Battalion Commanders at War: U.S. Army Tactical Leadership in the Mediterranean Theater, 1942-1943

Modern War Studies

by Steven Thomas Barry

Examines the largely unsung leadership of U.S. Army battalion commanders in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations of World War II and concludes that they were hugely instrumental in overcoming their German adversaries to emerge victorious, first in North Africa (Operation TORCH) and then in Sicily (Operation HUSKY).

Genres: Leadership, Military Fiction, Military History, World War II

272 pages, Hardcover

First published May 23, 2013

Reviews

[Edgar Raines · Rating 4 out of 5]

Barry argues that the U.S. Army performed well no matter what the tactical situation from the beginning of the North African campaign. Breakdowns occurred at higher levels, especially division and corps. Not only Fredendall but Patton come in for, I believe, justified criticism. Once the division and corps levels were filled with competent officers—Patton was competent but took time to adjust to the problems associated with corps command—and single American battalions were not called upon to stop massed German divisions, American defeats turned into American victories. It was the uniformly high competence exhibited by American battalion commanders in victory and defeat that carried the Army until it sorted out its problems at higher levels of command.
Battalion Commanders at War: U.S. Army Tactical Leadership in the Mediterranean Theater, 1942-1943

[Christopher · Rating 3 out of 5]

Enjoyable read but felt that the assessment of battalion leadership was too limited. The argument is that our system worked and we produced excellent battalion leaders in WWII. As a skeptic, the US Army did well because we won but were we really prepared? Not convinced.

[Caleb D · Rating 2 out of 5]

Steven Thomas Barry, Battalion Commanders at War: U.S. Army Tactical Leadership in the Mediterranean Theater, 1942–1943

Barry asks a central question: How and why did U.S. regular army battalion commanders—most of whom had no prior combat experience—successfully exercise combat leadership in the Mediterranean theater?

His thesis is that the leadership of U.S. regular army battalion officers was the essential component that enabled battlefield success. Despite shortcomings in equipment, organization, mobilization, and higher operational leadership, these battalion commanders provided the tactical stability that allowed U.S. units to function effectively in combat. Without them, American forces could not have fought successfully at the tactical level.

Barry develops his argument around three key factors:
1. Prewar Preparation & Training
• Professional military education at West Point, service schools, and doctrine courses.
• Large-scale maneuvers and peacetime exercises that gave officers organizational and tactical practice.
• The norms, discipline, and standards of the prewar Regular Army, which instilled a professional identity.
2. Personal Qualities and Adaptability
• Calmness under fire and the ability to make decisions under extreme stress.
• Creativity and improvisation when doctrine, equipment, or higher command guidance proved inadequate.
• Clear communication of mission and intent, which gave subordinates confidence and initiative.
3. Doctrine, Innovation & Combined Arms Tactics
• Reliance on U.S. Army doctrine as a framework, even when it had to be adapted.
• Incorporation of innovations, including coordination of infantry, armor, artillery, and air support.
• Translation of vague or broad operational orders into practical tactical action on the battlefield.

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Evaluation:
The book is deeply researched but also dense and sometimes difficult to follow, particularly because many of the officers Barry highlights are relatively unknown and easy to confuse for readers without specialized knowledge of the Mediterranean campaigns. Nevertheless, the study provides valuable insight into an often overlooked truth: it was battalion-level leadership, more than equipment or high-level planning, that ensured U.S. tactical success in North Africa and Sicily.

[Chris Esposo · Rating 5 out of 5]

“Battalion Commanders”' is a well-written, precise account of the thinking that informed the organization and doctrine of the young US Army as it prepared for the Operation Torch landings in North Africa during the first year of US involvement in the Second World War. The book goes over everything from the stateside training (and it’s development from scratch) the GI Army went through, as well as the cultivation (and planned preservation) of the officer class, especially those at the Battalion command level.

Though I read the book via audio, it seems that the text offers some basic tables (or at least presents them via text) on after-action reports at a fairly granular level i.e. tactical maneuvers/engagements between the US Army and both Italian and Wehrmacht forces in North Africa, with key attributes of those engagements spelt out, including whether air assets were available, and for whom, the nature of the armor for each side, which side fired first, and how many units of each side were present. There were some interesting findings according to the text, including that visibility and situational awareness was key to prevailing in these engagements and less the supposed ‘superiority’ of the equipment (in this case, comparing the M4 Shermans, and the far lesser inventoried “Jumbo” Sherman M4s w/ their Axis counterparts, including the King Tiger and Panther tanks). According to the text, firing first, and en-masse not only usually led to victory in the engagement, but often resulted in a far diminished attrition rate on the prevailing force of the engagement. Whereas, if fire-initiative could not be achieved, the range of attrition on the US side could be as large as 3/4ths loss of armor.

There’s some commentary on why these outcomes may have come about, and what fire-initiative really must have meant in context, and the mechanics of how it translated to to a favorable outcome, but I having this level of concise analysis is refreshing for a history text for this era, which often are too word-heavy, with relatively little information conveyed for the volume of words. If the written text includes tables for these analyses, it will almost surely be worth purchasing a Kindle or physical copy to go through the details.

Overall, I enjoyed this book, and will look to get similar text with this level of detail (or greater), when reading text in this domain in the future. Recommended.

[Ulysse Colonna · Rating 3 out of 5]

Deep dive in the medium-ranking managers of the US Army. It does efficiently drill the point that training is key and that good general are not inspired prima donas but efficient HR managers. The skills as an historian of the author may at times be found wanting but overall, the result is quite good.

[Joe · Rating 5 out of 5]

As we move into an era of fiscal austerity in the military, and leaders try to determine where we should focus our budgets, a book like this reminds us of the importance of investing in people. While authors like Jorg Muth, argue that the leader development system in the U.S. military was woefully inadequate compared to the German system, Steve Barry provides a strong counter-argument backed by evidence of battalion level performance in the Mediterranean Theater. In addition to highlighting the pre-war development of mid-level leadership, the author also provides the reader with glimpses into the realities of modern warfare. From poor intelligence and shortened timelines to failures in staff planning, war presents us with a friction that can only be overcome with great training, a good understanding of tactical doctrine, and excellent leadership. Examples of this are found throughout the book.

The below excerpts really stood out to me in the reading:

“A poorly trained unit cannot learn profitably by combat, since it not prepared to make the most of the battle experience it receives and the confidence that battle experience imparts to the soundly trained organization.”

The author finishes his book with a final reminder about the realities of combat when he highlights an excerpt from LTC Hamilton Howze’s memoir. In the below quote, Howze explains why he carried a copy of Clausewitz’s writings with him in combat.

“I found this book eminently sustaining in times of stress-it was something to cling to, to refer to when an operational plan went awry, when units went kting off on the wrong road, when subordinates seems to lose their minds, or when your luck was bad. In other words, a normal battle day.”