John Locke’s foundational place in the history of British empiricism and liberal political thought is well established. So, in what sense can Locke be considered a modern European philosopher? Identity and Difference argues for reassessing this canonical figure. Closely examining the "treatise on identity" added to the second edition of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding , Étienne Balibar demonstrates Locke’s role in the formation of two concepts central to the metaphysics of the subject—consciousness and the self —and the complex philosophical, legal, moral and political nature of his terms.
With an accompanying essay by Stella Sandford, situating Balibar’s reading of Locke in the history of the reception of the Essay and within Balibar’s other writings on "the subject," Identity and Difference rethinks a crucial moment in the history of Western philosophy.
Étienne Balibar is emeritus professor of philosophy at Paris X Nanterre and emeritus professor of comparative literature at the University of California, Irvine. He is also professor of modern European philosophy at Kingston University, London, and professor of French and comparative literature at Columbia University. His books include Violence and Civility: On the Limits of Political Philosophy (Columbia, 2015).
I so admire this little book, much of my admiration based in how very different it is, both in its component parts and the quirky history of how they got there. Balibar is a French philosopher who provided a translation of Lockes' Essay Concerning Human Understanding in the 1990's. Along with this new translation came Balibar's introduction to the Essay plus the first original translation made by Pierre Coste under Locke's supervision. Finally an extensive Glossary of Terms made up most of Balibar's own contribution to a new interpretation of Locke. The book I read is an English translation of Balibar's introduction and Glossary, along with a brilliant introduction to this new translation by the English philosopher, Stella Sanford. The starting point for much of Balibar's interpretation comes from Comte's translation, wherein the latter became progressively more perplexed and apologetic about how to deal with Locke's use of the word 'consciousness'. Balibar maintains this is because Coste was reading the European invention of consciousness.
This is an honor usually bestowed on Descartes. Balibar means to show that this cannot be so-Descartes' conscience ( French has never separated what in English is conscience from consciousness, using only context to separate their meanings) is not up to the task of providing the concepts which later philosophers in the European tradition so ambitiously analyzed-Kant, Hegel, Husserl, so many others including you and me. What Locke most essentially throws into the Cartesian pot is time. Descartes was profoundly atemporal in his outlook, always attempting to scrape away memory and tradition and hoping for the pristine observation unhindered by received knowledge. The moment of 'I think, I am' is a static moment, hoping for no reference outside itself. Locke would say that knowledge is not possible under that condition. Perception is immediately accompanied by reflection in order for that sensible imprint to be thought, and in order for perception and reflection to be used, they must be contextualized by a space which has both a history and a future. Descartes' thinking thing funnels images carefully dusted of all extraneous matter, Locke's conscious thinking thing is a self with a memory which cannot be dusted away.
This is a very limited synopsis of Locke's additions to the history of consciousness, which Balibar does not so much argues for, but rather demonstrates the significant changes Locke brought to the topic. Balibar's interpretation of Locke is to be found in the Glossary, where intense scrutiny of many words in the Essay show how Locke bent, extended, contorted the field of terms his predecessors and contemporaries had given him. Coste, translating into French immediately after the Essays were composed, has to deal with these bendings and extensions even more than Locke's English contemporaries, and his perplexity marks the a point of a creative adjustment in the concept of consciousness.
One of the really innovative aspects of Locke's self, the basis of consciousness, and surely one of the reasons Balibar became intrigued with Locke in the first place, is that it flies in the face of both the theology of the time-the god-given soul as the foundation of the human spirit-and the materialists who identify consciousness totally as brain function. Locke straightforwardly denies consciousness foundation in any substance; it is a process that comes into being 'where this personality extends it self beyond present Existence to what is past, only by consciousness, whereby it becomes concerned and accountable, owns and imputes to it self past Actions.... they (are) themselves in what Bodies soever they appear, or what Substance soever that consciousness adheres to , are the same, that committed those Actions...(locke, Essay II,) Sanford's introduction brings up recent work based in Locke making accountability the driving force in their research on subjectivity, a person being self constructed across time as it appropriates past experiences. (Some sources mentioned were Marya Schechtmann and Kim Atkins). I feel this is very close to formulations from another favorite thinker of mine, H. G. Gadamer, and appreciate this little book once more for initiating future reading, not least of all in Balibar himself.
1. ข้อถกเถียงหลักๆของหนังสือเริ่มด้วยการบอกว่าความเข้าใจในประวัติศาสตร์ปรัชญาต่อสิ่งที่เรียกว่า Modern Subject และ Consciousness หรือจิตสำนึกซึ่งมักเริ่มต้นที่เดส์การ์ตผ่านแนวคิดเรื่อง Cogito (I Think) นั้น เป็นความเข้าใจที่ผิดเพราะสิ่งที่เดส์การ์ตเสนอผ่านประเด็นเรื่อง Cogito จะไม่ใช่เรื่องของจิตสำนึก แต่เป็นเรื่องของ Thought of thought ซึ่งจำกัดขอบเขตไว้แค่ที่ตัว I as the thinking thing ในฐานะ Interior ของ Thought โดยไม่อาจ Relate กลับไปหา outer nature ตลอดจนเชื่อมโยงกับประสบการณ์ต่างๆที่มนุษย์ต้องเผชิญหน้าภายใต้กระแสแห่งเวลาได้ จนทำให้ไม่สามารถยกระดับไปสู่การเป็นจิตสำนึก(เหมือนที่ทั่วไปมักถือกัน) ดังนั้น สิ่งที่เดส์การ์ตทำจริงๆจึงไม่ใช่ Philosophy of Consciousness แต่เป็น Philosophy of Certitude ที่มุ่งวางรากฐานให้กับ the existence of modern self ต่างหาก
2.ตรงกันข้ามกับเดส์การ์ต จุดเริ่มต้นจริงๆของ Modern Consciousness คือล็อค โดยเฉพาะข้อเสนอของล็อคใน an essay concerning human understanding ที่มองว่าจิตของมนุษย์ทำงานผ่านกลไก Perception สิ่งต่างๆใน Outer nature ก่อนจะสั่งสมเป็นความทรงจำหรือ Memory เพียงแต่แทนที่จะมองลักษณะของจิตว่าเป็นแค่ Tabula Rasa เหมือนคนที่อ่านล็อคโดยทั่วไปมักถือกัน หนังสือกลับนำเสนอคุณลักษณะพิเศษบางอย่างในจิตของมนุษย์นอกเหนือจากที่กล่าวไป ซึ่งแกเรียกคุณสมบัตินี้ว่า reflection อันเป็นกลไกการทำงานของจิตที่สะท้อนกลับและยืนยันการทำงานของตัวมันภายในพื้นที่ของจิตจนก่อเกิดเป็นจุดเริ่มต้นของ สิ่งที่เรียกกันต่อมาว่าจิตสำนึกหรือConsciouness