3.5 stars
A "member of the opposition" once said that he had read Ted Sorensen's new book, Kennedy, and that he did not like it very much. The feisty Sorensen replied that he was surprised because "I didn't know you could read."
In the Kennedy administration, Ted Sorensen, who was an attorney, poltical adviser, and main speechwriter in the Kennedy administration, occupied a unique position in the White House. He wrote major speeches for the President, but was also a trusted member of his inner circle. John F. Kennedy had plenty of yes-men. He sometimes needed a no-man and relied on the sharp-tongued Sorensen to be just that in times of foreign and domestic crises. In the judgement of Bobby Kennedy, the adviser played this role well. "If it was difficult," the Attorney General said, "Ted Sorensen was brought in."
For example, Sorensen recalled drafting a vital letter to Nikita Khruschev during the peak of the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the hawks in the American government were pressuring the President into actions that might have led to an all-out nuclear war. Much better known to the general public is the inaugural address question: "Ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country," which he was credited with.
Ted Sorensen was an unapologetic admirer of President Kennedy and his inner circle, and this shows in his work. He describes Kennedy as "one of the most extraordinary men of our land and our time" and expresses his desire "to dwell on the rich and lasting legacy he has left for you and for me and for us, a legacy of hope." Understandably, a man who stated that the President's assassination had traumatized him for life could not and did not write a biography of Kennedy that paints him with all his warts.
Just like the rest of Kennedy's close advisers, Sorensen believed that President Eisenhower's foreign policy establishment was slow-moving, overly reliant on John Foster Dulles's brinksmanship and massive retaliation, and complacent. They feared that after eight years of stagnation the State Department would be unable to switch to a new vision of international affairs. The young President-elect was determined to control foreign policy through a White House and National Security Council that matched his youth and energy. With Washington and Moscow struggling for the loyalty of the Third World, Kennedy promoted freedom over Communism. "Let every nation know," declared he in his inaugural speech. "whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty."
However, despite Sorensen's generous verdict in favor of his President, Kennedy's foreign policy undeniably was a mixed legacy. Yes, he did handle the Cuban missile crisis brilliantly, saving the world from potential nuclear annihilation, negotiate a test ban treaty with Khruschev, and became an iconic figure of peace and hope for people all over the world. Yet he also approved the Bay of Pigs invasion plan, which while sold to him by Dick Bissel and Allen Dulles from the CIA in the most favorable light possible, glaringly portended disaster of international scope; and his handling of the Vietnam issue produced much confusion. Although he was preparing for complete withdrawal of American personnel from South Vietnam, publicly he kept defending US commitment there. This allowed his successor, Lyndon Johnson, to justify his policy of escalation to a general war. He had pledged to follow in the steps of his predecessor, but the general public knew only those "steps" Kennedy shared publicly, which were all for the deepening of American involvement.
Sorensen's account of all these major events is comprehensive, but lacks the insight and historical context I was expecting from a Kennedy-administration insider. Very little attention is paid, for instance, to one of the most important foreign policy intiatives – the Allience for Progress, a massive foreign aid program for Latin America. In March 1961, the President proposed a ten-year plan for Latin America, which aimed to increase the per capita annual income by 2.5%, establish democratic governments, eliminate adult illiteracy by 1970, stabilize prices to avoid inflation or deflation, and limit their financial independence. While the program failed in the long term (because the Presidents after Kennedy were not enthusiastic about implementing it), it did achieve success during the Kennedy years.
Some aspects, such as Kennedy's election campaign and his Space Program, are covered fascinatingly by Sorensen. Nevetheless, this work can hardly be considered a well-rounded biography, for the author virtually skips the first twenty-six years of Kennedy's life, as well as does not reveal almost anything about the key people who fell outside the narrow circle to which Kennedy and Sorensen belonged but who had crucial impact on the President at some point or another – his wife, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, Nikita Khruschev, Fidel Castro etc.
Overall, KENNEDY is a highly compelling read, which, however, requires plenty of background knowledge about John F. Kennedy from the reader. It is a sympathetic, special outlook on the final eleven years of Kennedy's life that chronicles both the President's mundane daily tasks and his activities during the many crises his term was plagued with. If judged as a comprehensive, objective study, though, it, unfortunately, falls much too short. This one is definitely for Kennedy buffs. For those unfamiliar with him, I would rather recommend AN UNFINISHED LIFE – an outstanding biography of the President.