The title should probably more appropriately read: "Failed Efforts to Suppress the African Slave-Trade," as until the victory of the Union Army the United States government made no effective effort to end this abomination.
Although written over 125 years ago, it by no means reads that way. In many respects, it reminded me of a doctoral dissertation, so thorough is it coverage and so comprehensive its documentation of sources. Du Bois, one of the most distinguished intellectuals in American history, has written a scholarly work that is remarkably free of any invective or guilt accusations. Rather, it is a humbling record of how white America repeatedly balked at ending what everyone -- especially at the beginning of the Republic after the Revolution -- regarded as both wicked and unfitting for the United States.
Du Bois documents that the only time our ancestors really got close to fulfilling their oft-promised intent to end the slave trade was in the first and second decades of the 19th century. The trade was outlawed by the federal government, armed ships were sent to patrol the coast of Africa to catch slavers caught in the act (although never enough of them to do the job), and there were attempts -- all ultimately unsuccessful -- to cooperate with other countries, especially Great Britain, in ending the trade.
Du Bois identifies two factors that undermined these inadequate efforts: 1) The money to be made in the trade, a fact which tied many Northerners to supporting slavery because of their investment in shipping and the profits to be made; and 2) Rapid innovations in the harvesting and processing of cotton. The trade might have been ended by 1820 had not profit from the trade continually weakened the resolve of just enough people -- especially in the Senate, but after the 1820s when cotton indeed became "King Cotton" in the South, the trade actually increased. Shamefully, as the British, Dutch, and French all refused to carry slaves any longer, the vast bulk of slaves captured from Africa were increasingly carried in ships flying the American flag.
[BTW, a very contemporary note is appropriate here: the role of the Senate, then as now, in blocking progressive legislation has repeatedly served commercial and business interests over those involving human rights. The unbalanced power the composition of the Senate gives to the South -- an imbalance that has only grown much greater in our own time -- has consistently allowed people representing a minority of Americans to block legislation favored by the majority. The mechanism of the filibuster, by which a super-majority within the Senate is necessary to pass legislation, only serves to make this lock-down worse.]
Du Bois, in his concluding chapter, observes that the legislation that did pass the Congress were on the whole "poorly conceived, loosely drawn, and wretchedly enforced. The systemic violation of the provisions of many of them led to a widespread belief that enforcement was, in the nature of the case, impossible; and thus, instead of marking ground already won, they were too often sources of distinct moral deterioration."
He then addresses a larger theme. "No American can study the connection of slavery with United States history, and not devoutly pray that his country may never have a similar social problem to solve, until it shows more capacity for such work than it has shown in the past.... We must face the fact that this problem arose principally from the cupidity and carelessness of our ancestors. It was the plain duty of the colonies to crush the trade and the system in its infancy: they preferred to enrich themselves on its profits."
And "with this real, existent, growing evil before their eyes, a bargain largely of dollars and cents was allowed to open the highway that led straight to the Civil War.
"With the faith of the nation broken at the very outset, the system of slavery untouched, and twenty years' respite given to the slave-trade to feed and foster it, there began, with 1787, that system of bargaining, truckling, and compromising with a moral, political, and economic monstrosity, which makes the history of our dealing with slavery in the first half of the nineteenth century so discreditable to a great people. Each generation sought to shift its load upon the next, and the burden rolled on, until a generation came which was both too weak and too strong to bear it any longer.
"...a certain hard common-sense in facing the complicated phenomena of political life must be expected in every progressive people. In some respects we asa nation seem to lack this; we have the somewhat inchoate idea that we are not destined to be harassed with great social questions, and that even if we are, and fail to answer them, the fault is with the question and not with us. Consequently, we often congratulate ourselves more on getting rid of a problem than on solving it. Such an attitude is dangerous; we have and shall have, as other peoples have had, critical, momentous, and pressing questions to answer.
"It behooves the United States, therefore, in the interests both of scientific truth and of future social reform, carefully to study such chapters of her history as that of the suppression of the slave-trade. The most obvious question which this study suggests is: How far in a State can a recognized moral wrong safely be compromised? And although this chapter of history can give us no definite answer suited to the ever-varying aspects of political life, yet it would seem to warn any nation from allowing, through carelessness and moral cowardice, any social evil to grow. No persons would have seen the Civil War with more surprise and horror than the Revolutions of 1776; yet from the small and apparently dying institution of their day arose the walled and castled Slave-Power. From this we may conclude that it behooves nations as well as men to do things at the very moment when they ought to be done."