Hard Feelings: The Moral Psychology of Contempt

by Macalester Bell

At a time when respect is widely touted as an attitude of central moral importance, contempt is often derided as a thoroughly nasty emotion inimical to the respect we owe all persons. But while contempt is regularly dismissed as completely disvaluable, ethicists have had very little to say about what contempt is or whether it deserves its ugly reputation. Macalester Bell argues that we must reconsider contempt's role in our moral lives. While contempt can be experienced in inapt and disvaluable ways, it may also be a perfectly appropriate response that provides the best way of answering a range of neglected faults.

Using a wide variety of examples, Bell provides an account of the nature of contempt and its virtues and vices. While some insist that contempt is always unfitting because of its globalism, Bell argues that this objection mischaracterizes the person assessments at the heart of contempt. Contempt is, in some cases, the best way of responding to arrogance, hypocrisy, and other vices of superiority. Contempt does have a dark side, and inapt forms of contempt structure a host of social ills. Racism is best characterized as an especially pernicious form of inapt contempt, and Bell's account of contempt helps us better understand the moral badness of racism. It is argued that the best way of responding to race-based contempt is to mobilize a robust counter-contempt for racists.

The book concludes with a discussion of overcoming contempt through forgiveness. This account of forgiveness sheds light upon the broader issue of social reconciliation and what role reparations and memorials may play in giving persons reasons to overcome their contempt for institutions.

Genres: Philosophy

320 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2013

Reviews

[Lanà · Rating 4 out of 5]

I bought this book after noticing my own feelings of contempt toward certain people in my life. I became curious about this emotion and about the people who seemed to trigger it.

While reading, I often found it difficult to understand where the author herself stands, because she frequently shifts her perspective on the nature of contempt. Still, I found several ideas particularly thought‑provoking. One is the notion that even when we are capable of recognizing good qualities in the person we hold in contempt, we often choose not to—perhaps because doing so would create an uncomfortable sense of cognitive dissonance. Instead, we “globalize” the triggering trait and reduce the person to a simplified version of themselves.

Another striking idea is that “where contempt exists, there is no danger from its target.” Kant discusses this extensively in his Metaphysics of Morals, and I expected him to be quoted here as well. But Bell goes further: she suggests that Kant may not have been as opposed to contempt as many assume—though he was referring to a different form of it. And indeed, the book shows that there are many varieties of contempt.

One of the most interesting sections for me was the analysis of cowardice and stupidity. I was particularly intrigued by the argument that stupidity alone is not what provokes contempt. Rather, it is the combination of perceived stupidity with the person’s social position and the level of respect that position demands.

[Rachel Kreager · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book was well-written and clear. It also did a good job of discussing “negative” emotions without value judgments and put a realist spin on moral psychology.

[Madeline]

I don't know if I think contempt is (characteristically) global.