This is the unprecedented inside story of high policy and politics in the Nixon adminstration by Admiral Elmo r. Zumwalt, Jr. Appointed Chief of Naval Operations in 1970, the youngest ever. He transformed the Navy in his four years as CNO, setting its course for a generation. His famous "Z-grams" upset hallowed Navy tradition. Admiral Zumwalt describes how he managed the Navy under the leadership of canny Melvin Laird and the intellectural James Schlesinger, how he came to terms with Admiral Hyman Rickover, and how he got his programs through Congress
Admiral Zumwalt was Chief of Naval Operations for the US Navy from 1970-1974. (The book was published in 1975). Zumwalt struggled to maintain naval parody with the Soviets during a period of budget cutting while improving the Navy’s dismal reenlistment rate at a time of racial strife and discontent in the enlisted ranks.
Zumwalt was picked from his post as the Commander of US Naval Forces in Vietnam by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to “modernize” the Navy based on new social norms and boost the Navy’s re-enlistment rate. (The Navy’s goal was 35% re-enlistment for first time personnel, the actual rate was 9.5 %)
Zumwalt repeatedly clashed with the Nixon administration (he was ordered to be fired twice but the order was never carried out) over issues such as the handling of black sailors in the USS Constellation and Kitty Hawk crises, and the SALT arms limitations talks.
This book is not an easy read and certainly not for everyone. I found the last 11 pages to be excruciating.
But for those interested in the history, and the challenges and politics of running a US armed service in turbulent times, it may be worth it.
"In his memoir, Zumwalt relates a story of a conversation he had had with Kissinger while on the train from Washington to Philadelphia to see the Army-Navy game. Before the conversation, Zumwalt says that he had admired Kissinger. In the conversation on the train, Kissinger told Zumwalt that, in his, Kissinger's opinion, the United States is "Athens to the Soviets' Sparta," and that in the long run, the U.S. is going to lose to the Russians just as Athens lost to Sparta. It is therefore his, Kissinger's job, to negotiate the best possible second-place finish with the russians, recognizing that in the long run, we are going to lose. This greatly unsettled Zumwalt, and turned him into a Kissiger opponent." Comment on Slate to a Hitchens diatribe about Kissinger.
A LAST HURRAH FOR VIETNAM is the title of a chapter in this book. Anyone interested in learning why the U.S. lost the war in Vietnam should read this chapter.
Recommended from Secretary Gates's notes, this novel of a memoir covers Zumwalts term as Chief of Naval Operations, serving 1970 to 1974. And hoo boy what years they were.
If you despised Nixon, be prepared to despise him more. If you hated American Foreign Policy since the mid 70s, have that hatred validated. If you like me only knew the name Kissinger in passing, Good Holy God on a Cheese Stick this book is for you.
The author makes no qualms about pulling punches or presenting " all sides equally". This is his story, and he will tell it. Oddly enough though, this is not a detractment. We identify with this man's personal moral code. We rejoice when he wins and commiserate when he is thwarted.
His viewpoints are emphatically and (mostly) stated out. His system of reforming the Navy merits study as a leadership guide, focused on it was as, essentially, people first.
I have concerns that fights are somewhat unevenly divided. He spends the first third of the book railing against Hyman Rickover, father of the Nuclear Navy, then the latter third railing against corruption, cronyism, Nixonism, bureaucracy and Kissinger. Once again, puck that guy. There is little to connect the two rather than the Navy's hamfisted attempts at solving racism in those days.
His attention to personality is telling and remarkably candid. It is a good book to study character and how to apply it.
While his attention to detail is remarkable, he was making a very, very, very detailed point about Then- Soviet Naval forces and how America was unequally stacked. Ny mind glazed over with discussions of yield and MIRVs and ABMs and Icelandic Fishing Disputes, and etc etc etc. I was drowning in the minutiae of arms negotiatons.
As a leadership guide, a few oft related chestnuts. As a guide to the person, a few stand out, but nothing relevatory. As arms negotiations, colored by his military outlook. Overall, meh.
Boring. Incredibly, unbelievably boring. I had wanted to read this book for a long time, believing that it would as a matter of course extensively cover the command held by Admiral Zumwalt in Viet Nam. I could not have been more wrong- he used practically the entire book (all but 42 pages!) to relate in excruciating detail his term as CNO during 1970-1974, barely covering his long career previous to that post. I would probably have found this book fascinating had it been a more conventional memoir; I regret very much the omission of the Admiral's experiences while in command of the "Brown Water Navy", which I had so looked forward to reading. This book is not badly written (that is why it gets 2 stars rather than 1). It merely has such a skewed focus that reading it is essentially a waste of time unless the reader is fascinated by interminable accounts of bureaucratic maneuvering, the budgetary processes of the defense establishment, etc. Unfortunately, I have to rate this one of the worst memoirs by a retired officer that I have ever read.
Mostly focuses on his time as CNO. If you served during that time and lived through all the Z-Grams, this is a fun read and brings back all those memories.