Chancellorsville, while one of the bloodiest battles of the War Between the States, with just over 30,000 total casualties, and being recognized as perhaps the finest tactical achievement of American arms, is still a criminally understudied campaign, and battle, of the War. Chancellorsville was such a multifaceted engagement, however, that it too has a forgotten front.
The battles of 2nd Fredericksburg, Salem Church, and Banks Ford are often skimmed over and breezed through in most accounts of the general Battle of Chancellorsville. This fine book, however, goes a long way towards ensuring that the men from both warring republics did not sacrifice their blood, sweat, tears, and far too many lives, in vain.
The writing is excellent, and the presentation is superb, honestly both standards that are commonplace with books published from Savas Beatie. In terms of bias of the authors, I honestly detected little, if any. The story is told, roughly in equal parts, between the boys from Dixie, and the boys from the North. And the authors clearly admired many of the men, and some of the officers, from both sides.
In any military history, I think this must be an ironclad standard to be lived up to.
Much of the story focuses on two units: the Federal VI Corps, Army of the Potomac, the men who wore the Greek Cross, and Brigadier General Jubal A. Early's Divsion, Army of Northern Virginia, the boys who served under Lee's 'Bad Old Man'. (The Greek Cross was one of the unit symbols Hooker bestowed upon the AoP in his reorganization during the late winter, and early spring of 1862-63, with the Greek Cross being assigned the men of the VI Corps. Lee's often referred to Early, always with a wry grin, as '...my bad old man.' Early was a lifelong bachelor, an atheist, a major deal in such Christian times, rude, cantankerous, aggressively sarcastic, with a biting wit, and a proficient wielder in, and dealer of, profanity. He was the only man of the Army allowed to swear in Lee's presence, and his personality was largely put up with because he was a damned good commander in his own right.)
The authors do an excellent job showcasing the planning for the roles in the operations to come that these two units will take part in, and they spend some time discussing the personality, and command style of both Early and Major General John Sedgwick, commander of VI Corps.
Sedgwick, as the authors contend, and whose judgment I have to agree with, has had an overblown reputation in the historiography of the War. He was, indeed, loved by his men. Sedgwick was one of the few Generals to earn genuine love, admiration, and devotion from his men, and subordinates. And some of the vignettes of him shared throughout the book really do standout in showcasing that, yeah, 'Uncle John' would have been a great man to serve under.
But not one to rely upon when he becomes the central element in your dreams of victory.
Sedgwick lacked aggression, and more importantly, a creative streak, and tended to too literally interpret orders, and then follow them to the letter. All heart, but no brains.
In a fluid, dynamic environment such as a battle, strict adherence to orders is most often a sin, not a virtue. And the wages of said sin are paid by your men.
Hooker's plan for Sedgwick's Corps was to be the trapping arm that closed the ANV into a vise, somewhere in the wilderness, where the superior mass of the AoP would then squeeze it to death. And as the authors show, Hooker's early moves did come close to encircling the ANV, and doing just that, on an operational level.
However, the ANV understood that, when outgunned, and outnumbered, being tactically aggressive can often be a potent force multiplier, and indeed it was. Aggressive Southern reactions to Hooker's initial encircling movements threw him, and his plan off guard, changing the entire direction, and tempo of the ensuing multi-day battle.
Sedgwick and the VI Corps were meant to push across the Rappahannock, seize Fredericksburg and establish a bridgehead, seize the heights beyond the town, and then drive inland, hopefully, into the Confederate rear.
A genuinely fine plan that was upended not by Early's aggressiveness (his Division was holding the Fredericksburg area, and was spread too thinly, observing and defending all the possible crossing points, to be aggressive), but rather by 'Uncle John's' tardiness, and general methodical nature. The time bought by Sedgwick's slowness allowed both Lee to focus on the main engagement around Chancellorsville, while Early was likewise able to snag some reinforcement when Sedgwick finally did begin his offensive.
It must be said that the Federals clearing of Marye's Heights, the site of their bloodsoaked catastrophe the December prior, was masterfully done. The VI Corps, rightly so, earned its reputation here for its innovative, hard hitting tactical offensives. It would be the VI which would, at the end, break the ANV's lines around Petersburg, beginning the retreat to Appomattox. And they introduced their uniquely American line breaking offensive here, at the 2nd Battle of Fredericksburg, which would prove to be the only bright spot in the entire campaign for the Federals.
As Early's Divsion was driven off, albeit in good order (though Barkesdale's Mississippi Brigade was very roughly handled when they were tossed off the Heights), Sedgwick took far too much time in massing his Corps for the drive into the Rebel rear. This gave Lee the time needed to manhandle and maul the Federals around Chancellorsville, and to then form a defensive line (splitting his already outnumbered host for a third time in doing so) around Salem Church to block the eventual advance of the VI Corps.
The ensuing Battle of Salem Church is one of the forgotten engagements of the War, and it should be better remembered. If for no other reason than for the memory of the men in blue and grey who struggled, suffered, and died there. The VI Corps' assault washed against the Southern line, and while at times bent it, did not break it, and a Southern counterattack won the day, and drove the VI Corps from the field.
Now, with both Hooker's main segment of the AoP on the northern bank of the Rappahannock, and with Sedgwick retreating towards Banks Ford to cross over to safety himself, the Confederates put the pressure on to win a truly decisive victory. Early's men had already cutoff the VI Corps' main avenue of retreat by cutting in behind them and retaking Fredericksburg and the Marye's Heights, forcing the Federals to pull back northwards. Lee determined to smash them in a night assault.
Despite their sheer exhaustion, and the general confusion inherent in night engagements (especially pre modern technology), the Confederates pushed the Federal rear guard hard, and smashed quite a bit of it. But not enough to rout the VI Corps, or to fatally weaken the AoP. Although the South had won a titanic success during this campaign, especially as they were outnumbered over 2-1, they simply lacked the resources to turn a magnificent tactical, and operational triumph into a lasting strategic one.
This really was a fine book, and I genuinely recommend anyone who is interested in the War Between the States, or military history in general to grab a copy. Very highly recommended.