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Now It Can Be Told: The Story Of The Manhattan Project
General Leslie Groves and J. Robert Oppenheimer were the two men chiefly responsible for the building of the first atomic bomb at Los Alamos, code name "The Manhattan Project." As the ranking military officer in charge of marshalling men and material for what was to be the most ambitious, expensive engineering feat in history, it was General Groves who hired Oppenheimer (with knowledge of his left-wing past), planned facilities that would extract the necessary enriched uranium, and saw to it that nothing interfered with the accelerated research and swift assembly of the weapon.This is his story of the political, logistical, and personal problems of this enormous undertaking which involved foreign governments, sensitive issues of press censorship, the construction of huge plants at Hanford and Oak Ridge, and a race to build the bomb before the Nazis got wind of it. The role of groves in the Manhattan Project has always been controversial. In his new introduction the noted physicist Edward Teller, who was there at Los Alamos, candidly assesses the general's contributions-and Oppenheimer's-while reflecting on the awesome legacy of their work.
496 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1961
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 48 reviews
April 18, 2018
Leslie Groves's book is one of the most revealing and compelling accounts of complex project management I have ever read. If you read this account for its project management insights - planning, communication, stakeholder management, etc. - you won't be disappointed. If you are more interested in Technical, Scientific detail -- read Richard Rhodes.
Groves, whose previous project had been the building of the Pentagon, was placed in charge of what is arguably the largest and most complex pre-digital-age project in history, a high-security, deadline driven project with a huge number of moving parts, involving a combined workforce and stakeholder community of over 600,000. Components of this project spread from coast to coast across the US, to Great Britain and even to the Belgian Congo. In addition, Groves was given all responsibility for intelligence gathering on German Technology -- both nuclear and non-nuclear. (Other recommended readings -- anything on the ALSOS mission.)
He provides technical detail where needed to illustrate the Project Management decision making, his mistakes and how he might have avoided them, the mistakes of others and how he might have mitigated them, the political positioning between the US and Britain, the personalities, discussions, conflicts and resolutions that resulted in the birth of the nuclear age.
To learn how a great project manager made decisions, read Groves.
Groves, whose previous project had been the building of the Pentagon, was placed in charge of what is arguably the largest and most complex pre-digital-age project in history, a high-security, deadline driven project with a huge number of moving parts, involving a combined workforce and stakeholder community of over 600,000. Components of this project spread from coast to coast across the US, to Great Britain and even to the Belgian Congo. In addition, Groves was given all responsibility for intelligence gathering on German Technology -- both nuclear and non-nuclear. (Other recommended readings -- anything on the ALSOS mission.)
He provides technical detail where needed to illustrate the Project Management decision making, his mistakes and how he might have avoided them, the mistakes of others and how he might have mitigated them, the political positioning between the US and Britain, the personalities, discussions, conflicts and resolutions that resulted in the birth of the nuclear age.
To learn how a great project manager made decisions, read Groves.
March 29, 2019
Not quite as fascinating as I had thought it would be—no particular characters stand out in the chapters on the research phase—but the last third was quite gripping.
Once the two bombs were created and tested, the moral arguments commenced and the reasoning for going ahead was more convincing than my preconceived ideas. And once they had decided, timing and weather conditions were crucial because of the excess weight. More than a few times, the missions hit so many unpredictable obstacles, it’s a wonder it succeeded.
Perhaps one of the reasons I was not that taken by this book might have had to do with the fact that my inspiration for reading it—the show “Manhattan” which I saw on Amazon Prime—was so much more engaging, possibly because most of the characters were fictional.
Once the two bombs were created and tested, the moral arguments commenced and the reasoning for going ahead was more convincing than my preconceived ideas. And once they had decided, timing and weather conditions were crucial because of the excess weight. More than a few times, the missions hit so many unpredictable obstacles, it’s a wonder it succeeded.
Perhaps one of the reasons I was not that taken by this book might have had to do with the fact that my inspiration for reading it—the show “Manhattan” which I saw on Amazon Prime—was so much more engaging, possibly because most of the characters were fictional.
July 29, 2016
Remember this is first person account by the general in charge of the Manhattan Project. You get a very matter of fact retelling of what Groves saw and dealt with. In some ways this is the ultimate project management tale. Groves goes into details on some of the political activities, but the narrative is mostly about how Groves and his team dealt with all of the unknowns.
And there were a lot of unknowns. Obviously how and if a bomb could be created wasn't known. There were also tremendous questions faced about how to deal with allies, what to do about counter-intelligence, and how to get materials for the massive construction projects.
Groves didn't really have to worry about costs, but time was a huge pressure. The scale of the project is unprecedented and fascinating to grasp. It'd be nice to dream we could put the same energy to other ends.
And there were a lot of unknowns. Obviously how and if a bomb could be created wasn't known. There were also tremendous questions faced about how to deal with allies, what to do about counter-intelligence, and how to get materials for the massive construction projects.
Groves didn't really have to worry about costs, but time was a huge pressure. The scale of the project is unprecedented and fascinating to grasp. It'd be nice to dream we could put the same energy to other ends.
March 12, 2011
Most of what's in here has been diced and reserved numerous times in the Manhattan canon, though some of Groves's highly right-wing asides are delicious, and were new to me. More valuable than anything is the conversational detail we learn of the Major General.
I was reading this as I heard of the Sendai earthquake and tsunami, prompting me to comment "Tonight Japan's gonna party like it was 1945." Given the resulting Fukushima partial melt, I suppose 1986 might have been more apt.
I was reading this as I heard of the Sendai earthquake and tsunami, prompting me to comment "Tonight Japan's gonna party like it was 1945." Given the resulting Fukushima partial melt, I suppose 1986 might have been more apt.
December 27, 2024
Leslie R. Groves' "Now It Can Be Told: The Story Of The Manhattan Project" offers a fascinating firsthand account of one of the most significant scientific and military endeavors in history. As the commanding general of the Manhattan Project, Groves provides unique insights into the monumental task of developing the world's first atomic bomb during World War II. Groves' straightforward and concise writing style conveys a wealth of information with remarkable clarity. He details the immense challenges faced by the project, from scientific hurdles to logistical nightmares, and how they were overcome through sheer determination and ingenuity. The author's matter-of-fact tone belies the gravity of the situation, as he recounts making decisions that would shape the course of history. One of the book's strengths is its comprehensive coverage of the project's many facets. Groves discusses everything from the selection of key personnel, like J. Robert Oppenheimer, to the construction of massive facilities at Oak Ridge, Hanford, and Los Alamos. He also provides insights into the intense security measures and the race against time to develop the bomb before Nazi Germany. While Groves' account is undoubtedly valuable, it's important to note that it represents a particular perspective. His focus on the project's management and military aspects sometimes overshadows the ethical dilemmas and human stories that have captivated other writers on the subject. “Now It Can Be Told" serves as an essential primary source for anyone interested in the Manhattan Project or the history of nuclear weapons. It offers a unique window into the decision-making processes and the immense pressures faced by those at the helm of this world-changing endeavor. Groves' book is not just a historical document; it's a testament to human ingenuity and the power of focused scientific and engineering efforts. It reminds us of the profound impact that determined leadership and collective effort can have, for better or worse, on the course of human history.
January 28, 2018
An excellent review of the Manhattan Project from the management side. Leslie Groves is an organizational superhero.
July 22, 2022
This is the story of a desperate arms race, against what turned out to be a mostly imaginary opponent. I read it for a perspective on how future arms races and large projects might work.
What Surprised Me
It seemed strange that a large fraction of the book described how to produce purified U-235 and plutonium, and that the process of turning those fuels into bombs seemed anticlimactic.
I was surprised that the two bombs used against an enemy were two very different bomb designs: different fuel, and different methods of reaching a critical mass. They considered their use sufficiently urgent that they couldn't afford to test the uranium reaction (used on Hiroshima) before using it in combat.
The magnitude of the undertaking stretched the limits of US capacity enough that it must have impaired some of the other war efforts. Measured by the number of employees, it was bigger than Canada's current military, bigger than Tesla or Facebook, but smaller than Apple.
Some of the difficulty came from the need to pursue multiple engineering paths in parallel, starting many of them with only vague guesses about what the path needed to accomplish. E.g. in October 1942, their estimate of how much fissionable material they needed per bomb was considered to be only accurate to within a factor of ten. A couple of months later, Groves got estimates of whether the leading strategy for producing plutonium would work: one expert was 99% confident, another saw only a 1% chance of success.
Security
The security considerations involved lots of problems that we rarely consider today. A hundred thousand ordinary workers can't be hired without at least a moderate amount of ordinary comment in local newspapers. The press was mostly quite cooperative about censoring anything especially sensitive. But there was a tricky trade-off involved in telling the press what to censor, as too much discussion of what to censor would draw unwanted attention, even though the press was fairly trustworthy. (Today it sounds strange to use "trustworthy" and "press" in the same sentence.)
It seems that the security was sufficient to avoid alarming Germany, but not the Soviet Union.
Lessons
Nothing in recent memory has come close to being as ambitious as the Manhattan Project.
The Manhattan Project seems by far the most impressive example of a major innovation that worked the first time it was tested. When I try to come up with comparable examples, they all seem like smaller advances on existing technology: bitcoin, the space shuttle, the moon landing. The Manhattan Project roughly consisted of inventing alchemy in three years, after centuries of failed attempts.
The project required an unusual degree of trust and cooperation. The book documents that, but doesn't attempt to understand the sources of that trust and cooperation.
I'm less clear on what I learned about arms races, beyond the fact that it can be both hard and important to figure out whether one is in an arms race.
The project started with little evidence as to whether there was an arms race. It became increasingly clear that Germany wasn't mounting a serious effort, whereas the Soviets were at least serious about espionage related to the project. (No other countries appeared to have an ability to compete in any such race).
Obeying Orders
The book occasionally mentions problems with subordinates figuring out how to follow orders, given limited communication.
That reminds me of Infernal Corrigibility, Fiendishly Difficult:
One example involved soldiers outside of the project being told to use two large cargo planes to transport two ordinary sized boxes across the Pacific. Given that planes were then in somewhat short supply, why couldn't they fill the planes with other cargo? Security concerns made it unwise to tell them anything related to atomic bombs or the U-235 in one box.
Why the second plane? In case one plane went down, they wanted good info about where. Note that planes were much less reliable then than they are now.
The orders were mostly followed, in spite of complaints that they were idiotic.
But that doesn't mean subordinates should always follow orders. The plane that dropped the bomb on Nagasaki had orders to drop the bomb only if the weather permitted visual sighting. The flight had a few snafus, which left it in a situation where it appeared that following orders would have left too little fuel to reach an airport (keeping the bomb would have meant using more fuel, and landing with it in the ocean, with vague hopes of a submarine rescue). The crew decided to drop the bomb using radar (Groves seems to approve). Their luck changed before they implemented that choice - they were able to drop it visually, and landed with too little fuel to taxi off the runway.
A key difference is that in the first situation, the subordinates had reasons to suspect that key information was being kept from them. In the second situation, the subordinates had information that would have surprised their superiors, and expected that their superiors had tried to provide fairly complete information. However, I wouldn't want to generalize too much from these examples.
Groves hints that the German government was less effective at getting scientists to cooperate with its goals. I don't see enough evidence there to draw any interesting conclusions.
Closing Thoughts
How much of this book is biased toward the author's perspective? I see slightly fewer admissions of mistakes than I'd expect in an optimal book, but also few attempts to blame others. With a few exceptions, such as blaming the British for a key security failure, Groves praises nearly everyone that he names.
Here's some odd praise for Groves from Edward Teller's introduction:
There are some important policy questions related to this story that I'm mostly ignoring because the book added little to my understanding. But I will note that Groves hints that the cost of the project made it hard to not use the bomb. If Truman had decided against using it, other politicians would have asked uncomfortable questions about the resources spent on the project. Whereas actual events led to universal praise from US politicians. That likely wasn't the deciding factor in Truman's choice. It's disturbing to think that under modestly different conditions, it could have been.
What Surprised Me
It seemed strange that a large fraction of the book described how to produce purified U-235 and plutonium, and that the process of turning those fuels into bombs seemed anticlimactic.
I was surprised that the two bombs used against an enemy were two very different bomb designs: different fuel, and different methods of reaching a critical mass. They considered their use sufficiently urgent that they couldn't afford to test the uranium reaction (used on Hiroshima) before using it in combat.
The magnitude of the undertaking stretched the limits of US capacity enough that it must have impaired some of the other war efforts. Measured by the number of employees, it was bigger than Canada's current military, bigger than Tesla or Facebook, but smaller than Apple.
Some of the difficulty came from the need to pursue multiple engineering paths in parallel, starting many of them with only vague guesses about what the path needed to accomplish. E.g. in October 1942, their estimate of how much fissionable material they needed per bomb was considered to be only accurate to within a factor of ten. A couple of months later, Groves got estimates of whether the leading strategy for producing plutonium would work: one expert was 99% confident, another saw only a 1% chance of success.
Security
The security considerations involved lots of problems that we rarely consider today. A hundred thousand ordinary workers can't be hired without at least a moderate amount of ordinary comment in local newspapers. The press was mostly quite cooperative about censoring anything especially sensitive. But there was a tricky trade-off involved in telling the press what to censor, as too much discussion of what to censor would draw unwanted attention, even though the press was fairly trustworthy. (Today it sounds strange to use "trustworthy" and "press" in the same sentence.)
It seems that the security was sufficient to avoid alarming Germany, but not the Soviet Union.
Lessons
Nothing in recent memory has come close to being as ambitious as the Manhattan Project.
The Manhattan Project seems by far the most impressive example of a major innovation that worked the first time it was tested. When I try to come up with comparable examples, they all seem like smaller advances on existing technology: bitcoin, the space shuttle, the moon landing. The Manhattan Project roughly consisted of inventing alchemy in three years, after centuries of failed attempts.
The project required an unusual degree of trust and cooperation. The book documents that, but doesn't attempt to understand the sources of that trust and cooperation.
I'm less clear on what I learned about arms races, beyond the fact that it can be both hard and important to figure out whether one is in an arms race.
The project started with little evidence as to whether there was an arms race. It became increasingly clear that Germany wasn't mounting a serious effort, whereas the Soviets were at least serious about espionage related to the project. (No other countries appeared to have an ability to compete in any such race).
Obeying Orders
The book occasionally mentions problems with subordinates figuring out how to follow orders, given limited communication.
That reminds me of Infernal Corrigibility, Fiendishly Difficult:
Someone else in Aspexia's position might wonder whether Asmodeus would be pleased, if she disobeyed Asmodeus's orders [in order to achieve something Asmodeus might want] ... Aspexia does not even consider it. One of the foremost ways in which a Grand High Priestess of Asmodeus is shaped, is to predictably not behave in ways that make it more expensive for Asmodeus to keep His compacts. Improvising circles around your orders can rather tend do that. If Aspexia was the kind of priestess to circumvent her orders, Asmodeus would have needed to take that nature into account in choosing her orders.
One example involved soldiers outside of the project being told to use two large cargo planes to transport two ordinary sized boxes across the Pacific. Given that planes were then in somewhat short supply, why couldn't they fill the planes with other cargo? Security concerns made it unwise to tell them anything related to atomic bombs or the U-235 in one box.
Why the second plane? In case one plane went down, they wanted good info about where. Note that planes were much less reliable then than they are now.
The orders were mostly followed, in spite of complaints that they were idiotic.
But that doesn't mean subordinates should always follow orders. The plane that dropped the bomb on Nagasaki had orders to drop the bomb only if the weather permitted visual sighting. The flight had a few snafus, which left it in a situation where it appeared that following orders would have left too little fuel to reach an airport (keeping the bomb would have meant using more fuel, and landing with it in the ocean, with vague hopes of a submarine rescue). The crew decided to drop the bomb using radar (Groves seems to approve). Their luck changed before they implemented that choice - they were able to drop it visually, and landed with too little fuel to taxi off the runway.
A key difference is that in the first situation, the subordinates had reasons to suspect that key information was being kept from them. In the second situation, the subordinates had information that would have surprised their superiors, and expected that their superiors had tried to provide fairly complete information. However, I wouldn't want to generalize too much from these examples.
Groves hints that the German government was less effective at getting scientists to cooperate with its goals. I don't see enough evidence there to draw any interesting conclusions.
Closing Thoughts
How much of this book is biased toward the author's perspective? I see slightly fewer admissions of mistakes than I'd expect in an optimal book, but also few attempts to blame others. With a few exceptions, such as blaming the British for a key security failure, Groves praises nearly everyone that he names.
Here's some odd praise for Groves from Edward Teller's introduction:
He started with, and partially retained, thorough doubts about the feasibility of the project. Yet in convincing the leaders at DuPont that they should participate, he appeared totally confident in order to overcome the incredulity of those overly sane engineers.
There are some important policy questions related to this story that I'm mostly ignoring because the book added little to my understanding. But I will note that Groves hints that the cost of the project made it hard to not use the bomb. If Truman had decided against using it, other politicians would have asked uncomfortable questions about the resources spent on the project. Whereas actual events led to universal praise from US politicians. That likely wasn't the deciding factor in Truman's choice. It's disturbing to think that under modestly different conditions, it could have been.
August 18, 2021
I am the only man I know who slogs through histories written almost 40 years ago about a then 30 year old project.
It was a slog. A lot of it was covered in previous books so it was a review. However, it was not an unenjoyable slog. The best recollection is that of those who were there.
I actually took to reading this as, in addition to an oral history of the atomic weapon weapons development project, as a guide to leadership. He sprinkles in notices that seemed to resonate and be repeated in such topics as Extreme Ownership. General Groves illuatrates concepts in leadership in a self effacing manner against the background of the Manhattan Project.
About the only complaint I may have is the actual detonation was a chapter or two- and in practical military terms rather than the sensationalist approach we've been used to. Which, for an engineer and military man, is appropriate. He concerns himself with apperances and technical data. This also explains in laymens terms whats going on in atomic developments.
The repeated reminders of how fast they set things up got a little repetitive after the halfway mark but again
... they set this massive thing up in the time it took me to get my college degree.
Good read.
It was a slog. A lot of it was covered in previous books so it was a review. However, it was not an unenjoyable slog. The best recollection is that of those who were there.
I actually took to reading this as, in addition to an oral history of the atomic weapon weapons development project, as a guide to leadership. He sprinkles in notices that seemed to resonate and be repeated in such topics as Extreme Ownership. General Groves illuatrates concepts in leadership in a self effacing manner against the background of the Manhattan Project.
About the only complaint I may have is the actual detonation was a chapter or two- and in practical military terms rather than the sensationalist approach we've been used to. Which, for an engineer and military man, is appropriate. He concerns himself with apperances and technical data. This also explains in laymens terms whats going on in atomic developments.
The repeated reminders of how fast they set things up got a little repetitive after the halfway mark but again
... they set this massive thing up in the time it took me to get my college degree.
Good read.
April 28, 2009
This is General Leslie Groves' first person account of the unbelievably gargantuan effort that led to the creation of the atomic bomb during World War II. It is best read in tandem with Richard Rhodes' "The Making of the Atomic Bomb." But keep in mind that these are accounts extolling the virtuous aspects of the project. Read a third book, "On the Home Front" by Michele Gerber, for a straightforward and scholarly telling of the environmental havoc wreaked by the ensuing Cold War on Hanford, Washington. (In fact, you might read Gerber's book first. Then you can laugh when General Groves points out what "extraordinary" measures they took to protect the fish in the Columbia River.) These books left me wondering: What could be accomplished if governments and people could apply the same resources, energy, and ingenuity to eliminating poverty and disease that get applied to making war?
July 24, 2019
This book was disappointing for me, mostly because I just didn't find the way Groves told the story/history compelling or exciting. It was an interesting book for thinking about management practices. Groves and everybody constantly faced huge uncertainties but nonetheless made good and fast decision after good and fast decision, and getting a glimpse at how that happened is worthwhile. But most of this can be garnered from the opening chapter or two, and the actual events of the book reinforce that in a useful but what I found to be not particularly interesting way. Big takeaways are the necessity of clear hierarchical structures, clear goals, and belief in the importance of one's project (and having the institutional backing to support that belief). Interesting at times, but I don't think worth the entire read.
July 10, 2022
As far as I can tell there isn’t a truly brilliant history of the Manhattan Project. After reading this, by the general who oversaw it, I think that’s largely a function of the scale of the exercise and the fact that the people who worked on it were - unsurprisingly - not picked for their story-telling skills.
Groves’ book is in some ways more ambitious: it’s about the running of the project as a project, and how they did it without knowing at any stage what was coming next or whether it would ultimately work. Even knowing the ending, he manages to convey just how much uncertainty they were operating in and how, as always, their only way through it is was hiring exceptional people and never ceasing pursuing the original vision.
Groves’ book is in some ways more ambitious: it’s about the running of the project as a project, and how they did it without knowing at any stage what was coming next or whether it would ultimately work. Even knowing the ending, he manages to convey just how much uncertainty they were operating in and how, as always, their only way through it is was hiring exceptional people and never ceasing pursuing the original vision.
November 4, 2022
Leslie Groves, Commander of the entire operation waited until declassification of the story came about 20 years later, because he salutes for the US Army Corps of Engineers. I picked up this book because it was the first hand account of one of the most amazing science and engineering feats in American history. It’s so hard to imagine why it didn’t compel more to discovery this gem. According to Goodreads, it was looked at by less than a hundred people.
General Leslie Groves writes simply and accurately, but especially politely, as a federal government engineer would do. Lacking the emotional bite against others makes it read like Bobby Orr’s biography, equally polite, and thus not so exciting as it could be, as it should be. This topic though, doesn’t need the salacious side-stories (e.g., Oppenheimer’s mistress and her suicide). It focuses on the management challenges, the scientific and the military decisions, and why they were made. Thirty-one distinctly separate chapters interrelated to the ultimate program management… the birthing of the Fat Man and Little Boy. Oak Ridge, Hanford, Los Alamos, Alamogordo, Potsdam… University of Chicago, UC Berkeley, Columbia… DuPont, Allis-Chalmers, Kellogg… All secret, all critical, all iconic to the story.
For an engineer like me, that dry telling of the tale is enough to be enthralled, to be hypnotized by the process, the discoveries, the luck, the genius, and the anecdotes… more than enough when you consider the amazing mix of history, science, research… development, secrecy, and military culture (that which I’ve lived in for the past 35 years). Military-led engineering culture has its strong points, especially with a mission like this. But I was also hoping to also see more of the less-than-glowing politics, the flaws in the culture, the wrenches in the system… those that ‘one’ experiences over years inside the American military machine. But General Groves snaps his salutes as clean as they come.
So many anecdotes, semi-interesting… like using over 80,000 tons of silver from the federal reserve (secretly off the books) for building magnets and stuff, because there wasn’t enough copper in the country. (I DID say semi-)…Practice bombing at the Salton Sea and Cuba…
The gambling on so many undeveloped sciences… electromagnetic vs gaseous diffusion vs centrifuge and liquid thermal… plutonium vs uranium… the A-Bomb vs the H-Bomb… fission vs fusion…Tinian vs Iwo Jima… deuterium or Tritium?… okay, that one not yet developed, but mentioned as a George Jetson target-science).
A chapter not to be skimmed over was ‘Choosing the Target’. Groves, for all his engineering acumen, shows his shortsightedness exposed when the political, historical, and humane foresight of the Secretary Stimson overrules Groves’ selection of Kyoto as one of the potential targets. In this case, this part of the story enlightened me, the numerical, analytical engineer on the importance of softer sciences like sociology and ethics. American lives are important, but we live in a world community. (Not sure that American ethos has ever been changed enough for that bigger world community… perhaps it is ingrained into American kids early…by way of the Mason Locke Weems’ false fable about George Washington cutting down the cherry tree. Personal values reign supreme over doing what is right? All that Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, eh.) Throughout this ‘diary’, Groves does a great job showing both sides of the discussions, debates, quarrels, and disagreements… thankfully, no one-sided soapbox speeches heard over these 460 pages.
The Trinity test at Alamogordo of the world’s first atom bomb is another chapter not to be skimmed. Very cool how they dealt with the unknown, with its multitude of Plan B’s.
“Now It Can Be Told” turned out to be a wonderful documentation of engineering innovation, a fast-track creation of Big Bang never before seen… at least by human eyes. A spark of an Einsteinian idea lighting a fuse to a conflagration that couldn’t be unseen, that couldn’t be untold.
I’ll add that a visit to Hiroshima is a MUST to help fill in the important missing 32nd chapter. Visit on a grey, rainy day… and then stay till the sun breaks through again, and glistens off the raindrops on the memorial peace statues.
General Leslie Groves writes simply and accurately, but especially politely, as a federal government engineer would do. Lacking the emotional bite against others makes it read like Bobby Orr’s biography, equally polite, and thus not so exciting as it could be, as it should be. This topic though, doesn’t need the salacious side-stories (e.g., Oppenheimer’s mistress and her suicide). It focuses on the management challenges, the scientific and the military decisions, and why they were made. Thirty-one distinctly separate chapters interrelated to the ultimate program management… the birthing of the Fat Man and Little Boy. Oak Ridge, Hanford, Los Alamos, Alamogordo, Potsdam… University of Chicago, UC Berkeley, Columbia… DuPont, Allis-Chalmers, Kellogg… All secret, all critical, all iconic to the story.
For an engineer like me, that dry telling of the tale is enough to be enthralled, to be hypnotized by the process, the discoveries, the luck, the genius, and the anecdotes… more than enough when you consider the amazing mix of history, science, research… development, secrecy, and military culture (that which I’ve lived in for the past 35 years). Military-led engineering culture has its strong points, especially with a mission like this. But I was also hoping to also see more of the less-than-glowing politics, the flaws in the culture, the wrenches in the system… those that ‘one’ experiences over years inside the American military machine. But General Groves snaps his salutes as clean as they come.
So many anecdotes, semi-interesting… like using over 80,000 tons of silver from the federal reserve (secretly off the books) for building magnets and stuff, because there wasn’t enough copper in the country. (I DID say semi-)…Practice bombing at the Salton Sea and Cuba…
The gambling on so many undeveloped sciences… electromagnetic vs gaseous diffusion vs centrifuge and liquid thermal… plutonium vs uranium… the A-Bomb vs the H-Bomb… fission vs fusion…Tinian vs Iwo Jima… deuterium or Tritium?… okay, that one not yet developed, but mentioned as a George Jetson target-science).
A chapter not to be skimmed over was ‘Choosing the Target’. Groves, for all his engineering acumen, shows his shortsightedness exposed when the political, historical, and humane foresight of the Secretary Stimson overrules Groves’ selection of Kyoto as one of the potential targets. In this case, this part of the story enlightened me, the numerical, analytical engineer on the importance of softer sciences like sociology and ethics. American lives are important, but we live in a world community. (Not sure that American ethos has ever been changed enough for that bigger world community… perhaps it is ingrained into American kids early…by way of the Mason Locke Weems’ false fable about George Washington cutting down the cherry tree. Personal values reign supreme over doing what is right? All that Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, eh.) Throughout this ‘diary’, Groves does a great job showing both sides of the discussions, debates, quarrels, and disagreements… thankfully, no one-sided soapbox speeches heard over these 460 pages.
The Trinity test at Alamogordo of the world’s first atom bomb is another chapter not to be skimmed. Very cool how they dealt with the unknown, with its multitude of Plan B’s.
“Now It Can Be Told” turned out to be a wonderful documentation of engineering innovation, a fast-track creation of Big Bang never before seen… at least by human eyes. A spark of an Einsteinian idea lighting a fuse to a conflagration that couldn’t be unseen, that couldn’t be untold.
I’ll add that a visit to Hiroshima is a MUST to help fill in the important missing 32nd chapter. Visit on a grey, rainy day… and then stay till the sun breaks through again, and glistens off the raindrops on the memorial peace statues.
February 8, 2018
A great story, exceptionally well-told. General Groves was not only a superb leader and a brilliant engineer, but also a quite talented writer. His straightforward and concise style conveys a remarkable amount of information in a very smooth "flow." He is honest, to the point of being blunt, leaving the reader assured of the accuracy of the account.
The thing that imprtessed me the most about this book was the story of a complex and high-risk undertaking, aggressively directed. Groves weighed the risks at every turn, and made the decisions that were necessary to keep the project on track. This is a great story for all Project Managers.
Highly recommended...
The thing that imprtessed me the most about this book was the story of a complex and high-risk undertaking, aggressively directed. Groves weighed the risks at every turn, and made the decisions that were necessary to keep the project on track. This is a great story for all Project Managers.
Highly recommended...
March 11, 2021
One passage from the appendix of the book summed up what the book was about and why I have been interested in World war II and the triumph of our will and ingenuity over our enemies.
"In that brief instant in the remote New Mexico desert the tremendous effort of the brains and brawn of all these people came suddenly and startlingly to the fullest fruition....Words are inadequate tools for the job of acquainting those not present with the physical, mental and psychological effects. It had to be witnessed to be realized." A herculean effort of American will brilliantly lead by General Leslie Groves and Dr. Robert Oppenheimer. I thoroughly enjoyed this book and highly recommend it.
"In that brief instant in the remote New Mexico desert the tremendous effort of the brains and brawn of all these people came suddenly and startlingly to the fullest fruition....Words are inadequate tools for the job of acquainting those not present with the physical, mental and psychological effects. It had to be witnessed to be realized." A herculean effort of American will brilliantly lead by General Leslie Groves and Dr. Robert Oppenheimer. I thoroughly enjoyed this book and highly recommend it.
July 19, 2018
An interesting account of the Manhattan project by the General who led it and who features, of course, in countless other accounts and dramatisations of the project. It's a little bureaucratic in tone and the author is careful to list military, political and business participants carefully which serves to remind us that the project was much more than the scientific endeavour that's the usual focus of accounts. Not scintillating reading but an important member of the corps of books on the subject.
May 25, 2021
I really enjoyed reading this book, as I learned the real background of the making of the atomic bomb. Site selection for 3 large factories was good, and one quickly realizes that General Groves was definitely the man for the job. I doubt the project would have succeeded without his ability to see the big picture. The first 4/5 of the book was very interesting, the last bit after Hiroshima & Nagasaki was a bit too procedural, hence my rating. Otherwise I would have given it 5/5. Recommended.
April 9, 2019
It’s an interesting book to get a full detailed breakdown of the Manhattan project but that level of detail is also its biggest flaw. It can be a tough read at times to get through. I had to take a break and read a different book half way through just cause I had lost all interest in it. But I went back to it and the last half is better as it has more about the tests, the actual bombings and you get a glimpse of what the German scientists thought about it as well.
August 6, 2023
Good chaser to the very information-low Oppenheimer movie, giving lots of insight into the engineering and dealings behind the manhattan project. Groves arranged for the materials, sites and personnel that made the bomb work.
The book is filled with interesting anecdotes about the project, from how they procured the uranium, how they kept the families at Oak Ridge and Hanford happy to information on worker safety.
The book is filled with interesting anecdotes about the project, from how they procured the uranium, how they kept the families at Oak Ridge and Hanford happy to information on worker safety.
December 18, 2023
I read this for research. (That makes it sound like I'm trying to refine uranium. I am writing a historical mystery about a physicist!) It is extremely details and objective, perhaps too objective at times for a reader looking for a narrative. I just wanted the facts and people and dates, so for my purposes this was perfect!
May 18, 2019
A Great History Book
Epocal history of the creation of the atomic bomb
One of the greatest engineering feats of mankind
One of the world's biggest construction projects spanning the continent
Epocal history of the creation of the atomic bomb
One of the greatest engineering feats of mankind
One of the world's biggest construction projects spanning the continent
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December 1, 2023The Ultimate Source
I've read many books on this subject but never one like this! General Groves provides behind-the-scenes insight into the problems that had to be overcome like no one else would be able to. Without giving away critical information.
I've read many books on this subject but never one like this! General Groves provides behind-the-scenes insight into the problems that had to be overcome like no one else would be able to. Without giving away critical information.
September 1, 2025
Very Good Book
It was interesting to read about the Manhattan Project from the view of a non-scientist. All the planning that was done without solid knowledge of what they were doing would actually work.
It was interesting to read about the Manhattan Project from the view of a non-scientist. All the planning that was done without solid knowledge of what they were doing would actually work.
June 24, 2022
solid writing
September 7, 2023
Extremely comprehensive and detailed.
November 15, 2023
A great (if extreme) book on excellent project management.
June 10, 2024
A long, tough book to read, but in companion with "The Manhatten Project," and "American Prometheus," it sheds much information into the point of view of General Groves.
February 4, 2025
Gripping and endlessly interesting, lacks the flair provided by the Oppenheimer biography but that ultimately adds to its authenticity as a meaningful historical document
April 14, 2025
Dry as fuck but a real masterclass in getting shit done. Some of the very casual ways he talks about choosing targets and stuff like that are jarring to read.
June 24, 2025
Too much science
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