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Summa Contra Gentiles #3.1
Summa Contra Gentiles: Book Three: Providence Part I
The Summa Contra Gentiles is not merely the only complete summary of Christian doctrine that St. Thomas has written; it is also a creative and revolutionary work of Christian apologetics composed at the precise moment when Christian thought needed to be intellectually creative in order to master and assimilate the intelligence and wisdom of the Greeks and the Arabs. In the Summa, Aquinas works to save and purify the thought of the Greeks and the Arabs in the higher light of Christian Revelation, confident that all that had been rational in the ancient philosophers and their followers would become more rational within Christianity.
This exposition and defense of divine truth has two main parts: the consideration of that truth that faith professes and reason investigates, and the consideration of the truth that faith professes and reason is not competent to investigate. The exposition of truths accessible to natural reason occupies Aquinas in the first three books of the Summa. His method is to bring forward demonstrative and probable arguments, some of which are drawn from the philosophers, to convince the skeptic. In the fourth book, St. Thomas appeals to the authority of the Sacred Scripture for those divine truths that surpass the capacity of reason. The present volume is the first part of a treatise on the hierarchy of creation, the divine providence over all things, and man’s relation to God.
This exposition and defense of divine truth has two main parts: the consideration of that truth that faith professes and reason investigates, and the consideration of the truth that faith professes and reason is not competent to investigate. The exposition of truths accessible to natural reason occupies Aquinas in the first three books of the Summa. His method is to bring forward demonstrative and probable arguments, some of which are drawn from the philosophers, to convince the skeptic. In the fourth book, St. Thomas appeals to the authority of the Sacred Scripture for those divine truths that surpass the capacity of reason. The present volume is the first part of a treatise on the hierarchy of creation, the divine providence over all things, and man’s relation to God.
278 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1265
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About the author
Thomas Aquinas
2,672 books1,158 followersPhilosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas, a Dominican friar and theologian of Italy and the most influential thinker of the medieval period, combined doctrine of Aristotle and elements of Neoplatonism, a system that Plotinus and his successors developed and based on that of Plato, within a context of Christian thought; his works include the
Summa contra gentiles
(1259-1264) and the
Summa theologiae
or theologica (1266-1273).
Saint Albertus Magnus taught Saint Thomas Aquinas.
People ably note this priest, sometimes styled of Aquin or Aquino, as a scholastic. The Roman Catholic tradition honors him as a "doctor of the Church."
Aquinas lived at a critical juncture of western culture when the arrival of the Aristotelian corpus in Latin translation reopened the question of the relation between faith and reason, calling into question the modus vivendi that obtained for centuries. This crisis flared just as people founded universities. Thomas after early studies at Montecassino moved to the University of Naples, where he met members of the new Dominican order. At Naples too, Thomas first extended contact with the new learning. He joined the Dominican order and then went north to study with Albertus Magnus, author of a paraphrase of the Aristotelian corpus. Thomas completed his studies at the University of Paris, formed out the monastic schools on the left bank and the cathedral school at Notre Dame. In two stints as a regent master, Thomas defended the mendicant orders and of greater historical importance countered both the interpretations of Averroës of Aristotle and the Franciscan tendency to reject Greek philosophy. The result, a new modus vivendi between faith and philosophy, survived until the rise of the new physics. The Catholic Church over the centuries regularly and consistently reaffirmed the central importance of work of Thomas for understanding its teachings concerning the Christian revelation, and his close textual commentaries on Aristotle represent a cultural resource, now receiving increased recognition.
Saint Albertus Magnus taught Saint Thomas Aquinas.
People ably note this priest, sometimes styled of Aquin or Aquino, as a scholastic. The Roman Catholic tradition honors him as a "doctor of the Church."
Aquinas lived at a critical juncture of western culture when the arrival of the Aristotelian corpus in Latin translation reopened the question of the relation between faith and reason, calling into question the modus vivendi that obtained for centuries. This crisis flared just as people founded universities. Thomas after early studies at Montecassino moved to the University of Naples, where he met members of the new Dominican order. At Naples too, Thomas first extended contact with the new learning. He joined the Dominican order and then went north to study with Albertus Magnus, author of a paraphrase of the Aristotelian corpus. Thomas completed his studies at the University of Paris, formed out the monastic schools on the left bank and the cathedral school at Notre Dame. In two stints as a regent master, Thomas defended the mendicant orders and of greater historical importance countered both the interpretations of Averroës of Aristotle and the Franciscan tendency to reject Greek philosophy. The result, a new modus vivendi between faith and philosophy, survived until the rise of the new physics. The Catholic Church over the centuries regularly and consistently reaffirmed the central importance of work of Thomas for understanding its teachings concerning the Christian revelation, and his close textual commentaries on Aristotle represent a cultural resource, now receiving increased recognition.
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January 2, 2024
Thus far, my favorite in the Summa Contra Gentiles collection. While Aquinas still at times relies on assertions that I don’t think he has sufficiently demonstrated, I found that to occur significantly less in this book. Moreover, his arguments on the nature and extent of divine providence, the aim of beings toward their own felicity, and the attainment of that felicity through a true knowledge of God (mediated through the light of understanding given by God to the creature) are magnificent.
June 4, 2024
THE THIRD VOLUME (Pt. I) OF THOMAS’S PHILOSOPHICAL MATERWORK
Thomas Aquinas (‘Thomas of Aquino’; i.e., present-day Lazio, Italy;1225-1274) was an extremely influential Italian Dominican friar, philosopher, theologian and Doctor of the Church. (He often cites Aristotle, who he refers to as ‘The Philosopher,’ as well as the Muslim philosopher Ibn Rushd [known as ‘Averroes’ in the West], who Thomas calls ‘the Commentator.’)
He states, “every agent tends toward some determinate effect, and this is called his end… the ancient natural philosophers [are] refuted; they claimed that all things come about as a result of material necessity, for they completely excluded final cause from things.” (Pg. 37-38; Bk. 3/I, Ch. 2)
He argues, “evil is different from the good which every agent intends. Therefore, evil is a result apart from intention… a defect in an effect and in an action results from some defect in the principles of the action… that which results as an effect of the defect of power will be apart from intention of the agent. Now, this is evil. Hence, evil occurs apart from intention.” (Pg. 41, Ch. 4) Later, he adds, “though evil be apart from intention, it is nonetheless voluntary… though not essentially but accidentally so… a person wills to do a disorderly action for the sake of some sensory good to be attained; he does not intend the disorder, nor does he will it simply for itself, but for the same of this result. And so, evil consequences and sins are called voluntary in this way.” (Pg. 47, Ch. 6) He concludes, “no essence is evil in itself… In fact, evil is simply a privation of something which a subject is entitled by its origin to possess and which it ought to have… privation is not an essence; it is, rather, a negation in a substance. Therefore, evil is not an essence in things.” (Pg. 48, Ch. 7)
He asserts, “On the side of the effect, evil is accidentally caused by the good… evil occurs accidentally because the privation of another form is the necessary concomitant of the presence in a given form. Thus, simultaneously with the generation of one thing there necessarily results the corruption of another thing. But this evil is not an evil of the product intended by the agent but of another thing… Thus it is clear that, in the natural order, evil is only accidentally caused by the good… However, in the moral order, the situation seems to be different… we shall find the two orders similar from one point of view, dissimilar from another. There is dissimilarity on this point: moral fault is noticed in action only, and not in any effect that is produced… Therefore, moral evil is … considered… only as a resultant from the agent.” (Pg. 57-58, Ch. 10)
He says, “Now, all things get their being from the fact that they are made like unto God, Who is subsisting being itself, for all things exist merely as participants in existing being. Therefore, all things desire as their ultimate end to be made like unto God… Moreover, all created things are, in a sense, images of the first agent, that is, of God… Now, the function of a perfect image is to represent its prototype by likeness to it; this is why an image is made. Therefore, all things exist in order to attain to the divine likeness, as to their ultimate end.” (Pg. 76, Ch 19) Later, he adds, “the effect does tend to become like the agent, not only in its species, but also in this characteristic of being the cause of others. Now, things tend to the likeness of God in the same way that effects tend to the likeness of the agent… Therefore, things naturally tend to become like God by the fact that th4ey are the causes of others.” (Pg. 82, Ch. 21)
He observes, “to understand the most perfect intelligible object, which is God, is the most perfect thing in the genus of this operation of understanding. Therefore, to know God by an act of understanding is the ultimate end of every intellectual substance.” (Pg. 98, Ch. 25)
He points out that “Man’s felicity does not consist in riches… Indeed, riches are only desired for the sake of something else; they provide no good of themselves but only when we use them, either for the maintenance of the body or some such use. Now, that which is the highest god is desired for its own sake and no for the sake of something else. Therefore riches are not the highest good of man.” (Pg. 116, Ch. 30)
He argues, “there is still another knowledge of God… and by this God is known to men through faith. In comparison with the knowledge that we have of God through demonstration, this knowledge through faith surpasses it… Yet, it is not possible for man’s ultimate felicity to consist in even this knowledge of God… in the knowledge of faith, there is found a most imperfect operation of the intellect… For the intellect does not grasp the object to which it gives assent in the act of believing. Therefore, neither does man’s ultimate felicity lie in this kind of knowledge of God.” (Pg. 130-131, Ch. 40)
He goes on, “God can be seen … in this life… only as in a mirror… Although this mirror, which is the human mind, reflects the likeness of God in a closer way than lower creatures do, the knowledge of God which can be taken in by the human mind does not go beyond the type of knowledge that is derived from sensible things, since even the soul itself knows that it is itself as a result of understanding the natures of sensible things… Hence, throughout this life God can be known in no higher way than that whereby a cause is known through its effect.” (Pg. 161, Ch. 47)
He suggests, “the nearer a thing is to God, Who is entirely immutable, the less mutable is it and the more lasting… But no creature can come closer to God than the one who sees His substance. So, the intellectual creature that sees God’s substance attains the highest immutability. Therefore, it is not possible for it ever to lapse from this vision.” (Pg. 205, Ch. 62)
He notes, “[God] uses all things by directing them to their end. Now, this is to govern. So, God is the governor of all things through His providence… God moves all things to their ends, and He does so through His understanding… He does not act through a necessity of His nature, but through understanding and will… Therefore, God by His providence governs and rules all things that are moved toward their end, whether they be moved corporeally, or spiritually as one who desires is moved by an object of his desire.” (Pg. 210-211, Ch. 64)
He argues, “everything that is in a place, or in something, is in some way in contact with it… an incorporeal thing is said to be in something according to the contact of power, since it lacks dimensive quantity. And so, an incorporeal thing is related to its presence in something by its power, in the same way that a corporeal thing is related to its presence in something by dimensive quantity. Now, if there were any body possessed of infinite dimensive quantity, it would have to be everywhere. So, if there be an incorporeal being possessed of infinite power, it must be everywhere… Therefore, He is everywhere.” (Pg. 223, Ch. 68)
He argues, “the good of the whole takes precedence over the good of a part… if evil were removed from some parts of the universe, much perfection would perish from the universe, whose beauty arises from an ordered unification of evil and good things. In fact, while evil things originate from good things that are defective, still, certain good things also result from them, as a consequence of the providence of the governor… Therefore, evil should not have been excluded from things by divine providence… if no evils were present in things, much of man’s good would be diminished… In fact, the good is better known from its comparison with evil, and while we continue to suffer certain evils our desire for goods grows more ardent… Therefore, it is not a function of divine providence totally to exclude evils from things… with these considerations we dispose of the error of those who, because they noticed that evils occur in the world, said that there is no God.” (Pg. 240, Ch. 71)
He adds, “evil and defects occur in things ruled by divine providence as a result of the establishment of secondary causes in which there can be deficiency, it is evident that bad actions… are not from God but from defective proximate causes; but, insofar as they possess something of action and entity, they must be from God.” (Pg. 241, Ch. 71)
He also asserts, “divine providence does not exclude freedom of choice… the fact that will is a contingent cause arises from its perfection… it is more pertinent to divine providence to preserve liberty of will than contingency in natural causes… Now, the intellect does not have one form determined to an effect; rather, it is characteristic of it to comprehend a multitude of forms. And because of this the will can produce effects according to many forms. Therefore, it does not pertain to the character of providence to exclude liberty of will.” (Pg. 244-245, Ch. 73) He summarizes, “divine operation does not exclude the operations of secondary causes… Therefore, secondary causes are the executors of divine providence.” (Pg. 259, Ch. 77)
This book will be “must reading” for anyone seriously studying Medieval philosophy and theology, or Catholic philosophy in general.
Thomas Aquinas (‘Thomas of Aquino’; i.e., present-day Lazio, Italy;1225-1274) was an extremely influential Italian Dominican friar, philosopher, theologian and Doctor of the Church. (He often cites Aristotle, who he refers to as ‘The Philosopher,’ as well as the Muslim philosopher Ibn Rushd [known as ‘Averroes’ in the West], who Thomas calls ‘the Commentator.’)
He states, “every agent tends toward some determinate effect, and this is called his end… the ancient natural philosophers [are] refuted; they claimed that all things come about as a result of material necessity, for they completely excluded final cause from things.” (Pg. 37-38; Bk. 3/I, Ch. 2)
He argues, “evil is different from the good which every agent intends. Therefore, evil is a result apart from intention… a defect in an effect and in an action results from some defect in the principles of the action… that which results as an effect of the defect of power will be apart from intention of the agent. Now, this is evil. Hence, evil occurs apart from intention.” (Pg. 41, Ch. 4) Later, he adds, “though evil be apart from intention, it is nonetheless voluntary… though not essentially but accidentally so… a person wills to do a disorderly action for the sake of some sensory good to be attained; he does not intend the disorder, nor does he will it simply for itself, but for the same of this result. And so, evil consequences and sins are called voluntary in this way.” (Pg. 47, Ch. 6) He concludes, “no essence is evil in itself… In fact, evil is simply a privation of something which a subject is entitled by its origin to possess and which it ought to have… privation is not an essence; it is, rather, a negation in a substance. Therefore, evil is not an essence in things.” (Pg. 48, Ch. 7)
He asserts, “On the side of the effect, evil is accidentally caused by the good… evil occurs accidentally because the privation of another form is the necessary concomitant of the presence in a given form. Thus, simultaneously with the generation of one thing there necessarily results the corruption of another thing. But this evil is not an evil of the product intended by the agent but of another thing… Thus it is clear that, in the natural order, evil is only accidentally caused by the good… However, in the moral order, the situation seems to be different… we shall find the two orders similar from one point of view, dissimilar from another. There is dissimilarity on this point: moral fault is noticed in action only, and not in any effect that is produced… Therefore, moral evil is … considered… only as a resultant from the agent.” (Pg. 57-58, Ch. 10)
He says, “Now, all things get their being from the fact that they are made like unto God, Who is subsisting being itself, for all things exist merely as participants in existing being. Therefore, all things desire as their ultimate end to be made like unto God… Moreover, all created things are, in a sense, images of the first agent, that is, of God… Now, the function of a perfect image is to represent its prototype by likeness to it; this is why an image is made. Therefore, all things exist in order to attain to the divine likeness, as to their ultimate end.” (Pg. 76, Ch 19) Later, he adds, “the effect does tend to become like the agent, not only in its species, but also in this characteristic of being the cause of others. Now, things tend to the likeness of God in the same way that effects tend to the likeness of the agent… Therefore, things naturally tend to become like God by the fact that th4ey are the causes of others.” (Pg. 82, Ch. 21)
He observes, “to understand the most perfect intelligible object, which is God, is the most perfect thing in the genus of this operation of understanding. Therefore, to know God by an act of understanding is the ultimate end of every intellectual substance.” (Pg. 98, Ch. 25)
He points out that “Man’s felicity does not consist in riches… Indeed, riches are only desired for the sake of something else; they provide no good of themselves but only when we use them, either for the maintenance of the body or some such use. Now, that which is the highest god is desired for its own sake and no for the sake of something else. Therefore riches are not the highest good of man.” (Pg. 116, Ch. 30)
He argues, “there is still another knowledge of God… and by this God is known to men through faith. In comparison with the knowledge that we have of God through demonstration, this knowledge through faith surpasses it… Yet, it is not possible for man’s ultimate felicity to consist in even this knowledge of God… in the knowledge of faith, there is found a most imperfect operation of the intellect… For the intellect does not grasp the object to which it gives assent in the act of believing. Therefore, neither does man’s ultimate felicity lie in this kind of knowledge of God.” (Pg. 130-131, Ch. 40)
He goes on, “God can be seen … in this life… only as in a mirror… Although this mirror, which is the human mind, reflects the likeness of God in a closer way than lower creatures do, the knowledge of God which can be taken in by the human mind does not go beyond the type of knowledge that is derived from sensible things, since even the soul itself knows that it is itself as a result of understanding the natures of sensible things… Hence, throughout this life God can be known in no higher way than that whereby a cause is known through its effect.” (Pg. 161, Ch. 47)
He suggests, “the nearer a thing is to God, Who is entirely immutable, the less mutable is it and the more lasting… But no creature can come closer to God than the one who sees His substance. So, the intellectual creature that sees God’s substance attains the highest immutability. Therefore, it is not possible for it ever to lapse from this vision.” (Pg. 205, Ch. 62)
He notes, “[God] uses all things by directing them to their end. Now, this is to govern. So, God is the governor of all things through His providence… God moves all things to their ends, and He does so through His understanding… He does not act through a necessity of His nature, but through understanding and will… Therefore, God by His providence governs and rules all things that are moved toward their end, whether they be moved corporeally, or spiritually as one who desires is moved by an object of his desire.” (Pg. 210-211, Ch. 64)
He argues, “everything that is in a place, or in something, is in some way in contact with it… an incorporeal thing is said to be in something according to the contact of power, since it lacks dimensive quantity. And so, an incorporeal thing is related to its presence in something by its power, in the same way that a corporeal thing is related to its presence in something by dimensive quantity. Now, if there were any body possessed of infinite dimensive quantity, it would have to be everywhere. So, if there be an incorporeal being possessed of infinite power, it must be everywhere… Therefore, He is everywhere.” (Pg. 223, Ch. 68)
He argues, “the good of the whole takes precedence over the good of a part… if evil were removed from some parts of the universe, much perfection would perish from the universe, whose beauty arises from an ordered unification of evil and good things. In fact, while evil things originate from good things that are defective, still, certain good things also result from them, as a consequence of the providence of the governor… Therefore, evil should not have been excluded from things by divine providence… if no evils were present in things, much of man’s good would be diminished… In fact, the good is better known from its comparison with evil, and while we continue to suffer certain evils our desire for goods grows more ardent… Therefore, it is not a function of divine providence totally to exclude evils from things… with these considerations we dispose of the error of those who, because they noticed that evils occur in the world, said that there is no God.” (Pg. 240, Ch. 71)
He adds, “evil and defects occur in things ruled by divine providence as a result of the establishment of secondary causes in which there can be deficiency, it is evident that bad actions… are not from God but from defective proximate causes; but, insofar as they possess something of action and entity, they must be from God.” (Pg. 241, Ch. 71)
He also asserts, “divine providence does not exclude freedom of choice… the fact that will is a contingent cause arises from its perfection… it is more pertinent to divine providence to preserve liberty of will than contingency in natural causes… Now, the intellect does not have one form determined to an effect; rather, it is characteristic of it to comprehend a multitude of forms. And because of this the will can produce effects according to many forms. Therefore, it does not pertain to the character of providence to exclude liberty of will.” (Pg. 244-245, Ch. 73) He summarizes, “divine operation does not exclude the operations of secondary causes… Therefore, secondary causes are the executors of divine providence.” (Pg. 259, Ch. 77)
This book will be “must reading” for anyone seriously studying Medieval philosophy and theology, or Catholic philosophy in general.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews