Mark W. Clark was a major figure in World War II. He was prominent as one of the top American commanders. Together with Dwight D. Eisenhower, Omar N. Bradley, and George S. Patton, Jr., Clark was widely regarded as being responsible for victory on the European side of the conflict. - from the introduction One of the great World War II memoirs by a legendary American general in charge of operations in North Africa and Italy. General Mark W. Clark recounts his wartime exploits and tells the story of the battles in Tunisia and Italy with verve and attention to key detail. An unparalleled account by a great military leader.
Found the hardback edition at a local Goodwill store. Very interesting, contemporary (copyright 1950), first-hand account of the WWII effort in North Africa and Italy, plus Clark's involvement in the post-surrender activities. Includes detailed efforts regarding battle fronts, troop movements, planning efforts, and interaction with other allied commanders.
A fascinating read for anyone with an interest in WW2, especially the Italy campaign. A man caught between the higher politicing of war, and the reality on the ground he lays to bear the issues of conducting a campaign under resourced. His vanity is out in the open (his expectance of birthday wishes the prime example), love of being photo'd, and an endless list of'met him, dined with him' is played out. But his will to be victorious is constant. He tries to justify decisions he made, never admitting if he made a mistake (the Rapido crossing, Anzio breakout he goes into depth on, Cassino) but he did see the coming of the difficulties in the Eastern European countries (Yugoslavia, Czechoslavakia) and Russia's duplicity and attempt to make Austria a satellite nation. A compelling read.
For all of us students of World War II this is an essential read. The coalition of nations fighting in Italy against the Axis powers was truly remarkable. I had no idea of the Brazilian contribution before this. I thought Clark's comment after the ending of the war as he had to deal with the Soviets was staggering. "It was not surprising, perhaps, that we celebrated a victory when in reality we had not won the war." This fills in a lot of gaps I had in my understanding of the Italian campaigns especially.
Found in the Bibliography of A.K. Chesterton's New Unhappy Lords under Section C of the books "written by authors either unaware of the implications of the policy-pattern described in "The New Unhappy Lords" or aware of the implications and approving of them." https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/2...
The book lives up to the man. He doesn't take blame for any mistakes he may have made and did. Still overall not a bad book, if you get by his pontification of his career.
This is a fascinating account of the North African and Italian campaigns in World War II by one of the main players, the ultimate commander in chief of Allied forces in Italy. The opening chapters about the political situation in North Africa start slowly, but then become more exciting than a spy movie as Clark undertakes a secret mission behind enemy lines to try to shore up French support for an Allied landing. Clark was a very capable commander, well deserving of his role as Eisenhower's right hand man. However, he has been criticized by some historians for almost losing the battle of Salerno and for failing to entrap the German army after the breakout from Anzio. This book does support some criticism of Clark's actions at Salerno, because he failed to anticipate, as Patton did, where the German counterattack would fall. However, he did manage to win the battle anyway, and in the bigger picture of Clark's wartime service this flaw is overshadowed by many successes. Some historians believe that the Allies missed an opportunity to destroy the German army via an encirclement when the Allies broke out of Anzio. To my mind, this is similar to the criticism of General Meade who won the battle of Gettysburg but failed to entrap Robert E. Lee afterwards. As one commentator has suggested, no American or British general in WW II successfully encircled and destroyed a German army; therefore it seems unfair to blame Clark for failing to order a dangerous maneuver that could well have backfired. Clark is very good at giving us the grand strategy and putting the Italian campaign in context. Some historians have complained that the Italian campaign was a fiasco because a smaller army of Germans was able to hold a larger army of Allies at bay due to great defensive terrain. However, this overlooks the fact that, if the Allies had not invaded, Italy would have been able to supply Hitler with three million soldiers, not to mention supplies. Stalin himself was very happy that the Allies invaded Italy and kept up the pressure with constant attacks. As Clark himself says in the book, he would much rather be criticised for attacking than for retreating. Overall this was a very informative and enjoyable book. Besides the accounts of campaigns, battles, and many human interest stories, it had a spy versus spy type of postlude which showed Clark's efforts against the Russians' attempt to turn Austria into a Cold War satellite after the war.
Clark led the american 5th Army up the Italian peninsula and is an important actor -although often overlooked- of the american deployment on the ETO. He did suffer from the ever present "Secondary Front" syndrome because of D-Day, being stripped of important forces slated either for Overlord or Dragoon.
Highly recommended reading for anyone interested in the Italian campaign in particular, as well as immediate post-war diplomacy with the Russian, since Clark went up to be American high commissioner for Austria.