Book One of the Summa Contra Gentiles series studies God's existence, nature, and substance, his perfect actuality, the autonomy of his knowledge, the independence of his will, the perfection of his life, and the generosity of his love. The Summa Contra Gentiles is not merely the only complete summary of Christian doctrine that St. Thomas has written, but also a creative and even revolutionary work of Christian apologetics composed at the precise moment when Christian thought needed to be intellectually creative in order to master and assimilate the intelligence and wisdom of the Greeks and the Arabs. In the Summa Aquinas works to save and purify the thought of the Greeks and the Arabs in the higher light of Christian Revelation, confident that all that had been rational in the ancient philosophers and their followers would become more rational within Christianity. Book 2 of the Summa deals with Creation; Book 3, Providence; and Book 4, Salvation.
Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas, a Dominican friar and theologian of Italy and the most influential thinker of the medieval period, combined doctrine of Aristotle and elements of Neoplatonism, a system that Plotinus and his successors developed and based on that of Plato, within a context of Christian thought; his works include the Summa contra gentiles (1259-1264) and the Summa theologiae or theologica (1266-1273).
People ably note this priest, sometimes styled of Aquin or Aquino, as a scholastic. The Roman Catholic tradition honors him as a "doctor of the Church."
Aquinas lived at a critical juncture of western culture when the arrival of the Aristotelian corpus in Latin translation reopened the question of the relation between faith and reason, calling into question the modus vivendi that obtained for centuries. This crisis flared just as people founded universities. Thomas after early studies at Montecassino moved to the University of Naples, where he met members of the new Dominican order. At Naples too, Thomas first extended contact with the new learning. He joined the Dominican order and then went north to study with Albertus Magnus, author of a paraphrase of the Aristotelian corpus. Thomas completed his studies at the University of Paris, formed out the monastic schools on the left bank and the cathedral school at Notre Dame. In two stints as a regent master, Thomas defended the mendicant orders and of greater historical importance countered both the interpretations of Averroës of Aristotle and the Franciscan tendency to reject Greek philosophy. The result, a new modus vivendi between faith and philosophy, survived until the rise of the new physics. The Catholic Church over the centuries regularly and consistently reaffirmed the central importance of work of Thomas for understanding its teachings concerning the Christian revelation, and his close textual commentaries on Aristotle represent a cultural resource, now receiving increased recognition.
In God there is no passive potency. With that one sentence one can deduce most of classical theism. Deny that sentence, and one’s theology is fraught with peril, if not outright heretical. Because of that loaded sentence, one should begin the journey here and not with Summa Theologiae. The latter text is usually too difficult without a prior knowledge of medieval philosophy. There are places where Thomas is wrong. This is not one of those places. If you have a heterodox doctrine of God (EFS, theistic personalism, etc), and when you are corrected on it, it does no good to say, “But Thomas was wrong on x, y, and z.” Maybe he was, but that is not the issue under discussion.
When Thomas Aquinas uses terms like act, potency, and motion, he does not mean by them what you mean. For example, when we say God is immobile, we mean that there is no potency in him requiring something other than God to activate God. Motion is the act the of something that is in potency. Since there is no potency in God (i.e., no unrealized aspect), then there is no motion in God.
Furthermore, God is eternal. This appears to be more familiar to today’s readers. Thomas’s reasoning will not be. When we say God is eternal, we mean God has no internal motion. If God is not eternal, then he must be brought into being by another. Again, we are back to the original statement: there is no passive potency in God. If there were, then God would depend on someone (or thing) beside himself to be God.
This eliminates any form of composition or any denial of divine simplicity. All composites have both act and potency. Moreover, composites are subsequent to components. As James Dolezal has so eloquently stated, “All that is in God is God.” Even though Thomas has not yet said that all of God’s attributes are identical to his essence, one can see where he is going. That raises a question, though. If the divine names signify the essence, then how are the names not synonymous with one another? Aquinas answers that they do not signify the same notion.
Continuing upon this line of thought, God is his essence. The essence of a thing is either the thing itself, or it is related to it by some cause. Yet nothing can be the cause of God. Therefore, God is his essence.
Can there be two perfect Gods? No. If two Gods are equally perfect, then there must be some way to distinguish them—something must be added to one or both. But if something is added to a God, then he (or she) cannot be perfect.
Those of us in the Reformed tradition would do well to pay attention to his remarks on God’s knowledge and will. God knows all things by his essence. That is fairly standard in Western Christianity. That is God’s natural knowledge. God also knows all possibles. That is God’s knowledge of vision. And since all potencies arise from him, the First Cause, he knows an infinite array of possibilities.
Thomas’s comments on divine willing are very useful for modern discussions of free will and determinism. Given that God is his willing, and God is a necessary being, does this make everything in the world “necessary”? No. When God wills something, he wills it to the “ordered end of his goodness.” I think Thomas is arguing for something like secondary causes. He uses the example of a doctor and medicine.
On another line of thought, when God wills things, he wills things “insofar as they participate in his goodness.” Since no created thing’s participation is entire in the essence of God, there is no 1:1 willing.
In conclusion, this text is probably the second place to start one’s journey on Thomas Aquinas. On Being and Essence is the most accessible, especially the edition by Armand Maurer. The introduction should give the reader a decent grasp on the issues involved. With that under the reader’s belt, Summa Contra Gentiles should be no trouble.
Il existe des livres qui change la vie et que l'on relira toute notre vie. Le premier Livre de la Somme Contre les Gentils est de ces livres pour ma vie intellectuelle, sans aucun doute. Je ne peux pas faire ici une review détaillée de ce livre. Il est la référence pour moi pour ce qui est la doctrine de Dieu. De loin le meilleur livre de théologie sur la doctrine de Dieu Un que j'aie pu lire. Je dis "Dieu Un" car Thomas aborde la Trinité dans d'autres partie de la SCG. Autrement dit, il ne traite ici que des attributs de Dieu, de son existence, etc. et non pas de la distinction des personnes. Il est donc certain que j'y reviendrai souvent dès que j'aurai une question à ce sujet. Thomas est à son meilleur à ce sujet, à mon humble avis.
Je ne peux pas décrire toute l'influence que cela a et aura sur ma théologie.
C'est la meilleure présentation de la doctrine de Dieu que je connaisse. La somme contre les Gentils est très concise mais quand même précise. On comprend très bien pourquoi tous les attributs de Dieu sont inter-reliés et si importants pour ne pas rabaisser Dieu. Très bons commentaires et bonne introduction. Je trouve la traduction compréhensible.
Pozdravljam cjelokupni blue pill matrix s pitanjem hoće li itko ikada iz blue pill matrixa pročitati ovu knjigu? Kada će netko s ljevice pročitati Tomu Akvinskog? Da dočekamo navedeno je jednako izgledno kao da dočekamo da se Pupovac okrene klasičnom poduzetništvu umjesto etnobiznisu. Ovo je osvrt prve knjige Suma protiv pogana, ostale knjige slijede. Izvorni naslov je Summa contra gentiles, ovo izdanje Kršćanske sadašnjosti posjeduje sjajan prijevod Augustina Pavlovića koji obara poput motorne pile. Izdanje je konstruirano na način da svaku izvornu latinsku stranicu slijedi hrvatski prijevod. Kul je da su starogrčki citati izneseni u alfabetu, jer iznošenje starogrčkih citata u latinici je bljakavo i seljačija. U uvodnom dijelu knjige ovog izdanja, pisanog od strane Augustina Pavlovića, navodi se da je hrvatski prijevod utemeljen na leoninskom izdanju čija je osnovica autograf samog Tome Akvinskog. Navodi Pavlović da je sačuvana samo trećina teksta autografa, no leoninsko izdanje je koristilo najstarije rukopise SCG iz 13. stoljeća. Samo leoninsko izdanje je objavljivano u razdoblju od 1918. do 1930. *SCG- Summa contra gentiles Ova prva knjiga SCG-a napisana je u Parizu 1259. Prvo štampano izdanje cjelokupne SCG se obistinilo 1475. Izvorni potpuni naslov glasi; Knjiga o istini katoličke vjere protiv zabluda onih koji ne vjeruju, izdana od brata Tome Akvinskog, Reda propovjednika. Ovo konkretno izdanje nudi osvrte različitih teologa s različitim mišljenjima o nakani i namjeri ovog djela te je u tom smislu ostvarilo vlastitu kvalitetu. Pluralizam i otvorenost u pogledu kontekstualizacije, nastanka i nakane djela svjedoči o kulosti i kognitivnoj opuštenosti, koja je nužna za ostvarenje kognitivne oštrosti, svih onih uključenih u ovo izdanje. Uvodni dio iznosi i godine prijevoda, ja ću ovdje baciti najzanimljivije prijevode; kineski prijevod u četiri sveska u razdoblju od 1970. do 1972., perzijski prijevod 1672., arapski prijevod 1931., poljski prijevod raspoređen u tri sveska; prvi svezak 1930., drugi svezak 1933., treći svezak 1935. Prvi hrvatski prijevod je ostvario nažalost samo rukopis te je nastajao od 1960. do 1966. od strane Franje Kovačevića Duje. Uvodni dio naglašava da se Toma oslanjao na Vulgatu, a ne hebrejsku Bibliju. Toma Akvinski je takav kuler, kognitivna siledžija, umoviti snagator te redpillana bomba. Kada bi sveučilište u Berkeleyu čitalo Akvinskog možda bi i postalo centar kritičkog razmišljanja. Najviše me oduševilo da gotovo nigdje ne spominje Isusa Krista, njegov najveći uzor je bio i ostao Aristotel kojeg on uvijek naziva Filozofom. Ova knjiga po svojoj konstrukciji, pa čak u mnogim pogledima i po sadržaju, pripada u potpunosti antičkoj filozofiji. Pročitavši već prije Dunsa Scota mogu ustvrditi da je srednjovjekovna filozofija u biti samo nadogradnja na antičku filozofiju. Toma logičkim dokazima i argumentima dokazuje svoje sudove, uistinu poput svog učitelja Aristotela i ostale ekipe s egejskih obala. Na samome početku Toma navodi da je konačni cilj svemira, pa tako i ove knjige, Istina. „A konačna svrha svake pojedine stvari jest ona koju ima u vidu njezin prvi začetnik ili pokretač. No prvi je začetnik i pokretač svemira um, kako ćemo kasnije dokazati. Treba dakle da konačna svrha svemira bude vrednota uma; a to je istina. Prema tome istina je konačni cilj cijelog svemira; a mudrost će osobito prionuti da nju promatra.“ U vezi odnose istine i uma Toma navodi ono što je moguće spoznati umom i ono što je nemoguće spoznati umom: „ Ima, doista istina o Bogu koje nadilaze svaku sposobnost ljudskog razuma, npr. Da je Bog trojstven i jedan. A ima i takvih do kojih može doći i prirodni razum, npr. Da Bog postoji, da je jedan i sl. Do tih istina o Bogu došli su i filozofi putem dokazivanja, vođeni svjetlom prirodnog razuma.“
U daljnjem tekstu Toma iznosi u biti samu definiciju Istine; „ Doista, budući da je istina izjednačavanje uma i stvarnosti, ukoliko um izriče da jest ono što jest, a da nije ono što nije, istina se odnosi na ono o umu što um izriče, a ne na radnju kojom to izriče. Naime za istinu uma se ne iziskuje da se samo mišljenje izjednači sa stvarnošću, budući da je stvarnost katkad tvarna, dok je mišljenje netvarno, nego ono što um mišljenjem kaže i spoznaje, to treba da bude izjednačeno sa stvarnošću, tj. da tako bude u stvarnosti kako um izriče.“ U ovom pasusu Tome Akvinskog jasno se ističe da je jedina istinska stvarnost ona netvarna, jer je istina samo ono što um kaže o onom što je netvarno baš zato što je tvarnost samo prividno stvarnost. Izjednačiti um i stvarnost znači spoznati ono što je onkraj tvarnosti, ono što je stvorilo tvarnost te samim time nije tvarno. Ono je netvarno te je time u potpunosti stvarno što bi značilo da je u potpunosto istinito, da je u konačnici sama Istina, a ono je Bog. Izvor svega. U tom smislu sami red pill je često neredpillast jer se stalno izgovara da treba napustiti matrix. No, možda i nije red pill neredpillast jer je to samo metafora. Red pill nije gnosticizam koji će u tom smislu napustiti matrix. Tvarnost je u općoj filozofiji, materijalizam, a u političkoj filozofiji svaki oblik materijalističke filozofije; marksizam, feminizam, rodna ideologija, ekologija, transhumanizam. Zasada svega toga je u osnovi tvarna, iako se može filozofirati da su svojim dogmama navedene filozofije postale svojevrsne lažne religije, pseudoduhovnosti. Promatranje pobačaja kao ljudskog prava je pravi primjer pseudoduhovnosti feminizma i ostalih natražnjaštva. To je davanje žrtve Ljudskim Pravima, lažnoj duhovnosti utemeljenoj na svijetu bez Boga, na lažnom i palom svijetu. Jebote, ako mene neće skoro nazvati Morpheus i reći mi da sam Neo onda je Bandić nekorumpiran! Vratimo se malo na samog Akvinskog. Idući citat pokazuje Aristotelov način dokazivanja te čak posjeduje i Aristotelovu terminologiju: „ Najprije ovako: Ako nešto pokreće samo sebe, treba da počelo gibanja ima u sebi – Također bi trebalo da gibanje prima neposredno, tj. od sebe samoga, a ne od nekog svoga dijela, kao što se životinja kreće posredstvom kretanja svojih nogu; u ovom slučaju ne bi cjelina primala gibanje samo od sebe, nego samo njezin dio, te jedan dio od drugoga. – Također bi trebalo da bude djeljivo i da ima dijelove: naime sve što se pokreće samo od sebe, pokrenuto je neposredno (bez ičijeg posredstva). Dakle , ako miruje samo jedan dio, miruje i cjelina. Jer ako bi jedan dio bio u miru, a drugi se kretao, bio bi to jasan znak da nije neposredno bila pokrenuta cjelina, nego njezin dio, tj. onaj koji se kreće dok drugi miruje. A s druge strane, ono što miruje zato jer je nešto drugo u stanju mirovanja, ne kreće se samo od sebe: jer ako mirovanje jednoga ovisi o mirovanju drugoga, onda isto tako i gibanje jednoga mora ovisiti o gibanju drugoga; to znači da ne prima gibanje od sebe samoga. Dakle, ono o čemu smo predmnijevali da se pokreće samo od sebe, zapravo se ne pokreće samo od sebe. Iz svega nužno slijedi da sve što se kreće, prima gibanje od drugoga.“ Korištenje konkretnog glagola kretati je izravna referenca na Aristotela i ekipu s egejskih obala. Navedena riječ u svom poimenčenom obliku označava kod Aristotela i Tome (i mnogih drugih) samog Boga. Citat kojeg bacih ste uhvatili ako ste shvatili da ovim citatom Toma želi definirati Boga, kao ono što samo ne kreće, ali pokreće sve drugo. Situacija polako postaje vruća, rasplamsan um Akvinskog tek tinja veliki požar kojim će zapaliti vatru spoznaje. „ Naime snaga se dokazivanja sastoji u tom da, ako nešto pokreće sama sebe i neposredno, a ne posredstvom dijelova, onda njegovo kretanje ne može ovisiti ni o čemu; a kretanje stvari koja se može dijeliti ovisi o dijelovima, kao uostalom i njezin bitak, i zato se ne može gibati neposredno i sama od sebe.“ Akvinski je upravo bacio još jednu kladu u peć. Posljednji citat se referira na prethodni te dopunjuje već izrečeno te bih bacio još jedan češer u oganj; „Kod uzajamno usmjerenih pokretača i pokretanih bića, od kojih naime jedno po redu prima gibanje od drugoga, nužno je da, ako se ukloni prvi pokretač ili on prestane pokretati, onda nijedan drugi neće pokretati ili primati kretannje; jer je ono prvo uzrok gibanja svih ostalih. No kad bi se niz pokretača i po redu pokrenutih bića bio beskonačan, ne bi (zapravo) bilo prvog pokretača, nego bi svi bili u nekom smislu posredni pokretači. Dosljedno nijedno biće ne bi primilo gibanje. Dakle ništa se na svijetu ne bi gibalo.“ Opet nailazimo na Aristotelovu terminologiju; pokretač, pokretana bića, kretati... Stari kuler se očito volio gibati, moguće da je Aristotel ovom spikom faćkao ženske na plažama Helade koju su zasigurno i tada bile pune dobrih komada mesa. No, ovo nije osvrt o Aristotelovim pick up artist tehnikama već o SCG. Moj problem sa zadnjim citatom jest to što po meni Akvinski baca jednu dogmu. Tvrdi da ne bi bilo gibanja bez prvog pokretača, da nije moguće da postoji beskonačni niz pokretanih bića. Otkada sam bio dijete oduvijek sam intuitivno cjelokupno postojanje (dakle, niz pokrenutih bića) zamišljao kao beskonačno. Akvinski kreće od aksioma, nužno je Prapočelo/prvi pokretač. Logički i ima smisla u nekoj mjeri, jer kako bi se kretala bića ako ih nešto ne pokreće? Moja kritika jest banalna, pa tko bi onda kretao nepokretnog i pokretajućeg pokretača, što je promašeno u tom smislu jer je to baš Bog. Bog je Bog po tome što nije pokretan i što pokreće sve drugo. Heraklit Efeški u tom smislu ima pravo kada kaže da bogovi nisu stvorili svijet jer ako svijet jest mora biti oduvijek. Prije svog čitanja Heraklita Mračnog sam istovjetno mislio, ako bilo što postoji mora oduvijek i zauvijek postojati. Budale bi se nasmijale i rekle- Hahaha pa kako si se onda Vatroslave rodio i kako ćeš umrijeti? Ja bih odgovorio da vjerujem u jedan vid reinkarnacije. Suvremena fizika čestica je utvrdila da se subatomske čestice nižu u beskraj. Dakle, beskraj je sveprisutan na prvoj razini stvarnosti, onoj fizičkoj. Koliko je fizika u zadnjih sto godina postala metafizička disciplina, ovo ne govorim u pejorativnom smislu, dapače, jasno je u samoj toj mjeri jer subatomske čestice manje od neutrona i protona postaju upitno fizičke same po sebi. Beskraj unutar jednog atoma je odraz beskraja svemira/ stvarnosti. U mnogim pogledima se tradicionalistička metafizika podudara sa suvremenom fizikom čestica. Koliko humanistika postaje agitpropovska i dogmatska toliko je fizika sve više duboka i oštra, poput srednjovjekovne metafizike. Gledajući HRT 3 doživih da jedan profesor sa zagrebačkog PMF-a priznaje da fizika ne zna kako proton izgleda u 3D oblik, među ostalim jer ne znaju koliko proton ima kvarkova. Kada ćete čuti da jedna feministkinja priznaje da njoj nešto nije jasno? Dogmatičarkama je sve jasno, isto kao što je bilo i Hitleru sve jasno. Sve jasno, a opet sve krivo. U tom vidu bi bilo kul napisati jedno filozofsko djelo u stilu Aristotela, Scota i Akvinskog koje bi uzelo u obzir spoznaje suvremene fizike čestica. Da se razumijemo ja želim vjerovati u nauk Crkve prije svega jer sve više vidim da je Crkva jedina razumna u ovom feminističkom i transrodnom svijetu, ali jebiga. Crkva kreće od aksioma poput same znanosti. Tako da sam samo kulturološki katolik. Za sad mi Akvinski nije pružio dovoljno dobre odgovore. Ovo je por cierto tek osvrt prve knjige SCG-a. Moje čitanje Akvinskog još nije dovršeno u trenu pisanja ovog osvrta. Ukratko, jasno je da Akvinski preuzimajući Aristotelovu terminologiju preuzima koncept Boga kao nepokretnog pokretača. U tom pogledu zanimljiva je jedna lingvistička primjedba Augustina Pavlovića koji u fusnotama baca da je latinski izvornik tog termina bio primus motor inmobilis kojeg Verešov prijevod razriješava kao iskonski začetnik zbivanja koji nije podložan zbivanju u smislu toga da navedeni prijevod naglašava metafizičku komponentu Boga koja je uistinu i temeljna, dapače i jedina, komponenta Boga. Akvinski daljnjim dokazivanjem produbljuje definiranje nepokretnog pokretača: „ Ako( je giban ) istom vrstom, bit će nužno da preinačitelj i sam trpi preinaku, da izliječitelj i sam bude liječen, a učitelj i sam bude poučavan, i to u istoj znanosti. Ali to je nemoguće, jer onaj koji poučava, mora posjedovati znanje, a onaj koji ga prima, nužno ga nema. Dosljedno, isto će biće imati isto svojstvo i neće ga imati, što je nemoguće.“ „Mora se dakle zaključiti da postoji nešto prvo (iskonsko) što ne prima gibanje od izvana... ... U jednom smislu, da je ono iskonsko posve nepodložno gibanju. U tom slučaju već imamo što smo stavili kao cilj dokazivanja tj. da postoji iskonski pokretač nepodložan gibanju. U drugom smislu, da se ono iskonsko giblje samo od sebe. A to se čini vjerojatnim, jer ono što je po sebi, uvijek je prije onoga što je po drugome. Zato je razumljivo da se među pokretanim bićima ono prvo giblje samo od sebe, a ne od drugoga. Međutim ako to dopustimo opet slijedi isto. Naime ne može se reći da biće koje sebe pokreće prima gibanje od sebe cijeloga: jer bi tada slijedile već spomenute nepriličnosti, tj. netko da bi netko istodobno poučavao i bio poučavan, a slično i kod ostalih gibanja (promjena); osim toga bi neko biće ujedno bilo u mogućnosti i u zbiljnosti, jer je pokretač, kao takav, u zbiljnosti, a pokretno biće u mogućnosti. Ne preostaje nego zaključiti da jedan njegov dio samo pokreće, a drugi dio biva pokretan... A ne može se kazati da su oba dijela pokretana, naime (uzajamno) jedan od drugoga, niti da jedan dio pokreće sebe i pokreće drugi dio; niti da cjelina pokreće dio; niti da dio pokreće cjelinu. Iz toga bi naime slijedile spomenute nepriličnosti, tj. da bi neko biće ujedno proizvodilo i primalo gibanje iste vrste; i da bi ujedno bilo u mogućnosti i zbiljnosti; i dalje, da ne bi ono cijelo gibalo neposredno samo sebe, nego posredstvom (svoga) dijela. Na kraju dakle dolazi se do zaključka da jedan dio bića koje giblje samo sebe mora biti nepodložno gibanju, a pokretati drugi dio. Ali budući da se u samokretnim pokretačima koji su kod nas- tj. u životinjama- onaj dio što pokreće- tj. duša- giblje #stjecajem okolnosti#, premda je sam po sebi nepodložan gibanju, (Aristotel) dalje dokazuje da se pokretački dio prvog samokretnog pokretača ne giblje niti sam po sebi niti #stjecajem okolnosti#. Naime u samokretnim pokretačima koji su kod nas, tj. u životinjama, i koji su propadljivi, onaj pokretački dio giblje se #stjecajem okolnosti#. Ali samokretne propadljive pokretače nužno treba svesti na prvo samokretno biće koje je vjekovječno. Dosljedno, nužno je da postoji neki pokretač samokretnog pokretača, koji se ne giblje niti po sebi niti #stjecajem okolnosti#. Bjelodano je da s njegova (Aristotelova) gledišta nužno mora postojati neki vjekovječni samokretni pokretač. Ako je naime gibanje vjekovječno, kako on pretpostavlja, tada rađanje samokretnih bića koja su podložna rađanju i ugibanju, mora biti neprestano. No tom neprekidnom trajanju ne može biti uzrok neko od samokretnih bića, jer nije vjekovječno. A niti sva zajedno:
I was actually reading the older Image Books edition, 1955. Highly recommended for pastors and theological students. Yes, Aquinas was Catholic. Yes, he was not a Van Tilian. He was, nevertheless, a clear and careful thinker. Clear and careful thinking is something that pastors and theological students should cultivate. This is not easy reading, but will richly repay a close and careul reading.
This was a hard ranking for me. Probably lower than 4 stars, but better than 3.5. At times, this was an awe and worship-inspiring read. The dedication of the mind to the prolonged consideration of the greatness and essence of God cannot help but leave one overwhelmed by the magnificence of God. Moreover, Aquinas is so good on the essence and simplicity of God.
That said, undeniably there is a density to Aquinas that can be difficult to follow at times (this is particularly the case in the latter third of the book). Admittedly, I am not well-versed in Aristotle, so I had some work to do in gleaning the distinctions in act and potency in being which are major categories in Thomistic thought. Moreover, a number of terms that Aquinas uses in fairly technical ways (i.e. act, potency, genus, species, appetites, accidents, etc.) he uses not only by their technical definitions, but also expands on the sense of the concept which is difficult to follow when his particular use of those terms is new to the reader, as it was to me. Finally, in a number of areas, I felt that Aquinas fell a bit short of demonstrating his claims, usually on account of definitions for terms that he assumed, seemed to be philological liberties on his part, and not evident on their face.
This was a pretty good book, but there's a lot of flaws in the arguments that St. Aquinas puts forth. It's very evident that he lived in a time when the academic/intellectual make-up was in the grasp of the catholic church, but it's fascinating how he chooses to argue his points in spire of that fact.
Aquinas explains the arguments that demonstrate that God exists, as well as the attributes of God. Throughout each section he explains why we say that God is X, and how to properly understand each attribute. He also exposes the false reasonings behind the improper ways of understanding God's attributes. Anybody who is interested in theology, as well as anybody who is or wishes to become a theologian, apologist, or, for that matter a philosopher, needs to read this book, and deal with the arguments that Aquinas explains.
Aristotle and Saint Thomas aquinas are the two most clear thinkers, I have read. Saint Thomas aquinas ability to reason is superb and be warned this is no easy read! It takes time and much patients to get through it. If you desire a better understanding about the nature of God this is a book one should read because it uses logical reasoning and don't worry he doesn't use scripture as a source for his arguments but rather uses reason, which is common to all.
Book 1 (of 4) of the SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES, by St. Thomas Aquinas, is one long, continuous, sustained logical argument for proving the existence and attributes of God.
Written originally in Latin, it's 102 short chapters (mostly 2 or 3 pages each, with some less than 1 page long and others 6 pages long or more), each proving some particular point about God. Chapters include "That God is eternal," "That God is not a body," "That God is good," "That God is one," "That God is truth," and "That God is living," among many others.
Each chapter builds up from the premises and conclusions of the chapters before it. Thus we get some chapters proving that God knows things (ch. 44, "That God is intelligent"), then a chapter about how God knows things (ch. 45, "That God's act of understanding is his essence"), and then several chapters about what kinds of things God knows (ch. 49, "That God understands things other than himself").
This book is, at turns, simplistically obvious and confusingly complicated. It is an intense intellectual exercise, and should not be approached lightly.
While reading Aristotle's NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, I highlighted a passage from Book VII, section 14: this sentence, "For the contrary of bad is good." And I noted in the margin, "Aristotle: the bold and brilliant philosopher!" It just seemed funny to me that in the middle of this complicated book about ethics and happiness is the stunningly simple sentence "For the contrary of bad is good."
As I've been reading through other famous works of philosophy, I've been fond of highlighting other such passages of -- as I call them -- "Aristotelian logic," and several such passages can be found in Aquinas' book SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES: "only the false is opposed to the true" (ch. 7, section 1); "election is made by choice" (ch. 88, section 4); and "it is true not only that good is good but also that evil is evil; for just as it is true that that which is is, so it is true that that which is not is not" (ch. 71, section 4).
The second half of that last example helps transition us to the other extreme of Aquinas' sentences: those which are overly complicated and impossibly hard to understand. For that second half of the last example took me a few moments to read and reread before I finally understood it, and there are many other sentences in the SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES which, no matter how many times I tried to reread them, I'm still not sure I understand them.
Consider some examples below (two among many, many).
Aquinas bases his argument proving the existence of God -- as Aristotle does in his book PHYSICS -- on the observation of motion in the universe. From ch. 13: "Everything that is moved is moved by another. That some things are in motion -- for example, the sun -- is evident from sense. Therefore, it is moved by something else that moves it. This mover is itself either moved or not moved. If it is not, we have reached our conclusion -- namely, that we must posit some unmoved mover. This we call God. If it is moved, it is moved by another mover. We must, consequently, either proceed to infinity, or we must arrive at some unmoved mover. Now, it is not possible to proceed to infinity. Hence, we must posit some prime unmoved mover."
Now, these are not the impossibly hard to understand sentences. No. I give these only to show that Aquinas bases his argument for proving the existence of God on the observation of motion in the universe, which then later leads to these impossibly hard to understand sentences:
"Since, therefore, the first mover of all things, whom we call God, is an absolutely unmoved mover, He must be related to the mover that is a part of the self-moving being as the appetible is to the one who has the appetite. Not, however, as something appetible by sensible appetite, since sensible appetite is not of that which is good absolutely but of this particular good, since the apprehension of the sense is likewise particular; whereas that which is good and appetible absolutely is prior to that which is good and appetible here and now." (From ch. 44, section 2.)
Yeah, don't ask me to explain that to you because I have no idea what's being said there either.
In this second example, see if you can count how many times the word "move" appears in its various forms:
"Furthermore, as was shown above, the first movable is moved by a mover moving through intellect and appetite. Now, a mover could not cause motion through his intellect unless he moved the movable in so far as it is of a nature to be moved in place. But this is true of the movable in so far as it is here and now, and consequently in so far as it is singular. Therefore, the intellect that is the mover of the first movable knows the movable in so far as it is singular. Now, this mover is either held to be God, in which case we have made our point, or it is held to be some being below God." (From ch. 65, section 8.)
I lost count, too. And I don't understand those sentences, at all.
My eyes skipped absently from word to word and my mind blanked while reading many, many difficult passages in the SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES.
For this reason -- because there are so many passages in the SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES which I am not smart enough to understand or appreciate -- I cannot rate this book very highly.
3 out of 5 stars.
It would take a person much smarter than I am to rate this book more highly than I have.
Is God happy? This is one of the questions Thomas Aquinas tackles in the Summa Contra Gentiles, book one. This book is much more accessible than the other, more famous, Summa Theologiae because it is written in a fairly flowing style that is at the same time a very concise summary of philosophical positions about God, nature, humans, etc. In a strange way, Thomas Aquinas would fit perfectly in an app that would shoot one theological observation a day in order to replace doom-scrolling. That might not displease Aquinas himself, who reputedly possessed most of the Church Fathers (and the Bible, of course) by memory, which allowed him to write, "look up" and quote even while traveling, liberated from the library shelves back in Paris. For me, the Summa Contra Gentiles is interesting because it deals with questions that are still relevant in theory, especially psychology and science. As Aquinas thinks about God, he sketches out a person, a subject, that is entirely free from lack, and he traces down what this means in "praxis". God is the only being that lives in an active voice--everyone else has life happen to them in a passive way. There is no contradiction between logic and theology. God knows all contingencies that did not occur in history. God knows evil. There is no need to be a Christian (let alone Catholic) to find Aquinas useful.
Solid effort by our boy TA. The beginning of the treatise deals with epistemology (TA argues that certain truths about God's nature can be arrived at through natural reason alone), the next few chapters outline arguments for God's existence based on TA reading of Aristotle (TA loves Aristotle, who he refers to as "The Philosopher" and references on nearly every page), and the bulk of the work consists of arguments for different characteristics of God.
There are over 80 chapters in the work that each deal with a different property of God, so as you can imagine it can be a bit of a slog if you're not inherently drawn to Scholasticism (e.g. "Ch. 75. That in willing Himself God also wills other things", "Ch. 76 That God wills Himself and other things by one act of will"), but he makes up for this in his proofs of God's existence and arguments for some of God's more interesting properties (e.g. "Ch. 20 That God is not a body","Ch. 42 That God is one", "Ch. 43 That God is infinite").
It became clear to me from reading this book that Aquinas is one of the writers and thinkers most responsible for the logocentric trend in the Western literary and philosophical thought as a result of his promotion of Aristotle as the ultimate signifier who, parallel with the Biblical texts themselves, established the human picture of the universe as a being in the world of encoded facts and logical proofs from which he could establish his consciousness through the perception of time. Three stars.
No one writes on God like Thomas Aquinas. I am a better technical writer after reading this book. Aquinas writes on God like an engineer writing a technical report, but with love. Possibly my favourite author.
From this book I will remember that happiness in this life is contemplation of God Almighty, and that fatigue and interruptions prevent perfect happiness. Worth the read.
Overall, this was a good read. There are some flaws in Thomas Aquinas' arguments and claims, but it was good defense of God's existence. His flow of thought is pretty simple to follow along with, but the material is challenging. This book was definitely one of the most challenging books I have read.
Great. The format makes it easier to read straight through than the other Summa. No flipping back and forth between objections and responses. Ch. 2 ¶2 is apparently the most autobiographical thing we have in writing from Aquinas.
Very good overview of Aquinas's theology proper. The best part was arguably the few chapters regarding the relation of the divine will and the willed effects, as he addresses a proto-modal collapse argument that the necessity of the divine will necessitates all effects willed.
Read this book for my college philosophy class (sebenernya awal 2023 bacanya..) I'm not even Christian but studying this book and Aquinas' arguments have somehow strengthen my own beliefs that there is in fact an omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent being above us.