Pathogens for War: Biological Weapons,Canadian Life Scientists, and North American Biodefence

by Donald H. Avery

Pathogens for War explores how Canada and its allies have attempted to deal with the threat of germ warfare, one of the most fearful weapons of mass destruction, since the Second World War. In addressing this subject, distinguished historian Donald Avery investigates the relationship between bioweapons, poison gas, and nuclear devices, as well as the connection between bioattacks and natural disease pandemics. Avery emphasizes the crucially important activities of Canadian biodefence scientists – beginning with Nobel Laureate Frederick Banting – at both the national level and through cooperative projects within the framework of an elaborate alliance system. Delving into history through a rich collection of declassified documents, Pathogens for War also devotes several chapters to the contemporary challenges of bioterrorism and disease pandemics from both national and international perspectives. As such, readers will not only learn about Canada’s secret involvement with biological warfare, but will also gain new insights into current debates about the peril of bioweapons – one of today’s greatest threats to world peace.

Genres: Canada

448 pages, Paperback

First published April 28, 2013

Reviews

[Gwen Harris · Rating 5 out of 5]

Pathogens For War is not my usual reading. I began because I had been told that Frederick Banting, the Canadian scientist who received the 1922 Nobel award for the discovery of insulin (along with Best) had been involved in developing biological warfare in the 1930s. More than just involved, as I learned, he led scientists in Canada as part of Anglo-American military cooperation. We in Canada like to think we (our government) do not even dabble in such unethical things. Not true - though these matters are never black and white - for purposes of military defence and public health, we need to have methods of bio-defence (vaccines) and retaliation (if attacked). This, simplistically put, was the position of the UK, Canada, and the United States in their collaborative work.

Donald Avery's examination and history of Canada's involvement in biological weapons research, an involvement that meant close ties with the UK and the USA, is an astonishingly compelling read that begins with post-WW1 research in the 1930s to the first decade of the 21st century. I did get bogged down in detail at times but it didn't matter - the general message comes through - biodefence matters whether for military purposes against terrorists, rogue nations, or enemy nations or for naturally emerging viruses of pandemic proportions.

The efforts of all governments have sometimes been well directed, but more often erratic, secretive, multi-agent, and dangerous. Have any pathogens escaped from the labs? Any insects made into vectors? Have any trials of pathogens and delivery methods killed livestock or humans? Some did.

In these pandemic days of COVID-19, we must ask - why were governments which had funded research of pathogens of all types and response to those pathogens and had extensive experience with influenza epidemics been so unprepared?

Avery wrote: During the past fourteen years influenza has been regarded as one of the greatest threats to global health - in both its avian and human strains. ... In short order a number of key guidelines were established: increasing awareness of the threat of avian influenza at the national level, developing more effective surveillance systems, and improving transparency in disease reporting" (237) .But the effort was not sufficient and certainly not sustained.

Can the public health system deal with a sudden surge of infected patients? It's been very clear since SARS in Toronto in 2003 that it cannot.

Fascinating and alarming book. Perhaps one day Avery will update his analysis to cover 2019-2021.