This book exemplifies my mixed feelings about social sciences. On one hand, it's worth checking out for students/scholars of American politics and conservatism, as it is rigorously researched and has some interesting findings. On the other hand, it is overly schematic and rigid in many places, often lacking in historical context, and incredibly repetitive (at 260 pages, this book easily could have been under 200 if the authors had not repeated their major claims over and over again).
Parker and Barreto use survey data to try to differentiate Tea Party supporters from the general population, from mainstream conservatives, and from other social-psych personality types (like authoritarian tendencies or social dominance orientation). They find, in most cases, that sympathy for the Tea Party shows up as a statistically significant and distinct explanation for a variety of viewpoints, particularly viewpoints associated with the belief that their country is "slipping away" from them through demographic and cultural change exemplified by Obama's election. PB locate the Tea Party in the tradition of reactionary conservatism, similar to the KKK and the John Birch Society, in that they are a conspiracy minded, anger-driven reaction to social and demographic change and an attempt to preserve hierarchies and traditions. TP supporters also showed high levels of antipathy for minorities, LGBT people, and other marginalized groups and a tendency to believe Obama is not a Christian or an American. This analysis draws on a somewhat outdated historical under standing of conservatism, but I think it holds up. For instance, if the TP was genuinely about conservative values of small gov't rather than reaction, it would have shown up before Obama took office given that Bush violated virtually all small gov't precepts of conservatism.
Of course, this is the kind of distinction that only a social scientist could love (I'm a historian). Historians have been questioning in the last decade or so whether you can really draw this clear boundary between reactionary conservatism and the "mainstream," which is supposed to be about stability, tradition, order, a slow pace of change, and moderation. Certainly the type of panic-mongering about moral and social crises has been pretty central to many mainstream conservatives, and there is absolutely no way to separate the rise of the modern conservative GOP from vehement anti-Communism, anti-Civil Rights sentiment, and a general backlash to social change. Social science relies on these ideal types, and I think PB has shown there is a real difference in how mainstream conservatives and Tea Partiers think and act in politics, with TP's being generally more extreme. However, especially in the Trump age, it seems hard to really make that distinction, and historians like COrey Robin have made solid cases that it has always been dubious. After all, it has largely been conservative thinkers and scholars who have insisted on that division (Rossiter, Buckley), for obvious reasons.
SO while this is an interesting book, I found myself consistently frustrated by the somewhat hair-splitting distinctions between, for example, someone in the Tea Party and someone with social dominance orientation, which is all about maintaining your group's dominant status. That seems to overlap significantly with the Tea Party's major concerns. A more historical approach to the Tea Party would have looked more at the tensions/factions within conservative and GOP thought/politics, how they were shifting in the 2000s in the response to a variety of contextual factors, and how certain events (Obama's election, the 2008 crisis) crystallized the formation of a distinct political movement. As is all too common with social science, this book is sorely lacking in the broader context. That problem, plus the tedious repetition of the major claims and the endless descriptions of their methodologies (basically the same in every chapter, yet explained in each chapter as if they were stand-alone articles), make this book a frustrating if ultimately useful read.