Josef Pieper’s work, The Silence of St. Thomas, is a collection of three essays which all illuminate the idea of St. Thomas that “truth and unknowability belong together” (59), and show that this idea leads us to not only a realistic and healthy epistemology, but a profound, silent reverence of creation, rooted in hope - an experience and attitude that St. Thomas himself had.
The first essay, “On Thomas Aquinas,” begins by going through St. Thomas’s life, especially how he views intellectual disputes as “a common striving for the victory, not of one of the contenders, but of truth” (22). It explores his conception of the world as an ordered creation in which our knowledge, through both bodily sense perception and our spiritual intellect, can know true things. But far from being a systematic, facile, “solutionistic” thinker, as many would portray St. Thomas to be, Pieper emphasizes how in fact Thomas began his Summa Theologica by saying “we are not capable of knowing what God is but only what He is not” (37) and left the Summa unfinished, deliberately stopping his writing altogether after having a mystical experience of God: “All that I have written seems to me nothing but straw…compared to what I have seen…” (40). Altogether, this first essay shows that Thomas’s life demonstrates both his strong belief in knowing truth through creation and his coming face-to-face with the deep unknowability of truth.
This segues the reader into Pieper’s next essay, “The Negative Element in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas.” This essay unpacks how, from the foundational truth that everything is created, things are both knowable because God has creatively thought them and thus made them intelligible to us (see 55-6), and also things are unknowable (with reference to their essence) because they all bear a likeness to God who is infinite (see 57-66). St. Thomas says that the highest knowledge is the knowledge of God as the Unknown; Pieper shows how, related to this thought, we can also see that “not only God Himself but also things have an ‘eternal name’ that man is unable to utter” (65). Thus, created reality has both an ontological clarity coming from created things in their self-revelation and also an infinite inexhaustibleness of even a single fly’s essence – both of these ideas together being a reflection of how everything “has its origin from God and also from nothing” (67). Pieper extracts from all this that “hope is the condition of man’s existence as a knowing subject” and our existence as knowing subjects will always be one as a traveler, as one “on the way” (69), since we can never get to the bottom of even a single created being, let alone the Infinite Creator Himself. Thus the “negative element” of St. Thomas’ philosophy regarding the unknowability of things is set against a background of an embracing affirmation of hope and each thing that is unknowable is not ultimately “dark and impenetrable, but only something that has so much light that a particular finite faculty of knowledge cannot absorb it all. It is too rich to be assimilated completely…” (60) Thus, even in the negative (“dark”) element, we have illumination.
The third essay in the book, “The Timeliness of Thomism,” brings these conclusions into our modern world (which still struggles with many of the same ideological difficulties as the 1950s when this book was written) in which understanding both the knowability and unknowability of things is a timely corrective to errant ways of thinking. Pieper notes how much St. Thomas would actually agree with the Existentialists in the 50s. The Existentialists repudiate others that consider the whole of creation as something completely fathomable through technology and scientific progress. One of them - Sartre - made a distinction, like St. Thomas, between artificial things, which receive their “measure” from man, and natural things, which do not, and that artificial things can be completely grasped in their essence (such as the nature of a letter opener), but natural things cannot. Where St. Thomas differs from Sartre is in saying that we can have insights and assertions about the nature of things – not exhaustive knowledge, but still true knowledge. Pieper shows how this divergence from Sartre is rooted in the insight that “true philosophy can come into being only when it refers to a true theology” (101). Existentialism ends by saying there are no essences of natural things because there is no form-creating, knowing mind who designed their essence, and thus there is no essence of man. But St. Thomas, building off of ideas of Plato and resonating with ideas of Augustine, says that the archetypal pattern of things dwells within the Divine Logos and thus all things are designed by God and exist through his “mind’s eye.” Thus, all concepts understood through the philosophical act aspire toward deriving truths, knowable truths, from an inexhaustible divine Source (see 98).
Pieper’s argument for the paradoxical union in created beings of both their truth and unknowability is a compelling one which he approaches through different angles in the three essays of this book: the angle of understanding the concept through St. Thomas’ own lived experience of it, diving deep into the philosophical nature of the unknowability, and placing this concept of St. Thomas in dialogue with the modern world. Personally, I admit to having seen St. Thomas as a systematic, cold, hard thinker, but this book refutes all such views of him, showing his profound reverence for the unknowability of the essence of things. Through Pieper’s clear - and at times almost lyrical and narrative - philosophical prose, he inspires the reader with a broadened mindset to go deeper into this infinite discoverable realm of unknowability and, like St. Thomas, personally experience the very wonder which his thesis is aimed towards illuminating.