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Self-Deception by Herbert Fingarette
With a new chapterThis new edition of Herbert Fingarette's classic study in philosophical psychology now includes a provocative recent essay on the topic by the author. A seminal work, the book has deeply influenced the fields of philosophy, ethics, psychology, and cognitive science, and it remains an important focal point for the large body of literature on self-deception that has appeared since its publication.How can one deceive oneself if the very idea of deception implies that the deceiver knows the truth? The resolution of this paradox leads Fingarette to fundamental insights into the mind at work. He questions our basic ideas of self and the unconscious, personal responsibility and our ethical categories of guilt and innocence. Fingarette applies these ideas to the philosophies of Sartre and Kierkegaard, as well as to Freud's psychoanalytic theories and to contemporary research into neurosurgery. Included in this new edition, Fingarette's most recent essay, "Self-Deception Needs No Explaining (1998)," challenges the ideas in the extant literature.
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First published January 1, 1969
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About the author
Herbert Fingarette
13 books21 followersHerbert Fingarette was an American philosopher and emeritus professor of philosophy at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He received his PhD at the University of California, Los Angeles under the direction of Donald Piatt.
Fingarette's work deals with issues in philosophy of mind, psychology, ethics, law, and Chinese philosophy.
Fingarette's work deals with issues in philosophy of mind, psychology, ethics, law, and Chinese philosophy.
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
November 2, 2016
In short: Read Appendix B, but not the rest of the book (unless you really want to).
A couple of psychology graduates I know have taken a Self-Deception course in university, with this book being used as the "textbook" (though it's written more like a long essay rather than a textbook).
Self-deception is typically thought of as paradoxical. The problem can be stated in the question: How can someone who believes something to be true deceive himself into believing otherwise? In other words, how can you believe and not believe the same thing at the same time? Fingarette reveals why it's not actually a paradox, using a few very useful and easy-to-understand metaphors. Self-deception is actually based on ordinary and normal mental processes. It's expected. It's not actually a paradox.
Appendix B explains everything concisely in 16 pages. This is at the end of the book. Had I known, I would have just read it instead of the whole book. I recommend borrowing this book from the library and reading Appendix B. This is all it takes to come to the clearer understanding of self-deception that the whole book offers. Check it out. It's well worth the read. Had the book not contained Appendix B, I would have given it one less star.
(For students or anyone who has subscriptions to online academic journals: Appendix B was originally published as "Self-Deception Needs No Explaining" in The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 192, July 1998.)
So I would recommend reading Appendix B. It's 16 pages of great insight. A summary of the history of thought about self-deception and a more detailed essay on Fingarette's thesis can be found in the rest of the book, though it's not necessary to read.
The book does what it promises to do. It paints self-deception in a clear, understandable light. What it doesn't do is provide elaborate examples or case studies, nor does it provide explicit diagnostics or treatments. If it did, I would have given it five stars. But it's probably one of the best places to start for anyone who is interested in self-deception and wants to study it further. It's definitely worth picking up just for Appendix B alone.
A couple of psychology graduates I know have taken a Self-Deception course in university, with this book being used as the "textbook" (though it's written more like a long essay rather than a textbook).
Self-deception is typically thought of as paradoxical. The problem can be stated in the question: How can someone who believes something to be true deceive himself into believing otherwise? In other words, how can you believe and not believe the same thing at the same time? Fingarette reveals why it's not actually a paradox, using a few very useful and easy-to-understand metaphors. Self-deception is actually based on ordinary and normal mental processes. It's expected. It's not actually a paradox.
Appendix B explains everything concisely in 16 pages. This is at the end of the book. Had I known, I would have just read it instead of the whole book. I recommend borrowing this book from the library and reading Appendix B. This is all it takes to come to the clearer understanding of self-deception that the whole book offers. Check it out. It's well worth the read. Had the book not contained Appendix B, I would have given it one less star.
(For students or anyone who has subscriptions to online academic journals: Appendix B was originally published as "Self-Deception Needs No Explaining" in The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 192, July 1998.)
So I would recommend reading Appendix B. It's 16 pages of great insight. A summary of the history of thought about self-deception and a more detailed essay on Fingarette's thesis can be found in the rest of the book, though it's not necessary to read.
The book does what it promises to do. It paints self-deception in a clear, understandable light. What it doesn't do is provide elaborate examples or case studies, nor does it provide explicit diagnostics or treatments. If it did, I would have given it five stars. But it's probably one of the best places to start for anyone who is interested in self-deception and wants to study it further. It's definitely worth picking up just for Appendix B alone.
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December 17, 2011"If we turn first to the context in which a person puts himself in self-deception, we can say, generally, that such a person has three options. We suppose, of course, that the individual is in a situation in which he is strongly inclined to a form of engagement which is radically inconsistent with the person's governing principles (the person's avowed aims, ideal, values, cultivated tastes, moral principles). One option ... is for the individual to forego the engagement, or to abandon it.... Normally, this is the chosen option of the adult person. To say that a person has put himself in self-deception, however, is to say that the person could not bring about a total abandonment of the engagement.
"A second option is to pursue the engagement, the person avowing it as HIS. To do this would be for the person to face a spiritual crisis... the betraying of the self....
"If there is a stalemate between inclinations which the individual will not give up, and the refusal by the person to avow these inclinations as his, there then remains one last option: the individual does engage himself in the way to which he is inclined, but the person refuses to acknowledge the engagement as his. This is man neither saved nor damned, in limbo, and at war with himself. It is from this perspective, so insistently favoured by Sartre and other Existentialists that we see how someone, by reason of lack of spiritual courage, attempts to save his integrity at a price which amounts to surrendering, however indirectly, the very integrity he cherishes."
Kindle location 1376-96
"When the Freudian emphasizes the compulsiveness of the unconscious, he is calling attention to the fact that it is indeed the individual who is acting, even though there is loss of direct control by the person; when the Freudian emphasizes the inner conflict between the 'forces' within different 'systems' [ego, id, super-ego], he is pointing to the fact that the force of will is a critical factor, for the dilemma cannot be defined within, and therefore cannot be resolved within a rational framework governing both 'systems'. The 'existentially' oriented psychotherapist raises similar issues with a different emphasis: he says that the world of the patient is through and through intelligible as the world of a human being, i.e., that it is a world of engagement, not the physicist's or the disinterested observer's world; and he says, further, that it is not by reference to established universal values but by a 'free', 'arbitrary', 'absurd' choice that the world of the patient will be of one kind or another. And, because the existentially oriented therapist adopts the emphasis he does, he prefers not to speak of a 'patient' at all.
"....The futility of preaching to the neurotic has long been remarked by the psychiatrically oriented. Direct appeals to integrity and moral concern, by evoking the motives of self-deception, strengthen the inclination to it and are self-defeating.
"What the self-deceiver specifically lacks is not concern or integrity but some combination of courage and a way of seeing how to approach his dilemma without probable disaster to himself.... He needs someone who can help him, tactfully but persistently, through a detailed consideration of the texture of life.... [F]or the self-deceiver must be helped to go to the limits of his courage, but not provoked beyond the breaking point. This help is precisely what the ideal psychotherapist would offer. Of course there are no ideal therapists."
Kindle location 1424-39
"A second option is to pursue the engagement, the person avowing it as HIS. To do this would be for the person to face a spiritual crisis... the betraying of the self....
"If there is a stalemate between inclinations which the individual will not give up, and the refusal by the person to avow these inclinations as his, there then remains one last option: the individual does engage himself in the way to which he is inclined, but the person refuses to acknowledge the engagement as his. This is man neither saved nor damned, in limbo, and at war with himself. It is from this perspective, so insistently favoured by Sartre and other Existentialists that we see how someone, by reason of lack of spiritual courage, attempts to save his integrity at a price which amounts to surrendering, however indirectly, the very integrity he cherishes."
Kindle location 1376-96
"When the Freudian emphasizes the compulsiveness of the unconscious, he is calling attention to the fact that it is indeed the individual who is acting, even though there is loss of direct control by the person; when the Freudian emphasizes the inner conflict between the 'forces' within different 'systems' [ego, id, super-ego], he is pointing to the fact that the force of will is a critical factor, for the dilemma cannot be defined within, and therefore cannot be resolved within a rational framework governing both 'systems'. The 'existentially' oriented psychotherapist raises similar issues with a different emphasis: he says that the world of the patient is through and through intelligible as the world of a human being, i.e., that it is a world of engagement, not the physicist's or the disinterested observer's world; and he says, further, that it is not by reference to established universal values but by a 'free', 'arbitrary', 'absurd' choice that the world of the patient will be of one kind or another. And, because the existentially oriented therapist adopts the emphasis he does, he prefers not to speak of a 'patient' at all.
"....The futility of preaching to the neurotic has long been remarked by the psychiatrically oriented. Direct appeals to integrity and moral concern, by evoking the motives of self-deception, strengthen the inclination to it and are self-defeating.
"What the self-deceiver specifically lacks is not concern or integrity but some combination of courage and a way of seeing how to approach his dilemma without probable disaster to himself.... He needs someone who can help him, tactfully but persistently, through a detailed consideration of the texture of life.... [F]or the self-deceiver must be helped to go to the limits of his courage, but not provoked beyond the breaking point. This help is precisely what the ideal psychotherapist would offer. Of course there are no ideal therapists."
Kindle location 1424-39
April 13, 2015
In this excellent book, Herbert Fingarette takes an eye-opening philosophical-psychological approach to a phenomenon that seems paradoxical and, therefore, difficult to understand. How can someone effectively lie to himself as well as to others (and is it still a lie)? How can someone know something and yet not know it, or believe something that he knows is not true?
When we engage with the world, Fingarette says, we only "spell out" to ourselves what we are doing when we have a special reason to. When there is a reason not to spell out to ourselves what we are doing, that is, when it is in our interest to avoid being explicitly conscious of what we are doing (e.g., when engaging in misconduct), we often avoid spelling out. For example, someone may make an ad hominem remark (that is, a criticism of a person rather than of what the person is saying) without consciously realizing that she is doing anything other than making a legitimate criticism.
Self-deception occurs when someone persistently avoids spelling out a particular kind of activity. It is, effectively, a "policy commitment," something generally avoided and, therefore, automatically not recognized each time it occurs.
According to Fingarette, self-deception "turns upon the personal identity one accepts rather than the beliefs one has." People tend to see themselves as good, likeable people. They may see themselves as clever, but not as dishonest or otherwise unethical. This makes it hard for them to "avow" their misconduct, that is, to identify themselves as someone who does such things.
Fingarette also looks at approaches to self-deception taken by other psychologists, as well as Sartre, Kierkegaard, and Freud.
When we engage with the world, Fingarette says, we only "spell out" to ourselves what we are doing when we have a special reason to. When there is a reason not to spell out to ourselves what we are doing, that is, when it is in our interest to avoid being explicitly conscious of what we are doing (e.g., when engaging in misconduct), we often avoid spelling out. For example, someone may make an ad hominem remark (that is, a criticism of a person rather than of what the person is saying) without consciously realizing that she is doing anything other than making a legitimate criticism.
Self-deception occurs when someone persistently avoids spelling out a particular kind of activity. It is, effectively, a "policy commitment," something generally avoided and, therefore, automatically not recognized each time it occurs.
According to Fingarette, self-deception "turns upon the personal identity one accepts rather than the beliefs one has." People tend to see themselves as good, likeable people. They may see themselves as clever, but not as dishonest or otherwise unethical. This makes it hard for them to "avow" their misconduct, that is, to identify themselves as someone who does such things.
Fingarette also looks at approaches to self-deception taken by other psychologists, as well as Sartre, Kierkegaard, and Freud.
August 1, 2019
Really enjoyed this and learned from it. Fingarette’s formulations and insights about the human potential, not oft explored, to spell-out engagement in the world, were enlightening. His ruminations on taking - or not taking - responsibility and avowing or disavowing engagements made good sense of human behaviour patterns that otherwise seem opaque.
First section is not an easy read. Stick with it.
First section is not an easy read. Stick with it.
November 19, 2013
Although I gained a valuable idea from "Self-Deception" by Herbert Fingarette, I do not recommend it for most readers. It is heavy with the argot of professional philosophers. (If you want a comparison between Fingarette's ideas and those of Sartre, Kierkegaard, and Freud, then you certainly SHOULD read this book.) The seminal idea is well summarized in an article entitled "Self-Deception Needs No Explaining," which the author published in The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 48, # 192, July 1998, pp. 289-301.
Only a philosopher would take 12 pages to explain why a concept needs no explaining!
But the central idea of the book is important. Fingarette shows that self-deception is not a problem of knowledge, but one of attention or attentiveness. He brings persuasive discussion of normal inattentiveness, how it's essential for daily life, and how self-deception is simply an application of that normal mental process. Thus--and here, sadly, the author did not realize the broader implication of his theory--self-deception is like inflammation, chronic pain, neoplasia, etc. It is an example of the maxim that pathology is simply physiology gone awry.
By definition, people are unaware of their self-deception. Most people,if they were aware, would not want to eliminate it. That's the whole point: we self-deceive because it protects us from mental anguish. When the protection of self-deception itself becomes harmful, there is reason to want to overcome it. That requires drawing the unwanted truth up into conscious consideration. Fingarette does not address techniques for doing that; that is not his subject of inquiry. But a grounded understanding of the essence of the phenomenon may help those rare people who are trying to discern and overcome self-deception.
Only a philosopher would take 12 pages to explain why a concept needs no explaining!
But the central idea of the book is important. Fingarette shows that self-deception is not a problem of knowledge, but one of attention or attentiveness. He brings persuasive discussion of normal inattentiveness, how it's essential for daily life, and how self-deception is simply an application of that normal mental process. Thus--and here, sadly, the author did not realize the broader implication of his theory--self-deception is like inflammation, chronic pain, neoplasia, etc. It is an example of the maxim that pathology is simply physiology gone awry.
By definition, people are unaware of their self-deception. Most people,if they were aware, would not want to eliminate it. That's the whole point: we self-deceive because it protects us from mental anguish. When the protection of self-deception itself becomes harmful, there is reason to want to overcome it. That requires drawing the unwanted truth up into conscious consideration. Fingarette does not address techniques for doing that; that is not his subject of inquiry. But a grounded understanding of the essence of the phenomenon may help those rare people who are trying to discern and overcome self-deception.
July 12, 2016
Self-Deception by Herbert Fingarette is a good read; a little slow at times but insightful & informative. To sum it up we do deceive ourselves, the reasons we do so & even how we do so is discussed. Let me just quote the author: “Self-deception puzzled us. …the truth, however, was that the puzzle arose because of certain mistaken assumptions about how in general the mind works. Explaining correctly how the mind works reveals self-deception as non-puzzling & in no need of any special explanation.”
In the end we all know that we do deceive ourselves & I am convinced that most of us can easily explain why we do so. Sadly we are not only dishonest with others we are dishonest with ourselves.
In the end we all know that we do deceive ourselves & I am convinced that most of us can easily explain why we do so. Sadly we are not only dishonest with others we are dishonest with ourselves.
November 26, 2016
Thorough analysis on the subject. Uses examples from literature (The Iceman Cometh), as well as the primary philosopher on the subject (Kierkegaard, godly deceiver). Cuts down to exactly what self-deception is, the purposeful--and only vaguely so--refusal to spell out the premises one operates on in order to remain "unknowing" and therefore morally distanced from them.
November 22, 2014
Strong. An important text in the field of self-deception vis a vis Sartre and Kierkegaard.
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews