Building the Kaiser's Navy: The Imperial Navy Office and German Industry in the Tirpitz Era, 1890-1919

by Gary E. Weir

During the nineteenth century the British navy ruled the world's oceans unopposed. By the end of the century, however, Germany in particular was ready to challenge England's hegemony on the seas by building a powerful navy of its own. The selection of Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, commander of the German cruiser squadron of the Far East, to carry out the task, proved to be a fortuitous choice. By the time of World War I, the German High Seas Fleet was a formidable opponent for the Royal Navy. This book by Gary E. Weir is the first major historical analysis of the interaction between the imperial German Navy and the German armaments industry during the era of Alfred von Tirpitz. Weir makes clear the significant contribution of von Tirpitz to Germany's rise as a naval power. As head of the imperial Naval Office (the Reichsmarineamt, or RMA), von Tirpitz gained leverage over private shipbuilders and armament suppliers and at the same time kept the navy independent of government control. His considerable talents as a politician, shipbuilder, strategist, propagandist and manager were to a great degree responsible for the High Seas Fleet encountered by the Royal Navy at Jutland. Ironically, von Tirpitz never commanded the navy he built. Weir does not fail to delineate the shortcomings of his naval system, which was responsible for the fact that those in charge of the fleet's operations played little part in its creation. Von Tirpitz's system also resulted in a disregard of the significance of U-boat potential and a lack of geographic, strategic, and operational considerations. Nevertheless, his profound influence in the navy persisted through the Weimar Republic and into the Third Reich, in thepolicies of Admiral Erich Raeder, veteran of Jutland. Based on research in primary German sources from key repositories such as the German federal military archives in Freiburg and the Krupp archives in Essen, this book is bound to stimulate further scholarship in the field of G

301 pages, Hardcover

First published April 1, 1992

Reviews

[Dave · Rating 4 out of 5]

The chapters progress chronologically through the period under discussion (1890-1919), covering developments in each period. It focuses on the administrative, bureaucratic and political elements of relations between the Reichsmarineamt, the naval organisation responsible for shipbuilding, and the state and private shipyards and their suppliers. It highlights the huge achievements of von Tirpitz, but also his errors of judgement (particularly the lack of emphasis on submarine development).

The general discussion in the book is sound, and follows the parallel stories of the fight against industrial monopolies, the use of the protocol system to manage private firms, the responsibility for technological development and political elements, and the chapters on the war years also discuss the labour difficulties experienced at that time. The discussion is supplemented by two appendices containing tables and organisational diagrams.

The book is an interesting read, but evolving from a PhD thesis and being a primarily an examination of the development and activities of a state bureaucratic organisation it shouldn’t come as a surprise that the writing is rather dry. The standard of editing is very high, with only occasional errors (usually of details rather than grammatically). There is a glossary (very important for the numerous acronym-labelled German organisations), extensive notes (primarily for sourcing but with some supplementary material), a bibliography (containing numerous German sources) and an index. As best I can tell it appears very well-researched.

The only weakness from my angle was the over-emphasis on the perceived errors of Tirpitz’s battleship strategy. Reading other works on WW1 suggest the German Navy might have had a chance of causing real damage to the RN if it had attempted to contest the North Sea in 1914 – and Tirpitz can hardly be blamed for the Kaiser’s reluctance to risk his fleet. Given the advantages of sea control by surface forces rather than submarine, and the much greater potential for power projection by surface forces, Tirpitz’s weaknesses here feel a bit oversold. On the other hand, while the RN had a strong background in ships of the line, it also had much experience in convoy escort, and the author seems to make the same mistake as Tirpitz in downplaying the potential British response – a submarine and commerce-raiding cruiser force was an even more clear and direct attack on British naval power than the German dreadnought program, and it is hard to see how it would have not been responded to vigorously. This is a counterfactual, though, and these are devilishly hard to argue in any direction – but it does feel like the author places Tirpitz’s strategy under far more scrutiny than the alternative that was presented by Persius, Galster et al. Whatever one’s view on this, it doesn’t take away from the excellent research that is presented on the actual events, personalities and policies of the German naval shipbuilding program in the lead-up to and during the First World War.

All up, it’s well worth a read for people interested in how the German naval bureaucracy managed its relations with private German firms, as well as politicians, to achieve its construction goals.