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Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350
The modern vision of the world as one dominated by one or more superpowers begs the question of how best to understand the world-system that existed before the rise of the first modern powers.
Janet Abu-Lughod's solution to this problem, in this highly influential work, is that Before European Hegemony, a predominantly insular, agrarian world was dominated by groups of mercantile city-states that traded with one another on equal terms across a series of interlocking areas of influence. In this reading of history, China and Japan, the kingdoms of India, Muslim caliphates, the Byzantine Empire and European maritime republics alike enjoyed no absolute dominance over their neighbours and commercial partners - and the egalitarian international trading network that they built endured until European advances in weaponry and ship types introduced radical instability to the system.
Abu-Lughod's portrait of a more balanced world is a masterpiece of synthesis driven by one highly creative idea: her world system of interlocking spheres of influence quite literally connected masses of evidence together in new ways. A triumph of fine critical thinking.
Janet Abu-Lughod's solution to this problem, in this highly influential work, is that Before European Hegemony, a predominantly insular, agrarian world was dominated by groups of mercantile city-states that traded with one another on equal terms across a series of interlocking areas of influence. In this reading of history, China and Japan, the kingdoms of India, Muslim caliphates, the Byzantine Empire and European maritime republics alike enjoyed no absolute dominance over their neighbours and commercial partners - and the egalitarian international trading network that they built endured until European advances in weaponry and ship types introduced radical instability to the system.
Abu-Lughod's portrait of a more balanced world is a masterpiece of synthesis driven by one highly creative idea: her world system of interlocking spheres of influence quite literally connected masses of evidence together in new ways. A triumph of fine critical thinking.
464 pages, Paperback
First published August 10, 1989
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About the author
Janet L. Abu-Lughod
14 books35 followersJanet Lippman Abu-Lughod was an American sociologist with major contributions to World-systems theory and Urban sociology.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 47 reviews
January 23, 2012
It is considered bad form to criticize others, esp on a site like goodreads, so I will do so without mentioning any names. An earlier reviewer of this book began by complaining about how "this book stinks of post-modernism. It's an odor that the author could have done without--references to chaos theory, anti-Kuhnian analysis and an attack on euro-centrism so strident that it borders on apoplexy, are, I think, undue".
Though the reviewer went on to give this book five-stars, these comments almost dissuaded me from reading it. And yet, these comments are so preposterous and outlandish, so utterly unjustified by the text, that I cannot pass them in silence.
This is a brilliant book and an achievement -- and I'm quite surprised that I not only never read it, but never even heard of it.
This book takes a sustained, critical, synthetic look at world economic history during the 13th and 14th centuries, when a full world system, according to A.-L., took shape, flourished, and collapsed under the pressure of the Plague and other deep local disturbances. As such, it served as the ground for the emergent European "moment" of the 16th cen. It consisted of six complex overlapping 'cores', moving from Europe to China, and covering the global trade routes -- the overland silk route from China through Central Asia, the egress from Mesopotamia/Baghdad through the Persian Gulf and the route from Egypt through the Red Sea... both into the Indian Ocean littoral.... offering an historical compliment to Kaplan's marvelous 'periplous' of the Indian Ocean... Her conclusion is that this vast, proto-industrial, multi-polar global equilibrium fell through a series of largely local declensions (including, but not restricted to the Plague of the 14th cen.) that unwound the synergies that had produced the world system in the first place. The rise of Europe, therefore, was not due to any particular "virtue" on Europe's part - any specially technological genius or breakthrough in values (Weber) or because of the situation of local coal mines (Pomeranz) -- but because the decline of the East had created a power-vacuum that Europe, with its brutal methods, capitalized on in the 16th century (and which, then, flourished - though this topic goes beyond the scope of her book and is only touched upon -- because Europe had, with its exploitation of the New World, acess to "free resources".)
This is a novel thesis (novel to me, anyway) - and is presented with such sobriety and focus and intelligence, that it is utterly captiavting. Is it true...? I have no idea? Is it plausible and persuasive --? in Abu-Lughod's hand, most definitely!
The book is synthetic, as I have said, and her scholarship is second-hand -- based merely on a wide reading of the secondary literature. This is a flaw. But it is thoroughly inductive and empirical in the extreme, and has not ONE of the flaws that the earlier reviewer complains of (the reference to chaos theory is a throw-away line in the introduction -- yes, one line, in a FOOTNOTE!, no less [p. 40, n. 16], to the introductory chapter). And yet, from these critical foundations, the book builds to a set of inferences of enormous import.
I like to tell people that bad books start with big ideas, while good books end with them. This is a good book. A VERY good book.
Though the reviewer went on to give this book five-stars, these comments almost dissuaded me from reading it. And yet, these comments are so preposterous and outlandish, so utterly unjustified by the text, that I cannot pass them in silence.
This is a brilliant book and an achievement -- and I'm quite surprised that I not only never read it, but never even heard of it.
This book takes a sustained, critical, synthetic look at world economic history during the 13th and 14th centuries, when a full world system, according to A.-L., took shape, flourished, and collapsed under the pressure of the Plague and other deep local disturbances. As such, it served as the ground for the emergent European "moment" of the 16th cen. It consisted of six complex overlapping 'cores', moving from Europe to China, and covering the global trade routes -- the overland silk route from China through Central Asia, the egress from Mesopotamia/Baghdad through the Persian Gulf and the route from Egypt through the Red Sea... both into the Indian Ocean littoral.... offering an historical compliment to Kaplan's marvelous 'periplous' of the Indian Ocean... Her conclusion is that this vast, proto-industrial, multi-polar global equilibrium fell through a series of largely local declensions (including, but not restricted to the Plague of the 14th cen.) that unwound the synergies that had produced the world system in the first place. The rise of Europe, therefore, was not due to any particular "virtue" on Europe's part - any specially technological genius or breakthrough in values (Weber) or because of the situation of local coal mines (Pomeranz) -- but because the decline of the East had created a power-vacuum that Europe, with its brutal methods, capitalized on in the 16th century (and which, then, flourished - though this topic goes beyond the scope of her book and is only touched upon -- because Europe had, with its exploitation of the New World, acess to "free resources".)
This is a novel thesis (novel to me, anyway) - and is presented with such sobriety and focus and intelligence, that it is utterly captiavting. Is it true...? I have no idea? Is it plausible and persuasive --? in Abu-Lughod's hand, most definitely!
The book is synthetic, as I have said, and her scholarship is second-hand -- based merely on a wide reading of the secondary literature. This is a flaw. But it is thoroughly inductive and empirical in the extreme, and has not ONE of the flaws that the earlier reviewer complains of (the reference to chaos theory is a throw-away line in the introduction -- yes, one line, in a FOOTNOTE!, no less [p. 40, n. 16], to the introductory chapter). And yet, from these critical foundations, the book builds to a set of inferences of enormous import.
I like to tell people that bad books start with big ideas, while good books end with them. This is a good book. A VERY good book.
July 13, 2016
A somewhat moot argument now, but at the time, Abu-Lughod's work was in the vanguard of synthesizing historiography in a way that made sense, namely by pointing up the relative insignificance of Europe for much of history.
The main idea is pretty straightforward: an archipelago of relatively non-aggressive, culturally diverse areas reaching from Egypt to China's eastern seaboard once formed a tidy world system that did not have much to do with backwater Europe. This system collapsed around the 14th century. Abu-Lughod asks why and comes up with some convincing, if tentative conclusions. Her thesis gives great weight to the Black Plague which devastated much of this area, which is obvious due to its demographic repercussions. More importantly, she focuses on geopolitical change in Central Asia (Mongols) and China (fluctuations in interest in trade, Ming disinterest in international commerce), to account for the sudden change in the Indian Ocean system. Nothing was special about Europe, nothing was inherent in Europe--in fact, on a technological and economic level, the rest of the world far surpassed European powers at the time. Concentric rings of influence and events affected adjacent areas throughout the entire area, and this is the meat of the work, describing what this meant for the coasts of India, Muslim powers, and, most importantly, China and southeast Asia.
The main takeaway: Europe came out on top because they literally came in shooting and acting all mafia, in an area where most people didn't behave that way.
A nice primer on the subject.
The main idea is pretty straightforward: an archipelago of relatively non-aggressive, culturally diverse areas reaching from Egypt to China's eastern seaboard once formed a tidy world system that did not have much to do with backwater Europe. This system collapsed around the 14th century. Abu-Lughod asks why and comes up with some convincing, if tentative conclusions. Her thesis gives great weight to the Black Plague which devastated much of this area, which is obvious due to its demographic repercussions. More importantly, she focuses on geopolitical change in Central Asia (Mongols) and China (fluctuations in interest in trade, Ming disinterest in international commerce), to account for the sudden change in the Indian Ocean system. Nothing was special about Europe, nothing was inherent in Europe--in fact, on a technological and economic level, the rest of the world far surpassed European powers at the time. Concentric rings of influence and events affected adjacent areas throughout the entire area, and this is the meat of the work, describing what this meant for the coasts of India, Muslim powers, and, most importantly, China and southeast Asia.
The main takeaway: Europe came out on top because they literally came in shooting and acting all mafia, in an area where most people didn't behave that way.
A nice primer on the subject.
May 7, 2015
Much-cited. I was afraid to sit down and read the actual thing for years, because I'm not an economics person. Turns out there was nothing to be afraid of: quite an easy read for the curious.
The most cogent, digestible view of the Italian merchant cities' connections with the Mongol world that I know about. That aspect can be read in conjunction with The Mongols and the Black Sea Trade in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries.
The most cogent, digestible view of the Italian merchant cities' connections with the Mongol world that I know about. That aspect can be read in conjunction with The Mongols and the Black Sea Trade in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries.
November 1, 2011
In Before European Hegemony, Janet Abu-Lughod questions the assumption that European dominance in the 16th century occurred by necessity. By assessing regional power and influence, Abu-Lughod proves that between 1250 and 1350 the East and the West equaled one another in economic strength. The shift of power to the West in subsequent centuries occurred not because of factors predetermined by Western dominance, but rather because the Eastern system left a vacuum of power that European countries were able to exploit. Through examination of three different global subsystems of Eurasia, Abu-Lughod shows that the economies of the Middle East and Asia were more advanced than their European counterparts. Arguing against once prevalent Eurocentric theories of the peculiarity of Europe’s rise, Abu-Lughod convincingly shows that significant economic development existed exogenously to Europe prior to the 16th century.
Abu-Lughod’s synthesis of Eurasian trade patterns weaves disparate sources together, offering a comprehensive picture of the global economy between the 13th and 14th centuries. Unfortunately, the attempt to disprove ‘European uniqueness’ by proving Eastern economic superiority does not allow for any interpretation of the rise of Europe other than its taking advantage of happenstance; a critique that refuses to acknowledge any European contribution to its taking advantage of the East’s disorganization following the black death. Overall, the book’s strengths in providing a strong sociologic evidence of the strength of the Eastern economy before European hegemony outweigh the lack of detached assessment on Europe’s rise and adequate explanation of Asia’s stagnation.
The most important analysis of Before European Hegemony shows that no single hegemon existed in the thirteenth century, nor did hierarchical relationships exist between economic systems. Instead, economies and trade routes developed around seven different regions with varying peripheral systems developing around the core. Despite the admitted paucity of data and problems with perspective, Abu-Lughod sketches broad portraits of the core systems beginning with the trade fairs of Champagne, the city-states of Venice and Genoa, and the industrial cities of Belgium showing the prerequisites for a the creation of an entrepôt: surplus production, low transport and security costs, and a high number of sellers and buyers in the marketplace. In this section, the author mentions, without irony regarding its uniqueness, the Italian city-states’ development of accounting techniques and its wide proliferation of letters of credit.
The second section of the book examines three Middle-Eastern trade routes and shows the impact Mongolian unification had on trade and the location that allowed the routes to become centers of the core system. Finally the third section discusses the role of the Indian subcontinent as the ‘hinge’ of East and West, which should have granted dominance in trade but instead led to trade surpluses because of India’s consistent export of luxury goods. The discussion ends with China, whose advanced technology, well-developed use of paper money, and strong sea presence granted it ability to link trade along the north-south axis prior to the arrival of the plague.
As a survey of trade patterns before European hegemony, Abu-Lughod’s work is massive in scope and depth. The book’s deep examination of an array of sources gives it intellectual rigor in source material where it could have been lacking. The author discredits previous Eurocentric ideas by proving that Europe did not have a monopoly on economic development and that European dominance did not occur a priori because of European superiority. Abu-Lughod strives to refute ideas like the European miracle and successfully shows that the East at a minimum rivaled the West in trade prior to the 16th century.
Where the book is less convincing is Abu-Lughod’s contention that Europe lacked any unique characteristics that led it to diverge from the East following the plague. Abu-Lughod’s goal to disprove cultural factors as a determinant of European hegemony creates an inability to divorce cultural exceptionality from cultural superiority. The introduction states that by looking at the world as it enfolded, rather than a regressive chain of effects and their causes, one can separate what happened from what necessarily happened. Yet, the end-result is the same; Europe did develop hegemony after the onset of the black plague. To argue that it did not happen necessarily or could have happened differently is recursive.
The author states that Europe’s rise occurred only because the East became disorganized rather than because of factors exclusive to Europe. At the same time, it is difficult to see Europe’s rise as merely opportunism. Clearly there must have been factors that led the European system to take over Asian trade routes during Asia’s period of ‘disarray’. The author admits as much in stating that the Portuguese were brutally violent when arriving on the Indian Ocean. Diamond also showed that Europe developed the ‘package’ that led to military and economic dominance. These factors, while not unique to only Europe, did give it a head start.
The last criticism of the book deals with attempts to explain China’s decline at the end of period discussed by the book. By many measurements China stood as the most advanced region before the plague began. According to the author, Chinese economic problems in the 15th century and subsequent ‘system retrenchment’ caused China to withdraw from naval operations. This does not sufficiently support the author’s contention that any power could have developed hegemon status at the end of the 14th century. Obviously, China’s internal situation precluded it from maintaining its power status.
Abu-Lughod’s analysis of world trade offers a strong record of trade patterns and market trends throughout Eurasia during the time before Europe achieved hegemony. The book overcomes the potential problems of weak data, unreliable testimony, and lack of perspective. However, in the passionate defense against European superiority, Abu-Lughod fails to credit Europe with the characteristics that allowed it to take advantage of the vacuum left by the dissolution of Asian economic power. Overall, that the Eurocentric ideas the book argues against have been largely discredited speaks to the success of its arguments.
Abu-Lughod’s synthesis of Eurasian trade patterns weaves disparate sources together, offering a comprehensive picture of the global economy between the 13th and 14th centuries. Unfortunately, the attempt to disprove ‘European uniqueness’ by proving Eastern economic superiority does not allow for any interpretation of the rise of Europe other than its taking advantage of happenstance; a critique that refuses to acknowledge any European contribution to its taking advantage of the East’s disorganization following the black death. Overall, the book’s strengths in providing a strong sociologic evidence of the strength of the Eastern economy before European hegemony outweigh the lack of detached assessment on Europe’s rise and adequate explanation of Asia’s stagnation.
The most important analysis of Before European Hegemony shows that no single hegemon existed in the thirteenth century, nor did hierarchical relationships exist between economic systems. Instead, economies and trade routes developed around seven different regions with varying peripheral systems developing around the core. Despite the admitted paucity of data and problems with perspective, Abu-Lughod sketches broad portraits of the core systems beginning with the trade fairs of Champagne, the city-states of Venice and Genoa, and the industrial cities of Belgium showing the prerequisites for a the creation of an entrepôt: surplus production, low transport and security costs, and a high number of sellers and buyers in the marketplace. In this section, the author mentions, without irony regarding its uniqueness, the Italian city-states’ development of accounting techniques and its wide proliferation of letters of credit.
The second section of the book examines three Middle-Eastern trade routes and shows the impact Mongolian unification had on trade and the location that allowed the routes to become centers of the core system. Finally the third section discusses the role of the Indian subcontinent as the ‘hinge’ of East and West, which should have granted dominance in trade but instead led to trade surpluses because of India’s consistent export of luxury goods. The discussion ends with China, whose advanced technology, well-developed use of paper money, and strong sea presence granted it ability to link trade along the north-south axis prior to the arrival of the plague.
As a survey of trade patterns before European hegemony, Abu-Lughod’s work is massive in scope and depth. The book’s deep examination of an array of sources gives it intellectual rigor in source material where it could have been lacking. The author discredits previous Eurocentric ideas by proving that Europe did not have a monopoly on economic development and that European dominance did not occur a priori because of European superiority. Abu-Lughod strives to refute ideas like the European miracle and successfully shows that the East at a minimum rivaled the West in trade prior to the 16th century.
Where the book is less convincing is Abu-Lughod’s contention that Europe lacked any unique characteristics that led it to diverge from the East following the plague. Abu-Lughod’s goal to disprove cultural factors as a determinant of European hegemony creates an inability to divorce cultural exceptionality from cultural superiority. The introduction states that by looking at the world as it enfolded, rather than a regressive chain of effects and their causes, one can separate what happened from what necessarily happened. Yet, the end-result is the same; Europe did develop hegemony after the onset of the black plague. To argue that it did not happen necessarily or could have happened differently is recursive.
The author states that Europe’s rise occurred only because the East became disorganized rather than because of factors exclusive to Europe. At the same time, it is difficult to see Europe’s rise as merely opportunism. Clearly there must have been factors that led the European system to take over Asian trade routes during Asia’s period of ‘disarray’. The author admits as much in stating that the Portuguese were brutally violent when arriving on the Indian Ocean. Diamond also showed that Europe developed the ‘package’ that led to military and economic dominance. These factors, while not unique to only Europe, did give it a head start.
The last criticism of the book deals with attempts to explain China’s decline at the end of period discussed by the book. By many measurements China stood as the most advanced region before the plague began. According to the author, Chinese economic problems in the 15th century and subsequent ‘system retrenchment’ caused China to withdraw from naval operations. This does not sufficiently support the author’s contention that any power could have developed hegemon status at the end of the 14th century. Obviously, China’s internal situation precluded it from maintaining its power status.
Abu-Lughod’s analysis of world trade offers a strong record of trade patterns and market trends throughout Eurasia during the time before Europe achieved hegemony. The book overcomes the potential problems of weak data, unreliable testimony, and lack of perspective. However, in the passionate defense against European superiority, Abu-Lughod fails to credit Europe with the characteristics that allowed it to take advantage of the vacuum left by the dissolution of Asian economic power. Overall, that the Eurocentric ideas the book argues against have been largely discredited speaks to the success of its arguments.
July 30, 2008
Before I elaborate on my praise let me say, first of all, that this book stinks of post-modernism. It's an odor that the author could have done without--references to chaos theory, anti-Kuhnian analysis and an attack on euro-centrism so strident that it borders on apoplexy, are, I think, undue. The author could have had all of her conclusions without the facile effort to jazz up the narrative. Even more, I think it does her argument a disservice: as post-modern ideas wane the author's arguments, bound needlessly as they are to these ideas, may pass with them as well. That would be a misfortune.
There are other complaints I would make against her presentation. Abu-Lughod relies too heavily upon typological formulations to direct her analysis. With another author, one whose theory was more crisply organized, this might be helpful; but it does not serve her since she hardly makes use of the categories she creates and, in any case, is not precise with her use of words.
Now that I am in the flow of this essay, I feel as if I could unload a battery of other criticisms against Abu-Lughod. But let me change gears, if I might, and defend why I think this book ultimately deserves a five star rating. It is not because I agree with her core arguments: either that the explanation for Europe's rise is found outside of Europe; or that a World System existed before the 16th century; or that her variant of World System's Theory is superior to her colleagues. No, I'm not sure if I do agree.
But you don't have to accede to an author's arguments to appreciate their effort. Abu-Lughod's book is a thoughtful epxosition, rich with historical anecdotes and guided by a novel theoretical architecture that arranges it all. The prose is lucid and accessible. The narrative is rarely tedious and possesses several stories--that of Marco Polo or of Palembang, to mention only two--that convey her point with powerful force.
However, the feature of the book that really earns the fifth star is how her discussion--the questions she raises and the issues she treats--expands the inquiry and provokes interest and curiosity, rather than depress or enervate it. For example, at the end of every chapter, minus the beginning and end, Abu-Lughod gives Lessons for each region under consideration: the implication being that she can, and has, derived laws of the World System that transcend the idiosyncrasies of the time. Bold, presumptuous, even arrogant, to be sure; and though her results are given in abstract, almost useless, descriptions the effort makes way for all kinds of controversy and questions. Abu-Lughod is not the last word on the subject. What makes her book a five star book is that she does a great job of organizing a beginning.
There are other complaints I would make against her presentation. Abu-Lughod relies too heavily upon typological formulations to direct her analysis. With another author, one whose theory was more crisply organized, this might be helpful; but it does not serve her since she hardly makes use of the categories she creates and, in any case, is not precise with her use of words.
Now that I am in the flow of this essay, I feel as if I could unload a battery of other criticisms against Abu-Lughod. But let me change gears, if I might, and defend why I think this book ultimately deserves a five star rating. It is not because I agree with her core arguments: either that the explanation for Europe's rise is found outside of Europe; or that a World System existed before the 16th century; or that her variant of World System's Theory is superior to her colleagues. No, I'm not sure if I do agree.
But you don't have to accede to an author's arguments to appreciate their effort. Abu-Lughod's book is a thoughtful epxosition, rich with historical anecdotes and guided by a novel theoretical architecture that arranges it all. The prose is lucid and accessible. The narrative is rarely tedious and possesses several stories--that of Marco Polo or of Palembang, to mention only two--that convey her point with powerful force.
However, the feature of the book that really earns the fifth star is how her discussion--the questions she raises and the issues she treats--expands the inquiry and provokes interest and curiosity, rather than depress or enervate it. For example, at the end of every chapter, minus the beginning and end, Abu-Lughod gives Lessons for each region under consideration: the implication being that she can, and has, derived laws of the World System that transcend the idiosyncrasies of the time. Bold, presumptuous, even arrogant, to be sure; and though her results are given in abstract, almost useless, descriptions the effort makes way for all kinds of controversy and questions. Abu-Lughod is not the last word on the subject. What makes her book a five star book is that she does a great job of organizing a beginning.
September 1, 2025
Read everything besides skimming the chapters focused on Cairo, Baghdad, and Malacca.
Janet, you brilliant queen.
Janet, you brilliant queen.
February 12, 2010
Argues that European dominance of the modern world system (dated to the 16th century) was not the result of any particular qualities inherent in European civilization. Rather, it developed out of a preexisting world system that flourished in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, over which Europeans were able to claim dominance as a result of decline in other economic zones (i.e. the Middle East and Asia). A really fascinating look at the medieval economy, incorporating regional case studies with a global macrohistory. Some points are highly problematic (such as her assertion that there are no cultural differences between Christianity, Confucianism, Buddhism, Hinduism or Islam that could account for European predominance after 1500, but that there are cultural differences between Catholicism and Protestantism that account for the failure of Spain and Portugal to reap fully the benefits of the new world -- fuck you, Max Weber), but really very thought-provoking.
June 23, 2025
Really fun, really interesting, really insightful. Abu Lughod uncovers a lost world out of whose destruction came the modern European-dominated world of the 16th century and onward. You’ll learn something about every part of this system, starting from its western backwater—Western Europe, and ending in its eastern core region of China. Abu Lughod lays out everything you need to know about how Indian textiles were shipped by Arabized Gujurati merchants to Arab ports; how Venetian maritime dominance came to depend on Eastern European Christian slavery alongside cotton production in Egypt; how small French towns hosted fairs and acted as entrepôts for money from Italy and textiles from Flanders (as you may have noticed, textiles are the paramount commodity for most of the regions).
All in all, wonderful book, only limited by the wide range of geographic, political, social, and economic factors the author is forced to consider or omit for the sake of not overwhelming readers while still informing and supporting the author’s thesis.
Highly recommend to anyone interested in history or politics or economics or even a novelist looking to write a great historical novel. There’s certainly enough material in this book to imagine an Indian Ocean odyssey.
All in all, wonderful book, only limited by the wide range of geographic, political, social, and economic factors the author is forced to consider or omit for the sake of not overwhelming readers while still informing and supporting the author’s thesis.
Highly recommend to anyone interested in history or politics or economics or even a novelist looking to write a great historical novel. There’s certainly enough material in this book to imagine an Indian Ocean odyssey.
June 12, 2024
Takes Wallersteins world systems stuff (dividing world into core and periphery parts of the economic system in this sweeping narrative from 1400s-today) and tries to sketch out the preceding system. Lots on the economic and trade dynamics of the Khan's and Muslim traders, Venice and Genoa, Malay peninsula and the role of China, and theories as to why the system collapsed and was taken over by Portugul and co. Plague having a lot to do with it falling apart. I enjoyed it.
January 2, 2021
Abu-Lughod's work is a thought provoking and insightful study of the mid-13th to mid-14th century world system and its component regions and trading circuits. The only criticism I can level at Abu-Lughod is that at times there is a class based analysis, such as of cities in Flanders, whose applicability and explanatory power to be highly questionable. Overall, this is a nice read but a critical approach should be maintained whilst reading.
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November 11, 2021Historical scholarship. A classic from the late '80s in which the author examines the world system – meaning, particularly, production and long-distance trade – that existed most immediately prior to the one that emerged in the context of capitalism. This earlier system reached its peak in the 13th and 14th centuries. Key elements were already faltering by 1350, when the Black Plague that swept the world dealt it a knockout blow.
The author starts in western Europe and proceeds more or less eastward, examining in turn each element of the system between there and China. While European colonial and capitalist domination is central to the system that emerged in the 16th and 17th centuries, in this earlier system, northwestern Europe had only recently reconnected to the broader world and it remained quite a marginal element, and an economic and cultural backwater compared to the thriving metropolises of Italy, the Islamic world, South Asia, and China. At the system's peak, there were multiple routes and a global flow of goods that, while minuscule by 21st century standards, played an important role in many differently situated lives and polities. Of course, the Americas and Australia were not connected to what was going on in Eurasia at this point, and for reasons it does not satisfactorily explain the book mostly doesn't talk much about Africa outside of Egypt, except for a few brief mentions of East African ports.
Beyond its careful description of the system – which in itself is fascinating, partly because it presents a vision of a world that functioned very differently from our own, but in ways that were clearly related – the book makes a number of interesting points and arguments. For example, its descriptions include noting lots of elements of what would later become capitalism, found locally in lots of different places. These are a mix of nascent social technologies and adaptations to local conditions, and are best understood as the new developing in the cracks of the old, with much different meaning than the same phenomena took on in later centuries as they became part of a compulsory global totality. As well, Eurocentric narratives tend to explain the eventual European predominance in the post 16th century world system by pointing to characteristics inherent in European culture, business practices, or politics in earlier eras, which this author clearly thinks is hogwash. Along with the way that such narratives ignore the utter centrality of slavery and settler colonialism to fuelling Europe's meteoric rise, she also points out that if you look carefully at relevant factors in the 13th and 14th centuries, there isn't really much that is present in Europe that is not also present elsewhere. Plus, a number of key elements in terms of business practices that some authors focus on as the seeds of future capitalist thriving were actually developed in the Islamic world first, and only later taken up by Italian merchants and then other Europeans. Plus, she argues that at least part of the key to later European domination was luck – when Portuguese sea power took over the world's oceans starting in the 15th and 16th centuries (which was followed by the Dutch and then the English), there was a sort of vacuum that they more or less fell into filling. That vacuum hadn't been there a hundred years earlier, and in fact it was only luck that it was there at that point, because China might well have been able to resist those early European assertions of hegemony but had, for a variety of reasons unrelated to Europe, turned inward for awhile and abandoned its earlier oceanic power before the Portuguese showed up.
Anyway, I'm reading a number of nonfiction books right now that have nothing to do with anything I'm likely to write about, and I'm taking great pleasure in it. This book may sound a bit dry, but it was fascinating and I would highly recommend it.
The author starts in western Europe and proceeds more or less eastward, examining in turn each element of the system between there and China. While European colonial and capitalist domination is central to the system that emerged in the 16th and 17th centuries, in this earlier system, northwestern Europe had only recently reconnected to the broader world and it remained quite a marginal element, and an economic and cultural backwater compared to the thriving metropolises of Italy, the Islamic world, South Asia, and China. At the system's peak, there were multiple routes and a global flow of goods that, while minuscule by 21st century standards, played an important role in many differently situated lives and polities. Of course, the Americas and Australia were not connected to what was going on in Eurasia at this point, and for reasons it does not satisfactorily explain the book mostly doesn't talk much about Africa outside of Egypt, except for a few brief mentions of East African ports.
Beyond its careful description of the system – which in itself is fascinating, partly because it presents a vision of a world that functioned very differently from our own, but in ways that were clearly related – the book makes a number of interesting points and arguments. For example, its descriptions include noting lots of elements of what would later become capitalism, found locally in lots of different places. These are a mix of nascent social technologies and adaptations to local conditions, and are best understood as the new developing in the cracks of the old, with much different meaning than the same phenomena took on in later centuries as they became part of a compulsory global totality. As well, Eurocentric narratives tend to explain the eventual European predominance in the post 16th century world system by pointing to characteristics inherent in European culture, business practices, or politics in earlier eras, which this author clearly thinks is hogwash. Along with the way that such narratives ignore the utter centrality of slavery and settler colonialism to fuelling Europe's meteoric rise, she also points out that if you look carefully at relevant factors in the 13th and 14th centuries, there isn't really much that is present in Europe that is not also present elsewhere. Plus, a number of key elements in terms of business practices that some authors focus on as the seeds of future capitalist thriving were actually developed in the Islamic world first, and only later taken up by Italian merchants and then other Europeans. Plus, she argues that at least part of the key to later European domination was luck – when Portuguese sea power took over the world's oceans starting in the 15th and 16th centuries (which was followed by the Dutch and then the English), there was a sort of vacuum that they more or less fell into filling. That vacuum hadn't been there a hundred years earlier, and in fact it was only luck that it was there at that point, because China might well have been able to resist those early European assertions of hegemony but had, for a variety of reasons unrelated to Europe, turned inward for awhile and abandoned its earlier oceanic power before the Portuguese showed up.
Anyway, I'm reading a number of nonfiction books right now that have nothing to do with anything I'm likely to write about, and I'm taking great pleasure in it. This book may sound a bit dry, but it was fascinating and I would highly recommend it.
February 17, 2023
Kitabın adı, bir anlamda anafikri sunma potansiyeline de sahip: Avrupa hegemonyasından önce ancak daha da önemli 13. yüzyılda kurulmuş ve işleyen bir dünya sisteminde herhangi bir devletin ya da topluluğun hegemonyasından önce; birbirleriyle farklı kültürel ve sosyal kodlara sahip kişilerin/toplulukların (büyük oranda da tüccarların) egemen olmaksızın veya egemen olunmadan bir arada çalıştırdığı, Avrupa'nın da daha ziyade periferisinde kaldığı bir sistemin sınırları sunuluyor metinde. Elbette su-götürür olma şansı var; daha doğrusu Avrupa kötüdür Asya iyidir gibi bir önermenin bu türden bir dayanıklılaştırmaya ihtiyacı var mı emin değilim fakat benim dünya sistemi kuramı için sahip olduğum göreli cahillik de paydaş olabilir.
Bence ikinci bir sorun Avrupa'nın yükselişi (ya da yazarın deyişiyle doğunun düşüşü) konusunda bana kalırsa. Veba salgınının ve nüfustaki hızlı düşüşün genel olarak sistemi zayıflattığı, üretim fazlası vermek daha zor olduğu için uluslar-arası ticareti de etkilediği açık ancak salgından benzer şekillerde etkilenen Avrupa ile atıyorum Çin'in, diğerinin üstüne neden çıktığı hala belirsiz. Kaldı ki bugünün dünyasında düşünürsek veba salgını gibi ekonomik bir çöküş ve gerileyiş merkezdeki ülkeleri, sistemden ve sistemin varlığından daha fazla kazanç elde ettikleri için daha fazla etkileme potansiyeline sahip olduğu gibi aynı şekilde sistemin bütünleşikliğine uygun bir biçimde riskin ve kaybın alta doğru kaydırılması, çevreye ittirilmesi de mümkün (örneğin 2008 krizinde finans şirketleri başlangıçta yoğun bir biçimde etkilense de alınan önlemlerle zarar büyük oranda sıradan halka ve çevre ülkelerine kaldı). O halde sorun yerinde duruyor demektir. Ayrıca söz konusu Avrupa hegemonyası kitabın son kısmında laf arasında söylendiği gibi yeni dünyanın yağmalanması ve ticaretin atlantik'e doğru kaydırılması ile açıklanabilirse yukarıda hikayenin herhangi bir gereği yok demektir.
Elbette kitaba yönelik eleştiriler arttırılabilir, örneğin 13. Yüzyılda Flandre'de yün işçilerinin örgütlenip eylem yaptığı veya benzer tarihlerde Çin'de metalürji için kullanılan kömür miktarının sanayi devrimi sonrasında İngiltere'de kullanılanın %70'ine karşılık gelmesi benim açımdan kabul edilmesi güç iddialar. Tüm bunlara rağmen bir girişim olarak kitabı epey takdir ettim zira hem hoş bir üslubu var yazarın hem de anlatılan hikayenin bir kısmı bizim hikayemizdir.
Bence ikinci bir sorun Avrupa'nın yükselişi (ya da yazarın deyişiyle doğunun düşüşü) konusunda bana kalırsa. Veba salgınının ve nüfustaki hızlı düşüşün genel olarak sistemi zayıflattığı, üretim fazlası vermek daha zor olduğu için uluslar-arası ticareti de etkilediği açık ancak salgından benzer şekillerde etkilenen Avrupa ile atıyorum Çin'in, diğerinin üstüne neden çıktığı hala belirsiz. Kaldı ki bugünün dünyasında düşünürsek veba salgını gibi ekonomik bir çöküş ve gerileyiş merkezdeki ülkeleri, sistemden ve sistemin varlığından daha fazla kazanç elde ettikleri için daha fazla etkileme potansiyeline sahip olduğu gibi aynı şekilde sistemin bütünleşikliğine uygun bir biçimde riskin ve kaybın alta doğru kaydırılması, çevreye ittirilmesi de mümkün (örneğin 2008 krizinde finans şirketleri başlangıçta yoğun bir biçimde etkilense de alınan önlemlerle zarar büyük oranda sıradan halka ve çevre ülkelerine kaldı). O halde sorun yerinde duruyor demektir. Ayrıca söz konusu Avrupa hegemonyası kitabın son kısmında laf arasında söylendiği gibi yeni dünyanın yağmalanması ve ticaretin atlantik'e doğru kaydırılması ile açıklanabilirse yukarıda hikayenin herhangi bir gereği yok demektir.
Elbette kitaba yönelik eleştiriler arttırılabilir, örneğin 13. Yüzyılda Flandre'de yün işçilerinin örgütlenip eylem yaptığı veya benzer tarihlerde Çin'de metalürji için kullanılan kömür miktarının sanayi devrimi sonrasında İngiltere'de kullanılanın %70'ine karşılık gelmesi benim açımdan kabul edilmesi güç iddialar. Tüm bunlara rağmen bir girişim olarak kitabı epey takdir ettim zira hem hoş bir üslubu var yazarın hem de anlatılan hikayenin bir kısmı bizim hikayemizdir.
July 15, 2024
5 ★
I myself read Before European Hegemony this time around because I had read part II during my undergraduate studies and wanted to read the whole thing to remind myself of how iconic Janet Abu-Lughod is. 10/10, no regrets.
Absolutely no one needs me to review this book, it's a vital piece of scholarship that you're indebted to either because you've read some or all of it, heard it referenced in more recent literature (it is from 1989), or you learned about Abu-Lughod's world system analysis without knowing about it.
I myself read Before European Hegemony this time around because I had read part II during my undergraduate studies and wanted to read the whole thing to remind myself of how iconic Janet Abu-Lughod is. 10/10, no regrets.
Absolutely no one needs me to review this book, it's a vital piece of scholarship that you're indebted to either because you've read some or all of it, heard it referenced in more recent literature (it is from 1989), or you learned about Abu-Lughod's world system analysis without knowing about it.
April 23, 2025
Abu Lughod does not present “new” facts about the civilizations that she tackles — most of the info she relates to us, we know by now. It is through her thesis of an interconnected world-system bounded by an equilibrium through which no single hegemon ruled the system throughout the 13-14th centuries that her brilliance shines through. The rise of Europe, according to Abu Lughod, was not due to intrinsic factors relating to its culture or socioeconomic formation but rather to mere chance relating to the decline and subsequent collapse of the world-system due to the myriad of factors she cites. Foundational read.
February 10, 2021
I read the first few chapters of this quite substantial volume, and the author's descriptions and how she brings the world system to life during this period — as a far more interconnected place than one might assume — were fascinating!
Read
November 15, 2024I read this for my Early Islamic World class and I’d be damned if I didn’t count it towards my Goodreads goal considering how much time I spent reading this and taking 22 pages of notes.
September 5, 2021
Liked the lens of a dense economic network. Loved the irreverent footnotes. I’m still learning and don’t feel confident putting this book in its academic context.
March 4, 2013
Abu-Lughod's argument here so logical and readable - she tells the reader exactly what she is going to prove and how she is going to prove it, and then she builds her case piece by piece until it all seems inarguable. One wonders if perhaps the fact that she was moving into the realm of history from a social science background might have been beneficial. Her willingness to lay out her case plainly is refreshing.
There was, she argues, a world system of trade that predated by several centuries the modern world system of Immanuel Wallerstein’s world systems theory. That latter system, according to Wallerstein, began in the sixteenth century with the entry of the Portuguese and other western European powers into the Indian Ocean trading networks. For the duration of the system, from its advent five hundred years ago to its decline today, the hegemonic power driving it has been the West. Abu-Lughod argues that from the mid-thirteenth to the mid-fourteenth centuries, there was another world system – this one with no hegemonic power. Every part of the “Old World,” from Western Europe to far eastern China and including large chunks of Africa, was linked through trade during this century. Every part benefited from the system, both economically and culturally. Though no part was hegemonic, all were necessary: “the participation of all was required for its perpetuation.” Throughout this book, Abu-Lughod is pushing back against the idea is that there was something about the West that made it unique, and allowed it to seize power. If one state or group of states becomes a core and other states form a periphery, then logically one could conclude that there was something particular about the first group that allowed it to seize the core position. Actually, Abu-Lughod argues, this is not necessarily true. By looking at systems on both the micro and macro level, she illustrates how “external geopolitical factors” tend to play much larger roles in the dynamics of core and periphery than the unique qualities of individual places.
This is a much easier book to read than the other "big picture" books I've been perusing lately. Everything is just so organized. Abu-Lughod even provides handy little paragraphs at the end of every chapter to sum up and explain why the evidence she just provided is important. I probably should have bought this rather than getting it from the library...I think I'm going to want to look at it again in the future.
There was, she argues, a world system of trade that predated by several centuries the modern world system of Immanuel Wallerstein’s world systems theory. That latter system, according to Wallerstein, began in the sixteenth century with the entry of the Portuguese and other western European powers into the Indian Ocean trading networks. For the duration of the system, from its advent five hundred years ago to its decline today, the hegemonic power driving it has been the West. Abu-Lughod argues that from the mid-thirteenth to the mid-fourteenth centuries, there was another world system – this one with no hegemonic power. Every part of the “Old World,” from Western Europe to far eastern China and including large chunks of Africa, was linked through trade during this century. Every part benefited from the system, both economically and culturally. Though no part was hegemonic, all were necessary: “the participation of all was required for its perpetuation.” Throughout this book, Abu-Lughod is pushing back against the idea is that there was something about the West that made it unique, and allowed it to seize power. If one state or group of states becomes a core and other states form a periphery, then logically one could conclude that there was something particular about the first group that allowed it to seize the core position. Actually, Abu-Lughod argues, this is not necessarily true. By looking at systems on both the micro and macro level, she illustrates how “external geopolitical factors” tend to play much larger roles in the dynamics of core and periphery than the unique qualities of individual places.
This is a much easier book to read than the other "big picture" books I've been perusing lately. Everything is just so organized. Abu-Lughod even provides handy little paragraphs at the end of every chapter to sum up and explain why the evidence she just provided is important. I probably should have bought this rather than getting it from the library...I think I'm going to want to look at it again in the future.
June 7, 2014
Abu-Lughod’s “Before European Hegemony” argues for the existence of non-Eurocentric thirteenth century world-system. It preceded sixteenth century Eurocentric world system as outlined by Wallerstein. Abu-Lughod argues that in the mid-thirteenth century, “many parts of the Old World begun to become integrated into system of exchange from which all apparently benefited.” Unlike in the later 16th century world-system, in this earlier world-system “cores, semi-pheries, and peripheries (and undoubtedly some intermediate categories as well) were found at a number of places around the globe.” In short, it was not hegemonic. In fact, she also argues that European centres were lagging significantly behind in this world-system, but she does not really explain the parameters for her comparison.
On the one hand, Abu-Lughod’s thesis seems interesting and plausible. On the other hand, however, the problem is her thesis is not backed by empirical evidence. Although the main axis of her thesis is on the economical history of fourteenth century, she rather chooses easy way out and bases her narrative on the political history of various trading partners of the fourteenth century world.As a result, she does not provide any original analysis of the international trade in fourteen century and does not make convincing argument for the scale of interaction within fourteenth-century world-system.
In short, her book provides interesting thesis and inspires reader to read more about the fourteenth century economic history. But it lacks effective argumentation and deep economical analysis.
On the one hand, Abu-Lughod’s thesis seems interesting and plausible. On the other hand, however, the problem is her thesis is not backed by empirical evidence. Although the main axis of her thesis is on the economical history of fourteenth century, she rather chooses easy way out and bases her narrative on the political history of various trading partners of the fourteenth century world.As a result, she does not provide any original analysis of the international trade in fourteen century and does not make convincing argument for the scale of interaction within fourteenth-century world-system.
In short, her book provides interesting thesis and inspires reader to read more about the fourteenth century economic history. But it lacks effective argumentation and deep economical analysis.
July 30, 2024
This asks what preceded the rise to European dominance. Immanuel Wallerstein's World Systems theory begins with the 16th century, with key moments being the dramatic Portuguese naval dominance over the Indian Ocean and the brutal Spanish colonisation of the Americas. Abu-Lughod's history argues that a different world system existed in the 13th century. This trading network integrated Europe (particularly Venice, Genoa and Flanders), Central Asia, the Middle East, India and China in a world-system without a single hegemon, despite the evident power of the huge Mongol empire. It was a world-system that differed in substantial ways from the 16th century: it wasn't global (the Americas and Australia were not part of it although it was larger than anything prior), and it was composed of several cores, not divided into a core, semi-periphery and periphery. Abu-Lughod charts the emergence of this system and investigates the probable causes of its relative decline. The immense shocks of the Black Death, the fall of the Mongol Empire, the ravages of Tamerlane's Golden Horde and the withdraw into isolation of the Ming empire are all important. But her research complicates a simple story of the rise of the West and the fall of the East. Europe's rise to a newly hegemonic position in the 16th century was far from inevitable. Overall this is a detailed and fascinating portrait of a surprisingly sophisticated and advanced medieval world in which Europe was a fairly isolated, underdeveloped player.
September 29, 2021
Before European Hegemony examines why Europe came to dominate the world in the 16th century and argues that to understand why it happened one has to go back to the 13th and early 14th century when Europe was a relative backwater among the regions of the Middle East, India, Southeast Asia and China.
European hegemony established in the 16th century cannot be explained by advanced European technology, social organization or business practices because much of this already existed in the 13th century and the Middle East and China far surpassed Europe in this regard. Indeed, many features of capitalism were already in place in banking and trade at this time and Muslims were often far more advanced than Europe in these practices.
The book argues that the fighting among Genghis Kahn’s successors disrupting land trade routes between Europe and China and the bubonic plague pandemic of the mid-14th century (i.e. Black Death) disrupting port cities and sea trade routes facilitated radical transformations of the economy and resulted in the dominance of Portuguese sailing ships.
Northwest Europe fell into the “Dark Ages” after the fall of Rome, but the Mediterranean region, especially Italy, maintained its trade relations with the near East, which itself was connected to the far East. Eventually, trade between Italy and Flanders resulted in trade fairs in towns in France halfway between the two regions, which stimulated economic growth in Northwest Europe, especially in the production of textiles. But these fairs eventually declined as Italians built ships that could reach Flanders via the Atlantic, political interference made travel to the fairs less safe, and the Black Death reduced the number of Italian merchants. As sea trade increased between Flanders and the Italians who served as intermediaries to the East, cities in Flanders became financial centers in addition to textile manufacturing and they learned sophisticated financial accounting from the Italians.
Venice and Genoa competed for commerce via the sea and it was the Crusades that super charged their sea trade with the East. This led them to develop better ships and sailing skills that allowed them to sail the Atlantic to Flanders and which the Portuguese later adopted for their explorations. Venice eventually won the competition against Genoa for a time, but both were devastated by the Black Death and Genoa eventually came out on top in the 16th century due to its closer proximity to the Atlantic.
There were three routes between Europe and China. A north overland route via the Caspian Sea and north central Asia, a middle route via Bagdad, the port of Basra and the Persian Gulf and a southern route via Egypt and the Red Sea.
Genghis Kahn’s conquest and uniting of central Asia made the northern overland trade between China and Europe easier (this is when Marco Polo traveled to China) and trade flourished, but then civil war in the Mongol empire in the middle of the 14th century and the Black Death disrupted this trade, forcing trade routes south to the sea.
The central trade route declined as an option for Europeans when Mongols move the regional capital from Bagdad to Tabriz, shifting the Persian Gulf port from Basra to Hormuz, and also when the Mongols converted to Islam, which presented a problem for Christians who had orders from the Pope not to cooperate with Muslims. Also, when the Crusaders were forced out of the Syrian coast, they had few trade access options except via Egypt and the Red Sea (despite Egypt being Muslim). Venice gained access to Egypt by providing the ruling Mamluks with slaves from Russia to serve in the Mamluk slave army.
There was robust sea trade between the Middle East and India, between India and Southeast Asia and between Southeast Asia and China, with Arab traders also going as far as China and vice versa. In fact, Arabs had gone around the Cape of Good Hope (southern tip of Africa) hundreds of years before the Portuguese.
The Arabs and Chinese dominated the sea trade routes at this time. India was so rich in resources that it didn’t need foreign trade as much and so wasn’t a sea power. Southeast Asia along the Strait of Malacca was dependent on the trade between China and India/Middle East and was more prosperous when China refused to let foreigners sail all the way to her ports. Instead, China met traders at ports in the Strait. China was the most sophisticated society on earth in the medieval period and began to venture into the sea trade and could have easily become a hegemonic power, easily defeating the Portuguese at sea had they been there in the 16th century, but China suddenly withdrew from the sea. When China withdrew from the sea in the 15th century, it left a power vacuum that the Portuguese unknowingly filled.
The Black Death probably originated in China and resulted in famine that further undermined Mongol (Yuan) rule and led to rebellion that brought the Ming dynasty to power. The Ming withdrew from the sea trade because economic collapse made it too expensive. The economic collapse was the result of the toll the pandemic took on the world economy and because Tamerlane in Central Asia blocked overland trade with China now that the Yuan were no longer in power.
In the 16th century, the Portuguese sailed around the Cape of Good Hope and took over and restructured a trade network that had already developed by the 13th century, but was in decline with China no longer on the scene. The Portuguese transformed the trade network from one of mutually beneficial trade relationships to one of conquered domination.
A historical myth we tell ourselves is that Europe came to dominate the world due to its superior culture and society, but this book highlights that the origins of European hegemony stem from historical flukes, not cultural superiority. Had the break-up of the Mongol empire and the Black Death not disrupted the growing trade relationships of the 13th and 14th centuries and had China not withdrawn from the sea in the 15th century, we may well instead have seen either a world of mutually beneficial trade relationships with multiple centers of power or possibly a Chinese world hegemonic power. A very educational book.
European hegemony established in the 16th century cannot be explained by advanced European technology, social organization or business practices because much of this already existed in the 13th century and the Middle East and China far surpassed Europe in this regard. Indeed, many features of capitalism were already in place in banking and trade at this time and Muslims were often far more advanced than Europe in these practices.
The book argues that the fighting among Genghis Kahn’s successors disrupting land trade routes between Europe and China and the bubonic plague pandemic of the mid-14th century (i.e. Black Death) disrupting port cities and sea trade routes facilitated radical transformations of the economy and resulted in the dominance of Portuguese sailing ships.
Northwest Europe fell into the “Dark Ages” after the fall of Rome, but the Mediterranean region, especially Italy, maintained its trade relations with the near East, which itself was connected to the far East. Eventually, trade between Italy and Flanders resulted in trade fairs in towns in France halfway between the two regions, which stimulated economic growth in Northwest Europe, especially in the production of textiles. But these fairs eventually declined as Italians built ships that could reach Flanders via the Atlantic, political interference made travel to the fairs less safe, and the Black Death reduced the number of Italian merchants. As sea trade increased between Flanders and the Italians who served as intermediaries to the East, cities in Flanders became financial centers in addition to textile manufacturing and they learned sophisticated financial accounting from the Italians.
Venice and Genoa competed for commerce via the sea and it was the Crusades that super charged their sea trade with the East. This led them to develop better ships and sailing skills that allowed them to sail the Atlantic to Flanders and which the Portuguese later adopted for their explorations. Venice eventually won the competition against Genoa for a time, but both were devastated by the Black Death and Genoa eventually came out on top in the 16th century due to its closer proximity to the Atlantic.
There were three routes between Europe and China. A north overland route via the Caspian Sea and north central Asia, a middle route via Bagdad, the port of Basra and the Persian Gulf and a southern route via Egypt and the Red Sea.
Genghis Kahn’s conquest and uniting of central Asia made the northern overland trade between China and Europe easier (this is when Marco Polo traveled to China) and trade flourished, but then civil war in the Mongol empire in the middle of the 14th century and the Black Death disrupted this trade, forcing trade routes south to the sea.
The central trade route declined as an option for Europeans when Mongols move the regional capital from Bagdad to Tabriz, shifting the Persian Gulf port from Basra to Hormuz, and also when the Mongols converted to Islam, which presented a problem for Christians who had orders from the Pope not to cooperate with Muslims. Also, when the Crusaders were forced out of the Syrian coast, they had few trade access options except via Egypt and the Red Sea (despite Egypt being Muslim). Venice gained access to Egypt by providing the ruling Mamluks with slaves from Russia to serve in the Mamluk slave army.
There was robust sea trade between the Middle East and India, between India and Southeast Asia and between Southeast Asia and China, with Arab traders also going as far as China and vice versa. In fact, Arabs had gone around the Cape of Good Hope (southern tip of Africa) hundreds of years before the Portuguese.
The Arabs and Chinese dominated the sea trade routes at this time. India was so rich in resources that it didn’t need foreign trade as much and so wasn’t a sea power. Southeast Asia along the Strait of Malacca was dependent on the trade between China and India/Middle East and was more prosperous when China refused to let foreigners sail all the way to her ports. Instead, China met traders at ports in the Strait. China was the most sophisticated society on earth in the medieval period and began to venture into the sea trade and could have easily become a hegemonic power, easily defeating the Portuguese at sea had they been there in the 16th century, but China suddenly withdrew from the sea. When China withdrew from the sea in the 15th century, it left a power vacuum that the Portuguese unknowingly filled.
The Black Death probably originated in China and resulted in famine that further undermined Mongol (Yuan) rule and led to rebellion that brought the Ming dynasty to power. The Ming withdrew from the sea trade because economic collapse made it too expensive. The economic collapse was the result of the toll the pandemic took on the world economy and because Tamerlane in Central Asia blocked overland trade with China now that the Yuan were no longer in power.
In the 16th century, the Portuguese sailed around the Cape of Good Hope and took over and restructured a trade network that had already developed by the 13th century, but was in decline with China no longer on the scene. The Portuguese transformed the trade network from one of mutually beneficial trade relationships to one of conquered domination.
A historical myth we tell ourselves is that Europe came to dominate the world due to its superior culture and society, but this book highlights that the origins of European hegemony stem from historical flukes, not cultural superiority. Had the break-up of the Mongol empire and the Black Death not disrupted the growing trade relationships of the 13th and 14th centuries and had China not withdrawn from the sea in the 15th century, we may well instead have seen either a world of mutually beneficial trade relationships with multiple centers of power or possibly a Chinese world hegemonic power. A very educational book.
October 6, 2022
In her book Before European Hegemony, Abu-Lughod presents a convincing argument around how world-systems change over time and may very well continue to evolve. I found the author’s argument powerful as she takes a multi-disciplinary approach, includes various perspectives, and spans across a wide range of geography—the Middle East, Asia and Europe. Ranging from culturally diverse regions like Egypt to China’s eastern seaboard, formed this old-world system. Primarily, I found that the similarities and differences of the early medieval world-system and the new modern system both drew from each other and are worth exploring across various facets. This paper will analyze these similarities and differences, as well as the characterizations of equality vs. hierarchy in these respective systems and why change in such systems occur.
One can learn a lot by examining the similarities of the old and new systems—some elements of the old system crossed over into the new. The old system, while previously existing from the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, was never documented. Abu-Lughod was the first to develop this influential research derived from empirical evidence. To create this world-system Abu-Lughod drew from the framework of the new world-system. Both systems value interconnectedness and prosperity. As well the fact that international trade, economic and political principles influenced social, cultural and religious thoughts of the respective time periods. We have seen this phenomenon with Bentley’s work and earlier books read thus far.
However, while the modern world-system was characterized by hierarchy, the medieval system was characterized by equality. I find this approach to the old system as very interesting in that egalitarian principles were implemented during this early time period, across a wide range of geographies—including the Middle East. Both hierarchy and egalitarian remain to be influential in understanding political and social aspects of society. Therefore, Abu-Lughod’s approach spread across a wider range of geographies, as compared to the modern one, and spoke to the interconnectedness and influence between geographical regions and entities. One could argue that even before Abu-Lughod’s book, the same egalitarianism principles were prevalent in earlier centuries, as seen in Betley’s work, where power disparity was relatively low. One example of this is seen in Bentley’s book around how cross-cultural encounters influenced the experiences of all peoples and influenced economic and cultural principles.
The new modern world system, which arose in the sixteenth century, derived its core from capitalism and hierarchy, a system in which socially produced inequalities are produced from institutional systems. The modern system is constantly evolving and is a capitalist system, as seen throughout history and leading to today. It is characterized by technology, labor, political, economical and cultural factors. This new system is also responsible for colonization throughout the sixteenth century. All parts of the system interact with each other, so a change in the modern system impacts the entirety of that system. I would argue that this is seen much less in the medieval world system, especially the use of force.
Abu-Lughod sheds light on a rich time period in which the world thrived, interconnectedness was present across a wide range of geographies, therefore allowing knowledge and ideas to disseminate across a wide range of cultures via the Silk Road and other trade routes. We do not see the extent of this influence in the new system because it was more focused on Europe and heirarchy vs. the vast spread of ideas to other cultures. More importantly, she focuses on geopolitical change in Central Asia—Mongols—and China’s fluctuations in interest in trade, Ming disinterest in international commerce. Europe was not special—in fact, on a technological and economic level, European powers were behind the rest of the world at the time. Concentric rings of influence and events affected neighboring areas throughout the regions describing what this meant for the coasts of India, Islamic powers, and, China and southeast Asia.
In regard to how systems change and evolution this is be due to two reasons: the Black Plague caused the old system to collapse and the new modern system arose from a completely different system that was far more Euro-centric than the prior. The new world-system was characterized by higher production, as well as capitalism. Europe came out on top because they came in guns blazing, in an area where most people didn't behave that way. Europe most certainly took advantage of the Plague to conquer these territories leading to the collapse of the old system and rise of the new.
In conclusion, by analyzing the overlap and contrast of both the old and new systems, I found the main arguments in the book to be seminal and credible, including well documented research leading to Abu-Lughod’s book. I also argue that due to her multi-disciplinary approach, Abu-Lughod’s approach to examining these systems is more holistic than Bentley’s or other authors we have read. Abu-Lughod successfully demonstrates her arguments on why egalitarian works and takes critical look at world economic history in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when an entire world-system formalized, flourished and ultimately collapsed due to the Plague and other disturbances. Before European Hegemony is an important and influential book that influences the way we see the past systems and what has evolved into present day.
One can learn a lot by examining the similarities of the old and new systems—some elements of the old system crossed over into the new. The old system, while previously existing from the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, was never documented. Abu-Lughod was the first to develop this influential research derived from empirical evidence. To create this world-system Abu-Lughod drew from the framework of the new world-system. Both systems value interconnectedness and prosperity. As well the fact that international trade, economic and political principles influenced social, cultural and religious thoughts of the respective time periods. We have seen this phenomenon with Bentley’s work and earlier books read thus far.
However, while the modern world-system was characterized by hierarchy, the medieval system was characterized by equality. I find this approach to the old system as very interesting in that egalitarian principles were implemented during this early time period, across a wide range of geographies—including the Middle East. Both hierarchy and egalitarian remain to be influential in understanding political and social aspects of society. Therefore, Abu-Lughod’s approach spread across a wider range of geographies, as compared to the modern one, and spoke to the interconnectedness and influence between geographical regions and entities. One could argue that even before Abu-Lughod’s book, the same egalitarianism principles were prevalent in earlier centuries, as seen in Betley’s work, where power disparity was relatively low. One example of this is seen in Bentley’s book around how cross-cultural encounters influenced the experiences of all peoples and influenced economic and cultural principles.
The new modern world system, which arose in the sixteenth century, derived its core from capitalism and hierarchy, a system in which socially produced inequalities are produced from institutional systems. The modern system is constantly evolving and is a capitalist system, as seen throughout history and leading to today. It is characterized by technology, labor, political, economical and cultural factors. This new system is also responsible for colonization throughout the sixteenth century. All parts of the system interact with each other, so a change in the modern system impacts the entirety of that system. I would argue that this is seen much less in the medieval world system, especially the use of force.
Abu-Lughod sheds light on a rich time period in which the world thrived, interconnectedness was present across a wide range of geographies, therefore allowing knowledge and ideas to disseminate across a wide range of cultures via the Silk Road and other trade routes. We do not see the extent of this influence in the new system because it was more focused on Europe and heirarchy vs. the vast spread of ideas to other cultures. More importantly, she focuses on geopolitical change in Central Asia—Mongols—and China’s fluctuations in interest in trade, Ming disinterest in international commerce. Europe was not special—in fact, on a technological and economic level, European powers were behind the rest of the world at the time. Concentric rings of influence and events affected neighboring areas throughout the regions describing what this meant for the coasts of India, Islamic powers, and, China and southeast Asia.
In regard to how systems change and evolution this is be due to two reasons: the Black Plague caused the old system to collapse and the new modern system arose from a completely different system that was far more Euro-centric than the prior. The new world-system was characterized by higher production, as well as capitalism. Europe came out on top because they came in guns blazing, in an area where most people didn't behave that way. Europe most certainly took advantage of the Plague to conquer these territories leading to the collapse of the old system and rise of the new.
In conclusion, by analyzing the overlap and contrast of both the old and new systems, I found the main arguments in the book to be seminal and credible, including well documented research leading to Abu-Lughod’s book. I also argue that due to her multi-disciplinary approach, Abu-Lughod’s approach to examining these systems is more holistic than Bentley’s or other authors we have read. Abu-Lughod successfully demonstrates her arguments on why egalitarian works and takes critical look at world economic history in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when an entire world-system formalized, flourished and ultimately collapsed due to the Plague and other disturbances. Before European Hegemony is an important and influential book that influences the way we see the past systems and what has evolved into present day.
August 31, 2017
When did the world economy start? Most modern historians and economists usually date this to around 1500 CE, or when the Portuguese rounded the southern cape of Africa and began their trade directly with India and points further east.
Abu-Loghod dissents by thoroughly describing a series of eight interlocking economies stretching from the Mediterranean Sea across the Old World to China. Each zone had its own set of trade points, and she makes a good case that "The Rise of the West" was more of a case of the "Decline of the East".
Abu-Loghod dissents by thoroughly describing a series of eight interlocking economies stretching from the Mediterranean Sea across the Old World to China. Each zone had its own set of trade points, and she makes a good case that "The Rise of the West" was more of a case of the "Decline of the East".
September 25, 2016
A very important book. Abu-Lughod presents a world system of trade which existed a century before Braudel's famous 14th century one and, more importantly, shows how this earlier trade network had its power nexus in the East, with the Arabs, Indians and Chinese playing a huge role and Europe barely factoring in. Worth reading especially as the power nexus is once more shifting away from Europe-- in fact, we can probably say that in 2016, it has decisively shifted away from Europe.
June 18, 2013
This is a "must read" for anyone who teaches AP World History, or for anyone who is a student of history. This book takes a world systems approach to looking at why the West rose and why the East declined.
July 27, 2007
Another one that explodes Eurocentricism. A wonderful entry into an alternative global world.
February 17, 2023
This book is a treasure trove. There was nothing inevitable about a sustained and exponentially growing world system getting started in the 1700s. There were a number of false starts centuries before hand. The most impressive of these proto-world systems gathered steam in the 1200s, and it is the topic of this book. After collapses on both ends of Eurasia at the end of the classical era, a number of regions and empires began to piece things back together. In Europe this led to the age of the Gothic cathedrals, which is sometimes even described as a "twelfth century Renaissance", 2-300 years prior to the more well known version starting in Italy.
The surge in population and prosperity in Europe was mirrored, fed into and was fed by growing prosperity across a broad arc of Eurasia, all the way to China. There were two major pathways of trade, with many subsystems involved. The overland "silk road"(s) and the Indian Ocean pathway from the Red Sea through Malacca up to China that remains so important today. Abu-Lughod memorably describes this as a sort of "pandemic prosperity", and it increased wealth, urbanism, and opportunities across the known world. If you look at the first decades of the 1300s a 19th century style exponential take-off in growth and complexity seems like a plausible next step.
Alas it was not to be. This world system in embryo was bludgeoned nearly to death by the bubonic plague starting in 1347 (or earlier). The Black Death used the trade links set up over the past century and a half to empty out the burgeoning cities, and slow trade massively. Some Italian cities began church expansions in the early 1300s that they never bothered to finish, even 700 years later. What was left of this first period of globalization was crushed out of existence by the break up of Mongol trade networks in the early 1400s and a Chinese turn inward a few generations later.
What Janet L. Abu-Lughod has managed to do here, is provide as complete a map of this lost world system as was possible in 1989. No doubt some of the details need updating because of later scholarship and discoveries, but this book still stands as an extraordinary achievement. She starts of with what she expects her audience to know better. She uses her diverse background as a sociologist and and scholar of cities to lay out what we know about the economic between European cities. Even more impressively, she tells the story of how those links evolved over the course of the 1200s and 1300s.
Then she repeats this trick, moving east, region by region, prosperous city by prosperous city until she gets all the way to China. The fact that she manages to not just map all of these linkages, but also tell the story of how each regions fortunes rose and fell is extraordinary. It's a relatively short book, but there is an immense amount of information to be absorbed here. The book has tremendously expanded my knowledge of how the world works. Can't think of any higher praise than that.
The surge in population and prosperity in Europe was mirrored, fed into and was fed by growing prosperity across a broad arc of Eurasia, all the way to China. There were two major pathways of trade, with many subsystems involved. The overland "silk road"(s) and the Indian Ocean pathway from the Red Sea through Malacca up to China that remains so important today. Abu-Lughod memorably describes this as a sort of "pandemic prosperity", and it increased wealth, urbanism, and opportunities across the known world. If you look at the first decades of the 1300s a 19th century style exponential take-off in growth and complexity seems like a plausible next step.
Alas it was not to be. This world system in embryo was bludgeoned nearly to death by the bubonic plague starting in 1347 (or earlier). The Black Death used the trade links set up over the past century and a half to empty out the burgeoning cities, and slow trade massively. Some Italian cities began church expansions in the early 1300s that they never bothered to finish, even 700 years later. What was left of this first period of globalization was crushed out of existence by the break up of Mongol trade networks in the early 1400s and a Chinese turn inward a few generations later.
What Janet L. Abu-Lughod has managed to do here, is provide as complete a map of this lost world system as was possible in 1989. No doubt some of the details need updating because of later scholarship and discoveries, but this book still stands as an extraordinary achievement. She starts of with what she expects her audience to know better. She uses her diverse background as a sociologist and and scholar of cities to lay out what we know about the economic between European cities. Even more impressively, she tells the story of how those links evolved over the course of the 1200s and 1300s.
Then she repeats this trick, moving east, region by region, prosperous city by prosperous city until she gets all the way to China. The fact that she manages to not just map all of these linkages, but also tell the story of how each regions fortunes rose and fell is extraordinary. It's a relatively short book, but there is an immense amount of information to be absorbed here. The book has tremendously expanded my knowledge of how the world works. Can't think of any higher praise than that.
November 24, 2019
In this book published originally in 1989, the author argues for the existence of a thirteenth century world system of production and exchange, thanks to the development of different regions specialized in fairs/entrepôt (Champagne), (proto-, ?) industrial production (Flanders) and commercial shippers (Italian mariner states). The main focus of the book is inevitably to explain for the eventual demise of this world system since without doubt, the modern world system, arguably a product of the “rise of the West” since the 16th century, is not a progenitor of this premodern system. This is a commendable task but the profusion of author’s attack on “Eurocentrism” or “western ethnocentrism” through the chapters is quite tiresome in the end. Besides, the writing cannot be said to be fluent and repetitions abound in discussion on certain events/theme across different chapters (the Vivaldi brothers, the Black Death). In the end, the chapter that I enjoy the most and learn a lot from is “The merchant mariners of Genoa and Venice”, which may evince some personal biais in my review.. Some interesting remarks here and there too and considering the year of publication, the thesis of the book, to which I in the whole subscribe, should have appeared more daring and vanguard. 3.5 stars.
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September 15, 2020A joy to read. Really enjoyed crossing the trade routs of 1250 - 1350 Eurasia and learning more about a bygone world system. Initially, I was unsure of this book because it published in 1989 and wondered if there was something newer about the topic I should be reading instead. In terms of details about specific medieval trading patterns, there was enough to keep me intrigued. But since the book is a bit older there are some themes (like dependency theory) that are not in vogue these days. Since the past thirty years, there are many aspects we may automatically assume today - like the sophistication of Asian civilizations before modernity - that were not the case when this book was published, Orientalism was much more overt. What is and was important, is that understanding a world before white hegemony will help us to begin to understand a world after white hegemony. There are plenty thought provoking ideas of nerdy comparisons to other books I could mention about this book but will spare you. I'd recommend for anyone that likes "anthro-economics".
October 21, 2021
As someone who has always felt it important to look at the "big picture" context of any particular historical era, this book likely would have ended up on my bookshelf regardless. In diving into Wallerstein's "The Modern World System", a number of colleagues said that Braudel's work was an important preface, and upon getting in to Braudel, other learned friends told me to read this book first, so I did.
Abu-Lughod's writing is clear, and her thought is organized with a clarity and evident good-humor that few historians can match. For a thorough survey of the economic world system of the Late Middle Ages, this book is without peer, and while short on specifics is an excellent entry-point for someone wishing to focus their studies (along with a very thorough bibliography. Highly recommended.
Abu-Lughod's writing is clear, and her thought is organized with a clarity and evident good-humor that few historians can match. For a thorough survey of the economic world system of the Late Middle Ages, this book is without peer, and while short on specifics is an excellent entry-point for someone wishing to focus their studies (along with a very thorough bibliography. Highly recommended.
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