In Praise of Reason 1st (first) , 1st (first) Edition by Lynch, Michael P. published by The MIT Press

by Michael Patrick Lynch

Why does reason matter, if (as many people seem to think) in the end everything comes down to blind faith or gut instinct? Why not just go with what you believe even if it contradicts the evidence? Why bother with rational explanation when name-calling, manipulation, and force are so much more effective in our current cultural and political landscape? Michael Lynch's "In Praise of Reason "offers a spirited defense of reason and rationality in an era of widespread skepticism--when, for example, people reject scientific evidence about such matters as evolution, climate change, and vaccines when it doesn't jibe with their beliefs and opinions.In recent years, skepticism about the practical value of reason has emerged even within the scientific academy. Many philosophers and psychologists claim that the reasons we give for our most deeply held views are often little more than rationalizations of our prior convictions. "In" "Praise of Reason" gives us a counterargument. Although skeptical questions about reason have a deep and interesting history, they can be answered. In particular, appeals to scientific principles of rationality are part of the essential common currency of any civil democratic society. The idea that everything is arbitrary--that reason has no more weight than blind faith--undermines a key principle of a civil that we owe our fellow citizens explanations for what we do. Reason matters--not just for the noble ideal of truth, but for the everyday world in which we live.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Politics

Unknown Binding

First published March 16, 2012

Reviews

[Wendelle]

""democracies aren’ t simply organizing a struggle for power between competing interests; democratic politics isn’ t war by other means. Democracies are, or should be, spaces of reasons. In the words of the political philosopher Joshua Cohen, a democracy is an association whose justification “ proceeds through public argument and reasoning among equal citizens. ”" -from the book

This book aims to champion the process of reason or rationality as the foundational epistemic principle or basis by which we can say we can derive knowledge. This is an important project as reason now coexists and competes in a crowded marketplace of ideas with other claimants of the title of preeminent source of knowledge, such as emotions and passion, intuition, religious or cultural tradition, socially contagious conspiracy theories.. Each of this proposed source of knowledge has its own set of avid adherents, such as flat Earthers, anti-vaxxers, diviners, postmodernists, that subscribe to a different way of gaining knowledge, and they will not be convinced through mere reasoning, to subscribe instead to reasoning.

Professor Lynch aims in this book to argue against skeptics who question the process of reason or rationality as the method to deduce knowledge. He does this because he believes society, composed of different individuals of different beliefs and moral principles, can survive only with civil discourse or debate, and civil discourse is only possible if there is a possibility of understanding and persuasion among different people through the medium of reason. To conduct this difficult project of establishing the primacy of reason he goes through different historical challenges to reason, such as the faultiness of induction from prior experience, and the circularity argument by Sextus of establishing the soundness of one epistemic method, through that method ("reasoning is epistemically sound because it is reasonable; empirical experiences of the external world are trustworthy because experience has shown they are trustworthy; faith-based knowledge is sound because I have faith that it is so.")

In the end, Professor Lynch concludes by likening reason to the keystone of an arch. A keystone is essential to the arch, but it does not compose the arch on it own. In the same way, it may not be possible to rigorously establish the primacy of reason through reason alone, or the process of rationality or the paradigm of the scientific method. But Professor Lynch says that does not stop us from valuing reason as the primary and most significant epistemic principle, over other possible sources. We can also point out the practical value or virtue of reason-- as a foundational lingua franca in building a civil society.

[Amir Sahbaee · Rating 3 out of 5]

من ترجمه‌ی کتاب رو خوندم از یاسر میردامادی نشر نو.چون به گودریدز اضافه نشده بود مجبور شدم همین نسخه رو انتخاب کنم
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کتابِ کتاب‌خوانی گروهیمون بود
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توی این کتاب آقای لینچ درباره‌ی عقل و دلیل‌آوری و استدلال صحبت می‌کنه.نه فقط بخاطر ارزش ذاتی و نظری عقل.بخاطر اینکه ما بتونیم دلیل کارهامون رو به دیگران بگیم و دلیل کارهاشون رو ازشون بپرسیم.که بعد این گفتگو بر پایه‌ی یک زمینه‌ی مشترک،به ما در ساختن جامعه‌ی اجتماعی،در ساختن سیاست دموکراتیک کمک بکنه.
فصول اول کتاب درباره‌ی خود عقله.آیا عقل اصلا میتونه مفید باشه؟مگر چندین پژوهش نشون ندادن که انسان‌ها خیلی از تصمیماتشون رو بر اساس شهود و غیره میگیرن و عقل رو کنار میذارن؟پس نقش عقل چقدر جدی و مهمه؟
اینجا لینچ بررسی میکنه دوتا دیدگاه رو:
اول دیدگاه افلاطونی ها که معتقدن عقل انسان رو رهبری میکنه و افسار احساسات رو به دست داره و همه چیز تحت فرمان عقله.
دوم دیدگاه هیومی‌ها که معتقدن انسان با پیروی از عقل مسیر اشتباه رو میره و در نهایت این احساس و شهوده که انسان رو به سمت درست هدایت می‌کنه.
و لینچ مسیری بین این دونظر رو به ما معرفی میکنه.
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بعد از اون لینچ سعی میکنه که دلیل بیاره برای پذیرفتن عقل.اما اول چندین نظر از شکاکان رو معرفی میکنه و با خیلی‌هاشون توان مقابله نداره.درواقع لینچ هم این رو میپذیره که بدون استدلال دوری و استفاده کردن از خود عقل(یا مثلا استدلال استقرایی و قیاسی) نمیشه خود این‌هارو اثبات کرد.
گریزی میزنه به اینکه شاید سنت بتونه جایگزین عقل باشه اما بعد ایرادات جدی به سنت وارد میکنه(مثلا اینکه کدام سنت؟و اینکه بعد دیگه سنت‌ها نقد پذیر نخواهند بود).
پس لینچ درنهایت اعتراف میکنه که شاید اصول معرفتی رو نشه بدون استدلال دوری اثبات کرد،اما میشه رو به عقلانیت عملی آورد و درباره‌ش صحبت کرد.یه چیزی شبیه نگاه کارکردگرایانه به اصول عقلی(البته دقیقا نگاه کارکردگرایانه نیست اما توضیح دقیقش نیاز به خوندن کتاب داره).
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درواقع لینچ از چیزی حرف میزنه به نام "بازی روش".این بازی فرضی از شما میخواد تصور کنید که قراره برید روی یک سیاره‌ی دیگه که چیزی ازش نمیدونید.شما قراره اونجا زندگی کنید اما نه از جایگاه اجتماعیتون اونجا خبر دارید نه از وضعیت اونجا.حالا ازتون میخواد سعی کنید فکر کنید که چه قواعد و اصولی رو برای اونجا میپذیرید.مثلا چطور سیاست و اجتماع ساخته بشه و غیره.و نشون میده که ما بر اساس کامن سنس تصمیم میگیریم قواعد باز رو انتخاب کنیم.قواعدی مثل قواعد علمی شامل تکرار پذیری،شفافیت،سازگاری پذیری و غیره.اینجوری میتونیم رویه‌های اون سیاره رو نقد کنیم و وضعیت خودمون رو بهبود ببخشیم.
پس میتونیم بر اساس همین عقل سلیم،اصالت عملی بدیم به این اصول.
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توی بخش آخر هم نویسنده اشاره می‌کنه به نگاه دو فرهنگی به دانشگاه.اینکه دانشگاه رو در علوم طبیعی و تجربی دنبال حقیقته اما علوم انسانی و هنر دنبال فلسفه بافی و غیره.
لینچ اینجا با بخشی ازصحبت های پست مدرنیستا همراه میشه و این نگاه دو فرهنگی به دانشگاه رو رد میکنه.اما برخلاف اونها ادعا میکنه که نهایتا حقیقتی وجود داره که هردو گروه دنبالش هستن.مثلا میگه این جمله که "شکنجه کردن زندانی نقض حقوق اوست" چطور میتونه با یه واقعیت بیرونی مثل علوم طبیعی در ارتباط باشه؟!
پس صادق بودن الزاما نیاز به واقعیت بیرونی نداره.
نتیجه میگیره که در فلسفه و علوم انسانی اینکه اصول سازگاری درونی و بیرونی داشته باشن میتونه اونارو به حقیقت تبدیل کنه.
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هرچند که بخش آخر خیلی پیچیده و سخته اما درکل کتاب سختی نیست.اما بیشتر درحال تلاش برای رسیدن به پاسخه.درواقع نتیجه‌ی جدیدی پیش روی ما نمیذاره فقط مسیر ذهنی نویسنده رو نشون میده که چطور به نتایج میرسه.اگر دنبال نتایج باشید کتاب خیلی جذاب نخواهد بود براتون و درواقع چیز جدیدی بهتون اضافه نمیکنه.
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ترجمه‌ی یاسر میردامادی هم خوب بود.جز پانویس چندتا ضرب‌المثلی که فارسی‌سازی کرده بود و اصلش رو نیاورده بود،استفاده از پانویس و روانی کاملا خوب بود.

[Charlie · Rating 4 out of 5]

Lynch's conception of the worthwhile civil society is one in which actors not only have reasons for their policies but are also able to give those reasons to others in a form they can accept—not merely "This is what I want" but "Here is why this is what we should want." But even if we the people were inclined to interact in this fashion, there there remains the question of whether we can. Just how rational can people be?

From skeptics old and new, Lynch defends the premise that we are rational enough. Against what he takes to be exaggerated inferences drawn from cognitive science and sociology, he argues that the roles of emotion and intuition in our judgments and decision-making do not entirely undermine the rational project. Being capable of irrationality does not preclude being capable of rationality. Against the philosophical arguments of Sextus Empiricus and Hume Lynch concedes that epistemic reasons cannot be given for epistemic methods. However, drawing on pragmatist philosophers and John Rawls, he argues that practical reasons can justify our commitments to some epistemic methods, particularly those that are comparatively intersubjective, transparent, repeatable, natural, and adaptable.

It's not clear that all of Lynch's arguments work. Those against newer sciences seem a bit too superficial, whereas those against classic skepticism seem somewhat clunky. But all throughout the book one feels that Lynch has his finger on the pulse of something. Also, its clear and even accessible style is a great asset in a book that argues for the importance of reason in public discourse. In Praise of Reason is enjoyable, important, provocative, and perhaps even correct.

[Carrie Poppy · Rating 2 out of 5]

Dry

[Tucker · Rating 4 out of 5]

The author defines reason as “the ability to explain and justify our beliefs and commitments” and more specifically “using certain methods, appealing to certain sources, and engaging in certain practices over others,” including scientific inferences from logic and and perception. (p. 3) “I will not,” he says, “defend reason with a capital R, nor the illusion that reason is value-free…Like the American pragmatists, I think the best we can say on behalf of reason &mash; indeed, what we should say — is that it plays a central role in any healthy public culture.” (p. 5)

But why be rational? That's the question he poses in this book. It dates back to "the followers of Pyrrho, four centuries before Christ." (p. 4) Can we give reasons for why we give reasons? Within any given system, people can argue about their reasons. Scientists can argue about logic and observation, and preachers can argue about revelation. Any conclusion can be evaluated according to the rules of the reasoning system. But, going all the way back to the fundamentals of the system, the system can’t explain itself. Thus we have no reason to endorse one system over another.

Skepticism of reason may occur on the grounds that (1) reason is a post-hoc rationalization, not the cause of our beliefs (2) reason can’t be defended with noncircular reasons (3) there's no way to reveal truth, anyway, not even by reason.

Any individual may indeed switch from being a scientist to a preacher, or vice versa, or they may persuade their neighbor to convert. But when we make these radical changes in our thought, it can’t be justified rationally, because we are changing the very grounds by which we justify things rationally. We might not have enough common ground for dialogue at all, let alone to agree upon a conclusion.

Lynch sees this as a “darker” implication: “changing people’s minds—or changing our own minds—if the change is radical enough, can never be a rational process. Manipulation, conversion, power is all there really is.” (p. 69) That's an outcome that Lynch doesn't want to accept because it clashes with the hope that dialogue and democracy are possible.

Lynch believes that we can argue for certain fundamental assumptions about how we know what we know (“epistemic principles”), but we need to leave our personal preferences aside and we can’t presuppose that any epistemic principle is true. That is, we should leave aside ulterior motives and avoid begging the question. (pp. 87-88)

Since we can’t “believe any particular epistemic] principle is true,”—which means we can’t find “an intrinsically epistemic reason for epistemic principles”—we can focus on methods instead. We should be aware of the consequences of what we commit to. Your commitments, especially your epistemic ones, “have further implications for what else you might believe in, commit to, and do.” (p. 114) He says “we should privilege principles that recommend methods and practices that are repeatable, adaptable, intersubjective, and transparent. (p. 102) Those principles belong to science, which is intersubjective (multiple people can participate in its evaluation) and transparent (work is shared in journals). Its results are repeatable, most people have the intuition and ability to engage in its methods, and these methods are adaptable. (pp. 91-93) Scientific principles “have a distinctive ‘open’ character” and “generate ‘public’ reasons—reasons that are assessable from a common point of view.” (p. 88)

Lynch believes he has identified a model in which reasons mean something. It is this:

Coherent belief-systems are ones that don’t contradict themselves. Supercoherence means that this remains the case ”in every successive stage of inquiry,” that is, when testing our beliefs, “we never encounter any reason to give them up….Supercoherence is eternal, undefeated coherence.” (p. 131) Add to this “compatibility with external facts” (i.e. scientific verification, I suppose) and he calls the result “concordance” (p. 135) This seems analogous to the idea of logical soundness (commonly defined as validity + truth), but with more detail.

This book is fairly clear, but repetitive. It would be far more popularly accessible if he had given examples of fundamental epistemic disagreements — subject matter, and ways in which dialogue commonly goes awry — so that the average reader has a reason to care about this topic. He suggested religion vs. science, but this was left vague. Presumably there are many more such disagreements, including many of which we are not often aware.

[Vinicius Pereira · Rating 5 out of 5]

Como jornalista esse livro é fundamental. Muitos jornalistas que eu tenho contato hoje em dia acreditam que a objetividade e a imparcialidade são mitos, uma farsa. Mas o que resta então? Em vez de perseguir a imparcialidade e buscar os fatos, vamos então todos virar advogados de alguma causa? Sim, todo processo - não só jornalístico, está sujeito a subjetividade do indivíduo, mas é notório que dividimos um campo epistemológico comum, certo? Como o autor afirma: Se abdicarmos desse pensamento somos inviáveis como sociedade e democracia, todas as pontes estarão quebradas.

"The thought that everything is arbitrary undermines a key principle of a civil society: that we owe our fellow citizens explanations for what we do. Civil societies are not necessarily polite or homogeneous; but they are societies that value reason-giving, inquiry, questioning, and hashing out one’s differences with others. In so doing, they take seriously the idea that there are better and worse ways of doing these things. If you give up on the idea that there are standards of this sort, you give up on the idea that giving reasons has any real point. Deliberation becomes a game played for the joy of manipulation and the increase of power."

[Fernando Trias · Rating 4 out of 5]

Lynch provides a penetrating critique of our age of truthiness, along with an insightful theory about the causes of modern-day skepticism. His argument is steeped in traditional philosophy, and his solution is a return to rationality. Academic in tone, yet easy to read, In Praise of Reason is even more relevant today than when it came out.

[Gerardo B. Herrera · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book presents an interesting argument in support of reason. Lynch connects the value of reason to a properly functioning democratic society. Lynch presents counter philosophical arguments against reason and how they fall short. Very interesting book and very well written for a philosophy book.

[Kaveh · Rating 1 out of 5]

این کتاب رو با ترجمه یاسر میر دامادی خوندم. به نظرم کتاب سخت خوان با ترجمه بسیار ضعیف و مبهمی بود

[Bot · Rating 5 out of 5]

A must read for the future of the planet.