How Things Shape the Mind: A Theory of Material Engagement

by Lambros Malafouris, Colin Renfrew (Foreword)

An account of the different ways in which things have become cognitive extensions of the human body, from prehistory to the present.An increasingly influential school of thought in cognitive science views the mind as embodied, extended, and distributed rather than brain-bound or "all in the head." This shift in perspective raises important questions about the relationship between cognition and material culture, posing major challenges for philosophy, cognitive science, archaeology, and anthropology. In How Things Shape the Mind, Lambros Malafouris proposes a cross-disciplinary analytical framework for investigating the ways in which things have become cognitive extensions of the human body. Using a variety of examples and case studies, he considers how those ways might have changed from earliest prehistory to the present. Malafouris's Material Engagement Theory definitively adds materiality--the world of things, artifacts, and material signs--into the cognitive equation. His account not only questions conventional intuitions about the boundaries and location of the human mind but also suggests that we rethink classical archaeological assumptions about human cognitive evolution.

Genres: Philosophy, Neuroscience, Anthropology, Psychology, Nonfiction, Nature, Archaeology

304 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2013

Reviews

[Alina · Rating 3 out of 5]

This review will be colored by the fact that I have a philosophical background in enactivism, and I am unacquainted with the standards of theoretical soundness in the social sciences. I'll start with what I like. Malafouris unfolds the implications of enactivism and embodied cognition for the archaeology of human cognition, a field defined by explaining the evolutionary development and history of cognition on the basis of archaeological studies and theories of ancient civilizations. He has penetrating criticisms of major theories in this field; they understand that cognitive leaps in our evolutionary history are caused by discrete ecological or technological events. Malafouris argues that this understanding presumes an inappropriate, uni-directional causal framework. Instead, given the insights of enactivism -- that humans are fundamentally embodied, coupled to their ecological niches -- we need to understand the interactions between material environment and cognitive capacities as occurring in a manner of circular, dynamical causation. He goes on to argue for a methodological shift in archaeological studies of material artifacts. Rather than ask about the role of the artifact in the hypothesized ancient society, or how the artifact might've been used, we should ask about the ways by which the artifact might've "scaffolded" human cognition, or expanded or enhanced the possibilities of cognitive tasks. This is fair.

But Malafouris draws flawed conclusions on the metaphysics of material artifacts and of cognition. His failings mostly stem from his tendency to conflate facts that must be separated to two domains: there are (1) causal facts about the world, independent of any observer, and (2) causal facts that appear in the world observed by a subject. It is a grave category mistake to assume that facts from one domain hold true in the other domain. Malafouris is right to conclude that in domain (1), human cognitive capacities are coupled with the material/technological objects in the human's ecological niche, so cognition and the design of these objects co-evolve, or co-constrain the possible ways each can develop over evolutionary history. He, however, is wrong to infer that this means in domain (2), material objects are literally component processes in the cognitive system, as much as neural processes are components. Yes, Malafouris concludes that there is a "symmetry" between the roles of material objects and neural activity with respect to cognition. This is just bad reasoning. There is clearly a difference between the ways human cognition and the environment dynamically co-evolve over evolutionary time, and the ways by which a particular human's cognitive system interacts with the environment at a synchronic point of time.

This book is an illuminating read for people who are not familiar with enactivism and embodied cognition, or who have an interest in the evolution of human cognition, or who want to know why it looks like we are so "smart." I would warn any reader, however, to not take Malafouris's metaphysical conclusions seriously. I also do not think this book is worth a reader's time, if the reader is already familiar with enactivism. Malafouris's sound arguments about material artifacts and evolution are intuitive, given knowledge about this field, and this book will not introduce any radically new ideas.

[Jeff · Rating 4 out of 5]

Fascinating overview of his theory of the nature of mind and its place in the interactions among brain, body, and material culture. It's heavy going for those without some background in cognitive science, but the basic premises are certainly understandable. Running against modernist thinking as well as Cartesian dualism is a rough road, but the concepts may end up changing the way both archaeologists and cognitive scientists conceptualize mind.

[Maria · Rating 1 out of 5]

Interesting subject, but totally unreadable.

[Benjamin · Rating 4 out of 5]

The subject was fascinating but it could have been presented more clearly. For example the term “agency” is introduced halfway through but not really defined well until later.

[Rachel Schloss · Rating 5 out of 5]

I don’t care what the people say

[Jonna Higgins-Freese · Rating 5 out of 5]

Apparently academics require it to be spelled out that, when people engage with physical objects, the physical objects shape and constrain and inspire their thoughts and actions. Have they never attempted to cook a meal without exactly the ingredients specified, or figured out how to make a recalcitrant piece of wood fit into a project, or thought about how to accomplish a task with the tools at hand?

[Mills College Library]

612.8 M236 2013

[Pat Fox · Rating 3 out of 5]

Scholarly argument that attempts to define the mind as extending to the material world and what we make.

[Alfonso José Pizarro Ramírez · Rating 5 out of 5]

Una de las lecturas más interesantes que he hecho en el último tiempo. Malafouris propone una teoría de involucramiento material, que consiste en una radicalización de la mente extendida, en donde el proceso cognitivo mismo se constituye y lleva a cabo por las cosas. Su trabajo de investigación se enmarca en la antropología cognitiva, siendo crítico de la manera tradicional de entender los objetos como signos de procesos mentales. Vinculando la fenomenología con las ciencias cognitivas, los objetos determinan y constituyen el pensamiento en la actividad misma. La concepción moderna del ser humano se pone en duda y la agencia se cuestiona desde una visión crítica: apela a Latour y su ontología plana. Finalmente, durante todo el libro no pude sino acordarme del General Intellect y de los trabajos de Engels sobre antopología y evolución del hombre

'La principal innovación de este libro radica en la idea radical de que los estados o procesos emocionales y cognitivos de los humanos literalmente comprenden elementos de sus alrededores materiales' (227)

'El Homo Sapiens es la única especie en transformar su biología mediante la manufactura de un reino distintivo de autoconsciencia collectiva de interacción social e involucramiento material.

La mente humana es tanto un producto de la evolución biológica como es un artefacto de su propia creación' (233)