Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia

by Arnold R. Isaacs

Still the best account of the last years of the Vietnam War, written by the author of the acclaimed Vietnam Shadows A gripping account of one of the century's most harrowing human catastrophes―the fall of South Vietnam― Without Honor captures the tragedy and the irony of the Vietnam War's last days and examines the consequences of the American military and political decisions that had sustained the war effort for a generation only to lead to the worst foreign policy failure in the nation's history. Arnold Isaacs, who spent the final years of the war in Vietnam as a correspondent for the Baltimore Sun , describes his firsthand observations of the collapse of Cambodia and South Vietnam―from the 1973 Paris peace agreement to the American evacuation of Saigon and its aftermath―with heartbreaking detail, from the devastated battlefields and villages to the boats filled with terrified refugees. He also provides an historical record of unparalleled accuracy and depth about the strategic decisions made during the war's end game and the intelligence failure that led Americans and their Southeast Asian allies to underestimate the strength and perseverance of the enemy. Drawing on previously classified military documents, field reports from American advisors, eyewitness accounts by soldiers and civilians, and North Vietnamese propaganda broadcasts, Isaacs offers a compelling and compassionate portrait of the impact of America's "Vietnamization" of the conflict and a bracing indictment of political and military leaders in the United States and both Vietnams for the massive human suffering that accompanied the end of the war.

Genres: History, Nonfiction

576 pages, Paperback

First published August 1, 1983

Reviews

[Maggie · Rating 5 out of 5]

I just re-read this remarkable book for the first time in many years and was impressed all over again by the author’s astute analysis and his vivid account of the last years of the war in Vietnam and Cambodia. Isaacs’s book is meticulously annotated and is based on extensive research, many interviews, and his own first-hand observations and reportage. He left Phnom Penh, Cambodia, just a few days before the Khmer Rouge entered the city. He was evacuated from Saigon by helicopter from Tansonnhut Airport on the afternoon of April 30, 1975, a chaotic departure about which he says:

“I didn’t know it then, but to whatever western or Asian gods decided I would leave from Tansonnhut instead of the embassy, I would be grateful for the rest of my life. Whatever the other sensations and memories, at least I would not have to remember leaving Vietnam by climbing over the backs of Vietnamese human beings, as some of my friends had to do, outside of the embassy wall.” (p 464)

The next day the victorious North Vietnamese army entered Saigon and the 30 year war ended.

Isaacs’s book covers 1972 to 1975. The first part outlines the state of the region as the “illusory” Paris Agreement was finalized, and the official American troop withdrawal. In a section entitled “The Pawns” he discusses the involvement and the eventual outcome of the war on both Laos and Cambodia. That will break your heart all over again.

On this re-reading, I focussed mostly on the sections about the total collapse of the South Vietnamese government and its army. I remain impressed by Isaac’s careful, knowledgable, and compassionate account of the disaster that came crashing down on the Vietnamese civilians, the soldiers of the South Vietnamese armed forces (ARVN), and even the private contractors employed by the U.S., as well as U.S. embassy staff and the remaining U.S. marines and Navy personnel.

He does not spare the major players in the final debacle: Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, Ambassador Graham Martin, and the South Vietnamese army and government headed by Nguyen Van Thieu. In the last section of the book “The Limits of Credibility” he addresses the Reagan-era attempts to re-cast the war and the U.S. actions throughout as a worthy effort that “failed not because they [U.S. actions and policies] were misconceived but only because they were not carried out resolutely enough….” This revisionism represented “a refusal to learn the lesson that had been so expensively taught”. (p 489) Isaacs wrote this book in 1983. I think it’s pretty clear that this idea has insinuated itself into our national recollection: we didn’t lose the war, our government (and all of those unpatriotic protesters) was “afraid to win”.

This is painful but important reading. On page 350, Isaacs discusses the decision by Thieu and his government to retreat from Pleiku and the highlands without giving clear, direct orders or explanation to the ARVN troops or the populace. “The order to retreat from the highlands led to a sudden, catastrophic release of all the deep social and moral flaws of their regime. The sicknesses of South Vietnamese society, like agents of retribution, were about to overtake and, in only seven weeks, destroy it.”

Ambassador Graham Martin, relentlessly following the lead of Kissinger and Nixon, was unwilling to allow an official authorization to begin coordinating an evacuation of either U.S. employees and citizens, or the many South Vietnamese people who had been employed by the U.S., and who were clearly at risk. “Neither publicly nor privately would Martin deviate from the official U.S. view that the Vietnamese, if given additional aid, could stabilize the battlefield.” (397-8)

But as we know, American embassy personnel, armed forces personnel, and contractors from the U.S. and other countries tried to effect an evacuation anyway. In the chaotic hours of the collapse, many people were successfully evacuated, albeit under terrifying conditions and while enduring harsh privations. Many more, however, were left behind, some trying desperately to get to the coast, others waiting patiently with their few belongings at the place they were told to gather, only no one ever came. Those who tried and failed to rescue them in the turmoil remain deeply affected by all they were unable to accomplish.

Too much, I know. So find the book and read it.

[Greg · Rating 4 out of 5]

How is this book not more well-known? I was just looking for an account of the fall of Saigon, but Isaacs' prose and personal accounts make this great.

[Alan Fogelquist · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of the most even handed and first hand accounts of US involvement in Vietnam and Cambodia. Completely refutes efforts to rewrite history.

[Seth J. Vogelman · Rating 4 out of 5]

Unique view on the end in Cambodia and Vietnam.

[Dave N · Rating 5 out of 5]

Devastating, both as an American and as a human being in general. No bad actor is spared in Isaacs's in-depth review of the end of the Vietnam war - North Vietnam, South Vietnam, the US, Cambodia and Laos - everyone shares the blame, albeit in different proportions. I came away heartbroken by so much of what was described in this book, even more so than in other histories of the war. The only positive portrayals come in the form of personal stories and anecdotes, and those are few and far between. Much more often the reader finds stories of people stooping to the lowest imaginable levels of humanity. And yet, even in those moments, you empathize with those bad actors because, so often, you can feel the fear they lived with for so many years and how the floodgates holding back the chaos just burst.
This book should be mandatory for anyone studying 20th-century American history, or even World history.

[Shirlsd]

WITHOUT HONOR: DEFEAT IN VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA. by Arnold R. Isaacs (1984)