What do you think?
Rate this book
Berkeley: Philosophical Writings
George Berkeley (1685-1753) was a university teacher, a missionary, and later a Church of Ireland bishop. The over-riding objective of his long philosophical career was to counteract objections to religious belief that resulted from new philosophies associated with the Scientific Revolution. Accordingly, he argued against scepticism and atheism in the Principles and the Three Dialogues; he rejected theories of force in the Essay on Motion; he offered a new theory of meaning for religious language in Alciphron; and he modified his earlier immaterialism in Siris by speculating about the body's influence on the soul. His radical empiricism and scientific instrumentalism, which rejected the claims of the sciences to provide a realistic interpretation of phenomena, are still influential today. This edition provides texts from the full range of Berkeley's contributions to philosophy, together with an introduction by Desmond M. Clarke that sets them in their historical and philosophical contexts.
- GenresPhilosophyEbooks
386 pages, ebook
First published January 1, 1709
4 people are currently reading
45 people want to read
About the author
George Berkeley
638 books231 followersGeorge Berkeley (/ˈbɑːrklɪ/;[1][2] 12 March 1685 – 14 January 1753) — known as Bishop Berkeley (Bishop of Cloyne) — was an Anglo-Irish philosopher whose primary achievement was the advancement of a theory he called "immaterialism" (later referred to as "subjective idealism" by others). This theory denies the existence of material substance and instead contends that familiar objects like tables and chairs are only ideas in the minds of perceivers, and as a result cannot exist without being perceived. Berkeley is also known for his critique of abstraction, an important premise in his argument for immaterialism.
Librarian note: There is more than one author in the Goodreads database with this name.
George^Berkeley
Librarian note: There is more than one author in the Goodreads database with this name.
George^Berkeley
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
October 7, 2024
AN EXCELLENT COLLECTION OF BERKELEY’S WRITINGS
George Berkeley (1685-1753), was an Anglo-Irish philosopher whose theory of "immaterialism" (later, "subjective idealism") was influential within the British Isles. Late in life, he also became a Bishop in the Anglican Church (in a predominantly Roman Catholic area).
In his “Principles of Human Knowledge” [his major work] he states, “That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist without the mind is what everybody will allow. And to me it seems no less evident that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the Sense, however blended or combined together… cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them… This is all that I can understand by these and the like expressions. For as to what is said of the ABSOLUTE existence of unthinking things, without any relation to their being perceived, that is to me perfectly unintelligible. Their ESSE is PERCIPI [“To be is to be perceived”]; nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.” (Pg. 62)
Later, he argues, “men became convinced that colours, sounds, and the rest of the sensible, secondary qualities had not existence without the mind, they stripped this substratum … of those qualities, leaving only the primary ones, figure, motion, and such-like; which they still conceived to exist without the mind, and consequently to stand in need of material support. But… none even of these can possibly exist otherwise than in a Spirit or Mind which perceives them, it follows that we have no longer any reason to suppose the being of Matter… so long as that word is taken to denote a UNTHINKING SUBSTRATUM of qualities or accidents, wherein they exist without the mind.” (Pg. 91)
He points out, “about the Resurrection, how many scruples and objections have been raised by Socinians and others? But do not the most plausible among them depend on the supposition that a body is denominated the SAME, with regard not to the form, or that which is perceived by sense, but the material substance, which remains the same under several forms? Take away this MATERIAL SUBSTANCE… and mean by BODY what every plain ordinary person means by that word, to wit, that which is immediately seen and felt, which is only a combination of sensible qualities or ideas; and then their most unanswerable objections come to nothing.” (Pg. 100)
He observes, “it does not appear to me that there can be any motion other than RELATIVE: so that to conceive motion there must be conceived at least two bodies; whereof the distance or position in regard to each other is varied. Hence, if there was only one body in being it could not possibly be moved. This seems evident, in that the idea I have of motion doth necessarily include relation.” (Pg. 108)
In his “popular” exposition of his ideas in his “Three Dialogues,” Philonous [who represents Berkeley’s position] says, “a microscope often discovers colours in an object different from those perceived by the unassisted sight… it is certain that no object whatever, viewed through them, would appear in the same colour which it exhibits to the naked eye… all colours we see with our naked eyes are only apparent as those on the clouds, since they vanish up a more close and accurate inspection which is afforded us by a microscope.” (Pg. 148)
Philonous adds, “no real inherent property of any object can be changed without some real change in the thing itself?... as we approach to or recede from an object, the visible extension varies, being at one distance ten or a hundred times greater than at another. Doth it not therefore follow from hence that is it not really inherent in the object?” (Pg. 153) Later, he asserts, “when we are said to see a red-hot bar of iron; the solidity and heat of the iron are not the objects of sight, but suggested to the imagination by the colour and figure which are properly perceived by that sense. In short, those things alone are actually and strictly perceived by any sense, which would have been perceived in case that same sense had then been first conferred upon us. As for other things, it is plain that they are only suggested to the mind by experience, grounded on former conceptions.” (Pg. 168)
He continues, “I… immediately and necessarily conclude the being of a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by Him… there is no difference I saying, There is a God, therefore He perceives all things; and saying, “Sensible things do really exist; and, if they really exist, they are necessarily perceived by an infinite Mind: therefore there is an infinite Mind, or God?” (Pg. 175)
Berkeley’s writings are among the clearest in the entire philosophical corpus; and despite the seeming “outrageousness” of some of his ideas, his perspective is a very challenging one for anyone seriously studying philosophy.
George Berkeley (1685-1753), was an Anglo-Irish philosopher whose theory of "immaterialism" (later, "subjective idealism") was influential within the British Isles. Late in life, he also became a Bishop in the Anglican Church (in a predominantly Roman Catholic area).
In his “Principles of Human Knowledge” [his major work] he states, “That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist without the mind is what everybody will allow. And to me it seems no less evident that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the Sense, however blended or combined together… cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them… This is all that I can understand by these and the like expressions. For as to what is said of the ABSOLUTE existence of unthinking things, without any relation to their being perceived, that is to me perfectly unintelligible. Their ESSE is PERCIPI [“To be is to be perceived”]; nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.” (Pg. 62)
Later, he argues, “men became convinced that colours, sounds, and the rest of the sensible, secondary qualities had not existence without the mind, they stripped this substratum … of those qualities, leaving only the primary ones, figure, motion, and such-like; which they still conceived to exist without the mind, and consequently to stand in need of material support. But… none even of these can possibly exist otherwise than in a Spirit or Mind which perceives them, it follows that we have no longer any reason to suppose the being of Matter… so long as that word is taken to denote a UNTHINKING SUBSTRATUM of qualities or accidents, wherein they exist without the mind.” (Pg. 91)
He points out, “about the Resurrection, how many scruples and objections have been raised by Socinians and others? But do not the most plausible among them depend on the supposition that a body is denominated the SAME, with regard not to the form, or that which is perceived by sense, but the material substance, which remains the same under several forms? Take away this MATERIAL SUBSTANCE… and mean by BODY what every plain ordinary person means by that word, to wit, that which is immediately seen and felt, which is only a combination of sensible qualities or ideas; and then their most unanswerable objections come to nothing.” (Pg. 100)
He observes, “it does not appear to me that there can be any motion other than RELATIVE: so that to conceive motion there must be conceived at least two bodies; whereof the distance or position in regard to each other is varied. Hence, if there was only one body in being it could not possibly be moved. This seems evident, in that the idea I have of motion doth necessarily include relation.” (Pg. 108)
In his “popular” exposition of his ideas in his “Three Dialogues,” Philonous [who represents Berkeley’s position] says, “a microscope often discovers colours in an object different from those perceived by the unassisted sight… it is certain that no object whatever, viewed through them, would appear in the same colour which it exhibits to the naked eye… all colours we see with our naked eyes are only apparent as those on the clouds, since they vanish up a more close and accurate inspection which is afforded us by a microscope.” (Pg. 148)
Philonous adds, “no real inherent property of any object can be changed without some real change in the thing itself?... as we approach to or recede from an object, the visible extension varies, being at one distance ten or a hundred times greater than at another. Doth it not therefore follow from hence that is it not really inherent in the object?” (Pg. 153) Later, he asserts, “when we are said to see a red-hot bar of iron; the solidity and heat of the iron are not the objects of sight, but suggested to the imagination by the colour and figure which are properly perceived by that sense. In short, those things alone are actually and strictly perceived by any sense, which would have been perceived in case that same sense had then been first conferred upon us. As for other things, it is plain that they are only suggested to the mind by experience, grounded on former conceptions.” (Pg. 168)
He continues, “I… immediately and necessarily conclude the being of a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by Him… there is no difference I saying, There is a God, therefore He perceives all things; and saying, “Sensible things do really exist; and, if they really exist, they are necessarily perceived by an infinite Mind: therefore there is an infinite Mind, or God?” (Pg. 175)
Berkeley’s writings are among the clearest in the entire philosophical corpus; and despite the seeming “outrageousness” of some of his ideas, his perspective is a very challenging one for anyone seriously studying philosophy.
August 25, 2018
Berkley is a very clear writer and he persistently argues for a provocative thesis. He is an idealist, which means that, for him, nothing exists but ideas and the minds that perceive them. The notion of matter independent of the mind is for him an absurdity. The idea that there is some material substance independent of the ideas in our minds, and to which our ideas correspond, leads to many problems in philosophical reasoning. Ultimately, Berkley's idealism is a way to cure us of skepticism, since positing a reality independent of our minds means we will never be able to access it. Identifying what is real with our ideas, though, secures our epistemic access to reality.
Read
May 23, 2019bruhh... ideas..
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews