What's the Use of Truth?

by Richard Rorty, Pascal Engel, William McCuaig (Translator)

What is truth? What value should we see in or attribute to it?

The war over the meaning and utility of truth is at the center of contemporary philosophical debate, and its arguments have rocked the foundations of philosophical practice. In this book, the American pragmatist Richard Rorty and the French analytic philosopher Pascal Engel present their radically different perspectives on truth and its correspondence to reality.

Rorty doubts that the notion of truth can be of any practical use and points to the preconceptions that lie behind truth in both the intellectual and social spheres. Engel prefers a realist conception, defending the relevance and value of truth as a norm of belief and inquiry in both science and the public domain. Rorty finds more danger in using the notion of truth than in getting rid of it. Engel thinks it is important to hold on to the idea that truth is an accurate representation of reality.

In Rorty's view, epistemology is an artificial construct meant to restore a function to philosophy usurped by the success of empirical science. Epistemology and ontology are false problems, and with their demise goes the Cartesian dualism of subject and object and the ancient problematic of appearance and reality. Conventional "philosophical problems," Rorty asserts, are just symptoms of the professionalism that has disfigured the discipline since the time of Kant. Engel, however, is by no means as complacent as Rorty in heralding the "end of truth," and he wages a fierce campaign against the "veriphobes" who deny its value.

What's the Use of Truth? is a rare opportunity to experience each side of this impassioned debate clearly and concisely. It is a subject that has profound implications not only for philosophical inquiry but also for the future study of all aspects of our culture.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction

96 pages, Hardcover

First published December 28, 2007

About the author

Richard Rorty (1931–2007) developed a distinctive and controversial brand of pragmatism that expressed itself along two main axes. One is negative—a critical diagnosis of what Rorty takes to be defining projects of modern philosophy. The other is positive—an attempt to show what intellectual culture might look like, once we free ourselves from the governing metaphors of mind and knowledge in which the traditional problems of epistemology and metaphysics (and indeed, in Rorty's view, the self-conception of modern philosophy) are rooted. The centerpiece of Rorty's critique is the provocative account offered in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979, hereafter PMN). In this book, and in the closely related essays collected in Consequences of Pragmatism (1982, hereafter CP), Rorty's principal target is the philosophical idea of knowledge as representation, as a mental mirroring of a mind-external world. Providing a contrasting image of philosophy, Rorty has sought to integrate and apply the milestone achievements of Dewey, Hegel and Darwin in a pragmatist synthesis of historicism and naturalism. Characterizations and illustrations of a post-epistemological intellectual culture, present in both PMN (part III) and CP (xxxvii-xliv), are more richly developed in later works, such as Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989, hereafter CIS), in the popular essays and articles collected in Philosophy and Social Hope (1999), and in the four volumes of philosophical papers, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (1991, hereafter ORT); Essays on Heidegger and Others (1991, hereafter EHO); Truth and Progress (1998, hereafter TP); and Philosophy as Cultural Politics (2007, hereafter PCP). In these writings, ranging over an unusually wide intellectual territory, Rorty offers a highly integrated, multifaceted view of thought, culture, and politics, a view that has made him one of the most widely discussed philosophers in our time.

Reviews

[robin friedman · Rating 4 out of 5]

A Debate On Truth

This recent short book, "What's the Use of Truth?" (2007) consists of the text of a debate held between two distinguished contemporary philosophers, Richard Rorty and Pascal Engel, at the Sorbonne in 2002. Rorty began his career as an analytic philosopher who edited a collection of texts in a book called "The Linguistic Turn." (1967) But, in his book "Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature" (1979) and many later writings, Rorty became disillusioned with analytic philosophy and, indeed, highly skeptical of the philosophical project as traditionally conceived. Rorty became a self-styled "pragmatist" in the tradition of John Dewey. Pascal Engel, in contrast to Rorty, began as a European philosopher steeped in Heidegger. He has since tried to bring European thought closer to the techniques and questions of analytic philosophy.

The subject of the Engel-Rorty debate is the nature of truth and whether the concept of truth is philosophically important. Rorty argues for a "deflationist" account of truth, and maintains that there is little benefit to be gained from studying the conundrums that philosophers have erected around the concept. Rorty claims to adopt the pragmatist maxim of William James that "if a debate has no practical significance, then it has no philosophical significance." To simplify greatly, Rorty rejects an approach in which true statements are thought to bear a relationship of correspondence to an independent reality. Instead, true statements are those accepted by a community under standards used by that community whether the statements be scientific, artistic, technical, political, religious, ethical what have you. There is no metaphysical entity called Truth for Rorty, and to say, for example, that ""The cat is on the mat" is true" is, in most circumstances, only to say "The cat is on the mat."

In the debate, Pascal Engel agrees with Rorty on some important points. Notably, he rejects any metaphysical notion of "the Truth" and he also rejects representationalism for the most part. But while Rorty claims to be a follower of James and Dewey, Engel is closer to the earlier American pragmatist, Charles Peirce. Engel argues that the concept of the truth as an important regulatory role to play in human thought by setting a goal and limiting condition of human inquiry. Engel discusses what he describes as the assertion-belief-truth triangle by which he endeavors to show that the question of the acceptability of a particular statement by a group cannot be reduced to the question of the truth of that statement.

Following the statement of their basic positions, Rorty and Engel engage in a brief discussion which grows increasingly heated.

As is often the case, Rorty states his position eloquently and rhetorically, with references to himself and those who think with him as "we pragmatists", "we quietists" and the like. It is difficult to take a good hard look at Rorty's views. Rorty does not seem to me entirely consistent in his pragmatism and anti-metaphysical orientation, as he slips, in places in his discussion, into a philosophical naturalism with no place for any form of theology. In other places, his approach seems to be of the breadth to allow theological discourse, just as any other discourse, as long as it serves a human need. Engel works hard in the debate to establish the importance of a limited concept of truth, but I was struck by how much the contours of philosophical debate have shifted towards a position much influenced by Rorty.

This book is short, lively, and provocative. I think it too brief and too concentrated to make a good introduction to the issues it addresses. This book will be of interest to serious students of philosophy and to those interested in the claimed death of or at least reformulation of this venerable discipline.

Robin Friedman

[Ming · Rating 2 out of 5]

The introduction by Savidan & Engel's main statement in this book were exercises in philosophical handwringing that failed to say very much in the way of insight; at the very least, this book provides a nice peek into Rorty's views and he presents them clearly - but I'm sure one can find an interview of his that accomplishes about the same.


I confess that I haven't really been too meticulous in reading through Engel's statements, but I find much of what he says (on the face of it) somewhat iffy. For example, he brought up the issue about the importance of traditional philosophical distinctions, but this was not really properly argued for (which allows Rorty to conclude the debate with 'We have give many of these traditional distinctions their chance. We have debated them ad infinitum, without that having had any practical upshot. So I propose from now on we focus on other things', pg. 59). I also don't get why Engel brought up the distinction between intuitionism and Platonism vis-a-vis mathematical truth beyond the fact that this is an example of a traditional philosophical distinction. I don't see how it relates to the truth/justification distinction that was being discussed; indeed, it was quickly swept aside by Rorty (who said that the ontological standing of mathematical truths will have little practical implication on the construction of mathematical knowledge). The feeling that Engel isn't really engaging with Rorty properly cropped up repeatedly throughout my reading of this book; I usually concur with Rorty, and think that Engel's comments about, e.g. "real property" regarding Truth (pg. 22) and questions about truth-apt virtues, are red herrings in this present discussion. It just seems that Engel's method of debate is to gather doubts and point out philosophical dangers about Rorty's position that aren't very well motivated or articulated. Oh well - I guess Engel really needed to find something to say.


I don't know too much about the literature on general contemporary epistemology, but there have to be better treatments of this philosophical debate elsewhere. In particular, I think there were a few lost opportunities for some interesting/rigorous discussions on the nature of truth, a problem made all the more conspicuous by the short length of this book. For example, (1) what we mean when we say some discourse "fits" the world and Rorty's claim that if one discourse has the capacity to represent the world, then all of them do so equally (pg. 36), which seems overhasty to me; (2) a main point of contention in this debate - can we have a meaningful distinction between truth and justification without "relapsing into the errors of Platonism" (Engel, pg. 51) or falling into epistemic worship of "god surrogates" (Rorty, pg. 40) [cf. Nietzsche's comments on the ascetic ideal after the death of God]? Any potentially interesting discussion of this issue got lost somewhere between Rorty's statement that this distinction will have little practical consequence (pg. 44-45) and Engel's continual fishing for poorly motivated examples. (3) Tension between what we do and what we think we do when we construct knowledge in regards to the whole debate about "redescription" (and its putative consequences outlined by Engel)

[Nat · Rating 3 out of 5]

I bought this book like I'd buy a candy bar while waiting in line at CVS. Except that I was in the Co-op. It's one of those enticing little books. It takes about 45 minutes to read.

Here's the summary:

Pascal Engel raises some legitimate concerns about Rorty's understanding of truth, like whether you can sustain a notion of justification without a notion of truth, or whether we can give up the idea that truth is a norm (a standard of correctness) for beliefs and assertions.

Rorty says that he doesn't really care one way or the other. Disputes about truth are scholastic and boring.

Engel accuses Rorty of having a conception of language and the world that is "smooth" and "homogenous" and that ignores traditional distinctions (he quotes Blackburn here). He says the role of philosophy should be to make distinctions.

Rorty says he likes the idea that his view of language is smooth and homogenous, and embraces what was supposed to be a criticism. He says the traditional distinctions are worn out and need to be replaced.

Engel gets mad and says Rorty's views aren't all that different from "King Carnap's".

Note: The jacket blurb, from one Bruce Krajewski, says "Richard Rorty and Pascal Engel's exchange about truth starts out in university tweed and ends up in a street fight". That's true if comparing someone to Carnap constitutes a street fight, but false otherwise.

[Zachary · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book is too short to capture the various nuances and complexities of the sometimes arcane philosophical dispute over truth. Nevertheless, it presents a concise summation of two radically different approaches to truth, one rooted in the analytic tradition, the other (somewhat) rooted in a more continental, postmodernist approach. For Richard Rorty, “the realism-antirealism debate is passé,” as editor Patrick Savidan writes in his introduction. What we think and what we say need not contain representations of reality or correspond with reality. “As realism subsides,” Savidan writes on Rorty’s view, “it will be possible to escape from the Cartesian problematic of the subject and the object and to break free of the ancient one of appearance and reality.” In effect, Rorty aims to renounce the “philosophical method . . . and problems” with respect to the dispute over truth which for him “are no more than the unfortunate consequence of the over-professionalization of philosophy.” On the other hand, Pascal Engel, who has eschewed the continental tradition in which he was trained in favor of analytic methods, seeks to defend a “minimal realism” per which truth has more than mere instrumental, practical value, as Rorty insists. To be sure, he does not endorse a transcendental, metaphysical realism of capital-t Truth. Yet he does wish to preserve the vocabulary of truth and to reaffirm a conceptual relation between truth, belief, and assertion that expresses a norm—albeit a conceptual, rather than an ethical or epistemic norm: truth as the aim or norm of assertion, and truth as the norm of belief. In other words, Engel seeks to maintain “a norm of objectivity for our statements and beliefs. . . . What I want to say is simply that truth is a norm of assertion (and of belief) in the sense in which, for any belief whatsoever, it is an objection [to] this belief to say that it is false and that it is normal (in the sense that it is the rule) to try to revise it.” Finally, Engel perceptively observes that there is an important difference between truth as such and our particular attitudes toward truth, i.e. between truth and what is believed about truth or the manner in which it is valorized. He asserts that his minimal realism does not demand faithfulness or worship in the way Rorty worries Truth, a non-human idea, requires such unjustified devotion.

Ultimately, one has the sense that Rorty wanted no part in this debate. His responses sound like the justifications of one who is supremely confident in his position and rather not address the issues of realism versus anti-realism in the first place. In fact, this is just what Rorty asserts. “We have debated [these distinctions] ad infinitum,” he writes, “so I propose that from now on we focus on other distinctions.” The analytic obsession over truth is “rather rebarbative and pointless,” and, insofar as the resolution of this dispute within analytic philosophy will, in Rorty’s view, have no practical consequences, it is philosophically pointless. In this sense, Rorty stands with William James, for whom philosophy was, contrary to what many outside the academy believe, an inherently practical project applicable to our everyday lives. Rorty, similar to James, deplores analytic scholasticism in that its overly sophisticated analyses typically have no real impact on everyday existence. For Rorty, all discourses are equal—philosophic ones are not inherently more scientific or perceptive than, say, the discourse of plumbers—and we all seem to know what we mean when we use the word truth—the term hardly demands philosophical scrutiny. Why turn truth into some nonhuman, God-like absolute to which we owe fealty, rather than see it as what we, as a community, decide is socially useful? “We do not have any way to establish the truth of a belief . . . except by reference to the justifications we offer” for why we think what we think or do what we do, justifications we know those around us can reasonably accept. Once more with reference to usefulness, Rorty notes that “the philosophical distinction between justification and truth seems not to have practical consequences,” and as such he is prepared to dispense with the distinction entirely. Truth simply is what is justified.

Where do I stand on this issue? Certainly not with Rorty. As a Christian, I do not shun capital-t Truth in the same way most secular philosophers, especially postmodernists, avoid it. And as a Christian liberationist, I believe that Truth plays a critical role in social justice efforts in response to systemic oppression. Moreover, it is evident to me that there are certain inter-subjective, existential truths with respect to identity, communication, and various other phenomena that, while empirically unjustifiable, nevertheless are true. In other words, apart from scientific truths, there are truths about existence that (contra Rorty on the equality of discourses) philosophers (or creative writers) are especially well-equipped to disclose. This is not to say that I endorse a theory of detached correspondence, or the representational model that philosophers from Quine to McDowell have demonstrated as problematic. It is impossible for me to know whether the way in which I apprehend the world correlates with how the world actually is, just as there are no objective ways for me to “check” whether my comprehension of what I apprehend suitably understands what is out there, outside of me, when the ways in which I comprehend the world derive from the world itself (which is outside of me). The correspondence theory presents quite the quandary. Yet there are reasons to preserve the notion of truth that Rorty seems to overlook here, specifically with respect to the truth of authenticity. “I am a philosophy student” denotes one sense; “I am really a philosophy student” denotes quite another. Truth as authenticity or sincerity seems worthy of preservation; it also intimates an appropriate norm for which we, as subjects, may wish to strive. As a former analytic philosopher who was ultimately drawn toward Derrida, Foucault, and other postmodernists, I wonder how Rorty felt about this approach to truth. I am confident he addressed it somewhere; unfortunately, this book is too short and too philosophically pithy to allow such ideas to come to the fore.

[m · Rating 2 out of 5]

Two-and-a-half stars.

This 96-page book is so slight (only 14,500 words) Columbia University Press ought to be abashed offering it for $25.

The exchanges between Pascal Engel & Richard Rorty are merely good, not particularly good. Rorty says nothing in these pages that he hasn't said (more cost effectively) to interlocutors here, here, here, and elsewhere.

You can read Rorty's third & final rejoinder to Engel's argument here — a reprint of Rorty's 2003 review of Engel's Truth.

[Elizabeth · Rating 3 out of 5]

he seems a bit glib, like an American, whereas the frenchman is all earnest discourse, looking for a group mind moment.
funny how philosophers will dissect a concept, seeking meaning, and succeed in sucking all the air and life out of it.

[VII · Rating 2 out of 5]

This has been rightfully described as a dialogue between two deaf people. Rorty who is already quite famous, is invited to Sorbonne to discuss with a much younger philosopher, Engel about truth. There is a quite clear difference in status that it is also shown in the dialogue.

The young protege prepares four questions that progressively move towards a more realistic conception of truth and the innocent reader probably hopes that they will be able to find common ground for discussion somewhere between them. Unfortunately, it never happens. After they state their positions, Engel (I think) is forced to write something that means “right, let's talk about something slightly different because if we don't, we 'll just end up repeating ourselves”.

If it was an attempt to clarify Rorty's positions (which is how most use this book now) I would wonder what Engel was thinking with his questions, but of course, he was also trying to promote his own positions so it's understandable. It was clear that they were not gonna fly though.

Overall it's so short that if you are interested in Rorty, it won't hurt reading it, but there are certainly better things to read from him.

[Nicholas Charles · Rating 3 out of 5]

this was good and short. i feel very neutral about "debate-turned-book" type books. i dont like debates usually. but this was a nice evening read. rorty is a tuning fork, though: hit him and he makes one sound. Engel seemed far more convincing to me and his attitude toward the debate seemed more engaged and concerned. Frankfurt generated some sympathy for the pragmatists position on truth in me, but Rorty snatched that all back.

what this has caused me to think more about: I definetely have some pragmatist nuggets in me (mainly in their numbingly repetitive and singular concern with humans, as a linguistic and practical community; i like humans, i also care more about stuff that matters then scholastic quibbling); i am becoming more and more sympathetic to minimalist realist metaphysics like engels, and feeling less attracted to skepticism in some domains maybe? i like thinking about truth. and uhhh fart

[Steve · Rating 3 out of 5]

The print copy of a debate exchange between American philosopher Richard Rorty and French philosopher Pascal Engel, with lots of footnotes.

In this book of their differing positions, the pragmatist Richard Rorty, sees "truth" as without practical use since preconceptions underlie the use of the term. Engel, on the other hand, sees "truth" as being an expression of value in a social context as well as in science and intellectual discussions generally.

Conventional "philosophical problems," Rorty asserts, are just symptoms of a professionalism that has disfigured the discipline since the time of Kant. Engel, however, is not as ready as Rorty to endorse the "end of truth," and he strongly disagrees with the "veriphobes" who deny its value.

[Noumnemonicon · Rating 4 out of 5]

A well-intentioned debate that goes significantly beyond "mere" questions of truth. Though I tend to sympathize more with Rorty's positions, Engel very often exposes shortcomings in Rorty's ability to communicate (and subsequently that of the continental philosophers Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, etc). I also find that Engel's emphasis on truth as a practical goal for inquiry is good food for thought.

[Phenoumenala · Rating 4 out of 5]

A short read that may surprise some but appease those familiar with Rorty. Interesting read since it feels indirectly addressed to the reader as a result of the debate forcing discussion to a concept of truth to try and reconcile with as opposed to being a debate to better understand theories of truth. A tug of war between intuitions.

[Adam Roesner · Rating 3 out of 5]

Extremely brief, each case come across quite weak. If this matter interests you, you won't get too much out of this book. If this is just a curiosity of yours, it might be worth reading but not for $20.

[Carl Gladish · Rating 5 out of 5]

Short and sweet.

[Johnny · Rating 4 out of 5]

Based on a discussion between French philosopher Pascal Engel and the late professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago, Richard M. Rorty, What's the Use of Truth? is a short but insightful book.

Rorty considers himself an "ironist" or a "quietist" in the tradition of Pragmitists like Dewey and James. Engel rather calls him out in the sense of being rather a social utilitarian. Rorty says that the question to pragmatists is not whether vocabulary possesses meaning or raises real/unreal problems, but whether the resolution of the debate will have an effect in practice, useful—p. 34.

Engel suggests that whether there is an intrinsic value to the truth is significant. “Expressionism would claim that the phrase ‘torture is evil’ merely expresses a mental state—p. 49, Rorty doesn’t think it important whether this is an expression or affirmation to be proved true or false—p.49 But, as Engel notes, a good deal of literary criticism and philosophy of science asks whether there are different degrees of objectivity to discourses.

This is a stimulating discussion and highly recommended for someone who wants a short, fast, and provocative philosophical debate.

[Chant · Rating 3 out of 5]

The book was a rather good back and forth between Engels Pascal and Richard Rorty, but it was a huge disappointment to see that the book was so short. If the book was at least 300 or so pages, it would justify the price tag, but alas, no dice.

A comment on the contents of the book. It was an interesting insight on the very concept of truth (which isn't a subject I care to study in philosophy) and it almost felt that Rorty was somewhat the same, as I tended to agree with him more about his notion of truth (that is laced with Deweyian pragmatism).

The book wasn't technical, or at least it didn't feel technical, because of the concise language used by Rorty and Engels, which isn't always a guarantee with analytic philosophy (as it is assumed).

Not a bad book, but it is better to take out of the Uni library/community library than actual buying the physical book.

[jo ianni · Rating 5 out of 5]

A very short book and lively debate between those operating in present incarnations of pragmatism or the aftermath of continental-analytical debates. While I am of the belief that both writers are missing the other side of the coin in their own respective ways both present our current state of affairs in regards to the subject of truth quite aptly. This debate would provide a great starting point for further discussions on the status of truth and I highly suggest it for those who are seeking a vivid a visceral conversation on that topic.

[arafat · Rating 3 out of 5]

Interesting debate between Richard Rorty and Pascal Engel on the usefulness of 'truth'. Some familiarity with pragmatist philosophy and the debates on realism and anti-realism would be relevant.

I picked up the book at the library partly because it's so short and cute and you can carry it in your pocket!

[Lev · Rating 5 out of 5]

Comedy philosophy at its best.

[Crystal · Rating 3 out of 5]

What is truth? Is it the norm or is it something that we individually expereince?

[David Scarratt]

Interesting, and miraculously short. As with any debate, you get the impression that the participants are not really facing each other, in more than one way.

[Jere · Rating 4 out of 5]

I'm with Rorty

[Federico Giovannini · Rating 3 out of 5]

Short, a bit technical but a nice little window on the world of Rorty's neopragmatism and its critics.

[tana · Rating 4 out of 5]

this will be a perpetual re-read. hurts my brain so good like i ate some ice cream too damn fast...