Human societies should be described and explained with the same precision and success as the rest of nature. Before embarking on the quest, we need to consider several points. Understanding humans requires that we step aside from humanity itself, and this requires adopting an evolutionary perspective. To understand their logic, we need to understand that you can get an evolved trait without genes that specify that trait, if there is the provision of additional information in the form of stable properties in the environment (the invariant cycle of the moon triggers our sleep cycle, but sleep isn’t in our genes.) Further, there is the distinction between the umgebung and the umwelt. Humans extract all kinds of information from their umwelt because of specialised information-detecting equipment. And this equipment is there because of evolution. Learning is made possible by a whole range of mental mechanisms called intuitive inference systems or modules. Common properties of all modules = they work outside consciousness, each module is specialised, and we can understand modules best once we see them as evolved dispositions. The world is governed by physical laws, not by the intentions of agents; similarly humans are governed by physical laws, not by the intentions of agents, so in order to understand humanity, we need to stop anthropomorphising humans! Finally, we need to get rid of the ‘nature vs nurture’ divide, as it rests on an antiquated notion of inflexible genes (gene activation can be switched on and off by other genes) and a perennially changing natural world (environments have many invariant properties.) An evolved trait in not necessarily encoded in the genes, nor does it occur invariably, refuse to be modified, or remain resolute amidst a changing environment.
- WHAT IS THE ROOT OF GROUP CONFLICT? We need to consider group formation generally in evolutionary terms first. We seem to have an instinctual drive to form groups, but groupishness is not a blunt instinct to follow the herd; people behave in ways that seem to favour in-groups because they implicitly use a social exchange heuristic, a set of assumptions about how the social interaction that is presented to them is a form of reciprocal cooperation. How do humans form alliances (where several individuals collectively enhance all their welfares)? All humans rely on support from kin and nonkin in a variety of social interactions. Coalitional psychology includes an alliance-detection system, where people subconsciously measure who’s with who, who will defect/commit to the group, etc. Coalitions are competitive and require recruiting social support, which is a rival good, (the more for me, the less for you) so coalitions may seem intrinsically antagonistic. Ethnic groups are perceived in terms of competition for resources, so stereotypes are a way to justify hostility toward a competitive alliance. What drives people’s behaviour is coalitional psychology, where it seems advantageous to one’s own coalition to keep other groups in a lower-status position because of the intuition that the welfare of groups is a zero-sum game. Coalitional dynamics extend to large groups that number thousands or millions because people can signal coalitional affiliation, by dress, accent, gestures, etc. So what of inter-ethnic violence? Although, it may seem diverse, ethnic conflict takes a predictable form, the result of complex computations inside minds; it follows a script. A minor scuffle, sometimes leads to rumours that ‘they’ are planning something big. An ominous period of calm follows, after which another small incident escalates into a proper fight, with people recruiting their own in order to kill the fleeing victims. So humans attack one another; is there a universal aggressive instinct at work? Our tribal past included both intense cooperation (within groups) and trade and peace (between groups) as well as aggression for murder, looting (within and between groups). What makes humans go to war or cooperate is not stable, general, and context-free preferences for aggression or peace but a set of conditional mechanisms that weigh the value of either strategy, given the current environment. The kind of warfare included in our ancestral past was the sudden raid; kill as many males as possible, take the plunder + women + slaves back to your own camp. This primitive warfare applies also to ethnic violence and they use the same capacities and have highly similar forms. People only engage in combat when they think they have numerical advantage; and because of this, many raids are successful. This is overwhelmingly a male operation. Civil wars and ethnic riots take on predictable forms because they occur between organisms with highly similar capacities for group aggression thanks to the long past of primitive warfare. We can make sense of nationalism and ethnic rioting in terms of evolved capacities for coalition building and defence. Humans depend on group cohesion and continuity for their own individual welfare; the stakes are high, which explains why the evolved systems trigger strong motivations in the form of powerful emotions.
- WHY DO PEOPLE HOLD AND PASS ON SUCH STRANGE BELIEFS? Reason is a social tool used to bring others round to our way of thinking, and expose the invalid arguments other people use. Why do people eagerly acquire and broadcast information of low value? (Vaccines cause autism.) It was thought that the spread of rumours was a ‘search for meaning’ after the event, and adds a modicum of control to a chaotic situation. But the rumours frequently add more confusion; it explains much less than, say, an official report. So why do rumours spread and why is it important for others to ‘get on board’ with what we’re saying? Rumours are mainly about negative events and describe people intent on harming ‘us’ which leads to disaster if no action is taken. Because of our evolutionary past, humans attend to predation, intrusion, contamination, contagion, social offence, but not other threats that are more dangerous in this modern world. Threat-related information is considered credible as a precautionary measure, meaning that it is more likely to be spread. Several factors limit the spread of rumour; the plausibility of the warning (the more plausible, the more likely it can spread), precautions must not be too demanding, and the threat should be serious enough to warrant worry. Threat detection is one domain we turn down our, ordinarily tightly controlled, epistemic vigilance. We need to explain why humans have a desire to transmit certain beliefs and convince others of their factual basis. Why are these beliefs intensely moralised? The moralisation is other people’s behaviour is an excellent instrument for social coordination, which is required for collective action
- WHAT IS THE NATURAL FAMILY? It is impossible to compare ‘families’ across different cultures, because the term is of no use. Kinship can be explained by evolution. The complex brain emerged to manage social relations and allow for greater cooperation. Larger brain, larger head; humans were delivered prematurely, and mothers needed help. Altriciality led to pair-bonding; close alliance of man and woman. In all societies, there are bonds between them, with expectations of sexual exclusivity, joint investment in offspring, and sharing resources. Further, couples have strong feelings of attachment, couples involve the in-laws too, and fathers are emotionally invested in the rearing of offspring. Pairs that divided labour in a more efficient manner achieved higher fitness. But the meat for sex formula is narrow, because there is more than meat and sex. Men provide protection against other men provided that they know that the child is theirs. Attractiveness requires complex computations, because any two dimensions of attractiveness criteria may not be strongly correlated, so computations must weigh different factors simultaneously. No one cares about his fitness, so to speak, but must use proxies (0bservable cues that have been associate with higher fitness in evolutionary past) that guide him or her toward the most desirable mate. But the world over, societies stipulate norms of propriety, sexual restraint, and appropriate parenting; marriage is a package, is a yes/no affair, is for the long term, is conspicuous; why all these rules? Associating sex, economic solidarity, and the nurturing of children is a consequence of the evolution of cooperative pairs where sexual exclusivity and paternal provision increased fitness. But then, why marriage? Norms have advantageous effects in allowing people to coordinate their behaviours through communication. Marriage conveys that the married are removed from the pool of potential mates and the married have joint obligations to one another but not to anyone else. This is why marriages are so public; because each party may shirk from his/her duties, making marriage public makes signals of commitment honest and hard-to-fake, and makes desertion a blemish on one’s reputation.
- WHY ARE MEN IN CHARGE?
(I) POLITICS:Let’s look at psychology: in hunter-gatherer societies, there’s a variety of situations, from relative equality between genders of the !Kung, to the Pacific Northwest with more complex political systems and male dominance. Women’s political influence, varied as it was in foraging groups, was drastically reduced in agrarian societies, as subsistence depended on heavy work mostly provided by the men. In describing the evolutionary past, we should avoid the extremes of Hobbes and Rousseau, as the evidence suggests intensive cooperation within groups and potential conflicts between them. If that is the case, it would follow that men’s decisions were the most crucial for the survival of the band. The reality and importance of primitive warfare during our evolution suggests that male psychology is adapted for intergroup conflict and would be most suited for guiding the group to victory. And it is: men are more aggressive, have greater upper body strength, construe social relations as between groups rather than individuals, and recall events from a group standpoint as opposed to women who recall them from a personal standpoint.
(II) DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: domestic oppression consists in limiting the autonomy of women; in all places where there are such limitations, women’s sexuality is also limited. Two factors determine the intensity of mate guarding: it’s more intensive where a few males monopolise access to women and there is a risk of cuckoldry. Why do men publicly chastise women for being too ‘slutty’? There is an incentive for men to participate in boosting the fitness of other unrelated men, because those unrelated men would then boost his own fitness when he is not present.
- CAN SOCIETIES BE JUST? The question of what is a just society is construed as a question about who produces what goods, how they are distributed, and how the rules under which we interact with others may create fair or unfair differences. Evolution to the rescue, again. Cooperation between nonkin is a puzzle; the central feature that accounts for successful cooperation is the possibility to choose partners, ditch defectors, and stick with cooperators. Humans evolved in groups where they could offer and receive cooperation from different individuals; they have an interest in the behaviour of others; so one may benefit a great deal from having a reputation for honest, mutually advantageous behaviour. But what about fairness? People try to maintain fair allocations and react strongly when people take more than their ‘fair’ share. The intuition about proportional allocation may stem from partner choice; if I engage with you in some joint venture, it’s in my interest to split the benefits evenly. If I don’t split even, you’ll find someone else who will. Communal sharing and trade benefit from these intuitions. For communal sharing, we look to see who contributed how much, and dole out how rewards proportionately. For trade, there are some psychological capacities we developed that enabled us to trade with strangers: agents must measure the respective utilities and infer that one is worth losing for the other; we must represent ownership of the objects exchanged; and we must be able to detect free-riding and cheating, which occur when individuals manage to extract a benefit without paying a cost. These three cognitive systems - utility equivalence, ownership, and free-rider detection - contribute to what we expect from a transaction. We expect transactions to occur between identified agents, to be free and voluntary, and that mutually profitable interaction occurs in the context of repeated transactions. We pay attention to a whole host of information because of our evolved preferences; not only goods, their amount and value, but the identity and reputation of persons. Humans evolved a capacity not just for trade but for repeated transactions with known partners, with carefully monitored mutual goodwill. Anthropologists were right to emphasise that trade in small societies is rarely only about trade; but they erred in assuming that these additional factors were a matter of arbitrary norms or culture. People can learn local norms because underlying principles about partner choice, reputation, and fairness are part of our evolved learning systems. Trade between individuals can scale up to encompass massive territories of trade between individuals far removed. The cooperative interaction that is trade naturally tends to expand, including more and more individuals; one engine of this expansion is the division of labour. By specialising, individuals can create more, higher-quality goods at a lower price, and since they require the work of others, the expansion can continue in a virtuous circle. We do not intuitively understand the global economy, as our mental modules were crafted to deal with local and personal trade; yet we still think of the economy in terms of our evolved social exchange template. We often think of the economy as a zero-sum game, but the economy is a positive-sum game; the more you gain, the more I gain. Where do these beliefs come from? People’s economic beliefs consist in reflective beliefs or comments on their intuitions. Emporiophobia is the fear of markets, which are impersonal forces. Features of modern markets (no expectation of repeated exchange, no judgment of character needed, etc) are interpreted by our modules as threats, which leads people to fear markets. Almost everyone agrees that justice should be the organising principle of society. There are two main paths from our intuitive psychology to a conception of mass-market society. We can extend intuitions about ownership and fair exchange to the vast number of transactions of a modern economy. We find it legitimate that people be entitled to the fruit of their work, sell their goods at the price buyers will accept, etc. People are entitled to what they acquire through voluntary exchange with other free agents, the view espoused by Nozick. We can also extend intuitions about collective action and redistribution, projecting them onto society. Society is a pool of collective action to which everyone contributes and from which they may receive appropriate rewards. Society would be just if people received essential liberty and equality of opportunity, the view espoused by Rawls. Either the processes (transactions must be just, and distribution will be just) or outcomes (distributions must be fair and this will make transactions fair) are focused upon. Our conceptions of justice lead to a paradox. The wealth created by economies is not understandable by our intuitive modules, so they are seen as a windfall. This activates our communal sharing preferences which aims to redistributes the wealth, but this clashes with our effort and ownership intuitions (those who contribute more, receive more.) Policies clash between intuitive systems.
- CAN HUMAN MINDS UNDERSTAND SOCIETIES? Humans use ‘folk sociology’ to understand how society works, but this isn’t necessarily accurate. Politics isn’t transparent in modern society; to understand how minds handle large-scale decision making, we need to see that most human evolution took place in small bands of nomadic foragers; accumulation of wealth enabled the formation of social ranks and hierarchies. What is the psychology that underlies large and complex polities? Collective action is the first thing which underlies the formation of complex polities: participants in joint hunting or collective parenting care about who is involved, how much they can be trusted, and how the fruits of collective labour are distributed. But this type of coordination requires deferring immediate gratification and stemming free-riders, both limits which have been minimised by communication between agents. Hierarchies are the second thing which underlie the formation of complex polities: human hierarchies are not just relevant to the distribution of goods; they are mainly production hierarchies, ways of orchestrating different individual’s contributions, because of a difference between skill-levels, to a task. Hierarchies often congeal as a relatively permanent system; why? Why are individuals interested in gaining power? Not only because of the material benefits conferred, but mainly because of the reproductive benefits conferred. Rank is the most desired trait in males. Many seek positions of dominance because they are intrinsically desirable (proximate) and lead to higher fitness (ultimate). Human minds wish to circumvent would-be despots and so act as a balance to this desire to seek dominance. In the foraging groups in which our political psychology evolved, titles weren’t as titled as presidents, which enabled the entrenched egalitarian motivation to develop in social life. As human groups got bigger, they developed descriptions of their own societies, folk sociologies, that have several common features: groups are like agents (hence why groups can act as individuals), power is a force (power is a substance attached to some people), and social facts are things (social facts exist independently from human minds, over and above what people think of them). Intuitive psychology systems are the main resource available to us to understand social groups. But these beliefs frequently generate all sorts of incoherent inferences. More realistic descriptions of society, in terms of interactions between individuals, is simply beyond our capacities. We are condemned to use folk sociology because of the mysteries of apparent order created by the aggregation of myriad interactions that we cannot follow. Our political psychology consists of implicit processes which underlie different approaches to policy considerations. Conservative vs liberal is based on abstract values, underpinned by intuitions, and moral outlooks. Liberals think that harm and fairness are moral; conservatives think that loyalty, authority, and sanctity are also important. A major point of contention between liberals and conservatives is the role of the state. People construe the state as an agent. The spontaneous and compelling belief that the state is like an agent explains the fact that policy choice is driven by moral intuitions. Social democrats construe the state as a benevolent distributor of deserved benefits; conservatives as an exploitative partner whose resources and monopoly of violence predict unfair exchange.