Proof of an External World

by G.E. Moore

One of the most important parts of Moore's philosophical development was his break from the idealism that dominated British philosophy (as represented in the works of his former teachers F. H. Bradley and John McTaggart), and his defence of what he regarded as a "common sense" form of realism. In his 1925 essay "A Defence of Common Sense", he argued against idealism and scepticism toward the external world on the grounds that they could not give reasons to accept their metaphysical premises that were more plausible than the reasons we have to accept the common sense claims about our knowledge of the world that sceptics and idealists must deny. He famously put the point into dramatic relief with his 1939 essay "Proof of an External World", in which he gave a common sense argument against scepticism by raising his right hand and saying "Here is one hand," and then raising his left and saying "And here is another," then concluding that there are at least two external objects in the world, and therefore that he knows (by this argument) that an external world exists. Not surprisingly, not everyone inclined to sceptical doubts found Moore's method of argument entirely convincing; Moore, however, defends his argument on the grounds that sceptical arguments seem invariably to require an appeal to "philosophical intuitions" that we have considerably less reason to accept than we have for the common sense claims that they supposedly refute. (In addition to fueling Moore's own work, the "Here is one hand" argument also deeply influenced Wittgenstein, who spent his last years working out a new approach to Moore's argument in the remarks that were published posthumously as On Certainty.)

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction

23 pages, Unknown Binding

First published January 1, 1939

About the author

George Edward "G. E." Moore OM, FBA was philosopher, one of the founders of the analytic tradition along with Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and (before them) Gottlob Frege. With Russell, he led the turn away from idealism in British philosophy, and became well known for his advocacy of common sense concepts, his contributions to ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics, and "his exceptional personality and moral character." He was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge, highly influential among (though not a member of) the Bloomsbury Group, and the editor of the influential journal Mind. He was elected a fellow of the British Academy in 1918. He was a member of the Cambridge Apostles, the intellectual secret society, from 1894, and the Cambridge University Moral Sciences Club.

Reviews

[L · Rating 1 out of 5]

A sadboi tries to prove the external world but then realises he fails.

[Robert Day · Rating 2 out of 5]

Awful woolly language. So obtuse and verbose and ramblish. Hurts my sensibilities to read such wastefulnesss.
And all it boils down to is that the author considered that he had proved the existence of external objects by holding up his hands and saying 'there you are - get a load of these matey!'
Time and space and sensory perception - thumbs poised for the longest time waiting for me to acknowledge that they will be tapping up and down on this device.
Say yee-haw if you think my thumbs dint exist.
If they dint, could you be reading this?
Or is this a shared figment?
Hmm.

[Myat Thura Aung · Rating 4 out of 5]

Here's a summary of 'Proof of an External World'.


Skepticism : *doubts that the external world exists*



G.E. Moore : Haha. Here's one hand. Here's another. You lose !

[Thom · Rating 1 out of 5]

80% of this essay is a bloviating exercise in defining terms past the point of reasonableness. There are seemingly endless digressionary explanatory passages that are dipped in this totally unearned smarm all the way through.

The fact that this is outright infuriating to read would be bad enough, but I find Moore’s “proof” of the external world to be sort of childish in the way that it consciously ignores the skeptic arguments about the world’s reality. I appreciate that he’s offering what he views as a common sense argument which is meant not to necessarily be accepted by the skeptic, but to be a rival argument. I think most skeptics and Kantians would challenge the premises that purport knowledge of the existence of an object in space (“I raise this hand”).

Moore pats himself on the back for purportedly finding a contradiction within Kant’s definitions of empirical external objects as (a) “to be met with in space” and (b) “external to our mind” in various ways. Most notably by misunderstanding what Kant means by “representation.” He treats representations as things in themselves, which he should at least attempt to explain that Kant would disagree with. He also says that other external minds aren’t met with in space; this ignores that Kant explicitly noted elsewhere in the Critique of Pure Reason that other consciousnesses can never be objects to us!

Moore wants to play dumb and puts on this “humble country lawyer” persona so that he doesn’t have to deal with, in particular, the complex Kantian conception of this problem. In this work. epitomizes the worst parts of analytic philosophy, often verging on an outright lack of intellectual integrity.

[Victoria · Rating 5 out of 5]

Amusing common sense justification which makes minimal sense - it arouses an epistemological curiosity which might expose regular functional individuals to the danger of falling down the analytic rabbit hole!

[Ethan]

Not necessarily disagreeable, but a point which is overly-laboured with very little fruit. It isn't proof of an "external world", as in, against Descartes, which he readily admits he can't do. The Wikipedia summary is honestly a better use of time.

[Liam Gibson · Rating 1 out of 5]

Was he writing for a word count?

[Alexandria · Rating 1 out of 5]

Says nothing new. A thorough waste of time.

[Griffin Wilson · Rating 2 out of 5]

If you have spent time with the likes of Descartes, Berkeley, Kant, Schopenhauer, or a host of others you may be continually bothered by their various versions of idealism, which, ultimately and in some way or another, seem irrefutable. I was interested to read Moore's "proof," but was very disappointed. Of course it's not impossible that an external world exists, but from that it does not follow that one actually does. As Wittgenstein would say: "the chain of reasons has to end." Unfortunately universal and apodictic certainty is impossible for many seemingly obvious things.

[Karl Lawson · Rating 1 out of 5]

Taken literally, the argument presupposes its conclusion and adds nothing in terms of content.

Taken as performative, arguing against the skeptic's framework through this performance, it manages nothing. It takes a rhetorical approach effective only on those who were already laughing at the notion of Descartes' demon. The work is an exercise in self-indulgence for Moore, and serves as little else.

His interpretation of Kant is also questionable.

[chaï · Rating 2 out of 5]

Terrible theory, fun read.

[leren_lezen · Rating 2 out of 5]

Didn't really understand this, and didn't really see any 'argument' being made, so it was a very big boy move to want to be better than Descartes and Kant and then come with this?

[Ali Reda · Rating 2 out of 5]

How am I to prove now that "Here's one hand, and here's another"? I do not believe I can do it. In order to do it, I should need to prove for one thing, as Descartes pointed out, that I am not now dreaming. But how can I prove that I am not? I have, no doubt, conclusive reasons for asserting that I am not now dreaming; I have conclusive evidence that I am awake: but that is a very different thing from being able to prove it. I could not tell you what all my evidence is; and I should require to do this at least, in order to give you a proof.

This view that if I can't prove such things as these, I do not know them, is, I think, the view that Kant was expressing in the sentence which I quoted at the beginning of this lecture, when he implies that so long as we have no proof of the existence of external things, their existence must be accepted merely on faith.

[Seamusin · Rating 1 out of 5]

A long tedious (though clear and elegant) fuss over wording, followed finally by the famous 'here is one hand' proof near the end, which is basically: my hands exist, therefore so does an external world. I find it hard to believe he could miss the point so widely, confusing perception and knowledge so obviously. After giving his 'proof' he does hint toward potential objectors who could be after something deeper, and even admits he could not satisfy them... All in all a poor show for 'common sense' philosophy.