Talking to Terrorists: How to End Armed Conflicts

by Jonathan Powell

An inside look at the subterranean exchanges that occur between governments and terrorist organisations.
     Should governments talk to terrorists? Should they ‘negotiate with evil’?
Without communication, argues Powell, we will never end conflict. As violent insurgencies continue to erupt across the globe, we need people who will brave the depths of the Mindanao jungle and scale the heights of the Colombian mountains, painstakingly tracking down the heavily armed, faceless leaders of these terrorist groups in order to open negotiations with them.
     Powell draws on his own experiences negotiating peace in Northern Ireland and talks to all the major players from the last thirty years – terrorists, secret agents and intermediaries – exposing the subterranean world of secret exchanges between governments and terrorist organizations to give us the inside account of negotiations on the front line. These past negotiations shed light on how today’s negotiators can tackle the Taliban, Hammas and al-Qaeda. And history tells us that it may be necessary to fight and talk at the same time.
     Ultimately, Powell brings us a message of there is no armed conflict anywhere in the world that cannot be resolved.


   • A wide-ranging, topical book that travels across the globe, spotlighting terrorist negotiations in far-flung countries to illuminate the scale and diversity of insurgencies.


   • Rich in first-hand accounts and dramatic stories of terrorist encounters in the words of the participants.


   • Powell’s first two books were insider accounts of the Blair years; this is bigger and much wider-ranging.


From the Trade Paperback edition.

Genres: Nonfiction, Politics, History, Terrorism, War, Military Fiction, Political Science

256 pages, Hardcover

First published September 26, 2013

Reviews

[Peter Dunn · Rating 3 out of 5]

It’s hard to fault Powell’s worthy goal which is to end long running conflicts and save lives. It’s equally hard not to be fascinated by the range of stories he tells about how various engagements with terrorists panned out. However the book is not without its flaws.

Firstly it draws heavily on his experiences in Northern Ireland where he was part of a UK government team negotiating with the IRA as a participant in talks, but also acting as simultaneously as the mediating team between the IRA and the Unionist parties and groups (non violent nationalism, and other non-sectarian parties sadly apparently being seen almost as an irrelevance). This allows us as readers access to an interesting viewpoint but we do get a slightly sugar coated view of just who was brought to the negotiating table. Yes we get some cursory references to how individuals in the talks had themselves been IRA targets, and the Omagh bombing (which was by a dissident nationalist terror group) is referenced, but the non Northern Irish reader deserves to understand much more about the horror these individuals had been responsible for in order to fully appreciate just how difficult it was for Unionists such as Trimble to even take part in these talks. I am not saying that I disagree with the author’s support for the need for these folks to be around a table at that time to resolve the conflict, but the reader deserved to understand just how challenging that was for the non-terrorist participants. To be absolutely fair the writer may address that problem better in his book that focussed on those specific negotiations ‘Great Hatred, Little Room: Making Peace in Northern Ireland’ which I must also get around to reading.

Secondly, for a book that wants to explore the ethics of talking to terrorists, the book worryingly simply ignores the apparent dismissal of the non violent political representatives of the community also “represented” by the terrorists in the Northern Ireland peace process. Sadly the author may even been right in this view of the seemingly irrelevance of those constitutional politicians compared to the efficacy of talking directly to terrorists instead, but surely the ethical implications of this needed a little more unpacking and exploring? For instance does such a conclusion therefore mean it is always more effective to turn to terror? Surely there has to be more hope than that?

Again to be fair Powell does briefly refer to SDLP MP Seamus Mallon’s assertion that the talks that eventually led to the Good Friday Agreement would probably only achieve a form of power sharing what had been previously been attempted in the 70s without the terrorists. What Mallon called "Sunningdale for slow learners”. Who knows - perhaps if more effort had have been made in making that earlier initiative work then talks with terrorists of either side in this particular conflict might have been unnecessary.

Lastly the book is I think too optimistic in viewing all forms of modern terrorism as being open to resolution through negotiation. I think the author is right to be optimistic on that point in regards to many forms of terrorism, but not all. Perhaps that may explain why he only gives a brief reference to the new lone wolf types of terrorist who takes their cue from extreme right wing or extreme Islamist interaction on the internet rather than being a member of a hierarchical or cell structure organisation with a leadership you can actually talk to.

Actually finished it on first May but Goodreads is playing up and won't let me set that as the date!

[May Jeong · Rating 4 out of 5]

really good beginner book of various peace processes in the past two decades. (hi alex!)

[Justin · Rating 3 out of 5]

Jonathan Powell compellingly presents the unpalatable (and indeed often unspeakable) case that all conflicts with terrorists end in negotiation. That occurs even when in every case the government concerned declared that this group could and would never be negotiated with. He covers a slightly bewildering array of conflicts and terrorist groups (IRA, PLO, ANC, ETA, GAM, RENAMO, Tamil Tigers, FARC, MILF and several others) from the last few decades, describing in quite some depth the negotiations they were involved in and the outcomes, and why some were successful and others weren't.

He draws a substantial number of anecdotes from his own involvement in the Northern Ireland peace process. Thus it should be a fascinating book, but I have to confess that it felt somewhat laborious, heavy going, and very technical. It felt more like an introductory book for those studying peace processes or perhaps professional negotiators, rather than for general readers like myself.

Most of the chapters follow a different stage of the peace process, such as making contact, building channels, starting the negotiation, the art of negotiation (particularly interesting), and implementation of the peace plan. Powell also takes a longer historical view with a look at Ireland in the 1920s, Mandate Palestine in the 1930s and 1940s, and Algeria in the 1960s.

Most importantly, in a concluding chapter he explains why everything he has discussed would apply to groups like Hamas, the Taliban and the various branches of Al-Qaeda (the book was published before ISIS/Islamic State appeared in the news in the summer of 2014), even though the evidence of peace processes with these groups is so far lacking. He strongly disputes the idea that "absolute" terrorism is different from supposed "rational" terrorism and notes that all groups have political grievances that can only be ended through negotiation; in every conflict he examines, the government always declares that the group is too extreme or otherwise impossible to negotiate with, and that only a military victory will end the conflict, and yet in all the cases he examines, all end in some kind of peace process. He is persuasive in pointing out the similarities with past conflicts, and convincingly argues that to think otherwise is to ignore the historical record!

[Jonny · Rating 4 out of 5]

If you read this expecting something reflecting Powell’s wider expertise from being Blair’s chief of staff for a decade, you’ll be disappointed. This is a technical book which is more academic than aimed at a mass market. It strikes a very good balance between secondary research on the circumstances and decisions that can lead to successful conflict resolution, and drawing particularly heavily on the author’s own experiences in Northern Ireland. The thematic nature of the book and range of conflicts covered can make it hard to follow at times, but this largely reflects the scale of ambition within the book and the complexity of the situations that it analyses.

[Kaan]

not a "starter" book

[Gordon Kwok · Rating 4 out of 5]

Overall, I really enjoyed this book. This is a great book if you are interested in diplomacy. The main thrust of this book is throughout history, those in government have always proclaimed they will never talk with "terrorists" but eventually the blood costs outweigh the desire to continue fighting on and the governments realized (albeit late) that they must talk to the "terrorists" to reach a peaceful resolution. Mr. Powell has a little bit of "street cred" when proposing this theory as he was one of the negotiators in the Good Friday Agreement, a major accomplishment any way you spin it.

Some of the principles seem very obvious but it is worth stating because people often lead with their heart and not their heads in conflicts:

1. Talking is (almost) always better than not talking.
2. Before a conflict has ended, we tend to look at peace as impossible. However, after they are resolved, we have a tendency for revisionism and believe that peace was always inevitable.
3. Process matters a lot and sometimes more than substance. One of the things that parties argue most in setting up a meeting is a) shape of the table b) where people are seated and c) where the meeting is held.

One of my favorite anecdotes from this book was the story about the North Vietnamese/Communist and the US delegates meeting during the Vietnam War. The sides began what became known as the "Table Wars" because they spent 10 weeks arguing over the shape of the table, where they would be placed and how many tables there would be. On one side was the North Vietnamese (combined with the National Liberation Front or NLF) and the other side was the Southern Vietnamese & US delegation. A non-starter for the Communists was the a triangle table because it would imply that the Communists were outnumbered 2-to-1. The Communists wanted a square table to give their side legitimacy or in the alternative 4 tables in a circular or diamond pattern. The Americans countered by proposing a rectangular table or a table where the 2 sides are facing each other. The Communists countered by proposing a circular table meaning no one held any position of superiority over anyone else. The South Vietnamese (who was waging the war against the Communists) protested and said it would imply that the Communists and them were equals. Eventually, they settled for a round table with no flags or name tags with a 2 rectangular tables no more than 4.5 cms away for the secretaries.

4. Implementation creates trust. Basically, this means just because an agreement has been signed does not guarantee peace. Peace will follow if both sides work in good faith to keep their end of the bargain.

5. Creating too many preconditions can paradoxically hinder the peace process. For example, if a civil war occurs and the side that wants to secede is demanding as a precondition for talking, that the government must recognize their sovereignty well the government is going to say no. Instead, sovereignty recognition should be one of those goals.

6. Work for inclusion of parties but also create many small working groups to discuss issues. Leaders do not like to make concessions in front of a large crowd.

7. Paradoxically, it may be easier for parties on the extreme end to make agreements than those in the center because no one can outflank them in position rigidness. It is also easier to make peace if there is a degree of political consensus in the country (for example in the UK, there was bipartisanship support for peace).

8. Third-parties can be helpful and can help set the agenda and force both sides to deal with each other in good faith. Empathy matters and a third party can help point the way to a path forward.

9. There is a positive correlation of unemployed young males and incidence of terrorism - it doesn't mean one causes the other but they are positively correlated.

10. Prepare for the negotiation. It is surprising how often governments and armed group enter negotiations without preparation. Political and military leaders regard political and military engagements as a professional activity but see negotiations as an intuitive or amateur activity. However, negotiations will be the most important determinant in the outcome of any struggle. It may sound paradoxical but if you were the government, you actually want the armed group to have access to expert advisors because if they do not grasp what they are compromising on, they will renege later on.

11. Process matters - parties trying to jump straight to the conclusion or doing it ad hoc style almost always fail. The good news is there is light at the end of the tunnel, the bad news is there is no tunnel and the negotiators have to build that tunnel. Peace is therefore a trust building process rather than an event.

12. Peace talks are about dialogues to reach a common understanding not a debate to score points off each other.

13. At the heart of every successful agreement is compromise. Build bridges for your partners to retreat over and create an environment where you are engaged in a joint project towards resolving a problem rather than an antagonistic clash. First law of negotiation is the hardest negotiation is with your own side. The second law is the importance of symbols such as identity of symbols. Third law is the solution is rarely "new" because they have been hashed out before - power-sharing, federalism, protection of minority rights, resource sharing and so on.

14. Empathy matters - think about the negotiations from the other side and how they will have to sell the agreement.

Overall, I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in the subject of negotiations or diplomacy.

[Heather · Rating 4 out of 5]

Powell shares his extensive experience with diplomatic and political negotiations. The first few chapters ping pong around historic conflicts but the later discussion on how talks work is interesting and illustrative. He lays out the moral and academic debate around if, when, and how to resolve seemingly impossible problems.

[Ana Paulina Maestre Camacho · Rating 4 out of 5]

Anyone who wants to understand WHY one should negotiate with armed groups should read this book. It is long and dense but worth it.

[Arensb · Rating 5 out of 5]

When I picked this book up at the library, I was deliberately looking for something far from what I usually read, so I came at this as a neophyte, not a poli-sci expert. A large part of what I liked about this book is simply the realization that this is an area of human knowledge that has been explored.

Powell's basic premise is: terrorists exist, and kill innocent people to draw attention to their cause. And for this reason, no democratic government wants to talk to them: "We do not negotiate with terrorists." But in the end, every government learns that it can't bomb its way to peace, and that it has to do the unthinkable and sit down with terrorists and talk to them. Given this, what is the best way to do this? What pitfalls should be avoided?

The bulk of the book is dedicated to answering these questions. Ultimately, Powell does not offer a formula, an algorithm, or much of an outline of a peace process. He does, however, warn the reader about a host of problems that may arise. Unfortunately, in many cases he lists potential problems no matter what one does. For instance, should negotiations start with the simple problems, like seating arrangements at the next meeting, or immediately tackle the difficult problems, such as whether Israel or Palestine should control Jerusalem. If you start with the easy questions, then you can report progress right away, but run the risk of getting bogged down in small problems and never getting around to resolving the fundamental disagreements. If you tackle the fundamental problems first, you get credit for that, but you may never get anywhere, in part because you haven't built any rapport by solving smaller issues. In the end, most of Powell's advice is like this, leaving the negotiator with a lot of advice, but ultimately having to figure out how it applies to the present situation.

By the same token, the book feels like a series of anecdotes rather than a scholarly overview. Yes, Powell's experience with Northern Ireland, and his citing of people involved in Basque, Palestinian, and Sri Lankan negotiations helps bring life to the narrative, but they also smack of things like sample bias.

After the practical advice, Powell looks back to see what lessons have been learned -- or not learned, as is so often the case -- from past attempts at dealing with anarchists, nihilists, and terrorists, then closes with a view to the future: was 9/11 different in kind from previous bombings, or just in scale? Can al Qaeda be negotiated with? Do they kill as a means to a (political) end, or is killing their only goal?

[Ehla · Rating 3 out of 5]

Good and compelling arguments, interesting anectdotes. However, it lacks structure and storyline. More often than not it feels as if the author strung together one anecdote or incident after another to illustrate his points. So unfortunately, one does not learn much about the background of the conflicts covered. Similarly, most reoccuring characters such as lead negotiators are never properly introduced. This makes it sometimes a bit frustrating read, as one encounters again and again the same persons and conflicts, but does not know about much about the historical setting. To sum up, while there are many gems to be found in the book, it is lacking a story line.

[!Tæmbuŝu]

KOBOBOOKS

Reviewed by The Independent (2 Oct 2014), The Guardian (13 Oct 2014)

[Louise Duckworth · Rating 3 out of 5]

There were elements of it that were interesting but overall, I felt it could have been written better. I still don't get how he thinks he can negotiate with such a religious group as Isis that believes that Islam is corrupt? there is nothing that you could negotiate on. I did find analytically, he was just going around in circles and repeating himself. And the rest of was more of a historical compoment to the book.

[Teun de Ridder · Rating 4 out of 5]

Erg sterk en spannend boek over onderhandelen met terroristen. En over waarom je áltijd moet praten, zelfs met Taliban, Al Qaeda en IS. En over hoe je dat dan doet. Enige nadeel is soms de hoeveelheid namen en details.

[Nancy · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book was recommended to me and I had great expectations for it. I must say that it did disappoint me.

[Joseph · Rating 5 out of 5]

Author argues from examples which is my preferred way of arguing. A fantastic book for anyone interested in negotiations.

[M.Zalmai Rahmani]

Nothing

[Tom J · Rating 3 out of 5]

this took me way longer to read than the ~360 pages of content would imply. there’s a great book here, and the points it makes are well explained and backed up, but the structure of the book is unbelievably unhelpful for the reader. without giving any warning, powell will compare mozambique, ireland, and indonesia, not bothering to give any background or even to say that the focus has shifted, quite literally, to the other side of the planet. dropping in names that haven’t been properly introduced regularly made me go back to see if i’d missed anything.

i would recommend reading this if only for the genuinely insightful and interesting worldview, but it’s far more of a struggle than it needs to be.

[Neil · Rating 3 out of 5]

Powell is clearly an expert in his field and this book is well researched but it wasn't what I was expecting. Each chapter delves into a different topic on negotiation but there is no real structure to Powell's anecdotes. He jumps back and forth between different conflicts and different parties without any real introduction to them.

This is not a 'pick up and casually read' kind of book and is a lot more academic than I thought. Certainly interesting and worth a read for anyone with more than a casual interest in this area.

[Denise · Rating 3 out of 5]

Fascinating subject, and the author has much to relate that is of interest. However, the book sorely lacks a clear structure. Jumping wildly from one anecdote to another with little in the way of background for each of the various conflicts and negotiations discussed, it's hard for the layperson to keep track of who is holding which talks where with whom and why without having to constantly look up pertinent details elsewhere.

[Yasir Noori · Rating 3 out of 5]

The book contains many examples of talks and negotiations with terrorists. However, I had issues following the different stories that were told. The author jumped between different stories abruptly to try to make a point making the book a bit hard to follow. I found the book to tell too much details on stories and events with less emphasis on the main points/teachings/skills of "talking to terrorists" .

[Damian · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is a good book, certainly worth reading. The writer is blind to certain things, not least his use of the word terrorist itself, but overall he deals with the subject in a very practical and level-headed way.

[James Tidd · Rating 4 out of 5]

Jonathan Powell tells of his experience as a mediator between various governments and various terrorist organisations. Looking at various negotiations in the UK, Spain, South Africa, and Sri Lanka, amongst others. He looks at why and how we should talk to terrorist organisations.

[Katie · Rating 4 out of 5]

Really interesting.

[Judith · Rating 4 out of 5]

A really interesting read and the author makes a very compelling case about talking to terrorists.