world (including awareness of our self and our processes, that is, self-awareness). The second is self-identity. Notice that awareness of self is different from identification with self. The third is experience or sensation: the feelings we get when we experience the world. This is what Kriegel calls "phenomenal consciousness."
It would be useful if all writers on consciousness defined just which aspect of consciousness they are talking about. Without clear definitions we are speaking in babblese like postmodern theorists or corporate lawyers trying to obscure and muddle the true message to be conveyed. I am sorry to report that some parts of this book that I did read seemed muddled. Perhaps in this case, though, the fault really is mine. Nonetheless I am willing to bet that sometime in the future people will look back and wonder what all the gobbledygook was about. I am somehow reminded of the medieval preoccupation of clerics with the problem of how many angels could dance on the head of a pin.
--Dennis Littrell, author of “The World Is Not as We Think It Is”
July 26, 2023
Фундаментальна колективна монографія, яку подають як підручник, але якби ж усі підручники були такими!
Колектив авторів - це найвідоміші спеціалісти по темах філософії свідомості, феноменології, аналітичної філософії, когнітивних наук тощо. Якщо хочете зрозуміти, зануритися у тематику філософії свідомості наразі найактуальнішого її зрізу, тоді ця книга для вас.
Колектив авторів - це найвідоміші спеціалісти по темах філософії свідомості, феноменології, аналітичної філософії, когнітивних наук тощо. Якщо хочете зрозуміти, зануритися у тематику філософії свідомості наразі найактуальнішого її зрізу, тоді ця книга для вас.
Read
July 11, 2008Philip David Zelazo, co-editor.
Want to read
April 6, 2010great think on consciousness and embodiment; recommended by John Kowalko
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews