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The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft and the Call of National Security
For more than thirty years, Brent Scowcroft has played a central role in American foreign policy. Scowcroft helped manage the American departure from Vietnam, helped plan the historic breakthrough to China, urged the first President Bush to repel the invasion of Kuwait, and worked to shape the West's skillful response to the collapse of the Soviet empire. And when US foreign policy has gone awry, Scowcroft has quietly stepped in to repair the damage. His was one of the few respected voices in Washington to publicly warn the second President Bush against rushing to war in Iraq.
The Strategist offers the first comprehensive examination of Brent Scowcroft's career. Author Bartholomew Sparrow details Scowcroft's fraught relationships with such powerful figures as Henry Kissinger (the controversial mentor Scowcroft ultimately outgrew), Alexander Haig (his one-time rival for Oval Office influence), and Condoleezza Rice (whose career Scowcroft helped launch -- and with whom he publicly broke over Iraq).
Through compelling narrative, in-depth research, and shrewd analysis, The Strategist brings color and focus to the complex and often secretive nature of US foreign policy -- an intellectual battlefield on which personalities, ideas, and worldviews clash, dramatically shaping the world in which we live.
The Strategist offers the first comprehensive examination of Brent Scowcroft's career. Author Bartholomew Sparrow details Scowcroft's fraught relationships with such powerful figures as Henry Kissinger (the controversial mentor Scowcroft ultimately outgrew), Alexander Haig (his one-time rival for Oval Office influence), and Condoleezza Rice (whose career Scowcroft helped launch -- and with whom he publicly broke over Iraq).
Through compelling narrative, in-depth research, and shrewd analysis, The Strategist brings color and focus to the complex and often secretive nature of US foreign policy -- an intellectual battlefield on which personalities, ideas, and worldviews clash, dramatically shaping the world in which we live.
752 pages, Hardcover
First published September 3, 2013
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340 people want to read
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June 15, 2015"The Strategist also includes original insights from Powell, George H.W. Bush, Kissinger, the late Lawrence Eagleberger, James Baker, George Shultz, Robert Gates, and seemingly everyone else who ever knew Scowcroft. Very few have a negative word to say about him, including hardcore neoconservatives like Abrams and Bill Kristol. The detail is remarkable, and the book serves doubly as a biography and a history of U.S. foreign relations during the Nixon, Ford, and both Bush presidencies.
Sparrow is clearly enamored with his subject, sometimes overstating both his wisdom and rectitude. Scowcroft approved of the bombings of Laos and Cambodia during the Vietnam War, for example, and generally believed in the Domino Theory that predicted Vietnam’s fall would be followed by a collapse in American credibility. The author notes those views, but he never pauses to note their wrongheadedness.
...Nonetheless, The Strategist should help cement the widespread view that Scowcroft is among the most skilled and successful officials to work in senior U.S. foreign-policymaking in the past half-century."
Jordan Michael Smith reviews: http://www.theamericanconservative.co...
Sparrow is clearly enamored with his subject, sometimes overstating both his wisdom and rectitude. Scowcroft approved of the bombings of Laos and Cambodia during the Vietnam War, for example, and generally believed in the Domino Theory that predicted Vietnam’s fall would be followed by a collapse in American credibility. The author notes those views, but he never pauses to note their wrongheadedness.
...Nonetheless, The Strategist should help cement the widespread view that Scowcroft is among the most skilled and successful officials to work in senior U.S. foreign-policymaking in the past half-century."
Jordan Michael Smith reviews: http://www.theamericanconservative.co...
January 11, 2016
Sympathetic bio of Scowcroft as the archetype of the successful national security adviser. Main focus on the George HW Bush administration, though there is much interesting Nixon/Ford material. He has an annoying tendency to make definitive judgments of issues w/o a strong evidentiary basis for doing so. However, this is still a pretty solid intro to Scowcroft and his conception of how to run national security policy.
June 29, 2024
Brent Scowcroft had a long lasting and outsized role as a top figure in the U.S. foreign policy establishment, serving as national security advisor to Gerald Ford as well as George H.W. Bush. This book, on the long side, gives us a view of his life and contributions to U.S. foreign policy. Scowcroft may be the most important foreign policy figure of the last half century or so that many have never heard of. That is how Scowcroft worked, as an advisor that actually did stay in the background.
Brent Scowcroft was a military man (Air Force) and started assuming some vital positions in the Nixon Administration, where he became military assistant to the President, and was eventually tapped by Henry Kissinger to be Deputy National Security Advisor. As anyone familiar with Kissinger knows working for him could be considered a form of purgatory. As the Deputy and as a superb staff man Scowcroft impressed both Kissinger and Nixon, and his career as a key member of the U.S. foreign policy establishment began. Scowcroft was in charge of advance for the Nixon trip to Beijing and became the first U.S. military man to be in China since 1949. From this initial appointment Scowcroft was on hand for some major U.S. foreign policy achievements, such as the opening to China as well as the Nixon detente with the Soviets. He was also on hand for some U.S. foreign policy lows, including the incursion into Cambodia and the ultimate U.S. withdrawal under terrible circumstances from Vietnam.
Scowcroft, initially considered a Kissinger man, grew solidly into a figure with distinct views that were all his own. After the exit of Nixon and the ascension of Gerald Ford to the Presidency Ford determined to not allow Kissinger to be both security advisor and Secretary of State, forcing Kissinger out as security advisor. Scowcroft assumed that role, carving out his own area of influence. To replace Kissinger and then have to work with him as Secretary of State could not have been easy but Scowcroft managed the transition smoothly. It is a strength that Sparrow highlights continuously in the book, as Scowcroft showed a great ability to manage people and process. His rather large handprint on the National Security apparatus serving the President is still felt today. In that sense, as an organization man, he was superior to Kissinger, whose processes were more ego-centric and designed to meet Kissinger’s needs. Scowcroft sought to put together an apparatus that would manage to get the best information to the President, including information that may not have towed the President’s line.
Scowcroft, even while out of government, became an influential voice on foreign policy. After the Ford loss to Carter he worked at Kissinger Associates (and later formed his own consulting firm) but was consulted on a number of different issues. He showed a trait that would later become more pronounced, which was a willingness to speak (softly) against policies he did not agree with, regardless of the party of the President. He was very critical of the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Iceland that had discussed the possible elimination of the nuclear arsenals of both countries.
Scowcroft filled some important roles in the Reagan Administration, as Reagan turned to him to serve on commissions charged with arms control issues as well as on the Tower Commission that wrote a report on Iran-Contra.
With the presidency of George H.W. Bush Scowcroft once again assumed the role of national security advisor to the President. In that role and working with the strong willed James Baker as Secretary of State Scowcroft was involved heavily in managing the collapse of the U.S.S.R, the reunification of Germany, the first Gulf War, which not only succeeded militarily but diplomatically, as the Bush Administration managed to win massive worldwide support, including from the Soviets, for the military effort to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. The policy that drove the first Gulf War, a limited military objective that eschewed regime change, would come back for debate in the administration of George W. Bush. The book critiques that decision, looking at the alternatives, along with the real human cost to the anti-Saddam elements in Iraq, who were eradicated by the left intact Saddam regime. In the end the Bush policy, despite not being perfect, was the correct call, in my opinion.
Scowcroft remained close for life with George H.W. Bush. (They wore a book together) That relationship did not stop Scowcroft from opposing the George W. Bush move to invade Iraq. His letter to the Wall Street Journal precipitated his temporary fall from grace with his former colleagues Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and his protege Condoleezza Rice. Many speculated that the Scowcroft letter was a way for George H.W. Bush to send a hard piece of advice to his son. I personally do not believe that but who really knows. Scowcroft ended up, of course, being shown to be correct on this issue.
In reading some of the reviews the book has been described as “laudatory” but I believe there is balance, as criticism is offered where the author thinks it warranted. Scowcroft was a major demo of the U.S. foreign policy establishment. In addition to being a real mentor to Condi Rice he was also the man who brought Bob Gates along. This book, on a figure involved in some of the most impactful foreign policy decisions in U.S. history, is a bit long but a very worthwhile read.
Brent Scowcroft was a military man (Air Force) and started assuming some vital positions in the Nixon Administration, where he became military assistant to the President, and was eventually tapped by Henry Kissinger to be Deputy National Security Advisor. As anyone familiar with Kissinger knows working for him could be considered a form of purgatory. As the Deputy and as a superb staff man Scowcroft impressed both Kissinger and Nixon, and his career as a key member of the U.S. foreign policy establishment began. Scowcroft was in charge of advance for the Nixon trip to Beijing and became the first U.S. military man to be in China since 1949. From this initial appointment Scowcroft was on hand for some major U.S. foreign policy achievements, such as the opening to China as well as the Nixon detente with the Soviets. He was also on hand for some U.S. foreign policy lows, including the incursion into Cambodia and the ultimate U.S. withdrawal under terrible circumstances from Vietnam.
Scowcroft, initially considered a Kissinger man, grew solidly into a figure with distinct views that were all his own. After the exit of Nixon and the ascension of Gerald Ford to the Presidency Ford determined to not allow Kissinger to be both security advisor and Secretary of State, forcing Kissinger out as security advisor. Scowcroft assumed that role, carving out his own area of influence. To replace Kissinger and then have to work with him as Secretary of State could not have been easy but Scowcroft managed the transition smoothly. It is a strength that Sparrow highlights continuously in the book, as Scowcroft showed a great ability to manage people and process. His rather large handprint on the National Security apparatus serving the President is still felt today. In that sense, as an organization man, he was superior to Kissinger, whose processes were more ego-centric and designed to meet Kissinger’s needs. Scowcroft sought to put together an apparatus that would manage to get the best information to the President, including information that may not have towed the President’s line.
Scowcroft, even while out of government, became an influential voice on foreign policy. After the Ford loss to Carter he worked at Kissinger Associates (and later formed his own consulting firm) but was consulted on a number of different issues. He showed a trait that would later become more pronounced, which was a willingness to speak (softly) against policies he did not agree with, regardless of the party of the President. He was very critical of the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Iceland that had discussed the possible elimination of the nuclear arsenals of both countries.
Scowcroft filled some important roles in the Reagan Administration, as Reagan turned to him to serve on commissions charged with arms control issues as well as on the Tower Commission that wrote a report on Iran-Contra.
With the presidency of George H.W. Bush Scowcroft once again assumed the role of national security advisor to the President. In that role and working with the strong willed James Baker as Secretary of State Scowcroft was involved heavily in managing the collapse of the U.S.S.R, the reunification of Germany, the first Gulf War, which not only succeeded militarily but diplomatically, as the Bush Administration managed to win massive worldwide support, including from the Soviets, for the military effort to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. The policy that drove the first Gulf War, a limited military objective that eschewed regime change, would come back for debate in the administration of George W. Bush. The book critiques that decision, looking at the alternatives, along with the real human cost to the anti-Saddam elements in Iraq, who were eradicated by the left intact Saddam regime. In the end the Bush policy, despite not being perfect, was the correct call, in my opinion.
Scowcroft remained close for life with George H.W. Bush. (They wore a book together) That relationship did not stop Scowcroft from opposing the George W. Bush move to invade Iraq. His letter to the Wall Street Journal precipitated his temporary fall from grace with his former colleagues Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and his protege Condoleezza Rice. Many speculated that the Scowcroft letter was a way for George H.W. Bush to send a hard piece of advice to his son. I personally do not believe that but who really knows. Scowcroft ended up, of course, being shown to be correct on this issue.
In reading some of the reviews the book has been described as “laudatory” but I believe there is balance, as criticism is offered where the author thinks it warranted. Scowcroft was a major demo of the U.S. foreign policy establishment. In addition to being a real mentor to Condi Rice he was also the man who brought Bob Gates along. This book, on a figure involved in some of the most impactful foreign policy decisions in U.S. history, is a bit long but a very worthwhile read.
February 2, 2025
For a book by a political "scientist", this is a rather well-written biography. It follows a clear chronology and it does not repeat itself ad nauseum.
It also has many key details about Scowcroft that reveal him to be far from the hero of 2003 some remember him as being. While in 2003, the then-retired Scowcroft whose pension was secured by then, opposed the Iraq War, he behaved like the fanatic Kwangtung Army and Reichenau during the Mayaguez Incident and in the lead up to Desert Shield. With Panama, he was basically indifferent, and he went along with Bush da Foist.
One of the great services of this book was that it shows that Kissinger was an abusive boss who delighted in making his subordinates cry. This was very brave of Sparrow to publish while Kissinger was still above room temperature.
That being said, Sparrow, being a political "scientist," overlooks a lot of things. He details the entire constellation of rear-echelon commands, like the Principals Committee, that Scowcroft either set up or was a part of, never once realising or understanding that all these ad hoc chin-wagging sessions fell far short of a General Staff.
This brings us to the horrifically ill-chosen title "Strategist." Through Sparrow's detailing of the Mayaguez Incident, Panama, Desert Shield and OIF, he does not once present anything that looks like the Schlieffen Plan or Plan XVII. There was no strategy for any of these operations, just ad hoc cobblings together at the last minute, which is why it is no surprise that Milley's disastrous 2021 rout from Afghanistan turned out the way it did.
Likewise, it is clear that Sparrow is a Washington insider writing to defend his fellow Washington insiders. He notes with great detail Kissinger and Scowcroft's decades of work to set up trade with China, never once condemning Kissinger or Scowcroft for destroying American industry and creating massive unemployment as a result. Likewise, in his section on OIF, he buries Wolfowitz's name among scores of others when Wolfowitz was the one who caused the Iraq War, having planned it since 1998 even before it was known that Bush Deuce would be running for POTUS.
It also has many key details about Scowcroft that reveal him to be far from the hero of 2003 some remember him as being. While in 2003, the then-retired Scowcroft whose pension was secured by then, opposed the Iraq War, he behaved like the fanatic Kwangtung Army and Reichenau during the Mayaguez Incident and in the lead up to Desert Shield. With Panama, he was basically indifferent, and he went along with Bush da Foist.
One of the great services of this book was that it shows that Kissinger was an abusive boss who delighted in making his subordinates cry. This was very brave of Sparrow to publish while Kissinger was still above room temperature.
That being said, Sparrow, being a political "scientist," overlooks a lot of things. He details the entire constellation of rear-echelon commands, like the Principals Committee, that Scowcroft either set up or was a part of, never once realising or understanding that all these ad hoc chin-wagging sessions fell far short of a General Staff.
This brings us to the horrifically ill-chosen title "Strategist." Through Sparrow's detailing of the Mayaguez Incident, Panama, Desert Shield and OIF, he does not once present anything that looks like the Schlieffen Plan or Plan XVII. There was no strategy for any of these operations, just ad hoc cobblings together at the last minute, which is why it is no surprise that Milley's disastrous 2021 rout from Afghanistan turned out the way it did.
Likewise, it is clear that Sparrow is a Washington insider writing to defend his fellow Washington insiders. He notes with great detail Kissinger and Scowcroft's decades of work to set up trade with China, never once condemning Kissinger or Scowcroft for destroying American industry and creating massive unemployment as a result. Likewise, in his section on OIF, he buries Wolfowitz's name among scores of others when Wolfowitz was the one who caused the Iraq War, having planned it since 1998 even before it was known that Bush Deuce would be running for POTUS.
February 10, 2018
The Strategist is an evaluation of American foreign policy as encountered by the life of Brent Scowcroft. This book is not bad--but as the #1 book I looked forward to reading in 2018, it was disappointing. As a biography, the insight into Scowcroft's motivations was lacking. His whole life was narrated, but author Sparrow could have done more to understand how Scowcroft's Mormon upbringing, time at West Point, airplane crash, etc. effected his future decision-making. Overall, the book is a good description of 20th century American foreign policy from a realist perspective, but Sparrow ties the different phases of Scowcroft's life together in only perfunctory ways. (The book reads almost as a series of case studies). Perhaps because Scowcroft preferred conversation to position papers and/or because Scowcroft hasn't written his own memoirs and he didn't talk to Bob Woodward, little of the book conveys Scowcroft's own feeling or emotions towards events. The book shows us Scowcroft and what he did, but doesn't take us inside his mind or why he did things. The book also needed another round of proof-reading and that was distracting at times.
Where the book was valuable was as an analysis of the position of National Security Adviser. Sparrow shows us Kissinger, Scowcroft, Reagan's 5 advisers, Scowcroft again, and then Condoleeza Rice and Stephen Hadley. Sparrow convincingly argues for Scowcroft's "thoughtful broker" as the only successful model and shows how Reagan's advisers George W. Bush's first adviser all failed when they departed from Scowcroft's model--Condi Rice the most spectacularly.
Where the book was valuable was as an analysis of the position of National Security Adviser. Sparrow shows us Kissinger, Scowcroft, Reagan's 5 advisers, Scowcroft again, and then Condoleeza Rice and Stephen Hadley. Sparrow convincingly argues for Scowcroft's "thoughtful broker" as the only successful model and shows how Reagan's advisers George W. Bush's first adviser all failed when they departed from Scowcroft's model--Condi Rice the most spectacularly.
March 11, 2025
While the life of Brent Scowcroft certainly merits the exhaustive approach of Bartholomew Sparrow’s “The Strategist,” his achievements do not deserve the near-fawning praise, repetitive exposition, and basic copy errors that appear throughout this biography.
With an endnotes section worthy of a biography written by Bob Caro, “The Strategist” contains valuable findings about the organization of the National Security Council from the Nixon Administration to the George W. Bush Administration, the George H.W. Bush Administration’s careful management of U.S. foreign policy during the final years of the Soviet Union as well as the Persian Gulf War, and the relationships among the Republican foreign policy officials who formed a generation of Scowcroft’s peers.
At the same time, “The Strategist” would have benefited from another round of edits—and a reality check. Sparrow’s frequent adoration of Scowcroft is just too effusive for any discerning reader to take seriously. How many different ways can a biographer describe their subject as wise, respected, and even-tempered? Less repetition and unambiguous admiration for Scowcroft would have made “The Strategist” easier to believe and easier to fit inside a carry-on.
With an endnotes section worthy of a biography written by Bob Caro, “The Strategist” contains valuable findings about the organization of the National Security Council from the Nixon Administration to the George W. Bush Administration, the George H.W. Bush Administration’s careful management of U.S. foreign policy during the final years of the Soviet Union as well as the Persian Gulf War, and the relationships among the Republican foreign policy officials who formed a generation of Scowcroft’s peers.
At the same time, “The Strategist” would have benefited from another round of edits—and a reality check. Sparrow’s frequent adoration of Scowcroft is just too effusive for any discerning reader to take seriously. How many different ways can a biographer describe their subject as wise, respected, and even-tempered? Less repetition and unambiguous admiration for Scowcroft would have made “The Strategist” easier to believe and easier to fit inside a carry-on.
May 17, 2020
Wonderful book about the best national security advisor in US history. Scowcroft's intense discipline and patriotism as well as his measured temperament and ability to manage personalities such as Nixon and Kissinger allowed him to impact US foreign policy for the better. This book does a great job outlining Scowcroft's many successes and providing an in-depth description of every step of his journey. Additionally, The Strategist gives readers a history lesson on US foreign policy from the 70s to the 90s through the eyes of Scowcroft.
The Strategist also helps the reader understand the traits that enables Scowcroft to succeed. He was courageous, humble, measured, and never sought the spotlight despite achieving at the highest level of government
The Strategist also helps the reader understand the traits that enables Scowcroft to succeed. He was courageous, humble, measured, and never sought the spotlight despite achieving at the highest level of government
May 10, 2017
A very thorough biography of Scowcroft that emphasizes his skill and intellect in forming national security policy. Sparrow largely avoids any critique of Scowcroft but stops short of full hagiography. Some of the included details of his military career are superfluous while the author glosses over bigger pieces of that career (promotion to 2 and 3 stars). Overall interesting but tame and a little too sympathetic.
September 21, 2025
An amazing look at what it takes to make strategy happen a the national level. This book could be used as the basis for a course in foreign policy. I really enjoyed it and have a great desire to learn more about Scowcroft and the NSC processes that he perfected and performed.
August 8, 2016
This is a biography of Brent Scowcroft, a quiet force in American foreign policy since the 1970's. This book is too long by about 100 pages: we really didn't need the long explanations of Scowcroft's management style nor his years as a consultant because these aren't very important historically. Still, it offers a lot of interesting insights into USFP, the personal worldview of Scowcroft as a kind of realist, and to the position of National Security Advisor.
Scowcroft can best be described as an enlightened realist. At the end of the day, he believes that the US should pursue its interests in foreign policy without too much concern for ideology. He comes across as more hawkish that I expected in this book, but he's also willing to make tough decisions to not use force if he feels vital US interests are not at stake (Syria, most humanitarian interventions, The Iraq War). He focuses on the areas of the world that matter most to US security and economic interests: EU, East Asia, Middle East. What makes Scowcroft remarkable as a strategist is that because he appreciates the limits of American power and resources, he systematically sought to build coalition to address crises and problems from groups of states that share America's interests. Realists tend to fixate on collective action problems and other pitfalls of multilateralism, but Scowcroft shows that there's really not much of a choice, even for the world's most powerful country, that to seek cooperation with like-minded countries. He therefore supports the institutions that, well, institutionalize and bolster these connections and establish protocols and laws for managing international politics.
Scowcroft is a good strategist because he always fits the case in front of him into the longer view of America's goals in the world. For example, I've always thought the more toned down US reaction to Tiananmen Square, while distasteful, was necessary to keep Us-China relations on a good track and keep China on the path to global openness and integration. Similarly, I appreciate how Scowcroft saw in advance that a unilateral rush to war with Iraq would most likely leave the US bogged down by itself in an expensive occupation, all for a reason that was not clearly in the national interest. For Scowcroft, human rights progress comes by moving the world in a more stable, prosperous, and hopefully more democratic direction, but not from costly intervention, haranguing, and posturing. Unfortunately, this approach is often labelled amoral, but it really isn't. It is results-oriented, and like the more direct approach to human rights, it should be judged primarily based on its results, not how it makes us feel.
There's also some fascinating stuff in this book about the foreign policy making apparatus, especially the NSC. By all accounts, even those of his rivals, Scowcroft was excellent at his job in two ways. First, he advised the president soundly and knowledgeably. Second, he managed the personalities and bureaucracies that provide advice to the president and execute policy. Sparrow shows just how poor Scowcroft's protege Condi Rice was at this job. She didn't so much advise the president (which implies challenging him when necessary, as Scowcroft did on several occasions) as protect him from scrutiny and see that his commands were carried out. She didn't manage or confront the bullying, arrogant personalities of Cheney and Rumsfeld even as they took US policy in directions different than what she wanted (It was shocking to read about Cheney setting up a rival NSC in the vice president's office to offset Rice's more cautious approach. Just another way that he circumvented and undermined sound policy making and debate in the Bush White House). She didn't convene "should we really do this" meetings on Iraq, focusing on implementing a decision made by Bush beforehand. Most importantly, she didn't resign even as she was marginalized and bullied by Cheney and Rumsfeld as they took US policy off a cliff. Scowcroft and Rice largely broke their friendship over the invasion and its aftermath. Undoubtedly history would have turned out differently if Scowcroft had been the NSA for Bush II as well.
This is a highly adulatory biography, but I think Scowcroft deserves it. He and Bush ably handled the end of the Cold War and, to an extent, the creation of a new system. They navigated the rapprochement with the USSR, German reunification, the reform of NATO, the Gulf War, the normalization of relations with China, and the USSR's collapse. Mistakes were made in each of these areas, but overall their track record in achieving the national interest and improving the world has probably not been bested since FDR. Scowcroft was also a humble, diligent, brilliant dude who was easy to work with and work for. This kind of kindness and selflessness appears rare in politics today. He's not as flashy as a Kissinger, Dulles, Clinton, or other high name foreign policy advisors, but in importance and skill Scowcroft matches anyone in the 20th century.
Because this book is so long, I can only recommend it for major foreign policy nerds.
Scowcroft can best be described as an enlightened realist. At the end of the day, he believes that the US should pursue its interests in foreign policy without too much concern for ideology. He comes across as more hawkish that I expected in this book, but he's also willing to make tough decisions to not use force if he feels vital US interests are not at stake (Syria, most humanitarian interventions, The Iraq War). He focuses on the areas of the world that matter most to US security and economic interests: EU, East Asia, Middle East. What makes Scowcroft remarkable as a strategist is that because he appreciates the limits of American power and resources, he systematically sought to build coalition to address crises and problems from groups of states that share America's interests. Realists tend to fixate on collective action problems and other pitfalls of multilateralism, but Scowcroft shows that there's really not much of a choice, even for the world's most powerful country, that to seek cooperation with like-minded countries. He therefore supports the institutions that, well, institutionalize and bolster these connections and establish protocols and laws for managing international politics.
Scowcroft is a good strategist because he always fits the case in front of him into the longer view of America's goals in the world. For example, I've always thought the more toned down US reaction to Tiananmen Square, while distasteful, was necessary to keep Us-China relations on a good track and keep China on the path to global openness and integration. Similarly, I appreciate how Scowcroft saw in advance that a unilateral rush to war with Iraq would most likely leave the US bogged down by itself in an expensive occupation, all for a reason that was not clearly in the national interest. For Scowcroft, human rights progress comes by moving the world in a more stable, prosperous, and hopefully more democratic direction, but not from costly intervention, haranguing, and posturing. Unfortunately, this approach is often labelled amoral, but it really isn't. It is results-oriented, and like the more direct approach to human rights, it should be judged primarily based on its results, not how it makes us feel.
There's also some fascinating stuff in this book about the foreign policy making apparatus, especially the NSC. By all accounts, even those of his rivals, Scowcroft was excellent at his job in two ways. First, he advised the president soundly and knowledgeably. Second, he managed the personalities and bureaucracies that provide advice to the president and execute policy. Sparrow shows just how poor Scowcroft's protege Condi Rice was at this job. She didn't so much advise the president (which implies challenging him when necessary, as Scowcroft did on several occasions) as protect him from scrutiny and see that his commands were carried out. She didn't manage or confront the bullying, arrogant personalities of Cheney and Rumsfeld even as they took US policy in directions different than what she wanted (It was shocking to read about Cheney setting up a rival NSC in the vice president's office to offset Rice's more cautious approach. Just another way that he circumvented and undermined sound policy making and debate in the Bush White House). She didn't convene "should we really do this" meetings on Iraq, focusing on implementing a decision made by Bush beforehand. Most importantly, she didn't resign even as she was marginalized and bullied by Cheney and Rumsfeld as they took US policy off a cliff. Scowcroft and Rice largely broke their friendship over the invasion and its aftermath. Undoubtedly history would have turned out differently if Scowcroft had been the NSA for Bush II as well.
This is a highly adulatory biography, but I think Scowcroft deserves it. He and Bush ably handled the end of the Cold War and, to an extent, the creation of a new system. They navigated the rapprochement with the USSR, German reunification, the reform of NATO, the Gulf War, the normalization of relations with China, and the USSR's collapse. Mistakes were made in each of these areas, but overall their track record in achieving the national interest and improving the world has probably not been bested since FDR. Scowcroft was also a humble, diligent, brilliant dude who was easy to work with and work for. This kind of kindness and selflessness appears rare in politics today. He's not as flashy as a Kissinger, Dulles, Clinton, or other high name foreign policy advisors, but in importance and skill Scowcroft matches anyone in the 20th century.
Because this book is so long, I can only recommend it for major foreign policy nerds.
September 7, 2020
Considered one more star based on the subject alone. Yet the author may have let the history surrounding the career of Scowcroft outpace the biography itself.
June 11, 2019
A balanced review of Scowcroft’s contributions to national security.
September 21, 2018
Brent Scowcroft has been a mainstay in the inner circle of our federal government for over 40 years. This book tells his story from his days at West Point to becoming a heavyweight in American foreign policy (Scowcroft's heaviest influence was in George H. W. Bush's term in from 1988-1992). It also tells of his dedication to service, which was immense though with a humble nature.
Of interest, a few disagreements between Scowcroft and Colin Powell are detailed, as are his theories and views on international relations and America's place therein. For those fans of IR theory, Scowcroft considers himself an "enlightened realist" who also subscribes to the premise of viable international institutions and alliances. I found myself nodding in agreement with many of his views.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
June 4, 2024
In this exhaustive biography of Brent Scowcroft Bartholomew Sparrow covers the long career of perphas the greatest National Security Advisor ever. From his family's Mormon heritage to his time at West Point to his time in the West Wing of the White House.
Scowcroft served under Presidents Nixon, Ford and Bush 41 as a member of the National Security Council and served as Advisor under Ford & Bush 41. The book examines many of the foreign policy crises and issues Scowcroft oversaw such as the end of the Vietnam War, U.S.-Chinese relations, the end of the Cold War and the First Gulf War. Sparrow spends a great deal of time showing how Scowcroft run the NSC as an "Honest Broker" and not a man with his own agenda.
Sparrow also covers Scowcroft's differences with the foreign policy pursued by Bush 43 and the famous anti-Iraq invasion Op-Ed.
Overall an excellent read and one I highly recommend for anyone interested in U.S. foreign policy of the late 20th century.
Scowcroft served under Presidents Nixon, Ford and Bush 41 as a member of the National Security Council and served as Advisor under Ford & Bush 41. The book examines many of the foreign policy crises and issues Scowcroft oversaw such as the end of the Vietnam War, U.S.-Chinese relations, the end of the Cold War and the First Gulf War. Sparrow spends a great deal of time showing how Scowcroft run the NSC as an "Honest Broker" and not a man with his own agenda.
Sparrow also covers Scowcroft's differences with the foreign policy pursued by Bush 43 and the famous anti-Iraq invasion Op-Ed.
Overall an excellent read and one I highly recommend for anyone interested in U.S. foreign policy of the late 20th century.
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April 9, 2015Bartholomew Sparrow, PhD'91
Author
From our pages, May–June/15: "Brent Scowcroft has helped shape US foreign policy for more than four decades as an Air Force lieutenant general, military assistant under President Richard Nixon, and national security adviser under presidents Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush. At age 89, he continues to advise leading policymakers on both sides of the aisle. But who is Brent Scowcroft? With the subject’s full cooperation, political scholar Bartholomew Sparrow unveils a detailed—and unprecedented—portrait of this little-known “wise man” of Washington and his influence on American foreign policy."
Author
From our pages, May–June/15: "Brent Scowcroft has helped shape US foreign policy for more than four decades as an Air Force lieutenant general, military assistant under President Richard Nixon, and national security adviser under presidents Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush. At age 89, he continues to advise leading policymakers on both sides of the aisle. But who is Brent Scowcroft? With the subject’s full cooperation, political scholar Bartholomew Sparrow unveils a detailed—and unprecedented—portrait of this little-known “wise man” of Washington and his influence on American foreign policy."
March 20, 2016
This was extremely informative. A bit mixed in terms of keeping my interest. I felt it started a bit slow, got really interesting, then I really had to invest in powering through, then it got very interesting again. Many interesting insights into how the NSC became what it is and how it operated in various administrations. I really enjoyed learning about Scowcroft. Plenty to think about here!
May 28, 2015
A deeply researched and richly detailed life of one of America's unsung hero's. Scowcroft has done more to impact US foreign policy in the last 50 years than just about any American - I dare say that would include Henry Kissinger, his former boss and business partner. I'm very much looking forward to reading Scowcroft's memoirs when they come out next year.
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November 4, 2015Great!
Readable and informative. An excellent account of the life and career of one of our nation's greatest leaders. A must-read.
Readable and informative. An excellent account of the life and career of one of our nation's greatest leaders. A must-read.
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