I thought of some alternative subtitles after reading this book. "Appeasement in our Time." "With Leaders like this, you don't need Enemies." "When war winners become losers."
I'm not trying to trivialize this modern masterpiece. It's just that, the more one reads of the foolhardy actions taken by the great European democracies after World War I regarding their future survival, the more one feels a sense of unease over the incompetence and lies which allowed a threat to world peace to gain a footing and prosper in Germany. It has been said that the seeds of World War II were sown in the way peace was restored following World War I. There may have been an inevitability to the rise of National Socialism among a populace humiliated by being labeled as the instigators of the first war, while boiling over with anger directed toward their own wartime government which capitulated before a victory over Germany's enemies or complete destruction of the country in defeat could be finalized in 1918. World War II became not so much a result of the need to revenge insults as a resetting of the state of hostilities left unfinished in 1918 that the Nazis were only too happy to commit their country on.
The subtitle "Alone" describes the position Winston Churchill was in during the 1930's, during which he was one of the few public figures who didn't subscribe to the corrosive groupthink guiding the British diplomatic direction. Winston had, by 1932, been a central figure in the government, after gaining a reputation as a war hero during several Victorian era colonial wars. He had held cabinet positions along with his position as a member of Parliament. His Victorian values prevented him from going along with the rest of the Tory-led government on Indian dominion status, and now he would view the great events of the day as an outsider.
It can be argued that the country needed someone with Winston's deep thinking serving HMG, but events would prove that his pariah status kept him from being tainted as just another insider at a time when the country was being sold down the river by its leaders. The main point of contention was Winston's instinctive and highly correct disliking of the new Nazi leadership in Germany, which would constantly run counter to the directions that a series of PM's, from MacDonald to Baldwin to Chamberlain.
By the time Stanley Baldwin took over, the mantra of diplomacy was appeasement, appeasement, appeasement. Neville Chamblerlain would become the high priest of the concept. The associates of these PM's would be yes-men or they wouldn't remain in office. The two most notorious to emerge were Chamberlain's Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, and the British ambassador in Berlin, the boot-licker of Hitler and the Nazi leadership, Sir Neville Henderson. These two, with the PM and Chamberlain's "Rasputin", Horace Wilson, became the "Men of Munich", those that orchestrated the sell-out of the Czechs during the Sudenten Crisis of 1938, that William Manchester methodically indicts for their actions.
As Manchester points out in the Author's Note, this work is a biography and not a history. Nevertheless, a biographer cannot make all facets of his subject's life clear without knowing that the reader understands the dynamics existing in the world while the story is unfolding. There was an awful lot going on in Winston's world, and Manchester does a masterful job of bringing the early twentieth century world into focus, especially as events transpired in Great Britain and Europe.
At the center of Manchester's story, of course, is Winston Churchill,
an ex-government minister. He retained his seat in Parliament, but would serve as a backbencher, literally an outsider within the House of Commons, not trusted or respected by most of the members of his party, which ran the government at this time. Different reasons explain his outsider status, including India, his previous defection from the Tories before returning to the party (ratting and re-ratting), and the hard-to-shake unfair (according to Manchester) reputation as the planner of the disastrous World War I Galipoli campaign. Most damning concerning Churchill's suitability to participate in government, however, was his absolute unwillingness to countenance the feckless foreign policy of his country. The two greatest victorious European powers of World War I, Great Britain and France, had established punitive conditions at Versailles which effectively would keep Germany bound with rules against re-armament so that peace in Europe would be maintained. Now, the British government was soft pedaling German rearmament, and would continue to rationalize Germany's erosion and eventual rebuke of the Versailles rules.
Manchester shows how Winston became Europe's best informed private citizen. He had at one time been given access to British military records which was never revoked, allowing him to mine a trove of military statistics up to World War II. Probably of most importance, however, was his huge network of operatives consisting of civil service and military workers who increasingly lost faith in their leadership and sent him valuable intelligence about British and even German armament manufacturing and stockpiling, at great personal risk to themselves. After the war, he would recall much of this data in charts and tables to bolster his recollection of this time in his great first volume in his "The Second World War" series titled "The Gathering Storm."
"The Last Lion 2" distressingly unfolds with the stagnation of British military preparedness while Nazi Germany became a formidable power in less than a decade. The French, Britain's ally with the largest, most powerful army in Europe at the beginning of this era, were increasingly weakened by a chaotic political scene. The one thing most of France's parties agreed on was the conviction to never again engage in vigorous action which could lead to the appalling bloodletting of World War I, and thus their army marked time inside a static defense which would prove catastrophic in 1940. Manchester writes about a corrosive spirit which permeated all strata of French society, undermining support of any measures, including expenditure of needed money, for the building of a military force which would engage a foreign enemy in the field.
A key point which Manchester presents is that the German adventurism and saber rattling of the 1930's was rationalized rather than condemned by the British government and seconded by the news media. As each German-provoked European crisis transpired, HMG tried find a reason to keep betting on the chimera of a stable Germany as a potential ally against any potential threat which may in future be posed by Russia. Winston Churchill risked, and damaged his public stature by constantly speaking publicly about the danger posed to Britain in these circumstances, and by pleading incessantly for his country to engage in efforts to form alliances with other countries to counter the German threat through the mechanism of collective security. His efforts were very effectively countered by a press which did not print his most forceful messages to a public which by the 1930's was living in a post-World War I collective post traumatic disorder.
There is a lot of great diplomatic and political history in this book. Some of the most compelling, in my opinion, occured around the time of the eventual realization by Chamberlain that Great Britain was hoodwinked, after Hitler turned the Sudentenland partition into an occupation of all of Czechoslovakia. When it became apparent that diplomatic steps needed to be explored in order to put up a challenge to a now-dominant German military, Chamberlain ineptly engaged in secret negotiations which bound England to go to war in the event of a German invasion of a Poland led by men of "dubious and unstable judgement" (p. 406).
There is a certain linearity narration of pieces of common knowledge by which history is portrayed in history class and on those endless World War II television documentaries: Great Britain and France had established a pact to go to war if Poland was invaded; Hitler invaded Poland on September 1st; Britain and France logically went to war; eventually the allies won the war ... (no wonder students are bored with history). In reality, by the time Hitler invaded Poland, HMG was trying to find a way to engage in negotiations in order to get an assurance from the Germans that they would stop fighting if they were allowed to keep Danzig, not having a clue that Hitler's earlier demands over Danzig were only a pretext for invading Poland. If Britain could negotiate a way to cop out of going to war with Germany, Chamberlain would jump at the opportunity, even if it left France in the lurch. It took two days for the government to get up the gumption to acknowledge the inevitability of a declaration of war.
Eight months later, when it was time for the Germans to invade France, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg, Chamberlain was still hanging on to power in the face of growing vehement public disgust with his government's lackluster conduct in the war so far. Case in point: the embarrassingly disastrous attempt to fight the Germans in Norway. The government could point to some commendable actions at sea, thanks to the decision to bring Winston Churchill into the government as First Lord of the Admiralty.
Manchester's book ends at the same point as Churchill's biographical "The Gathering Storm". It is May 1940, and the German blitzkrieg across Western Europe had caught everyone by surprise. The British government was shaken by the realization of a possible defeat of France. Somehow, Britain would have to find a way to fight a war, after years of inadequate military preparedness funding, against the most powerful army in Europe. Poland and Czechoslovakia, two formerly possible allies, had been sacrificed to the German onslaught. German, and to an extent, Italian military forces were consolidating control of Europe. Russia and Germany were raping Finland and Poland respectively, while agreeing to refrain from aggression against each other. When it finally became time for the Chamberlain conservative government to leave, public opinion would elevate the one man who had the backbone, and the knowledge of the workings of government, to vigorously prosecute a war: Churchill.
In his own book, Churchill writes of going to bed the first night after the King called for him to form a government, assured that his whole previous life was preparation for his new role as PM. Manchester suggests that Churchill's outward confidence concealed deep fears over the ability of his country to survive, given the magnitude of the challenges facing it.