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The Siege at Jadotville: The Irish Army's Forgotten Battle
The Irish soldier has never been a stranger to fighting the enemy with the odds stacked against him. The notion of charging into adversity has been a cherished part of Ireland’s military history.In September 1961 another chapter should have been written into the annals, but it is a tale that lay shrouded in dust for years.The men of A Company, 35th Irish Infantry Battalion, arrived in the Congo as a UN contingent to help keep the peace. For many it would be their first trip outside their native shores. Some of the troops were teenage boys, their army-issue hobnailed boots still unbroken. They had never heard a shot fired in anger. Others were experienced professional soldiers, but were still not prepared for the action that was to take place.Led by Commandant Pat Quinlan, A Company found themselves tasked with protecting the European population at Jadotville, a small mining town in the southern Congolese province of Katanga. It fell to A Company to try and protect people who later turned on them. On 13 September 1961 the bright morning air of Jadotville was shattered by the sound of automatic gunfire.The men of A Company found their morning Mass parade interrupted, and within minutes went from holding rosaries to rifles as they entered the world of combat. This was to be no Srebrenica; though cut off and surrounded, the men of Jadotville held their ground and fought …This is their story.
288 pages, Paperback
First published March 1, 2005
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 53 reviews
December 6, 2016
I saw the trailer for the movie and then just had to read the book before seeing the movie. This is an absolutely wonderful story about the Irish soldiers at the Siege of Jadotville and the author gives all the relevant background that helps to tell this story beautifully. This book is a great example of bravery in a lesser known war, absolutely loved it!!
January 2, 2011
One of the best books I've read but I'm not totally impartial , my father fought in the battle. however as an example of company in defence its hard to beat. This period of irish army history was nearly forgotten and Declan Power is to be congradulated on his trojan work to bring the heroic actions of "A" company rightfully back into the public arena.
November 21, 2016
‘Those that I fight I do not hate, those that I guard I do not love’ ~ W.B. Yeats
It is a sad state of affairs when it takes a Hollywood actor to draw your attention to bravery and sacrifice on your own doorstep. Unfortunately, it wasn’t until Jamie Dornan attached himself to a Netflix motion picture of the same name that I became fully interested in this topic. I am not alone in my ignorance either. The tale of these brave Irish soldiers’ bravery has been all but wiped from national history in recent decades. Thankfully, Declan Power has written the book that these heroes fully deserve.
Historical non-fiction is a perilous genre. It is never going to compete with the bestsellers and to be successful it must walk the tightrope of attracting popular opinion whilst also standing up against the scrutiny of academics. Declan Power achieves this with impressive skill. Here he has created a book that factually leaves no stone unturned, yet also maintains an entertaining flow that engages the reader throughout. The 288 pages fly by as Power recounts the political climate at the time, the state of the Irish Army and UN at the time and the events and aftermath of Jadotville.
I found myself reading this book in a constant state of disbelief. How could 150 Irish soldiers compete with an army five thousand strong led by well paid mercenaries? How could they deal with constant air raids, dwindling food and water supplies and a complete lack of military information and support? The answers to these questions tell an extraordinary tale that reveals startling truths about the UN’s involvement in the Congo during a turbulent decade.
In September 1963, A Company were sent to replace a company of twice their number in Jadotville. They were sent to protect a local white population that were in fact already antagonized and upset about their mere presence in the first place. This alone shows the staggering gap between on the ground information and top table decisions that was evident at the time.
As for the Irish troops themselves, Power paints an accurate picture of how they had only just emerged from a turbulent time themselves in recent history. Some men would even have fought on opposite sides of a recent civil war. Several remarks by the author highlight the state of the Irish Army at that time.
• ‘In 1960 the Army only numbered in the region of seven thousand troops. This was a miniscule number with which to provide even the basic requirements for a peacetime army in a democratic society.’
• ‘Equipment was World War II vintage at best, and in many cases still World War I.’
• ‘Even the helmets issued to the men at the time were useless, being made out of a type of fibreglass and used for ceremonial or patrol duty. They were actually helmet-liners and designed to be worn inside the steel helmet that normally accompanied them.’
Many of the soldiers enlisted left their country for the first time in search of adventure. One soldier remarked, ‘Many of the lads were expecting to see a country filled with giraffes, lions, and tigers. After all, we could only know what we had seen in the cinema – Tarzan films and the like.’ Many of these soldiers had lied about their ages and we still only teenagers or in their early 20s.
To read that none of the A Company soldiers were actually killed during the intense five day siege at Jadotville is nothing short of a miracle. This story has many heroes but a huge amount of credit has to be given to Commandant Pat Quinlan who led the men superbly. As commanding officer, it was he who shouldered most of the blame when A company ultimately surrendered to the Katangan forces. But it was also his decisions that would save many lives. His story is just one of many remarkable accounts presented in this book. We also learn about the crucial involvement of Irishman and civilian Charles Kearney. By a stroke a fortune, Kearney happened to be working as an engineer in the locality at the same time and his information and invaluable help proved to be vital to A Company’s survival.
In his concluding statements, the author references the ‘national apathy’ of the Irish people. This he argues might not seem so bad in practise, but he correctly states that ‘we as a nation have left a vacant space for others to cast slurs on our fighting men.’ This illustrates why he wrote this book with such commitment. For far too long, these soldiers endured an unwarranted shame, and in some cases abuse, for their role in the Congo affair. These men deserve to emerge from the shadows as noble warriors and take their rightful place at the top table of national heroes. Declan Power’s book is the weapon that their cause badly needed.
Would I recommend this book to a friend?
Yes. This is one for all the Dads and Grandads out there interested in current affairs or Irish history. It is a book that will provide many talking points and it gives a great insight of how the UN works as a peacekeeping force. I now look forward to watching the film.
It is a sad state of affairs when it takes a Hollywood actor to draw your attention to bravery and sacrifice on your own doorstep. Unfortunately, it wasn’t until Jamie Dornan attached himself to a Netflix motion picture of the same name that I became fully interested in this topic. I am not alone in my ignorance either. The tale of these brave Irish soldiers’ bravery has been all but wiped from national history in recent decades. Thankfully, Declan Power has written the book that these heroes fully deserve.
Historical non-fiction is a perilous genre. It is never going to compete with the bestsellers and to be successful it must walk the tightrope of attracting popular opinion whilst also standing up against the scrutiny of academics. Declan Power achieves this with impressive skill. Here he has created a book that factually leaves no stone unturned, yet also maintains an entertaining flow that engages the reader throughout. The 288 pages fly by as Power recounts the political climate at the time, the state of the Irish Army and UN at the time and the events and aftermath of Jadotville.
I found myself reading this book in a constant state of disbelief. How could 150 Irish soldiers compete with an army five thousand strong led by well paid mercenaries? How could they deal with constant air raids, dwindling food and water supplies and a complete lack of military information and support? The answers to these questions tell an extraordinary tale that reveals startling truths about the UN’s involvement in the Congo during a turbulent decade.
In September 1963, A Company were sent to replace a company of twice their number in Jadotville. They were sent to protect a local white population that were in fact already antagonized and upset about their mere presence in the first place. This alone shows the staggering gap between on the ground information and top table decisions that was evident at the time.
As for the Irish troops themselves, Power paints an accurate picture of how they had only just emerged from a turbulent time themselves in recent history. Some men would even have fought on opposite sides of a recent civil war. Several remarks by the author highlight the state of the Irish Army at that time.
• ‘In 1960 the Army only numbered in the region of seven thousand troops. This was a miniscule number with which to provide even the basic requirements for a peacetime army in a democratic society.’
• ‘Equipment was World War II vintage at best, and in many cases still World War I.’
• ‘Even the helmets issued to the men at the time were useless, being made out of a type of fibreglass and used for ceremonial or patrol duty. They were actually helmet-liners and designed to be worn inside the steel helmet that normally accompanied them.’
Many of the soldiers enlisted left their country for the first time in search of adventure. One soldier remarked, ‘Many of the lads were expecting to see a country filled with giraffes, lions, and tigers. After all, we could only know what we had seen in the cinema – Tarzan films and the like.’ Many of these soldiers had lied about their ages and we still only teenagers or in their early 20s.
To read that none of the A Company soldiers were actually killed during the intense five day siege at Jadotville is nothing short of a miracle. This story has many heroes but a huge amount of credit has to be given to Commandant Pat Quinlan who led the men superbly. As commanding officer, it was he who shouldered most of the blame when A company ultimately surrendered to the Katangan forces. But it was also his decisions that would save many lives. His story is just one of many remarkable accounts presented in this book. We also learn about the crucial involvement of Irishman and civilian Charles Kearney. By a stroke a fortune, Kearney happened to be working as an engineer in the locality at the same time and his information and invaluable help proved to be vital to A Company’s survival.
In his concluding statements, the author references the ‘national apathy’ of the Irish people. This he argues might not seem so bad in practise, but he correctly states that ‘we as a nation have left a vacant space for others to cast slurs on our fighting men.’ This illustrates why he wrote this book with such commitment. For far too long, these soldiers endured an unwarranted shame, and in some cases abuse, for their role in the Congo affair. These men deserve to emerge from the shadows as noble warriors and take their rightful place at the top table of national heroes. Declan Power’s book is the weapon that their cause badly needed.
Would I recommend this book to a friend?
Yes. This is one for all the Dads and Grandads out there interested in current affairs or Irish history. It is a book that will provide many talking points and it gives a great insight of how the UN works as a peacekeeping force. I now look forward to watching the film.
January 12, 2017
Dublin’s Glasnevin Cemetery includes the Irish Defence Forces United Nations Service Memorial honoring members of the IDF who have died on service with the United Nations. The story told in “The Siege of Jadotville” is among other things the story of how the men of A Company 35th Battalion managed half a century ago to not end up on that memorial – and why it took so many years for an accurate account of their accomplishments to be published. I picked up my copy recently noting that its publication was now linked to a NETFLIX original film of the same title (and worth checking out for its interpretation of the book into film). For your information, this is not the movie script in book form and the movie is not based solely on this book, there are a number of points of difference in the respective accounts of the siege. The book is rounded out and well supported by several appendices with background information on the Irish Defense Forces, a glossary, a chronology of key dates, a bibliography, and 11 pages of photographs.
The links between Ireland and the Congo go back more years than many might suspect. I first learned of them when I served in the American Embassy in the Congo (then Zaire) in the late 1970s and discovered Roger Casement’s 1904 report on conditions in the Congo, contributing to an international campaign against King Leopold of Belgium’s private ownership of this huge territory. I also learned about A Company’s ten comrades from 33rd Battalion who had been killed in November, 1960 on UN service in the Congo.
Declan Power, journalist and former member of the Irish Army, presents the story of A Company’s deployment to Jadotville in the Congo’s breakaway province of Katanga in September, 1961. Less than a week after their arrival in that district capital city, the Irishmen found themselves surrounded by unfriendly mercenary-led Katangan Gendarmes loyal to the breakaway government of Moise Tshombe. Within another week, A Company found itself under repeated attack by overwhelming numbers supported by more and heavier artillery and even aircraft – weapons that the Irish did not have. The attackers were commanded and led by a cadre of hardened veterans of other conflicts in Europe and Indochina while the Irish were to a man experiencing their first taste of combat.
Jadotville (now Likasi) was a district capital city in the former Belgian Congo that in 1957 was home to about 5,000 Europeans and 72,000 Congolese. It was about 114km/70 miles from Elisabethville/Lubumbashi, which was home to A Company’s higher UN headquarters and base for any supporting or relief units that might come to its aid. In 1957 there was reportedly a two-lane asphalt paved main road between them, declining maintenance in succeeding years had apparently done much to erase that. There was also a railway between the two cities but that was not a resource available to the UNOC.
With an excellent Foreword that itself sets the stage for the story and how it finally comes to be told, the author then proceeds through fourteen chapters to tell the story of the UN, the Irish, the Mercenaries, Belgians, and the Congolese and how their interactions led to the siege of Jadotville. He also sketches out the subsequent events both then and in later years in the turbulent Congo. Declan Power provides lots of background details via digressions, flashbacks, and even a few ‘meanwhile at headquarters” injects to support the story of how they came to be at Jadotville. This was a learning experience for the UN and the Irish Defence Forces.
Subsequent history suggests that, sadly, the Congolese and the mercenaries did not learn as much. In the 1970s and 1980s, as a US State Department officer in several different positions, I was still seeing Robert Denard, Mike Hoare, and Black Jack Schramme in reports relating to different countries (and headlines). I was also in Zaire (Congo) in the late 1970s when the “Katangan Gendarmes” returned from their Angolan refuge in an attempt to topple then-dictator Mobutu, partial payback by Angola for Mobutu’s involvement in US-led efforts to intervene in the ongoing multiparty conflict in Angola. These “Gendarmes” actually reached Kolwezi, the next large town east of Likasi (former Jadotville). At Kolwezi, they encountered not former French Foreign Legion paratroopers turned mercenary officers but this time active duty FFL thereto Mobutu’s Zaire as a part of a multinational military effort.
The links between Ireland and the Congo go back more years than many might suspect. I first learned of them when I served in the American Embassy in the Congo (then Zaire) in the late 1970s and discovered Roger Casement’s 1904 report on conditions in the Congo, contributing to an international campaign against King Leopold of Belgium’s private ownership of this huge territory. I also learned about A Company’s ten comrades from 33rd Battalion who had been killed in November, 1960 on UN service in the Congo.
Declan Power, journalist and former member of the Irish Army, presents the story of A Company’s deployment to Jadotville in the Congo’s breakaway province of Katanga in September, 1961. Less than a week after their arrival in that district capital city, the Irishmen found themselves surrounded by unfriendly mercenary-led Katangan Gendarmes loyal to the breakaway government of Moise Tshombe. Within another week, A Company found itself under repeated attack by overwhelming numbers supported by more and heavier artillery and even aircraft – weapons that the Irish did not have. The attackers were commanded and led by a cadre of hardened veterans of other conflicts in Europe and Indochina while the Irish were to a man experiencing their first taste of combat.
Jadotville (now Likasi) was a district capital city in the former Belgian Congo that in 1957 was home to about 5,000 Europeans and 72,000 Congolese. It was about 114km/70 miles from Elisabethville/Lubumbashi, which was home to A Company’s higher UN headquarters and base for any supporting or relief units that might come to its aid. In 1957 there was reportedly a two-lane asphalt paved main road between them, declining maintenance in succeeding years had apparently done much to erase that. There was also a railway between the two cities but that was not a resource available to the UNOC.
With an excellent Foreword that itself sets the stage for the story and how it finally comes to be told, the author then proceeds through fourteen chapters to tell the story of the UN, the Irish, the Mercenaries, Belgians, and the Congolese and how their interactions led to the siege of Jadotville. He also sketches out the subsequent events both then and in later years in the turbulent Congo. Declan Power provides lots of background details via digressions, flashbacks, and even a few ‘meanwhile at headquarters” injects to support the story of how they came to be at Jadotville. This was a learning experience for the UN and the Irish Defence Forces.
Subsequent history suggests that, sadly, the Congolese and the mercenaries did not learn as much. In the 1970s and 1980s, as a US State Department officer in several different positions, I was still seeing Robert Denard, Mike Hoare, and Black Jack Schramme in reports relating to different countries (and headlines). I was also in Zaire (Congo) in the late 1970s when the “Katangan Gendarmes” returned from their Angolan refuge in an attempt to topple then-dictator Mobutu, partial payback by Angola for Mobutu’s involvement in US-led efforts to intervene in the ongoing multiparty conflict in Angola. These “Gendarmes” actually reached Kolwezi, the next large town east of Likasi (former Jadotville). At Kolwezi, they encountered not former French Foreign Legion paratroopers turned mercenary officers but this time active duty FFL thereto Mobutu’s Zaire as a part of a multinational military effort.
June 5, 2017
the story had a great potential, but the execution...
February 4, 2017
This book covers the participation of the Irish forces, specifically "A" Company, 35th Battalion of the Irish Army during the UN intervention in the Congo and Katanga province in 1960 and 1961.
I really thought this was more of a 2.5 star book then 3 but it is better than a 2. This is what I would call a "popular history" book. It doesn't have the references and notes one expects with a more scholarly work. So my negative comments are not because it isn't a scholarly work but due to its shortcomings as a "popular history" book. I'll start off with what I liked and then what I didn't.
The GOOD
The book is an easy read. It doesn't require the reader to know much about the back story to the events. The author does a fair job of trying to fill in enough details so the reader has an idea of how these men came to be where they were and what was happening at that time in the world. The author does an outstanding job of explaining without condescension, in my opinion, military and intelligence terms and actions to a reader who might have no knowledge of these things. The back of the book has a good glossary of terms. These two things make the book much more readable to someone who might not have any military knowledge. The author frequently quotes people who were actually there so they can describe their actions in their own words. He gives frequent examples of poor decision making by UN administration and the negative effect it had.
The BAD
It would have been nice to have told exactly what happened during the "siege", a sort of chronological description of events from 13 Sept 1961 to 16 Sept 1961. That often boring list of details and events that people refer to under the title history. The author mentions all sorts of details, some of which are actually interesting and to the point. They aren't in a coherent structure. Also, a number of opinions on why things happened are just stated without any real facts to back them up. Even though I agree with many of them and know where I can find backup sources to support them, they aren't in this book. As a result of this the book is really the story of :
1. How these people got into a bad situation.
2. How good leadership kept things from getting worse.
3. How they were treated afterwards.
4. How it is unfair to treat them poorly because of other people's (politicans and the UN) bad decisions.
It lacks the basic story line that makes for an interesting read. As someone who saw the movie said to me,"It is a special talent to take something that exciting and make it boring."
A good story usually needs a bad guy and Moise Tshombe seems fit for the part. However, unlike a movie that doesn't have time to tell everything, a book can spare a couple of paragraphs to balance the picture. So how hard would it have been to mention that after kicking Tshombe out, less than 18 months later Pres. Joseph Kasa-Vubu made Tshombe the prime minister to end the Simba Rebellion? Tshombe brings back the mercs and I'll let the Encyclopedia Britannica say it:
"Much of the credit for the survival of the government goes to Tshombe, who by July 10, 1964, had replaced Adoula as prime minister. Ironically, then, a year and a half after his defeat at the hands of the UN forces, Tshombe, the most vocal advocate of secession, had emerged as the providential leader of a besieged central government."
So I liked it, but that is mostly due to my interest in Africa and its history. Otherwise it would get an "it's ok" rating.
I really thought this was more of a 2.5 star book then 3 but it is better than a 2. This is what I would call a "popular history" book. It doesn't have the references and notes one expects with a more scholarly work. So my negative comments are not because it isn't a scholarly work but due to its shortcomings as a "popular history" book. I'll start off with what I liked and then what I didn't.
The GOOD
The book is an easy read. It doesn't require the reader to know much about the back story to the events. The author does a fair job of trying to fill in enough details so the reader has an idea of how these men came to be where they were and what was happening at that time in the world. The author does an outstanding job of explaining without condescension, in my opinion, military and intelligence terms and actions to a reader who might have no knowledge of these things. The back of the book has a good glossary of terms. These two things make the book much more readable to someone who might not have any military knowledge. The author frequently quotes people who were actually there so they can describe their actions in their own words. He gives frequent examples of poor decision making by UN administration and the negative effect it had.
The BAD
It would have been nice to have told exactly what happened during the "siege", a sort of chronological description of events from 13 Sept 1961 to 16 Sept 1961. That often boring list of details and events that people refer to under the title history. The author mentions all sorts of details, some of which are actually interesting and to the point. They aren't in a coherent structure. Also, a number of opinions on why things happened are just stated without any real facts to back them up. Even though I agree with many of them and know where I can find backup sources to support them, they aren't in this book. As a result of this the book is really the story of :
1. How these people got into a bad situation.
2. How good leadership kept things from getting worse.
3. How they were treated afterwards.
4. How it is unfair to treat them poorly because of other people's (politicans and the UN) bad decisions.
It lacks the basic story line that makes for an interesting read. As someone who saw the movie said to me,"It is a special talent to take something that exciting and make it boring."
A good story usually needs a bad guy and Moise Tshombe seems fit for the part. However, unlike a movie that doesn't have time to tell everything, a book can spare a couple of paragraphs to balance the picture. So how hard would it have been to mention that after kicking Tshombe out, less than 18 months later Pres. Joseph Kasa-Vubu made Tshombe the prime minister to end the Simba Rebellion? Tshombe brings back the mercs and I'll let the Encyclopedia Britannica say it:
"Much of the credit for the survival of the government goes to Tshombe, who by July 10, 1964, had replaced Adoula as prime minister. Ironically, then, a year and a half after his defeat at the hands of the UN forces, Tshombe, the most vocal advocate of secession, had emerged as the providential leader of a besieged central government."
So I liked it, but that is mostly due to my interest in Africa and its history. Otherwise it would get an "it's ok" rating.
April 2, 2018
Thank Netflix for introducing me to this surprisingly unknown account of peackeeping gone awry. Unfortunately I’d watched the movie first, which did a very good job of cutting down a company-sized action into something more akin of a platoon in defence. The book, on which the Netflix feature is based, provides a greater expanse of detail for both A Coy’s actions and the wider activities of the UN in the Congo. The author has relied on mostly first hand accounts and years of advocacy by members of the company involved. The loss of signal logs and other confirmatory data sets do leave critical thinkers wondering just how balanced the final account is, particularly the interactions with higher. As one of the key drivers for the addition of a peace enforcement mandate for the UN and a formal UN military chain of command through the PKO, the Congo mission is great example best intentions losing all relevance in the hard face of armed competing interests. It is also a very timely reminder that that despite direction, the basics of soldiering have their place in every mission. My key concern with the book is the authors continued reference to a lack of psyops/IO by the UN having a pivotal impact on tensions in the Congo. Contest in the information environment is never cut and dried and as we have seen more recently, the asymmetric advantage held by those for whom democratic ideals are not the basis of good governance are difficult to defeat, let alone counter. As an IO guy I enjoyed the reference to my trade, but to describe a supporting effort so pivotally I think overstates its importance in military conflict.
January 26, 2020
Be sure to watch the movie as well
March 31, 2020
Excellent book, the best I've read on the Irish Soldiers in Jadotville.
November 18, 2024
Siege at Jadotville: The Irish Army's Forgotten Battle by Declan Power
⭐️⭐️⭐️
Declan Power’s Siege at Jadotville recounts the remarkable and often overlooked story of A Company, 35th Irish Infantry Battalion, during their mission in the Congo as UN peacekeepers in 1961. Tasked with protecting the mining town of Jadotville, these Irish soldiers—many young and inexperienced—found themselves besieged by a formidable force of Katangese Gendarmerie. Despite the overwhelming odds, Commandant Pat Quinlan and his men fought heroically, enduring five days of intense combat without a single loss of life. The book also sheds light on the shameful treatment the soldiers received upon their return home, unjustly labeled as cowards despite their incredible bravery.
Having watched the film adaptation before reading, I approached the book with high expectations of a detailed, gripping account. While Power’s research is evident and the book does a commendable job of explaining the historical and political backdrop, the narrative fell short in delivering a cohesive and engaging retelling of the siege itself.
Power excels in making complex military and intelligence concepts accessible to readers unfamiliar with such topics, offering insightful commentary on the poor decision-making of UN leadership and its devastating effects on A Company. The firsthand accounts from the soldiers add authenticity, allowing the men to speak in their own voices. However, the book’s disjointed structure detracts from its overall impact. The narrative jumps around in time, making it difficult to follow the actual sequence of events during the siege. A chronological retelling of the battle from September 13–16, 1961, would have provided much-needed clarity and focus.
Although Siege at Jadotville is highly informative, it often veers off into broader discussions of the Congo conflict, leaving the core story of the siege underdeveloped. Readers seeking a vivid, moment-by-moment account of the battle may find themselves disappointed. While the heroics of Commandant Quinlan and his men are undeniable and well-highlighted, the book doesn’t offer enough depth or emotional connection to its key players. For me, the characters felt like distant figures rather than the vibrant, courageous individuals portrayed in the film.
Ultimately, while the book is a valuable resource for understanding the broader context and injustices faced by A Company, it lacks the narrative drive and focus to make the siege itself come alive. For once, I preferred the film adaptation, which delivered the emotional and dramatic weight that the book occasionally misses. That said, Siege at Jadotville remains a worthwhile read for those interested in military history and the untold stories of ordinary men thrust into extraordinary circumstances.
⭐️⭐️⭐️
Declan Power’s Siege at Jadotville recounts the remarkable and often overlooked story of A Company, 35th Irish Infantry Battalion, during their mission in the Congo as UN peacekeepers in 1961. Tasked with protecting the mining town of Jadotville, these Irish soldiers—many young and inexperienced—found themselves besieged by a formidable force of Katangese Gendarmerie. Despite the overwhelming odds, Commandant Pat Quinlan and his men fought heroically, enduring five days of intense combat without a single loss of life. The book also sheds light on the shameful treatment the soldiers received upon their return home, unjustly labeled as cowards despite their incredible bravery.
Having watched the film adaptation before reading, I approached the book with high expectations of a detailed, gripping account. While Power’s research is evident and the book does a commendable job of explaining the historical and political backdrop, the narrative fell short in delivering a cohesive and engaging retelling of the siege itself.
Power excels in making complex military and intelligence concepts accessible to readers unfamiliar with such topics, offering insightful commentary on the poor decision-making of UN leadership and its devastating effects on A Company. The firsthand accounts from the soldiers add authenticity, allowing the men to speak in their own voices. However, the book’s disjointed structure detracts from its overall impact. The narrative jumps around in time, making it difficult to follow the actual sequence of events during the siege. A chronological retelling of the battle from September 13–16, 1961, would have provided much-needed clarity and focus.
Although Siege at Jadotville is highly informative, it often veers off into broader discussions of the Congo conflict, leaving the core story of the siege underdeveloped. Readers seeking a vivid, moment-by-moment account of the battle may find themselves disappointed. While the heroics of Commandant Quinlan and his men are undeniable and well-highlighted, the book doesn’t offer enough depth or emotional connection to its key players. For me, the characters felt like distant figures rather than the vibrant, courageous individuals portrayed in the film.
Ultimately, while the book is a valuable resource for understanding the broader context and injustices faced by A Company, it lacks the narrative drive and focus to make the siege itself come alive. For once, I preferred the film adaptation, which delivered the emotional and dramatic weight that the book occasionally misses. That said, Siege at Jadotville remains a worthwhile read for those interested in military history and the untold stories of ordinary men thrust into extraordinary circumstances.
September 22, 2022
Loved the movie which me brought to the book. Highly informative but I felt that this book was disjointed. It seemed to me that the chapters were out of order. The heroics of A company and its commander Commandant Pat Quinlan cannot be questioned are the main point of the story. We see Quinlan triumph like Shackleton against deadly odds and bring all his men through this ordeal alive. This book does a great job of explaining that and how conditions were against A Company from the start. It also paints the story of the shameful injustice that was perpetrated against the them by the UN and the Irish leadership once they got home. I’m glad this book got written because the truth of their valor and commitment to duty needed to be told. However I was it had focused more on the actual battle. Or at least had more pages devoted to it. It spent significantly more time rambling all over the place about the the Congo conflict and the Katangese Gendarmerie than the actual battle. In ways I feel the Wikipedia page does a better job of explaining the whole event. I will give credit to Mr Powers because does provide us with an enormous amount of information, however haphazard and chaotic his delivery is. What I didn’t feel from this book was a connection to the primary players. If I hadn’t seen the movie first they would have just been names on a page. Read this book because it’s accurate and explains the no-win situation A Company was forced into. Read this book because it details the lead up to the travesty of justice that was brought against A Company and especially Commandant Quinlan when they returned home after their captivity. But if you want to connect with these men and feel the energy and emotion of the battle that they flawlessly fought in, go see the movie.
June 18, 2021
A very interesting read!
A case study, of sorts, in how not to do international intervention. Peacekeeping is a frustrating concept, the UN's "do not fire until fired upon" two hands tied behind military commanders' backs, and the top down chain of command from UN HQ to dusty hamlet a moronic manifestation of micromanaging and naiveté... and who gets blamed?!
Don't get me wrong, I'm a supporter of the UN - or, rather, a UN-like organization - having the ability and right (as opposed to just the ability, which, of course, is the default in geopolitics and conflicts) to intervene for the greater good. Preferably without nuking a place. It'd be nice if interventions wasn't so obviously politically and/or economically motivated, of course, but in principle I'm on board.
However, this book illustrates just how wrong things can go when motivations are off, preparations are woefully inadequate, and the little people are hung out to dry twice over - first by throwing them to the wolves, then again being blamed and shamed when things go wrong. Throw in the corrupting influence of the death-throes of European empires and the scrambling for financial and personal gain, and this book is a perfect portrayal of a geopolitical crisis gone FUBAR.
Yet, the book is so much more. It is also a story of great courage and perseverance, of how good leadership, planning, and trust can get people through just about anything.
Well worth a read, the movie is pretty solid as well (and the reason I found the book).
A case study, of sorts, in how not to do international intervention. Peacekeeping is a frustrating concept, the UN's "do not fire until fired upon" two hands tied behind military commanders' backs, and the top down chain of command from UN HQ to dusty hamlet a moronic manifestation of micromanaging and naiveté... and who gets blamed?!
Don't get me wrong, I'm a supporter of the UN - or, rather, a UN-like organization - having the ability and right (as opposed to just the ability, which, of course, is the default in geopolitics and conflicts) to intervene for the greater good. Preferably without nuking a place. It'd be nice if interventions wasn't so obviously politically and/or economically motivated, of course, but in principle I'm on board.
However, this book illustrates just how wrong things can go when motivations are off, preparations are woefully inadequate, and the little people are hung out to dry twice over - first by throwing them to the wolves, then again being blamed and shamed when things go wrong. Throw in the corrupting influence of the death-throes of European empires and the scrambling for financial and personal gain, and this book is a perfect portrayal of a geopolitical crisis gone FUBAR.
Yet, the book is so much more. It is also a story of great courage and perseverance, of how good leadership, planning, and trust can get people through just about anything.
Well worth a read, the movie is pretty solid as well (and the reason I found the book).
January 25, 2021
As Comdt. Quinlan noted in his after-action report, he “never once saw any man waver…Their steadfastness and coolness under heavy fire was extraordinary.”
WHAT IS THIS BOOK ABOUT?
- The men of A Company, Thirty-Fifth Irish Infantry Battalion, arrived in the Congo as a United Nations contingent to help keep the peace. They were tasked with protecting the European population of Jadotville. On 13 Sept, 1961, the bright morning air of Jadotville was shattered by the sound of automatic gunfire.
CONGO’S INDEPENDENCE
- The Belgian government officially took possession of the country in 1908, renaming it the Belgian Congo.
- This meant a colony peopled with diverse tribes, having no national identity or native class trained for public administration, was to take control of its own affairs in less than five months. Not exactly a recipe to inspire confidence.
- Despite the Congo having one of the highest literacy levels throughout Africa—roughly between 40 and 60 percent of the population could read and write—no effort had been made to educate for leadership and responsibility.
- he never intended conferring on the Congolese anything more than a purely fictitious and nominal independence.
NEW PRIME MINISTER LUMUMBA SEEN AS A PROBLEM BY BELGIUM
- When it came to Lumumba’s turn to speak, he lashed the colonial administration as being a catalog of “atrocious sufferings, humiliating bondage, and filled with ironies, insults, [and] blows which we had to endure morning, noon, and night because we were Negroes.”
SECURITY IN THE CONGO
- Security in the Belgian Congo was provided by a paramilitary outfit called the Force Publique.
- Naturally, the Force Publique were deployed to restore order. Now renamed the Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC), it failed to stop the violence.
- Whatever was the cause, less than three days after independence, the rank and file of the ANC had become emboldened to such an extent that they rose against their European officers.
KATANGA PROVINCE OF CONGO TRIES TO BREAK AWAY, BECOMES A COLD WAR HOT SPOT
- Katanga was the jewel in the Belgian colonial crown. In 1960, as independence grew to be more than just an aspiration, Katanga was supplying 10 percent of the world’s copper, 60 percent of its cobalt, and large quantities of diamonds.
- Katanga produced nearly half the metals needed for the manufacture of jet engines and radar apparatuses in the western world.
- While Katanga made up 10 percent of the Congolese population, it created a staggering 50 percent of the nation’s revenue.
THE CONGO LOOKS TO THE UN FOR HELP WITH KATANGA
- This declaration of independence forced Lumumba to turn to the last hope he had of preserving any vestige of the Congo—the United Nations.
- The UN was then presented with a strife-ridden country, where the problems were being blamed on one hand on an uncontrollable paramilitary force, and on the other on interference by a European UN member state.
LUMUMBA ALSO REACHES OUT TO THE SOVIETS FOR HELP
- Before a reply had been received from the UN, Lumumba and Kasavubu sent a telegram to the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev. It read, “The Congo is occupied by Belgian troops and the lives of the Republic’s president and prime minister are in danger.” Khruschev replied that the Soviets would render “any assistance that might be necessary for the victory of Congo’s just cause.”
THIS LIKELY SEALED LUMUMBA’S FATE
- ordered that Lumumba be flown to Katanga. At this time, many natives believed Belgian mercenaries were responsible for his death. After another severe beating on the plane, Lumumba was eventually to die by a firing squad on January 17, 1961, under the orders of the native-led Katagan government.
ONUC IS CREATED BY THE UN
- The undertaking was titled Opération des Nations Unies au Congo, or United Nations Operation in the Congo. It became known as ONUC.
- The troops who arrived in the Congo were lightly armed. They were equipped and briefed for what can best be described as a police-type action—that is, restoration of law and order, and dealing with recalcitrant members of the mutinous ANC.
NOT WELCOME
- I remember seeing posters being put up by the white settlers after we arrived, saying, “A Company—Go Home!” This struck me as a strange sort of a welcome from people we had been sent to protect.
HAD POOR EQUIPMENT
- Transport to Jadotville broke down and prevented the delivery of necessary equipment. Some of the radio sets were also faulty and only worked intermittently throughout the battle.
LACK OF INTEL
- Individual powers supporting the UN operation did maintain intelligence networks, but the UN itself did not.
- He admitted that it was a serious handicap and had justified the lack on the grounds that the UN must “have clean hands.”
UNSEASONED TROOPS
- Most of the troops, regardless of age, had seen very little action before.
IRELAND HAD A SMALL ARMY
- In 1960 the Army only numbered in the region of seven thousand troops.
UP AGAINST VERY EXPERIENCED MERCENARIES
- a European mercenary officer captured by A Company during the fighting testified to the diverse and wide experience of the mercenary forces ranged against them. All had been veterans of either WWII or France’s colonial adventure in Vietnam. Indeed, many were veterans of both.
MERCENARIES PAID FOR BY BUSINESS INTERESTS
- President Tshombe was now open to any suggestions that would enable him to keep his state intact. At this point he was under a certain amount of pressure from foreign commercial interests to stabilize the situation in mineral-rich Katanga and preserve its status. However, it was the beefing up of his gendarmerie that was to bring him into direct conflict with the UN and with the Irish troops who were stuck in the heart of Katanga.
OPERATION RUMPUNCH
- Operation Rumpunch was the UN’s direct response to the increasingly belligerent behavior of the gendarmerie
- Operation Rumpunch was scheduled to kick off the next day on August 28. Its objectives were effectively to capture the strategic centers around the Elisabethville area, to round up the white mercenary officers working for the Katangans and any other malign foreign influences and oversee their repatriation forthwith, and to restore the UN’s primacy as the leading authority in the region, both militarily and politically.
PSYOPS EMPLOYED AGAINST THE UN
- The Katangans had been dropping leaflets around the Elisabethville area in the days preceding Operation Rumpunch trying to whip up an antipathy amongst the black population against the UN forces.
- The idea was to convince the world in general and the black Katangan population in particular that the UN was the real bully here, and that the white-led gendarmerie were the ones to whom they owed their allegiance.
- the UN were largely powerless to react to false information and recognize when they were being spun a line.
- why didn’t the UN make any clear attempt to counter this harmful misinformation with means of their own? I propose that the answer to this can be found in the earlier references to their antipathy to establishing a proper intelligence-gathering and collation facility. Countering misinformation properly requires timely and accurate intelligence.
- Mercenaries in the employ of Katanga formed an “information commando” to produce and publicize “atrocity stories.” The stories, now considered to be false, enabled mercenaries to transmit and influence several world capitals. This was achieved with the assistance of a network of supporters and sympathizers. This network then fed the stories to media outlets and news agencies in these capitals where they were internationally disseminated.
- The week after surrendering, the Irish troops were graced with a visit by Tshombe himself. The Katangan President wanted to wring all he could from the UN now that he had so many of their troops as hostages. Maximum propaganda was generated from the fact that they were being well treated.
COUNTERING PROPAGANDA
- The only ways of countering this are to be able to respond rapidly with accurate info, graphically countering the opposition, or engage in preemptive propaganda operations. This is difficult for UN forces as they must operate within strict guidelines. Counter-photography is one method available. Having photographers and video cameramen record instances where UN troops are committed to combat. This enables allegations of atrocities to be rendered invalid, where such actions are being viewed as they happen around the world...These facilities were not available to ONUC in 1961.
UN RE-ARMED THE PEOPLE THE IRISH HAD JUST DISARMED
- “But when he was congratulating us, the UN were handing back the weapons we had seized, weapons we had turned against us when we arrived to Jadotville a few weeks later,” remembers Pte. John Gorman.
FOLLOW-UP OP TO RUMPUNCH: MORTHOR
- The ONUC leadership in Katanga were now busily planning another major operation to follow up on Rumpunch. This was to become known as Operation Morthor.
- Morthor was an appropriately monikered operation, as it was conceived to stamp out Katanga’s continued secession and restore order once and for all.
- The reason for their deployment was muddled, complex, and, above all, political. They were poorly equipped from the start, and facing a badly-outlined task which had been beyond a previous larger force.
- It does seem like military madness that A Company was not informed of Operation Morthor and the fact it could result in an attack on the Irish positions at Jadotville...the UN Force commander for the entire Congo operation, Gen. Sean McKeown, is on record as saying he “was only informed of what was to happen in Elisabethville at ten o’clock” on the night preceding the proposed operation.
ACTIONS MADE WITHOUT MILITARY INPUT
- the order to deploy A Company to Jadotville “was a decision taken at the top”—that is, from UN HQ in New York.
ENEMY HAD AIRCRAFT
- This “air force” consisted of a German Dornier bomber of WWI vintage, a helicopter out of which the pilot tossed hand grenades and, most importantly of all, two Fouga Magister jet fighters.
- In any event, the UN had no airpower available to counter this threat at that time.
LACK OF GUIDANCE FROM HIGHER
- If Quinlan had a specific objective or definite orders he might have acted differently, but he was cut off from any proper direction or advice.
- directions from Elisabethville were vague at best and most information, such as that about the jet, erroneous.
ACTIONS THAT HELPED SAVE THEIR LIVES
- “Comdt. Quinlan’s order to dig trenches undoubtedly saved lives and enabled us to put up a resistance.”
- he ordered me to have the men fill every possible container with water.
- By carrying out this shrewd maneuver, Quinlan had consolidated his forces and ensured their survival for another few days.
- Even so, morale was high. The men had great confidence in Quinlan’s leadership and trusted him implicitly.
- The establishment of a routine by Quinlan was an essential tool in staving off the awful boredom and tedium...Without this and the continued leadership by NCOs and officers, discipline could easily have broken down.
ATTEMPTS TO REINFORCE JADOTVILLE FAILED
- This combined unit was a reinforced company—it had more troops and better firepower than a normal company. Designated Force Kane One, it was faced with the task of breaking through to the beleaguered A Company and ending the siege.
- It would be nearly three days before Force Kane Two would try again to breakthrough to A Company. This attempt was also doomed to failure and a number of fatalities would be suffered.
IRISH RUN OUT OF OPTIONS, SUPPLIES AND HAVE TO SURRENDER
- Once he received the message that Force Kane Two had returned to Elisabethville for a second and final time, Quinlan knew the game was up. It was up to him now to ensure that the senseless slaughter of his men did not take place.
- For A Company, a parallel universe was coming into being. Even though they had won the battle, they had lost the engagement. They just hadn’t realized it yet.
- The rank-and-file had not been told, in an attempt to keep morale stable. The next morning A Company paraded, stacked their weapons, and marched to captivity. Many of the younger soldiers had no idea they had surrendered.
AFTERMATH
- After having been marched away from their weapons and defensive positions, A Company were taken to a musty old hotel in Jadotville town.
- The new UN Secretary-General, U Thant, had given full and unambiguous authority for the UN forces to pursue all ground and air action to restore freedom of movement in Elisabethville area.
- One of the prime objectives of UN intervention was to prevent the Congo becoming a Cold War battlefield, and in that it prevailed.
- “there was a palpable sense of shame” within the Irish contingent after Jadotville.
- in the earlier part of 2005, the newly incumbent Minister for Defense, Mr. Willie O’Dea, announced that an internal reexamination of the events surrounding Jadotville completely exonerated A Company and Comdt. Quinlan from any notion of unsoldierly behavior.
- The fact is that the fall of Jadotville called a halt to any further fighting by the UN to attain the objectives set by Operation Morthor, namely the ending of the Katangan secession.
*** *** *** *** ***
FACTOIDS
- Uranium for bombs dropped on Japan mined in the Congo: https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20...
- the Congo is nearly the size of Western Europe, at approximately 900,000 square miles.
- There were a large number of Belgian troops still in the Congo, particularly at Kamina Air Base in Katanga. The base was considered essential if required for NATO operations in Africa, and was also sited so the city could be used as an alternative Belgian capital in the event of a nuclear war in Europe.
- Along the road we saw sticks with pieces of paper attached. This was the local postal service.”
- [Jadotville] Now called Likasi,
- For the last couple of decades, Irish troops going abroad on active service have experienced what is called a “battle inoculation.” The idea is to put the troops in trenches in a reasonably safe state and subject them to shell and machine-gun fire.
HAHA
- “The Irish are a fair people—they never speak well of one another.”
BONUS
- Netflix’s ‘Siege of Jadotville’ trailer: https://youtu.be/9_JHsiQTTmg
- Overview of UN Operation in the Congo: https://youtu.be/2rcHxVi_34E
- Mobutu takes control: https://youtu.be/VCJ1x_If8mw
- Arrest and assassination of Prime Minister Lumumba: https://youtu.be/C02LQTJGSCs
- Vickers machine gun: https://youtu.be/gG2YfcAJrtU
- Carl Gustav M45 “Swedish K” SMG: https://youtu.be/ohQ4d7BLapQ
- Fouga Magister aircraft: https://youtu.be/vLMRhzRoRLc
WHAT IS THIS BOOK ABOUT?
- The men of A Company, Thirty-Fifth Irish Infantry Battalion, arrived in the Congo as a United Nations contingent to help keep the peace. They were tasked with protecting the European population of Jadotville. On 13 Sept, 1961, the bright morning air of Jadotville was shattered by the sound of automatic gunfire.
CONGO’S INDEPENDENCE
- The Belgian government officially took possession of the country in 1908, renaming it the Belgian Congo.
- This meant a colony peopled with diverse tribes, having no national identity or native class trained for public administration, was to take control of its own affairs in less than five months. Not exactly a recipe to inspire confidence.
- Despite the Congo having one of the highest literacy levels throughout Africa—roughly between 40 and 60 percent of the population could read and write—no effort had been made to educate for leadership and responsibility.
- he never intended conferring on the Congolese anything more than a purely fictitious and nominal independence.
NEW PRIME MINISTER LUMUMBA SEEN AS A PROBLEM BY BELGIUM
- When it came to Lumumba’s turn to speak, he lashed the colonial administration as being a catalog of “atrocious sufferings, humiliating bondage, and filled with ironies, insults, [and] blows which we had to endure morning, noon, and night because we were Negroes.”
SECURITY IN THE CONGO
- Security in the Belgian Congo was provided by a paramilitary outfit called the Force Publique.
- Naturally, the Force Publique were deployed to restore order. Now renamed the Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC), it failed to stop the violence.
- Whatever was the cause, less than three days after independence, the rank and file of the ANC had become emboldened to such an extent that they rose against their European officers.
KATANGA PROVINCE OF CONGO TRIES TO BREAK AWAY, BECOMES A COLD WAR HOT SPOT
- Katanga was the jewel in the Belgian colonial crown. In 1960, as independence grew to be more than just an aspiration, Katanga was supplying 10 percent of the world’s copper, 60 percent of its cobalt, and large quantities of diamonds.
- Katanga produced nearly half the metals needed for the manufacture of jet engines and radar apparatuses in the western world.
- While Katanga made up 10 percent of the Congolese population, it created a staggering 50 percent of the nation’s revenue.
THE CONGO LOOKS TO THE UN FOR HELP WITH KATANGA
- This declaration of independence forced Lumumba to turn to the last hope he had of preserving any vestige of the Congo—the United Nations.
- The UN was then presented with a strife-ridden country, where the problems were being blamed on one hand on an uncontrollable paramilitary force, and on the other on interference by a European UN member state.
LUMUMBA ALSO REACHES OUT TO THE SOVIETS FOR HELP
- Before a reply had been received from the UN, Lumumba and Kasavubu sent a telegram to the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev. It read, “The Congo is occupied by Belgian troops and the lives of the Republic’s president and prime minister are in danger.” Khruschev replied that the Soviets would render “any assistance that might be necessary for the victory of Congo’s just cause.”
THIS LIKELY SEALED LUMUMBA’S FATE
- ordered that Lumumba be flown to Katanga. At this time, many natives believed Belgian mercenaries were responsible for his death. After another severe beating on the plane, Lumumba was eventually to die by a firing squad on January 17, 1961, under the orders of the native-led Katagan government.
ONUC IS CREATED BY THE UN
- The undertaking was titled Opération des Nations Unies au Congo, or United Nations Operation in the Congo. It became known as ONUC.
- The troops who arrived in the Congo were lightly armed. They were equipped and briefed for what can best be described as a police-type action—that is, restoration of law and order, and dealing with recalcitrant members of the mutinous ANC.
NOT WELCOME
- I remember seeing posters being put up by the white settlers after we arrived, saying, “A Company—Go Home!” This struck me as a strange sort of a welcome from people we had been sent to protect.
HAD POOR EQUIPMENT
- Transport to Jadotville broke down and prevented the delivery of necessary equipment. Some of the radio sets were also faulty and only worked intermittently throughout the battle.
LACK OF INTEL
- Individual powers supporting the UN operation did maintain intelligence networks, but the UN itself did not.
- He admitted that it was a serious handicap and had justified the lack on the grounds that the UN must “have clean hands.”
UNSEASONED TROOPS
- Most of the troops, regardless of age, had seen very little action before.
IRELAND HAD A SMALL ARMY
- In 1960 the Army only numbered in the region of seven thousand troops.
UP AGAINST VERY EXPERIENCED MERCENARIES
- a European mercenary officer captured by A Company during the fighting testified to the diverse and wide experience of the mercenary forces ranged against them. All had been veterans of either WWII or France’s colonial adventure in Vietnam. Indeed, many were veterans of both.
MERCENARIES PAID FOR BY BUSINESS INTERESTS
- President Tshombe was now open to any suggestions that would enable him to keep his state intact. At this point he was under a certain amount of pressure from foreign commercial interests to stabilize the situation in mineral-rich Katanga and preserve its status. However, it was the beefing up of his gendarmerie that was to bring him into direct conflict with the UN and with the Irish troops who were stuck in the heart of Katanga.
OPERATION RUMPUNCH
- Operation Rumpunch was the UN’s direct response to the increasingly belligerent behavior of the gendarmerie
- Operation Rumpunch was scheduled to kick off the next day on August 28. Its objectives were effectively to capture the strategic centers around the Elisabethville area, to round up the white mercenary officers working for the Katangans and any other malign foreign influences and oversee their repatriation forthwith, and to restore the UN’s primacy as the leading authority in the region, both militarily and politically.
PSYOPS EMPLOYED AGAINST THE UN
- The Katangans had been dropping leaflets around the Elisabethville area in the days preceding Operation Rumpunch trying to whip up an antipathy amongst the black population against the UN forces.
- The idea was to convince the world in general and the black Katangan population in particular that the UN was the real bully here, and that the white-led gendarmerie were the ones to whom they owed their allegiance.
- the UN were largely powerless to react to false information and recognize when they were being spun a line.
- why didn’t the UN make any clear attempt to counter this harmful misinformation with means of their own? I propose that the answer to this can be found in the earlier references to their antipathy to establishing a proper intelligence-gathering and collation facility. Countering misinformation properly requires timely and accurate intelligence.
- Mercenaries in the employ of Katanga formed an “information commando” to produce and publicize “atrocity stories.” The stories, now considered to be false, enabled mercenaries to transmit and influence several world capitals. This was achieved with the assistance of a network of supporters and sympathizers. This network then fed the stories to media outlets and news agencies in these capitals where they were internationally disseminated.
- The week after surrendering, the Irish troops were graced with a visit by Tshombe himself. The Katangan President wanted to wring all he could from the UN now that he had so many of their troops as hostages. Maximum propaganda was generated from the fact that they were being well treated.
COUNTERING PROPAGANDA
- The only ways of countering this are to be able to respond rapidly with accurate info, graphically countering the opposition, or engage in preemptive propaganda operations. This is difficult for UN forces as they must operate within strict guidelines. Counter-photography is one method available. Having photographers and video cameramen record instances where UN troops are committed to combat. This enables allegations of atrocities to be rendered invalid, where such actions are being viewed as they happen around the world...These facilities were not available to ONUC in 1961.
UN RE-ARMED THE PEOPLE THE IRISH HAD JUST DISARMED
- “But when he was congratulating us, the UN were handing back the weapons we had seized, weapons we had turned against us when we arrived to Jadotville a few weeks later,” remembers Pte. John Gorman.
FOLLOW-UP OP TO RUMPUNCH: MORTHOR
- The ONUC leadership in Katanga were now busily planning another major operation to follow up on Rumpunch. This was to become known as Operation Morthor.
- Morthor was an appropriately monikered operation, as it was conceived to stamp out Katanga’s continued secession and restore order once and for all.
- The reason for their deployment was muddled, complex, and, above all, political. They were poorly equipped from the start, and facing a badly-outlined task which had been beyond a previous larger force.
- It does seem like military madness that A Company was not informed of Operation Morthor and the fact it could result in an attack on the Irish positions at Jadotville...the UN Force commander for the entire Congo operation, Gen. Sean McKeown, is on record as saying he “was only informed of what was to happen in Elisabethville at ten o’clock” on the night preceding the proposed operation.
ACTIONS MADE WITHOUT MILITARY INPUT
- the order to deploy A Company to Jadotville “was a decision taken at the top”—that is, from UN HQ in New York.
ENEMY HAD AIRCRAFT
- This “air force” consisted of a German Dornier bomber of WWI vintage, a helicopter out of which the pilot tossed hand grenades and, most importantly of all, two Fouga Magister jet fighters.
- In any event, the UN had no airpower available to counter this threat at that time.
LACK OF GUIDANCE FROM HIGHER
- If Quinlan had a specific objective or definite orders he might have acted differently, but he was cut off from any proper direction or advice.
- directions from Elisabethville were vague at best and most information, such as that about the jet, erroneous.
ACTIONS THAT HELPED SAVE THEIR LIVES
- “Comdt. Quinlan’s order to dig trenches undoubtedly saved lives and enabled us to put up a resistance.”
- he ordered me to have the men fill every possible container with water.
- By carrying out this shrewd maneuver, Quinlan had consolidated his forces and ensured their survival for another few days.
- Even so, morale was high. The men had great confidence in Quinlan’s leadership and trusted him implicitly.
- The establishment of a routine by Quinlan was an essential tool in staving off the awful boredom and tedium...Without this and the continued leadership by NCOs and officers, discipline could easily have broken down.
ATTEMPTS TO REINFORCE JADOTVILLE FAILED
- This combined unit was a reinforced company—it had more troops and better firepower than a normal company. Designated Force Kane One, it was faced with the task of breaking through to the beleaguered A Company and ending the siege.
- It would be nearly three days before Force Kane Two would try again to breakthrough to A Company. This attempt was also doomed to failure and a number of fatalities would be suffered.
IRISH RUN OUT OF OPTIONS, SUPPLIES AND HAVE TO SURRENDER
- Once he received the message that Force Kane Two had returned to Elisabethville for a second and final time, Quinlan knew the game was up. It was up to him now to ensure that the senseless slaughter of his men did not take place.
- For A Company, a parallel universe was coming into being. Even though they had won the battle, they had lost the engagement. They just hadn’t realized it yet.
- The rank-and-file had not been told, in an attempt to keep morale stable. The next morning A Company paraded, stacked their weapons, and marched to captivity. Many of the younger soldiers had no idea they had surrendered.
AFTERMATH
- After having been marched away from their weapons and defensive positions, A Company were taken to a musty old hotel in Jadotville town.
- The new UN Secretary-General, U Thant, had given full and unambiguous authority for the UN forces to pursue all ground and air action to restore freedom of movement in Elisabethville area.
- One of the prime objectives of UN intervention was to prevent the Congo becoming a Cold War battlefield, and in that it prevailed.
- “there was a palpable sense of shame” within the Irish contingent after Jadotville.
- in the earlier part of 2005, the newly incumbent Minister for Defense, Mr. Willie O’Dea, announced that an internal reexamination of the events surrounding Jadotville completely exonerated A Company and Comdt. Quinlan from any notion of unsoldierly behavior.
- The fact is that the fall of Jadotville called a halt to any further fighting by the UN to attain the objectives set by Operation Morthor, namely the ending of the Katangan secession.
*** *** *** *** ***
FACTOIDS
- Uranium for bombs dropped on Japan mined in the Congo: https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20...
- the Congo is nearly the size of Western Europe, at approximately 900,000 square miles.
- There were a large number of Belgian troops still in the Congo, particularly at Kamina Air Base in Katanga. The base was considered essential if required for NATO operations in Africa, and was also sited so the city could be used as an alternative Belgian capital in the event of a nuclear war in Europe.
- Along the road we saw sticks with pieces of paper attached. This was the local postal service.”
- [Jadotville] Now called Likasi,
- For the last couple of decades, Irish troops going abroad on active service have experienced what is called a “battle inoculation.” The idea is to put the troops in trenches in a reasonably safe state and subject them to shell and machine-gun fire.
HAHA
- “The Irish are a fair people—they never speak well of one another.”
BONUS
- Netflix’s ‘Siege of Jadotville’ trailer: https://youtu.be/9_JHsiQTTmg
- Overview of UN Operation in the Congo: https://youtu.be/2rcHxVi_34E
- Mobutu takes control: https://youtu.be/VCJ1x_If8mw
- Arrest and assassination of Prime Minister Lumumba: https://youtu.be/C02LQTJGSCs
- Vickers machine gun: https://youtu.be/gG2YfcAJrtU
- Carl Gustav M45 “Swedish K” SMG: https://youtu.be/ohQ4d7BLapQ
- Fouga Magister aircraft: https://youtu.be/vLMRhzRoRLc
November 16, 2016
Great book it is a great piece of literature very well written. The 150 inexperienced Irish soldiers holding off thousands of advancing troops without losing men it's incredible and hard to believe. It shows the resilience of a tougher generation of the soldier and shows how they overcame, lack of military intelligence, lack of equipment and an overwhelming force. It made me often think of the 300 Spartans and how brave soldiers can become. A well written and accurate account of both the politics that surround the struggle and the military deployment in the country. Recommended reading for anyone with an interest in Irish military history. Very grateful to have won this book at a giveaway and I am very thankful to Maverick House for sending me this book.
January 20, 2020
Military history with a definite agenda; an insider's view with the aim of exonerating and bringing recognition to the Irish leaders and soldiers involved in the engagement. As such, the author places blame for mistakes squarely on the United Nations.
This does a great job bringing to light overlooked Irish history and giving long overdue recognition to the soldiers in the field. Personally I would have preferred a more narrative chronological approach, as well as a bit more balance and less finger pointing. However, having known absolutely nothing about the 1960s crisis in the Congo other than its mention in Billy Joel's song "We Didn't Start the Fire," this provides a welcome explanation from a little known Irish perspective.
This does a great job bringing to light overlooked Irish history and giving long overdue recognition to the soldiers in the field. Personally I would have preferred a more narrative chronological approach, as well as a bit more balance and less finger pointing. However, having known absolutely nothing about the 1960s crisis in the Congo other than its mention in Billy Joel's song "We Didn't Start the Fire," this provides a welcome explanation from a little known Irish perspective.
February 17, 2017
Excellent accounting of the little known war/police action/peacekeeping adventures of Company A 35th Battalion Irish UNOC in the Congo in 1960. Great illustration of why the UN should not direct or be in charge of people with guns. While this action is little known the book is so well researched that you feel like a member of the company.
July 1, 2017
This was an important book to read. Shows the incompetence of the UN in Africa and brings out a little-known incident where they left an Irish army company to die without water or ammo in the Congo. The movie was also good. I didn't always like the style of writing and it left some questions unanswered but a good read.
November 18, 2016
Good book about a forgotten battle
This is a fine book about an untested Irish unit that served under the auspices of an unprepared UN in the Congo crisis of the early 1960s.
This is a fine book about an untested Irish unit that served under the auspices of an unprepared UN in the Congo crisis of the early 1960s.
June 25, 2018
Excellent book about a rarely discussed part of Irish history. Outstanding account of bravery! Highly recommended!
September 13, 2019
Watched film first then read for more info. Well researched and interesting period but for once i preferred the film im afraid.
September 13, 2020
There's a good story here - Netflix made this into a movie - but Power's writing is uneven. Power careens between narrative, analysis, and first person accounts. The first chapter was particularly uneven, but if you work through it, the writing improves somewhat.
An important part of this story is providing the context for what led to the situation with the deployment of a company of Irish soldiers to a small outpost in a region attempting to break away from the Congo as part of a UN peacekeeping force. Power works to do this, but curiously leaves out any discussion of how the Belgian colonial administration (under King Leopold and later the Belgian government) is widely regarded as one of the most savage in colonial history. Power appears to disparage the Congolese independence movement for thinking the Belgian multi-year transition plan was too long, but this ignores the brutality of Belgian colonial administration and fails to include the overall wave of independence movements sweeping through Africa and Asia at the time. Power looks at the many flaws in the UN peacekeeping effort, an important part of this story, but I think even a brief discussion of where this effort fits into the history of UN peacekeeping would have been beneficial. At this point, the organization was less than 2 decades old, and the effort in the Congo represented the most extensive role it had taken on in a peacekeeping role - the Congo peacekeeping effort offered many lessons painfully learned, some of which Power covers.
Power works to tell the story of A Company during its time under siege and the aftermath, but a couple of items are frustrating. One is the writing, mentioned before. Another is the lack of a clear description of the position held by the Irish troops and the surrounding area (and a complete lack of maps in the Kindle edition). Power makes some important points regarding the issues of inadequate intelligence and the use of PsyOps, but by the 5th time Power brings them up, the reader may be left saying, enough already, we get it! One other element of this book is that Power only briefly covers what was going on, on the other side of the conflict - understanding context for the decisions made by the Belgian colonists and mercenary leaders could have helped the reader better understand the factors that drove the battle.
Power also looks at how the veterans of Jadotville were treated and the legacy of the battle in the Irish army and society - an important part of the story.
An important part of this story is providing the context for what led to the situation with the deployment of a company of Irish soldiers to a small outpost in a region attempting to break away from the Congo as part of a UN peacekeeping force. Power works to do this, but curiously leaves out any discussion of how the Belgian colonial administration (under King Leopold and later the Belgian government) is widely regarded as one of the most savage in colonial history. Power appears to disparage the Congolese independence movement for thinking the Belgian multi-year transition plan was too long, but this ignores the brutality of Belgian colonial administration and fails to include the overall wave of independence movements sweeping through Africa and Asia at the time. Power looks at the many flaws in the UN peacekeeping effort, an important part of this story, but I think even a brief discussion of where this effort fits into the history of UN peacekeeping would have been beneficial. At this point, the organization was less than 2 decades old, and the effort in the Congo represented the most extensive role it had taken on in a peacekeeping role - the Congo peacekeeping effort offered many lessons painfully learned, some of which Power covers.
Power works to tell the story of A Company during its time under siege and the aftermath, but a couple of items are frustrating. One is the writing, mentioned before. Another is the lack of a clear description of the position held by the Irish troops and the surrounding area (and a complete lack of maps in the Kindle edition). Power makes some important points regarding the issues of inadequate intelligence and the use of PsyOps, but by the 5th time Power brings them up, the reader may be left saying, enough already, we get it! One other element of this book is that Power only briefly covers what was going on, on the other side of the conflict - understanding context for the decisions made by the Belgian colonists and mercenary leaders could have helped the reader better understand the factors that drove the battle.
Power also looks at how the veterans of Jadotville were treated and the legacy of the battle in the Irish army and society - an important part of the story.
June 25, 2025
It is only fitting that the events described in this excellent book are becoming more widely known, both in Ireland and further afield. The siege of Jadotville in September 1961 is one of the finest feats of arms in the hundred-year history of the Irish Defence Forces, and it is scandalous that Commandant (i.e. Major) Patrick Quinlan and his men only received the recognition they deserved when some 50 years had passed.
The book begins with a timely reminder of the prominent role played by Irish troops in peacekeeping, not least in the Congo crisis in the 1960s. In part, this is due to Ireland being a Western European nation that doesn't carry any imperial baggage. In the case of the Congo, Irish interest was increased by the appointment of a former Chief of Staff to the Irish Defence Forces to command the UN forces: "In January 1961, Lt Gen Sean McKeown was appointed Force Commander to ONUC...McKeown was seen as a popular choice by all the nations serving in ONUC. The smaller states were happy to see an officer from a state with a non-colonial background in the position, and the larger western states were happy to serve under an officer of a similar cultural background who could speak their language, both literally and operationally. The net result was a huge boost for Irish Army morale, which only increased applications from Irish servicemen to be part of the Congo operation."
Although the Irish Defence Forces were relatively few in number (the army numbering only 7000 troops in 1960), a significant commitment was made to provide troops for peacekeeping in the Congo. This was a shot in the arm for many of the men serving at the time, who described the army as "run down, lacked financing and direction and its mission was not clearly defined. Duties consisted of ceremonial training and Aid to the Civil Power, as the IRA border campaign was beginning at the time...there was a distinct lack of adventure in the army at this time." Initially, a single battalion of 700 men and ultimately six battalions would serve in the Congo with no shortage of volunteers.
In Katanga province, the UN peacekeepers found a confused and ambiguous operational environment (as many UN peacekeepers have since), and the Irish contingent was no exception. A Company of the 25th Battalion was ordered into Jadotville, ostensibly to protect the local settlers from indigenous Congolese. It quickly became clear that the need for this protection was highly questionable, and Jadotville itself was relatively isolated. Road transport was bottlenecked over a single bridge, and the accommodation provided for the UN troops was chosen based on how many men it could hold rather than on whether it would be defensible. As Power comments, "To even the most militarily illiterate reader, it was obvious that Jadotville would be a difficult place to reach if under concentrated attack. One might also ask why it was a good idea to send troops there to protect the locals, if the UN seemed to be so unpopular with them."
None of this would have mattered if Jadotville was a quiet billet, but unfortunately, that was also not to be the case. The Katangan political leadership had recruited a large number of foreign mercenaries, as well as some Belgian military advisers, to train and lead their local gendarmerie. This meant that, "while the Irish public still cultivated notions of their troops going out to fight savage but primitive tribesmen, the newly arrived troops of the 35th Battalion were facing into action with a well- led light infantry force." And so, the stage for the siege was set as Power concludes, "things were far from perfect as regards the deployment of A Company. The reason for their deployment was muddled, complex and, above all, political. They were poorly equipped from the start, and facing a badly outlined task which had been beyond a previous larger force. Still, the order was given and, in the finest traditions of the Irish soldier, the troops looked to their front, swung up their arms and marched off to get on with the job."
As regards the Irish troops themselves, Power introduces us to several prominent characters. Commandant Quinlan looms large throughout the narrative and was a tactically adept and able professional infantry officer. On arriving at Jadotville with A Company, he had them dig in - something that previous troops stationed there had failed to do: "his foresight was to save his men's lives. As well as ordering his men to dig trenches after they arrived, he ordered that all available receptacles be filled with fresh water, even though he was expecting reinforcements by the end of the day. These actions were to mean the difference between life and death." Even with that, the position at Jadotville was far from ideal.
Once hostilities erupted on the 13th of September 1961, Quinlan and his men found themselves fighting a classic company-in-defence action but without the heavy support weapons and equipment generally necessary to such a task. This was largely because no one in the UN was expecting A Company to end up in a pitched battle with well-armed and well-led troops. Over the ensuing five days, A Company was attacked by a mixed force of 3000 - 5000 troops, generally in waves of several hundred at a time. Lacking motorised transport, the Irish troops were unable to attempt a breakout, and several attempts to break the siege failed because of Jadotville's remote location. Eventually, out of ammunition and facing annihilation, Quinlan and his men surrendered and were eventually repatriated.
Because of the political and strategic errors evident in the deployment of A Company to Jadotville, and because of the misplaced shame attached to the units surrender, the events of Jadotville were largely ignored: "The biggest mistake the Army has made since this was to consider it a blot on their copy book and quietly to hope the incident would go away. If it was a blot on anybody's copybook, it was ultimately the UN's, because of its organisation and strategy in implementing operations in the Congo." Quinlan never served overseas again and died in 1997. Tragically, it was only in the early 2000s that an official inquiry cleared Quinlan and his men of allegations of soldierly misconduct and restored their reputations. Further belated recognition has come in more recent years, as the Irish government awarded the first Presidential Unit Citation in the history of the state to A Company in 2016.
Declan Power has written a riveting account of the actions of Quinlan and his men, and of the background to UN involvement in the Congo. It stands as a tribute to their service, albeit one that is long overdue.
‘Those that I fight I do not hate, those that I guard I do not love’ ~ W.B. Yeats
The book begins with a timely reminder of the prominent role played by Irish troops in peacekeeping, not least in the Congo crisis in the 1960s. In part, this is due to Ireland being a Western European nation that doesn't carry any imperial baggage. In the case of the Congo, Irish interest was increased by the appointment of a former Chief of Staff to the Irish Defence Forces to command the UN forces: "In January 1961, Lt Gen Sean McKeown was appointed Force Commander to ONUC...McKeown was seen as a popular choice by all the nations serving in ONUC. The smaller states were happy to see an officer from a state with a non-colonial background in the position, and the larger western states were happy to serve under an officer of a similar cultural background who could speak their language, both literally and operationally. The net result was a huge boost for Irish Army morale, which only increased applications from Irish servicemen to be part of the Congo operation."
Although the Irish Defence Forces were relatively few in number (the army numbering only 7000 troops in 1960), a significant commitment was made to provide troops for peacekeeping in the Congo. This was a shot in the arm for many of the men serving at the time, who described the army as "run down, lacked financing and direction and its mission was not clearly defined. Duties consisted of ceremonial training and Aid to the Civil Power, as the IRA border campaign was beginning at the time...there was a distinct lack of adventure in the army at this time." Initially, a single battalion of 700 men and ultimately six battalions would serve in the Congo with no shortage of volunteers.
In Katanga province, the UN peacekeepers found a confused and ambiguous operational environment (as many UN peacekeepers have since), and the Irish contingent was no exception. A Company of the 25th Battalion was ordered into Jadotville, ostensibly to protect the local settlers from indigenous Congolese. It quickly became clear that the need for this protection was highly questionable, and Jadotville itself was relatively isolated. Road transport was bottlenecked over a single bridge, and the accommodation provided for the UN troops was chosen based on how many men it could hold rather than on whether it would be defensible. As Power comments, "To even the most militarily illiterate reader, it was obvious that Jadotville would be a difficult place to reach if under concentrated attack. One might also ask why it was a good idea to send troops there to protect the locals, if the UN seemed to be so unpopular with them."
None of this would have mattered if Jadotville was a quiet billet, but unfortunately, that was also not to be the case. The Katangan political leadership had recruited a large number of foreign mercenaries, as well as some Belgian military advisers, to train and lead their local gendarmerie. This meant that, "while the Irish public still cultivated notions of their troops going out to fight savage but primitive tribesmen, the newly arrived troops of the 35th Battalion were facing into action with a well- led light infantry force." And so, the stage for the siege was set as Power concludes, "things were far from perfect as regards the deployment of A Company. The reason for their deployment was muddled, complex and, above all, political. They were poorly equipped from the start, and facing a badly outlined task which had been beyond a previous larger force. Still, the order was given and, in the finest traditions of the Irish soldier, the troops looked to their front, swung up their arms and marched off to get on with the job."
As regards the Irish troops themselves, Power introduces us to several prominent characters. Commandant Quinlan looms large throughout the narrative and was a tactically adept and able professional infantry officer. On arriving at Jadotville with A Company, he had them dig in - something that previous troops stationed there had failed to do: "his foresight was to save his men's lives. As well as ordering his men to dig trenches after they arrived, he ordered that all available receptacles be filled with fresh water, even though he was expecting reinforcements by the end of the day. These actions were to mean the difference between life and death." Even with that, the position at Jadotville was far from ideal.
Once hostilities erupted on the 13th of September 1961, Quinlan and his men found themselves fighting a classic company-in-defence action but without the heavy support weapons and equipment generally necessary to such a task. This was largely because no one in the UN was expecting A Company to end up in a pitched battle with well-armed and well-led troops. Over the ensuing five days, A Company was attacked by a mixed force of 3000 - 5000 troops, generally in waves of several hundred at a time. Lacking motorised transport, the Irish troops were unable to attempt a breakout, and several attempts to break the siege failed because of Jadotville's remote location. Eventually, out of ammunition and facing annihilation, Quinlan and his men surrendered and were eventually repatriated.
Because of the political and strategic errors evident in the deployment of A Company to Jadotville, and because of the misplaced shame attached to the units surrender, the events of Jadotville were largely ignored: "The biggest mistake the Army has made since this was to consider it a blot on their copy book and quietly to hope the incident would go away. If it was a blot on anybody's copybook, it was ultimately the UN's, because of its organisation and strategy in implementing operations in the Congo." Quinlan never served overseas again and died in 1997. Tragically, it was only in the early 2000s that an official inquiry cleared Quinlan and his men of allegations of soldierly misconduct and restored their reputations. Further belated recognition has come in more recent years, as the Irish government awarded the first Presidential Unit Citation in the history of the state to A Company in 2016.
Declan Power has written a riveting account of the actions of Quinlan and his men, and of the background to UN involvement in the Congo. It stands as a tribute to their service, albeit one that is long overdue.
‘Those that I fight I do not hate, those that I guard I do not love’ ~ W.B. Yeats
September 14, 2024
I actually saw the movie on Netflix before reading the book. The movie and the book are excellent, it covers an area of military history that is largely forgotten. It covers the UN actions in the Congo in 1961 and the complete failure of the UN in solving the civil war and protecting their Peacekeepers. The story is about a company of Irish troops being placed in an unsupported location. They are surrounded and fight for three days with no support, reinforcement or resupply against mercenary led Congolese force where the odds were 20-1. They fight off the Congolese and actually cause large casualties to them. The Irish lose no KIAs and only a few wounded none serious. In the end with no support, they have to surrender, where they are treated fairly well until repatriated after a short time. When they return to Ireland, they are first treated as heroes but then are largely forgotten and thought of as an embarrassment to the Irish Army. This occurs until a number of Veterans fight for the recognition they deserve. Which in the end they do get but not until in the last 15 years. The book does show how terrible the UN was in trying to interfere and solving the problem of post-colonial Africa. I highly recommend this book it is an easy read and a lot of information about this largely forgotten UN action.
April 22, 2019
Ireland's small army has taken on many peacekeeping missions since the Emergency, but Katanga was an early test of both its resolve and its courage. Shortly after the Congo gained independence from Belgium the resource-rich province of Katanga chose to secede. The United Nations decided to get involved in keeping the Congo intact (a situation which would be inconceivable today) and sent a peacekeeping force which was wholly inadequate to the job at hand... if, indeed, the UN had ever properly defined the job at hand. A small contingent of poorly-equipped Irish troops were committed to holding the militarily insignificant town of Jadotville and were soon under siege by local gendarmerie led by white mercenaries.
It's a fascinating book. Unfortunately, I couldn't get over the idea that, as a frame of reference, it talked about the Soviets sending a man to the moon in 1960 (!) and it makes me wonder how accurate the assessment of some of the political issues discussed were.
It's a fascinating book. Unfortunately, I couldn't get over the idea that, as a frame of reference, it talked about the Soviets sending a man to the moon in 1960 (!) and it makes me wonder how accurate the assessment of some of the political issues discussed were.
Read
November 17, 2020After seeing the film I bought the book. As ever, the book is better than the film. There is far greater detail regarding the political situation, both within the Congo and Internationally, that led to the events at Jadotville.
The book also covers the lead up to the siege and the period of imprisonment that was lightly brushed over on the film, which focused on a cinematic action led perspective, much of which was absent from the book.
This is an interesting read, not just for this period of history in the Congo but the emergence of the Irish Republic onto the international stage.
If you either see the film or read the book, read the book.
The book also covers the lead up to the siege and the period of imprisonment that was lightly brushed over on the film, which focused on a cinematic action led perspective, much of which was absent from the book.
This is an interesting read, not just for this period of history in the Congo but the emergence of the Irish Republic onto the international stage.
If you either see the film or read the book, read the book.
Read
September 27, 2021I read this to get an idea what went on there as there is some controversy about this, official embarrassment etc. No maps, however between this and a book by Michael Whelan , the battle of J.., give some sort of an idea of the chaos of the situation, and possibly into how the UN works, or not, at times. Amazingly - nobody died, (on the Irish side) versus 100's of various mercenary etc, attackers.
January 2, 2024
Written as a piece of advocacy to win more medals, plaques and honors for the Jadotville veterans. The book exaggerates some elements of the battle for that purpose. There is a bibliography but no in-text citations to understand the provenance of Power's claims. Read the Independent Review Group - Jadotville report, which is free. The number of Katangese attackers is exaggerated into many thousands, and there is no evidence for the supposedly massive Katangese casualties.
August 21, 2025
5星。
看完網飛電影找原作來看，第一次看軍事主題的非小說，意外很好讀。
作者對事件的描述淺顯易懂，將1960年代的剛果局勢清晰勾勒出來，也用明確事證直指聯合國在期間的各種問題：行事理念太過清高，不肯打資訊戰，整個情資部門也根本沒有發揮作用，在雅多維爾之前根本是被卡坦加釣著玩；不知道卡坦加有多少兵力、不知道卡坦加當地民意，派駐各地的聯合國軍隊之間無法有效聯絡，上級指令一團混亂還經常自打嘴巴，總之就是根本沒準備好應對暴動以外的武裝衝突。
關於這本書的主角——被派去根本沒有戰略價值、在地理條件上也根本守不住的雅多維爾，還能硬抗五天的A中隊，書中詳細描述他們在剛果參與的軍事行動（這部分大概是受限於篇幅，在電影中沒有演出來），原來他們抵達剛果之後不是馬上被派去守村子，還曾參與另外一些以護衛或維安為目的的行動，在獲釋之後也不是直接回國，而是留在剛果打了第二次卡坦加戰爭。
整體來說是知識量很足，一點也不艱澀，可以讀得很順的一本精緻的軍事小史。
看完網飛電影找原作來看，第一次看軍事主題的非小說，意外很好讀。
作者對事件的描述淺顯易懂，將1960年代的剛果局勢清晰勾勒出來，也用明確事證直指聯合國在期間的各種問題：行事理念太過清高，不肯打資訊戰，整個情資部門也根本沒有發揮作用，在雅多維爾之前根本是被卡坦加釣著玩；不知道卡坦加有多少兵力、不知道卡坦加當地民意，派駐各地的聯合國軍隊之間無法有效聯絡，上級指令一團混亂還經常自打嘴巴，總之就是根本沒準備好應對暴動以外的武裝衝突。
關於這本書的主角——被派去根本沒有戰略價值、在地理條件上也根本守不住的雅多維爾，還能硬抗五天的A中隊，書中詳細描述他們在剛果參與的軍事行動（這部分大概是受限於篇幅，在電影中沒有演出來），原來他們抵達剛果之後不是馬上被派去守村子，還曾參與另外一些以護衛或維安為目的的行動，在獲釋之後也不是直接回國，而是留在剛果打了第二次卡坦加戰爭。
整體來說是知識量很足，一點也不艱澀，可以讀得很順的一本精緻的軍事小史。
February 9, 2019
Outstanding story of heroism and leadership. In 1961, company of Irish soldiers on a UN peacekeeping mission in the Congo bloodied a superior force of Katangan rebels led by French and Belgian mercenaries. Instead of being lauded for their professionalism, they were shunned by their compatriots and government.
September 24, 2019
I came across this story via the movie of the same name, without ever having realised that Irish Army units were fighting for their lives in the Congo of the 1960s.
Once again, this is a story of brave soldiers let down by politicians and working military miracles despite every obstacle put in front of them.
An excellent read.
Once again, this is a story of brave soldiers let down by politicians and working military miracles despite every obstacle put in front of them.
An excellent read.
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