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Purity of Heart Is to Will One Thing by Soren Kierkegaard
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Published January 1, 1719
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October 11, 2024
ONE OF KIERKEGAARD’S “EDIFYING DISCOURSES”
Kierkegaard (1813-1855) was a Danish philosopher, theologian, poet, social critic, and religious author, who was the first existentialist philosopher.
This book contains one of Kierkegaard’s “Edifying Discourses,” and it was written in 1846. He wrote in the Preface, “Although this little book (it can be called an occasional address, yet without having the occasion which produces the speaker and gives him authority…) is like a fantasy, like a dream by day as it confronts the relationships of actuality: yet it is not without assurance and not without hope of accomplishing its object. It is in search of that solitary ‘individual.’ to whom it wholly abandons itself, by whom it wishes to be received, as if it had arisen within his own heart; that solitary ‘individual’ whom with joy and gratitude I call my reader; that solitary ‘individual’ who reads willingly and slowly, who reads over and over again, and who reads aloud---for his own sake. If it finds him, then in the distance of the separation the understanding is perfect, if he retains for himself both the distance and the understanding in the inward of appropriation.”
He says, “If [a] flower were really immortal then immortality must be just that which prevented it from dying, and therefore immortality must have been present in each instant of its life. And the story of its life must once again have been wholly different in order to express continually immortality’s difference from all the changeableness and the different kinds of variations of the perishable. Immortality cannot be a final alteration that crept in, so to speak, at the moment of death as the final stage. On the contrary, it is a changelessness that is not altered by the passage of the years.” (Pg. 35)
He says, “For in the temporal, and sensual, and social sense, repentance is in fact something that comes and goes during the years. But in the eternal sense, it is a silent daily anxiety. It is eternally false, that guilt is changed by the passage of a century. To assert anything of this sort is to confuse the Eternal with what the Eternal is least like---with human forgetfulness.” (Pg. 45)
He states, “So also with riches and power and the world that passes away and the lust thereof. The one who has willed either of them, even if he only willed one thing, must, to his own agony, continue to will it when it has passed, and learn by the agony of contradiction that it is not one thing. But the one who willed in truth willed one thing and therefore willed the Good, even if he be sacrificed for it, why should he not go on willing the same in eternity, the same thing that he was willing to die for? Why should he not will the same, when it has triumphed in eternity?” (Pg. 59)
He argues: “If it be possible for a man really in truth to will one thing, then he must will the good in truth. If it be possible for a man to will the good in truth, then he must be at one with himself in willing to renounce all double-mindedness. Therefore, if it be possible for a man to will one thing, then he must will the Good, for only the Good is one. Thus if it becomes a fact, a fact that he wills one thing, he must will the Good in truth.” (Pg. 68)
But he adds, “the man who desires the Good for the sake of the reward does not will one thing, but is double-minded. The Good is one thing; the reward is another that may be present and may be absent for the time being, or until the very last. When he, then, wills the Good for the sake of the reward, he does not will one thing but two.” (Pg. 69)
He observes, “If … one things of eternity’s punishment, it gives a false impression, as if indeed it were not double-mindedness to will the Good only out of fear of punishment. But yet this IS double-mindedness… It is the one whose miserable glory consists solely in avoiding something hence the pleasure is not a pleasure in itself, but only by contrast. Nor does he attribute the punishment to God and to the Good… But in that case the Good is not one thing. Thus by his double-mindedness he brings about a strained relation between the Good and the punishment. He wishes that the punishment did not exist, and thereby he really wishes also that the Good did not exist, for otherwise he must have another relation to the Good than the one that he has through punishment.” (Pg. 86-87)
He suggests, “the all-knowing One, who in spite of anyone is able to observe it all, does not desire the crowd. He desires the individual; He will deal only with the individual, quite unconcerned as to whether the individual be of high or low station, whether he be distinguished or wretched.” (Pg. 185)
He concludes, “For as only one thing is necessary, and as the theme of the talk is the willing of only one thing: hence the consciousness before God of one’s eternal responsibility to be an individual is that one thing necessary.” (Pg. 197-198)
This is one of Kierkegaard’s most interesting “religious” books, and will be of great interest to anyone studying his thought.
Kierkegaard (1813-1855) was a Danish philosopher, theologian, poet, social critic, and religious author, who was the first existentialist philosopher.
This book contains one of Kierkegaard’s “Edifying Discourses,” and it was written in 1846. He wrote in the Preface, “Although this little book (it can be called an occasional address, yet without having the occasion which produces the speaker and gives him authority…) is like a fantasy, like a dream by day as it confronts the relationships of actuality: yet it is not without assurance and not without hope of accomplishing its object. It is in search of that solitary ‘individual.’ to whom it wholly abandons itself, by whom it wishes to be received, as if it had arisen within his own heart; that solitary ‘individual’ whom with joy and gratitude I call my reader; that solitary ‘individual’ who reads willingly and slowly, who reads over and over again, and who reads aloud---for his own sake. If it finds him, then in the distance of the separation the understanding is perfect, if he retains for himself both the distance and the understanding in the inward of appropriation.”
He says, “If [a] flower were really immortal then immortality must be just that which prevented it from dying, and therefore immortality must have been present in each instant of its life. And the story of its life must once again have been wholly different in order to express continually immortality’s difference from all the changeableness and the different kinds of variations of the perishable. Immortality cannot be a final alteration that crept in, so to speak, at the moment of death as the final stage. On the contrary, it is a changelessness that is not altered by the passage of the years.” (Pg. 35)
He says, “For in the temporal, and sensual, and social sense, repentance is in fact something that comes and goes during the years. But in the eternal sense, it is a silent daily anxiety. It is eternally false, that guilt is changed by the passage of a century. To assert anything of this sort is to confuse the Eternal with what the Eternal is least like---with human forgetfulness.” (Pg. 45)
He states, “So also with riches and power and the world that passes away and the lust thereof. The one who has willed either of them, even if he only willed one thing, must, to his own agony, continue to will it when it has passed, and learn by the agony of contradiction that it is not one thing. But the one who willed in truth willed one thing and therefore willed the Good, even if he be sacrificed for it, why should he not go on willing the same in eternity, the same thing that he was willing to die for? Why should he not will the same, when it has triumphed in eternity?” (Pg. 59)
He argues: “If it be possible for a man really in truth to will one thing, then he must will the good in truth. If it be possible for a man to will the good in truth, then he must be at one with himself in willing to renounce all double-mindedness. Therefore, if it be possible for a man to will one thing, then he must will the Good, for only the Good is one. Thus if it becomes a fact, a fact that he wills one thing, he must will the Good in truth.” (Pg. 68)
But he adds, “the man who desires the Good for the sake of the reward does not will one thing, but is double-minded. The Good is one thing; the reward is another that may be present and may be absent for the time being, or until the very last. When he, then, wills the Good for the sake of the reward, he does not will one thing but two.” (Pg. 69)
He observes, “If … one things of eternity’s punishment, it gives a false impression, as if indeed it were not double-mindedness to will the Good only out of fear of punishment. But yet this IS double-mindedness… It is the one whose miserable glory consists solely in avoiding something hence the pleasure is not a pleasure in itself, but only by contrast. Nor does he attribute the punishment to God and to the Good… But in that case the Good is not one thing. Thus by his double-mindedness he brings about a strained relation between the Good and the punishment. He wishes that the punishment did not exist, and thereby he really wishes also that the Good did not exist, for otherwise he must have another relation to the Good than the one that he has through punishment.” (Pg. 86-87)
He suggests, “the all-knowing One, who in spite of anyone is able to observe it all, does not desire the crowd. He desires the individual; He will deal only with the individual, quite unconcerned as to whether the individual be of high or low station, whether he be distinguished or wretched.” (Pg. 185)
He concludes, “For as only one thing is necessary, and as the theme of the talk is the willing of only one thing: hence the consciousness before God of one’s eternal responsibility to be an individual is that one thing necessary.” (Pg. 197-198)
This is one of Kierkegaard’s most interesting “religious” books, and will be of great interest to anyone studying his thought.
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